

MARTIN WRIGHT

**LEARNING TO CHANGE:
RESTORATIVE RESPONSES TO WRONGDOING**

1. OUTLINE

The basic problem we face is how people persuade each other to behave decently to each other. The first issue is preventing harmful behaviour, the next – if harmful behaviour still occurs – is to try to prevent it from happening again. Restorative justice adds a further dimension: looking after victims, and enabling them, and others affected, to take part in the process. Perpetrators are encouraged to acknowledge responsibility for the harm caused, and to do what they can to repair it. Examples are given from North American First Nations, where the emphasis is on healing rather than blame; from Russia; and from South Africa. A direction of travel for the future is suggested, in which the restorative concept would be applied throughout society, beginning with schools and community mediation.

This paper, based on one presented at Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv, on 13 May 2008, recognises that restorative practices can be used in inter-community as well as intra-community conflicts, as will be seen in some places if the word “offenders” is replaced by “Palestinians” and “perpetrators” by “Israelis”. The “victims” can be either Palestinians or Israelis, depending on the context.

People researching conflict often say that conflict in itself is not necessarily a bad thing, and it may be inevitable; what matters is how we handle it. As we live together in the crowded parts of this planet, probably using up more of its finite resources, especially oil and water, in the past century than in the whole previous history of time, we need to find acceptable ways of sharing them out. At present, rich countries consume far more than poor ones, and in any one country rich people have far more than poor people. These inequalities are strongly linked to conflict, crime and other social ills¹. Of course, there are conflicts about other things than the distribution of property: love triangles, noisy neighbours, bad driving, insults, and many more. The challenge facing us is how to persuade other people not to harm each other, or us; and if they do, how to respond in a constructive and effective way.

¹ R. Wilkinson, “Dysfunctional Societies: Why Inequality Matters”, paper to conference, *Criminal Justice and Social Justice: New Directions*, King’s College, London, 5–6 July 2007.

2. PROBLEM: BEHAVIOUR

This usually boils down to the way in which “we” want “them” to behave – “we” being generally the “haves”, the people who legally possess the power, who (usually) abide by the laws which people like us have made, while “they” are the “have-nots”, economically, educationally and socially. “We” may be the immigrants into North America in earlier centuries who took over the land, forcing the original population into reservations with little work or dignity; or we may be the shareholders and customers supporting the supermarkets whose use of their economic power puts many small shopkeepers out of business. “They” may be different ethnically or religiously: black, Asian or Roma in European countries, Palestinians in Israel, Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland. Most people conform, because of social and economic pressures, but for those who break the rules the principal way in which “we” try to control “them” is by the threat of punishment, and ultimately imprisonment, and it is widely if not universally found that prisons are disproportionately full of the poor, the disadvantaged, and the ethnic minorities. Sometimes, when we want to be humane, instead of (or as well as) punishing them we “rehabilitate” them; this may mean giving them a better chance of surviving in the socio-economic structure we have created, but it also implies that we want to force them to accept it. Even restorative justice is in danger of falling into this trap: the caricature is that a poor person steals from a rich person, and is made to pay back what he took, so that the unequal *status quo* is restored. Fortunately, it doesn’t have to work out like that; in practice, victims commonly want reparation in other forms, not monetary compensation.

Of course, some of “us” also commit crimes, and others cause harm which somehow has avoided being defined as crime. The “crimes of the powerful” include acts which are criminal according to national or international law, and those which many people think should be so classified: tax avoidance or evasion, false accounting, exploiting sweatshop labour, demanding unsafe working practices², “waterboarding” of people suspected of terrorism. One particularly ruthless example is the chemical plant at Bhopal, India, where inadequate maintenance led to the release of a huge amount of poisonous methyl isocyanate gas in 1984, causing the deaths of thousands of people and chronic illness of tens of thousands more, from which they are still suffering; the company responsible, Union Carbide, later taken over by Dow Chemical Corporation, paid inadequate compensation and refused to accept more responsibility. The abuse of power is committed not only by those at the top, but by those lower down, for example ill-treatment of residents in nursing homes³, of people with learning difficulties in care homes⁴, and of civilians by occupying soldiers in Iraq⁵ and elsewhere, although this raises the question of whether those in authority did anything to prevent it.

² E.g. M. Yokoyama, “Analysis of Irresponsible Behaviors in Japanese Corporations”, *Kokugakuin Journal* 2006, No. 41(4).

