No Strings Attached? Zero-Price Practices on Social Media Markets under EU Abuse of Dominance Assessment

• Authors: Marta Sznajder

Abstracts

FR

Les clients paient-ils trop peu lorsqu’ils ne paient rien pour accéder «gratuitement» à une plateforme de médias sociaux, et/ou paient-ils trop? Ces services attirent les clients même s’ils ont un coût d’informations personnelles ou d’attention. Comme le droit de la concurrence se concentre traditionnellement sur les prix positifs, les services «gratuits» soulèvent la question si et comment ils peuvent être évalués comme potentiellement nuisibles à la concurrence et aux consommateurs. Ainsi, l’objectif de cet article est d’examiner dans quelle mesure le droit européen de la concurrence peut être appliqué pour évaluer les pratiques unilatérales de tarification abusive des plateformes de médias sociaux fournissant des services «gratuits» aux clients. Il explore les caractéristiques économiques et la dynamique concurrentielle des plateformes de médias sociaux, oppose le cadre traditionnel d’évaluation des abus de position dominante, des prix prédateurs et des prix excessifs aux défis posés par leurs services «gratuits», et propose des recommandations.

EN

Do customers pay too little when they pay nothing for accessing a social media platform ‘for free’, and/or do they pay too much? These ‘free’ online services attract customers even if they come at personal information or attention costs. As competition law traditionally focuses on positive prices, ‘free’ services raise the question whether and how they could be assessed as potentially harmful to competition and consumers. Thus, the aim of this paper is to discuss the extent to which EU competition law can be applied to evaluate unilateral abusive pricing practices of social media platforms providing ‘free’ services to customers. It explores the economic characteristics and competitive dynamics of social media platforms, contrasts the traditional framework for assessment of abuse of dominance, predatory pricing, and excessive pricing with the challenges posed by their ‘free’ services, as well as offers recommendations.

Keywords

EN

abuse of dominance; excessive pricing; predatory pricing; zero-price markets; social media; online platforms

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 24
• Pages: 33-63

Dates

published

2021

Contributors

author

Marta Sznajder

• Faculty of Management, University of Warsaw

• https://orcid.org/0000000250042589

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2021.14.24.2

Biblioteka Nauki

2158417