Has the Turning Point Been Missed? Exclusivity Payments Granted by Dominant Undertakings in the Light of the Enforcement Priorities Guidance

• Authors: Tomasz Krzyżewski

Abstracts

FR

Pendant de nombreuses années, les paiements d’exclusivité et le type spécifique de rabais de fidélité ont été traités par la Commission européenne (la Commission) comme des restrictions par objet. Cette approche a été progressivement révisée en faveur d’un raisonnement fondé sur les effets. Dans les Orientations sur les priorités retenues par la Commission pour l’application de l’article 82 du Traité CE aux pratiques d’éviction abusives des entreprises dominantes (Orientations), la Commission a démontré sa volonté de suivre l’approche “économique”. En particulier, la Commission a annoncé que pour les pratiques d’exclusion fondées sur les prix, le test du “concurrent le plus efficace” sera utilisé. Cet article vise à vérifier si la Commission a suivi les lignes directrices dans son évaluation des pratiques d’exclusion dans deux affaires, Qualcomm et Google (Android), considérées par l’auteur comme des occasions de passer d’une approche fondée sur la forme à une approche économique. Dans ses considérations, l’Auteur fournit des propositions sur la manière dont la pratique de la Commission devrait être modifiée afin de garantir que les entreprises dominantes bénéficient d’un niveau suffisant de sécurité juridique.

EN

For many years, exclusivity payments and its specific type – loyalty rebates – were treated by the European Commission (Commission) as restrictions by object. This approach has been gradually revised towards a more effect-based reasoning. In the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (Guidance), the Commission demonstrated its willingness to follow the so-called ‘economic approach’. In particular, the Commission announced that for price-based exclusionary conduct the so-called ‘as-efficient competitor’ test (AEC test) is going to be used. This article aims to verify whether the Commission followed the Guidance in its assessment of exclusionary practices in two cases, Qualcomm and Google (Android), considered by the Author as an opportunity to make a move from a form-based to an economic-based approach. In his considerations, the Author provides proposals on how the practice of the Commission should be changed to ensure dominant undertakings are provided with a sufficient level of legal certainty.

Keywords

EN

competition law; dominant position; abuse of dominant position; exclusivity; as-efficient competitor test

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 24
• Pages: 63-95

Dates

published

2021

Contributors

author

Tomasz Krzyżewski

• https://orcid.org/0000000157854232

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2021.14.24.3

Biblioteka Nauki

2158419