³ J. Braithwaite, *Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation*, Oxford University Press, New York–Oxford 2002, p. 17–18.

⁴ J. Laurance, “Abused. Bullied. Confined. Drugged. The Scandal of How Britain Cares for Its Most Vulnerable People: The Mentally Disabled”, *The Independent*, 5 July 2006, p. 1–2.

⁵ R. Kellaway, “Brutal! Exposed: Squad of British Soldiers Beat Teenage Iraqis and Shame Their Country”, *News of the World*, 12 February 2006, p. 1–5.

Before we go any further, we need to define crime: in some countries, the link with punishment is built into the language: “criminal law” is referred to as penal law, *Strafrecht*, *droit pénal*. I suggest that it is:

an action or omission (usually harmful) defined by the legislature as one where the state is authorized to take action against the person(s) responsible if the parties cannot resolve it themselves; and which, in addition, a court (or other criminal justice agency) has classified as falling within that definition.

Usually, legislatures say that crimes are to be punished, but I will argue that the state’s intervention does not have to take the form of punishment. Of course, vast numbers of harmful acts fall outside this definition, for example because they have not been defined as crimes, or because a particular action has not been brought to the police or a court. The borderline is constantly changing: since 1997, over 3,000 actions have been defined as crimes by the British parliament; and occasionally actions are removed from the list of crimes, such as the apartheid laws in South Africa.

If we want to reduce the amount of crime, or harm, we need to consider its causes – or rather, it is better to say “pressures towards” crime, because some people are able to resist pressures. One of the chief pressures has been identified as inequality by Richard Wilkinson, professor of social epidemiology at the University of Nottingham and author of *The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies Healthier*. Some rich countries are much more socially dysfunctional than others. They have worse health – both mental and physical, more violent crime, higher teenage birth rates, less trust, poorer educational attainments, larger prison populations, more obesity, and weaker community life. Compared to other countries, Britain does not perform well. What is it that goes so right – or wrong? Criminologists have of course identified many such pressures, such as abuse during childhood, being brought up in a criminal environment, and so on; but the evidence suggests that the most important key is the amount of inequality in each society⁶.

In Britain, and no doubt elsewhere, there is a tendency to demonize offenders. We see ourselves as people, and it is important to see offenders as humans, too. Offenders too have “senses, affections, passions [and are] fed with the same food, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warm’d and cool’d by the same winter and summer”.

Like us, they may say “If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?” (Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, III(i)). Shakespeare’s Shylock went on to say “and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?”. It is sadly true that many people feel that way, but it is a dangerous principle; as Gandhi said, if we keep taking an eye for an eye, we will leave everyone blind. If (like some British media and politicians) we regard offenders as inferior, as thugs, yobs, vermin, cockroaches or whatever, they are likely to find equally insulting ways of describing us, and there will be no progress⁷. As Fisher et al.⁸ have shown, if we limit

⁶ R. Wilkinson, op. cit.

⁷ “In North American First Nations, mutual respect is shown by the fact that some tribes have no word for derogatory concepts such as stupid (the Mi’kmaq), pest, waste, or weed (Lakotah)” (R. Ross, *Returning to the Teachings: Exploring Aboriginal Justice*, Penguin Books, Toronto 1996, p. 54, 78, 128).

⁸ R. Fisher, E. Kopelman, A.K. Schneider, *Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict*, Penguin Books, New York 1996, p. 28.

ourselves to describing our feelings and the impact of what others do, and listen to them doing likewise, we are more likely to persuade them to change their behaviour – and we may also see the need to change some of ours. This is part of the restorative justice process.

3. RESPONSES

So there is harmful behaviour, which may or may not be a crime; how do we try to reduce it? We can try to prevent it happening in the first place, by primary prevention; or when it happens, we can try to reduce the likelihood of its happening again.

3.1. Primary prevention

The first method which many people and legislatures think of when trying to prevent undesirable behaviour is to threaten punishment. I will define punishment as deliberate infliction of a measure *intended* to be painful or inconvenient, such as a fine or imprisonment. Measures such as rehabilitation, reparation or containment may deprive a person of time or money, but that is not their primary purpose. There are two main problems with punishment: it doesn't work very well, and it is impossible to determine what the "right" amount is; these raise another large question: is it ethical?

