Współczesne mechanizmy aukcyjne na potrzeby rynku mediowego

• Authors: Joanna Rachubik , Dorota Mirowska-Wierzbicka , Wojciech Zawadzki , Maciej Wilamowski , Krzysztof Fiok , Wojciech Maciejewski , Mateusz Szczurek

Title variants

EN

Modern Auction Mechanisms for the Media Market

Abstracts

EN

Online advertising is one of the most dynamically developing forms of advertising in the Polish market. This paper aims to review existing auction mechanisms for pricing and selling online advertisements. The analysis of the available solutions, including their advantages and disadvantages, such as usefulness in determining the advertisers’ willingness to pay, allows for the indication of practical recommendations for the use of specific auction mechanisms for the media market in Poland. The presented solutions can be considered an alternative to the traditional method of concluding purchase/selling transactions of advertising space.

PL

Reklama internetowa jest jedną z najdynamiczniej rozwijających się form reklamy na rynku polskim. W artykule dokonano przeglądu koncepcji wykorzystania mechanizmów aukcyjnych na potrzeby sprzedaży reklam internetowych. Analiza dostępnych rozwiązań, w tym ich wad i zalet, takich jak przydatność w ustalaniu gotowości do zapłaty reklamodawców, pozwala na wskazanie praktycznych rekomendacji dotyczących zastosowania konkretnych mechanizmów aukcyjnych dla rynku mediowego w Polsce jako alternatywy dla tradycyjnego sposobu zawierania transakcji kupna/sprzedaży przestrzeni reklamowych.

Keywords

PL

reklama; aukcja; rynek mediowy; media

EN

advertising; auction; media market; media

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Studia i Materiały
• Year: 2021
• Issue: 2(35)
• Pages: 61-75

Dates

published

2021

Contributors

author

Joanna Rachubik

• Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Polska

• https://orcid.org/0000000287964720

author

Dorota Mirowska-Wierzbicka

• Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Polska

• https://orcid.org/000000034497415X

author

Wojciech Zawadzki

• Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Polska

• https://orcid.org/0000000319680360

author

Maciej Wilamowski

• Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Polska

• https://orcid.org/000000018478572X

author

Krzysztof Fiok

• Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Systems, University of Central Florida, Orlando, USA

• https://orcid.org/0000000157111498

author

Wojciech Maciejewski

• Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Polska

• https://orcid.org/0000000198253943

author

Mateusz Szczurek

• Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Polska

• https://orcid.org/0000000184261547

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1733-9758.2021.35.5

Biblioteka Nauki

20874812