‘Improve the Law’ as a Judicial Duty on the Borderlines of Free Speech: Judges as Responsible Epistemic Agents

• Authors: Gülriz Uygur , Fatma İrem Çaglar Gürgey

Abstracts

EN

This paper discusses judicial duty of improving the law on epistemic grounds and claims in that regarding this obligation, it is possible to give a place to free speech from an epistemic point of view. As a requirement of having epistemic agency, judges like other human beings have epistemological responsibility. Different from the others’ responsibility, judges’ responsibility is connected to their duty of improving the law, which is required by their job as well as the idea of the rule of law and judicial professional principles. Judges should improve the law’s capacity to guide the conduct of its citizens, who are obligated to obey the law. Improving the law also improves the delivery of justice. The ways of legal interpretation and justification are important to improve it. While applying the law, judges can find the law unclear or they may encounter some norm conflicts. In these cases, they should resolve them to keep the law ‘legally in good shape’, which should meet epistemological requirements. When fulfilling this obligation, judicial free speech on epistemic grounds should not be limited.

Keywords

EN

judicial ethics; judicial free speech; epistemological responsibility; agency

• Publisher: Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego
• Journal: Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 60-73

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Gülriz Uygur

author

Fatma İrem Çaglar Gürgey

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7206/kp.2080-1084.556

Biblioteka Nauki

2185927