It does not make much impression on offenders who have little or nothing to lose. It obviously doesn't work on an offender who does not think about it, or thinks he will escape it, or thinks that the reward of his action is much greater than the pain. In the latter case, increasing the threatened punishment could in theory deter the offender, but only if he knows about the increase and believes that there is a substantial risk of detection. It is an old truism that the greatest deterrent is not the amount of punishment but the likelihood of being caught. The state should not inflict pain on offenders unless this is demonstrably *more* effective than other, less repressive methods. If the scales of justice balance the harm done by the offender with further harm inflicted on the offender, this only adds to the total amount of harm in the world⁹.

There is no absolute scale by which to measure the seriousness of an offence, nor the amount of punishment required to deter offenders, nor the impact of a certain quantum of punishment on a particular individual. Thus it is impossible to say that punishment is proportionate, because there is no way of measuring what it is proportionate to. At best, it is proportionate to other punishments; but that would be equally true if all punishments were halved, or doubled.

One of the other main methods of prevention is known as situational crime prevention, for example by making it physically harder to commit the crime. This can be effective, until the offenders find a way of getting round it, or displace their activities to another target; and heavy security imposes ever-increasing inconvenience on ordinary citizens. The ideal method is social crime prevention, which encourages and enables everyone, including offenders, to live a rewarding life without harming other people. This may be by more equitable distribution of material things, such as money;

⁹ M. Wright, "Victim/Offender Mediation as a Step towards a Restorative System of Justice", in: H. Messmer, H.-U. Otto (ed.), *Restorative Justice on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials of Victim/Offender Mediation – International Research Perspectives*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1992, p. 525.

but people are often willing to accept a degree of inequality, if it is not excessive, provided they are treated with respect.

As regards the ethics of punishment, this is too large a subject to explore here. Briefly, as proposed above, it is argued that punishment, the infliction of harm, can only be justified, if at all, when it is *more* effective than any less repressive measure; and when we have tackled the inequalities just mentioned. Otherwise, it could be said that we are scapegoating the offenders: they are punished for succumbing to the pressures we have created in our unequal society.

3.2. Secondary: prevent re-offending

If primary prevention is unsuccessful, as sometimes it is bound to be, how can repetition be prevented? Sometimes a warning or reprimand may be sufficient, but otherwise the first response, once again, is often punishment of the individual offender. Once again, however, there is a mismatch: between the effects that “we”, or the judges acting in our name, believe it to have, and its actual effects; between what we intend offenders to feel, and what they do feel. The intended effect is that the offender thinks “I had better not do that again”; the actual effects are likely to include blaming someone else, self-justification, determination to avoid being caught next time¹⁰, or what Braithwaite¹¹ calls “reactance”:

Intentions to control are reacted to as attempts to limit our freedom, which lead us to reassert that freedom by acting contrary to the direction of control.

If freedom of religion is a vitally important freedom to Christians, then throwing more Christians to the lions may only strengthen their commitment to martyrdom, adding rather than detracting from the growth of Christianity.

It may have a temporary effect, which makes the punisher think that it has worked, but experiments have shown that the effect wears off. If the punishment takes the form of imprisonment, it has additional side-effects: it splits up families, gives people stigma (or in the eyes of some fellow offenders, additional criminal status), makes it harder for them to behave in a law-abiding way, often making them homeless and unemployed. Despite the best efforts of some humane staff, prisons tend to be dysfunctional societies, which only exceptional people can survive with their humanity intact, as (fortunately for South Africa) Nelson Mandela did. Last but not least, punishment does nothing for victims, except in some cases to satisfy their wish for retribution (which is not as great as generally supposed, as we shall see).

Another strategy for secondary prevention is rehabilitation: many offenders suffer from disadvantages of various kinds: disturbed family background, lack of skills, lack of education, and so on; so if they can be helped to overcome these, the chances that they will avoid crime will be increased. The first difficulty with this approach is making sure that enough resources are given to these interventions; and secondly it may appear to take responsibility from the offender and place it on his or her background. Thirdly, like punishment, it does nothing for the victim, who may even resent the help given to the offender.

¹⁰ M. Wright, *Restoring Respect for Justice: a Symposium*, 2nd ed., Waterside Press, Winchester 2008, chapter 2.

¹¹ J. Braithwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 106, 107.

