Punishing white-collar offenders. Theory and function

• Authors: Andrzej Uhl

Title variants

Punishing white-collar offenders. Theory and function

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The most prominent sentencing theories, also known as justifications for punishment, were developed long before white-collar crime entered mainstream criminology. Not surprisingly, the literature still focusses on the phenomenology of white-collar crime rather than on the issues of punishment. As a growing number of respectable offenders face criminal prosecution or even incarceration, the application of traditional sentencing rationales proves problematic in practical, ethical, and terminological terms. The article first explains how the debate on punishing upper-world offenders in Europe is inhibited by the offence-based nomenclature of economic crime or ‘collaring the crime, not the criminal’. Thereafter, a review and discussion of relevant English-language literature on the subject is offered, leaving open some questions as to its applicability to the Central-eastern European context. White-collar offenders were traditionally viewed as the perfect target for general deterrence, yet the body of evidence challenges this hypothesis. The theory of positive general prevention seems promising with regard to reinforcing business ethics and counteracting the spiral effect. It is hardly clear what the rehabilitation of middle-class convicts should mean in practice, while incapacitation is reinvented as business debarment and the loss of licences. There is often a glaring discrepancy between retributive and preventive ends in white-collar cases, which also features the political dimension of class inequalities in the criminal justice system. A short excursus provides insight into neoliberal criticisms of punishing white-collar offenders, revealing its unintentional similarities to penal abolitionism. Finally, empirical findings on subjects relevant to punishment theories, such as fair sentencing, public attitudes, and the effectiveness of deterrence, are reviewed with special attention given to Central and Eastern European research.

PL

The most prominent sentencing theories, also known as justifications for punishment, were developed long before white-collar crime entered mainstream criminology. Not surprisingly, the literature still focusses on the phenomenology of white-collar crime rather than on the issues of punishment. As a growing number of respectable offenders face criminal prosecution or even incarceration, the application of traditional sentencing rationales proves problematic in practical, ethical, and terminological terms. The article first explains how the debate on punishing upper-world offenders in Europe is inhibited by the offence-based nomenclature of economic crime or ‘collaring the crime, not the criminal’. Thereafter, a review and discussion of relevant English-language literature on the subject is offered, leaving open some questions as to its applicability to the Central-eastern European context. White-collar offenders were traditionally viewed as the perfect target for general deterrence, yet the body of evidence challenges this hypothesis. The theory of positive general prevention seems promising with regard to reinforcing business ethics and counteracting the spiral effect. It is hardly clear what the rehabilitation of middle-class convicts should mean in practice, while incapacitation is reinvented as business debarment and the loss of licences. There is often a glaring discrepancy between retributive and preventive ends in white-collar cases, which also features the political dimension of class inequalities in the criminal justice system. A short excursus provides insight into neoliberal criticisms of punishing white-collar offenders, revealing its unintentional similarities to penal abolitionism. Finally, empirical findings on subjects relevant to punishment theories, such as fair sentencing, public attitudes, and the effectiveness of deterrence, are reviewed with special attention given to Central and Eastern European research. Najważniejsze teorie kary zostały sformułowane na długo zanim przestępczość "białych kołnierzyków" wkroczyła do kryminologii głównego nurtu. Literatura przedmiotu wciąż skupia się raczej na fenomenologii tego typu przestępczości niż na kwestiach karania. Przy wzrastającej liczbie skazanych lub nawet uwięzionych sprawców z klasy średniej i wyższej zastosowanie istniejących teorii kary napotyka na problemy natury praktycznej, etycznej i terminologicznej. Artykuł wyjaśnia, jak oparta na cechach czynu nomenklatura "przestępczości gospodarczej" utrudnia naukową dyskusję na temat karania "białych kołnierzyków". Następnie zaprezentowany jest przegląd prac anglosaskich i ich omówienie w kontekście środkowo- i wschodnioeuropejskim. Sprawców w "białych kołnierzyków" uważa się powszechnie za właściwych adresatów prewencyjnej funkcji kary, co jest jednak tylko częściowo potwierdzone w badaniach empirycznych. Teoria prewencji pozytywnej wydaje się z kolei obiecująca w aspekcie utwierdzania etycznych postaw w biznesie i przeciwdziałania efektom spiralnym. Pozostaje niejasne, co mogłaby oznaczać resocjalizacja "białych kołnierzyków", podczas gdy funkcja uniemożliwiająca spełniona jest przez środki w postaci zakazu prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej. Wymóg sprawiedliwości często koliduje z względami prewencji, co ma swój wymiar polityczny w postaci nierówności klasowych w systemie sprawiedliwości karnej. W krótkim ekskursie omówiona zostaje neoliberalna krytyka karania "białych kołnierzyków" - krytyka przywołująca w sposób niezamierzony argumenty zbliżone do postulatów abolicji penalnej. Przy szczególnym uwzględnieniem prac z Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej podsumowane są także wyniki badań empirycznych w obszarach istotnych z punktu widzenia wybranych teorii kary: spójności orzekanych kar, postaw społecznych czy skuteczności prewencji.

Keywords

EN

white-collar crime; punishment theory; sentencing rationales; just deserts

PL

white-collar crime; punishment theory; sentencing rationales; just deserts; przestępczość; przestępczość gospodarcza; teoria kary; funkcje prawa karnego; sprawiedliwa odpłata; white-collar crime; punishment theory; sentencing rationales; just deserts; przestępczość; przestępczość gospodarcza; teoria kary; funkcje prawa karnego; sprawiedliwa odpłata

• Publisher: Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN / Institute of Legal Studies PAN
• Journal: Archiwum Kryminologii
• Year: 2020
• Issue: XLII/2
• Pages: 27-47

Dates

published

2021-02-02

Contributors

author

Andrzej Uhl

• Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3408-9766

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7420/AK2020Y