Does the ‘more appropriate’ authority need to be independent? Rule of law implications for case referrals with respect of concentrations

• Authors: Miłosz Malaga

Abstracts

FR

Dans le récent arrêt Sped-Pro, le Tribunal a jugé qu’afin de garantir une protection juridictionnelle efficace du plaignant, la Commission est tenue d’examiner l’indépendance de l’autorité nationale de la concurrence concernée, ainsi que les préoccupations générales en matière d’État de droit, lorsqu’elle rejette des plaintes au titre de l’article 102 du TFUE et conclut qu’une telle autorité est «mieux placée» pour connaître de l’affaire. Cette contribution vise à discuter si une telle obligation s’applique aux renvois d’affaires de la Commission aux États membres en matière de concentrations. D’une part, il s’agit des mêmes autorités nationales de concurrence et les mêmes standards devraient s’appliquer. D’autre part, le système de renvoi des affaires diffère des caractéristiques du cadre des articles 101 et 102 du TFUE. Ainsi, cet article discute de l’arrêt du Tribunal dans l’affaire Sped-Pro, du cadre juridique et de la pratique concernant les renvois en matière de concentrations et, enfin, des conséquences de l’arrêt pour l’approche future de la Commission dans la matière discutée.

EN

In the recent Sped-Pro judgment, the General Court ruled that in order to guarantee effective judicial protection of the complainant, the Commission is obliged to examine the given national competition authority’s independence, and overall rule of law concerns, when it rejects complaints regarding Article 102 TFEU and concludes that such an authority is ‘best placed’ to hear the case. This contribution aims to discuss whether such obligation applies to case referrals from the Commission to Member States with respect of concentrations. On one hand, these are the same national competition authorities and the same standards should apply. On the other – the case referral system differs from the characteristics of the Articles 101–102 TFEU framework. Thus, this paper contains a discussion on the General Court’s judgment in Sped-Pro, the legal framework and practice regarding merger referrals, and, finally, the consequences of the judgment for the future approach of the Commission in the discussed matter.

Keywords

EN

referrals of concentrations; national competition authority; regulator’s; independence; rule of law; EU merger regulation; control of concentrations; European Competition Network; effective judicial protection; internal market

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 25

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Miłosz Malaga

• Faculty of Law and Administration, Adam Mickiewicz University

• https://orcid.org/0000000199699066

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2022.15.25.5

Biblioteka Nauki

2158408