4. RESTORATION

Let me introduce the idea of restoration with a case history from Germany¹². In a multi-storey housing estate in Wohlers Eichen, a suburb of Bremen, a group of seven 10- to 14-year-olds were caught at so-called lift-surfing. They had tampered with the lifts so that they could travel sitting on top of them. They also moved a switch for maintenance engineers which “for a laugh” made the lift go in the wrong direction when residents used it. In addition, there was about €2,000 worth of damage to the doors.

The case was taken to the mediation centre by the housing company. As a first step, at a meeting with the young people and their parents or guardians it was made clear that lift surfing was not a bit of fun but serious criminal damage with potentially very dangerous consequences for all concerned; including the possibility that the landing doors could open when no lift was there, so that in the worst case someone could fall down the lift shaft and be killed.

After the young people had understood the possible consequences, their parents had been informed and agreed to take part in mediation, and the possibility of suitable reparation was discussed. The young people explained that they had personally apologized to all the affected residents, and would take on cleaning up work at the entrances. Since all the families of the young people were receiving social security, the housing company agreed to give up any claim to material compensation, if the agreed community work was completed.

There were then discussions between the representatives of the housing company, the parents and the young people, which reached an agreement with which all were satisfied and the residents also benefited. It is felt very unlikely that these young people would interfere with the lifts again.

Restorative justice is reviving a principle of the Office of Economic Opportunity in the United States in the 1960s: to enable people who are seen as a problem to be part of the solution to the problem.

No one should claim that restorative justice resolves every problem; but it does provide a way round many of them. It accepts that harmful actions should have consequences for the perpetrator; these are in some ways more demanding, because they require the perpetrator to face up to what he or she has done, and make up for it, rather than make excuses and passively endure punishment. If the victim wishes it, there is a meeting at which he or she can express their feelings, ask questions and receive answers; they can then work out a suitable form of reparation or healing.

Conventional	Restorative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on past, law-breaking, blame • Adversarial (by lawyer) • Offender's wrongdoing • Offender's incentive to deny, minimize 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on future, harm, problem-solving • Dialogue (in person) • Victim's needs • Incentive to “wipe clean”, make amends

¹² Summarized from: F. Winter, *Mediation in Neighbourhoods in Wohlers Eichen: A Violence Prevention Project with Emphasis on Integration through Residents' Participation*, Application for Bremen Prize for Integration 2007.

The distinguishing features of the restorative approach are, firstly, that it does not focus on the breaking of the law, but on the harm that has been caused. Secondly, it enables the victim and the offender, if they wish, to talk about the harm caused by the perpetrator's actions, and consider how it can be put right. The victim can express his or her fear and needs; the offender can explain why he did what he did, and may often have needs also. It is important that the perpetrator accepts some responsibility for causing the harm, although this need not be an admission of guilt in the legal sense. In some cases, such as boundary disputes which have turned violent, it is not clear who is the victim and who is the perpetrator, so that the process becomes more like conflict resolution; in some ways the offender may also be a victim, and *vice versa*. In a fully restorative process, there is community involvement at various levels: the family and friends of the participants may be present, and in some cases members of the community who have been affected; the mediators may be trained volunteers from the community; and the mediation service may be run by a non-governmental organization.

Restorative justice is sometimes presented as a new method; but in fact it is more like a renaissance. Its roots are found in ancient traditions all over the world. In New Zealand, the Maori bring together the extended family to help to work out a way forward from problems of a young person in the family; relatives contribute ideas and often help to put them into effect. This has been adapted into the formal system for juveniles, under the name "family group conference": social workers are now present, and if the young person has committed an offence, a youth advocate, a police officer, and (if he or she wishes) the victim are present, but they leave the room while the family works out its plan. Only the most serious cases go to the juvenile court, and even they must be referred to a family group conference before the judge passes sentence.

The First Nations in North America have also preserved a tradition of justice that is different from the Western one. The people of Hollow Water, in Manitoba, Canada, produced a "Position Paper on Incarceration", in which they said: "People who offend against another (...) are to be viewed and related to as people who are out of balance – with themselves, their family, their community and their Creator. A return to balance can best be accomplished through a process of accountability that includes support from the community through teaching and healing. The use of judgement and punishment actually works against the healing process. *An already unbalanced person is moved further out of balance*"¹³.

In their world-view, everything is related to everything else: "When people cause problems, for instance, this law of interconnectedness requires that a justice system investigate all the factors that might have contributed to the misbehaviour"¹⁴.

