Sovereign Debt Restructurings in Grenada: Causes, Processes, Outcomes, and Lessons Learned

• Authors: Tamon Asonuma , Mike Xin Li , Michael G. Papaioannou , Saji Thomas , Eriko Togo

Abstracts

EN

This paper documents the two debt restructurings that Grenada undertook in 2004–06 and 2013–15. Both restructurings emerged as a consequence of weak fiscal and debt situations, which became unsustainable soon after external shocks hit the island economy. The two restructurings provided liquidity relief, with the second one involving a principal haircut. However, the first restructuring was not able to secure long-term debt sustainability. Grenada’s restructuring experience shows the importance of (1) establishing appropriate debt restructuring objectives; (2) committing to policy reforms and maintaining ownership of the restructuring goals; and (3) engaging closely and having clear communications with creditors.

Keywords

EN

Sovereign Debt; Sovereign Defaults; Sovereign Debt Restructurings; Serial Debt; Restructurings; Serial Defaults; Grenada; Disaster Clause

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Journal of Banking and Financial Economics
• Year: 2018
• Issue: 2(10)
• Pages: 67-105

Dates

published

2018

Contributors

author

Tamon Asonuma

• International Monetary Fund, U.S.A.

author

Mike Xin Li

• International Monetary Fund, U.S.A.

author

Michael G. Papaioannou

• International Monetary Fund, U.S.A.

author

Saji Thomas

• International Monetary Fund, U.S.A.

author

Eriko Togo

• International Monetary Fund, U.S.A.

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/2353-6845.jbfe.2018.2.4

Biblioteka Nauki

2040944