Each aspect of creation must be respected if all are to survive¹⁵. Relationships may be more important than who did what to whom – it may be unnecessary to decide that question. With less punishment, the truth is more likely to come out. At Hollow Water, using this method instead of the threat of punishment led to the revelation of child

¹³ Quoted by: R. Ross, op. cit., p. 171 (emphasis in the original paper).

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 64.

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 78.

abuse that had been going on for years. In a nine-year period, 48 cases were dealt with; only 5 were sent to jail and of the others only 2 re-offended¹⁶. In Ross's experience, "For people who have only known abusive relationships, for instance, it may take some effort to convince them that healthy relationships are possible. (...) Trust, love and respect are just words to many people, for they have never known them"¹⁷. Rather than postulate abstract principles of "right" and "wrong", the Navajo are practical: "If you don't tell the truth, your fellows won't trust you and you'll shame your relatives"¹⁸. To put it another way, "The Peacemaker does not ask if it is 'good' or 'bad' [but] 'is it *hashkeeki* (moving towards disharmony) or is it *hozhooji* (moving towards harmony)?"¹⁹. In Aboriginal communities, "*the traditional purpose for allocating responsibility was not to pick someone out for punishment, but to identify issues that needed to be addressed, as well as the people whose attitudes and activities had to be reoriented if the issues were to be resolved*"²⁰.

These traditions have been adapted in the use of sentencing circles, where in addition to the families and supporters of the accused and the victim, there may be other members of the community affected by the crime, and a prosecutor, defence lawyer and judge. The focus is on producing a constructive action plan rather than a punishment; but the presence of the judge means that the most serious cases can be dealt with, and (as in the New Zealand juvenile court) the judge can impose a custodial sentence if the offender is considered too dangerous to be at large. Another advantage of the sentencing circle is that sitting in a room with the people harmed provides a more effective way of meeting the law's demand for denunciation of the offence than sitting in a jail cell, perhaps hundreds of miles away²¹.

Another example comes from Russia. Although it is not a case of mediation, but arbitration, the restorative principle of respecting needs was followed. At the start of the twentieth century, on instructions from the Russian Senate, young barristers were sent to rural areas in order to learn what was happening in villages with regard to legal decisions affecting the majority of the population. One of the lawyers described the following event: "The elders [of the *obshchina* or commune] judged the case of two peasants who had an argument over a piece of land. As a result, the following decision was taken. 'Ivan is right, Egor is not right. Therefore, Ivan will get two thirds and Egor only one third of the parcel of land'. To which the young lawyer said, 'If Ivan is right, he should get all the land, and if he's not, then he shouldn't get any land at all. How can you take such a decision?' The elder replied, 'Land is only land, but they have to live in the same village to the end of their days'"²².

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 36.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 137.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 107; cf. M. Wright, *Making Good: Prisons, Punishment and Beyond*, Waterside Press, Winchester 2008, p. 255–258 (on "natural consequences").

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 123, 146.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 209 (emphasis in the original).

²¹ Ibidem, p. 215.

²² Th. Shanin, *Kuda idet Rossiya?* [Whither Russia?], Aspect Press, Moscow 1996, p. 170; cited by: R.R. Maksudov, *Where Society Must Rein in Government: Restorative Justice and Preservation of Community*, unpublished paper, n.d., transl. A.W. Bouis.

5. THE FUTURE: DIRECTION OF TRAVEL

Marshall Rosenberg quotes the American comedian Irwin Corey: “If we don’t change direction soon, we’ll end up where we’re going!” We may be going in a depressing direction. Speaking from a British perspective, I can say that we are feeling that measures introduced in the name of protection feel increasingly like control. It is said that the average Briton is filmed on security cameras about 300 times a day. Some of the cameras have loudspeakers attached so that we can be told to stop doing whatever we’re doing. Internet connections can be intercepted. The government plans identity cards containing information which it can use without the knowledge of the individual. And so it goes on²³. Ironically, at the same time as the prison population has reached a record level (over 80,000), more and more citizens are surrounding themselves with prison-like security in gated communities. Imagine: half the population in enclosures from which they are not allowed out, and the other half in enclosures which no one else is allowed to enter! Is this really the direction in which we wish to travel?

What would a restorative society be like? The ideals of restorative justice could – and are beginning to – spread out from the criminal justice system. We see them in schools, where children are taught respect for each other as well as the staff, and learn the basic principles of mediation. Rosenberg describes an Israeli kindergarten for children between 4 and 6 years old.

Two girls were squabbling, and turned to a boy, asking him to mediate. They went to the mediation corner of the room, and the mediator asked the first girl what the other child had said that she didn’t like. He asked how she felt, and she told him. Then he asked her what were her needs, and what was her request. Then he asked the other girl to repeat back what the first one had said. When she showed that she understood what the first one had said, he helped her, in turn, to express herself. In a short time, they had resolved the conflict and ran off together²⁴.

Not only relationships among children, but in the school, and the all-important discipline of the family, can be based on restorative principles. As the Israeli Supreme Court has said: “The child depends on his parent, needs his love, his soft touch and his protection. The use of punishment that causes pain and degradation does not contribute to the character or education of the child, but instead it harms his rights as a person. It harms his body, his honor and his proper development. It distances us from our aspiration to be a society free of violence”²⁵. The court was speaking about physical punishment, but its statement could apply to punishment in general.

Besides schools, restorative approaches are spreading in community mediation. Here is an opportunity for what is now called the “third sector”: after the state and commercial sectors, the voluntary sector of non-governmental organizations and individuals volunteering their services. This is easier to propose in affluent countries with

²³ H. Porter, “Why I Told Parliament: You’ve Failed Us on Liberty, *Observer*, 9 March 2008, p. 33.

²⁴ M.B. Rosenberg, *Speak Peace in a World of Conflict: What You Say Next Will Change Your World*, PuddleDancer Press, Encinitas, CA 2005, p. 111–112.

²⁵ Israeli Supreme Court judgement in criminal appeal 4596/98 Plonit vs. A.G. 54(1), January 2000, quoted by: P. Redekop, *Changing Paradigms: Punishment and Restorative Discipline*, Herald Press, Waterloo, Ontario–Scottsdale, PA 2008, p. 274.

shorter working hours; yet poor people are often the most generous. One can envisage a network of mediation centres throughout the country, with a group of volunteers trained in mediation skills, and a small staff to take on the more demanding cases and provide the administration. We might learn from South Africa, where the Zwelethemba programme not only provides a service like this, in about twenty townships so far, but for each case handled it puts some money into a community fund which is used to improve the quality of life for the community and especially its young people, and thereby reduce the pressures towards crime²⁶. We might also learn from North American Aboriginal peoples, among whom, rather than create an apparatus of justice, “*the primary emphasis was on teaching individuals from birth how to live together in ways that avoided or minimized [disputes] in the first place. (...) justice involves far more than what you do after things have gone wrong. Instead, it involves creating the social conditions that minimize such wrongdoing*”²⁷.

From one continent to another, aspirations are very similar. In North America, the Navajo have the concept of *k'e*: compassion, friendliness, unselfishness, peacefulness, and all the other positive values which create solidarity²⁸. In South Africa, Archbishop Desmond Tutu has described the concept of *ubuntu*: being “generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. (...) It also means my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs”²⁹. A final example is the combination of physical well-being and prosperity, living in right relationships, including a just political and economic relationship free from oppression, and honesty and moral integrity. This is how Howard Zehr³⁰, the “grandfather of restorative justice”, describes the unifying vision of *shalom*. I hope that the ideal of restorative justice will help to move both our countries towards harmony, and I wish all strength to everyone who is working to make this vision a reality.

²⁶ J. Froestad, C. Shearing, “Beyond Restorative Justice: Zwelethemba, a Future-Focused Model Using Local Capacity Conflict Resolution”, in: R. Mackay, M. Bošnjak, J. Deklerck, C. Pelikan, B. van Stokkom, M. Wright (eds.), *Images of Restorative Justice Theory*, Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, Frankfurt am Main 2007.

²⁷ R. Ross, op. cit., p. 255–256 (emphasis in the original).

²⁸ P. Bluehouse, J. Zion, “Hozhooji naat’aanii: The Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony”, *Mediation Quarterly* 1993, No. 10(4), quoted by R. Ross, op. cit., p. 264.

²⁹ D. Tutu, *No Future without Forgiveness*, Rider, London 1999, p. 34–35.

³⁰ H. Zehr, *Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice*, 2nd ed., Herald Press, Scottsdale, PA 1995, p. 130–132.