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CRISES OF STATE IN BLACK AFRICA?

1. INTRODUCTION*

In most African countries today, there are evidently crises of state policy. These are now of some years standing and they extend to numerous aspects of the social (cultural, political and economic) lives of the people of the different countries. Their most obvious manifestations are: (1) large foreign debts (to private and to public international banks); (2) more critically, a high level of dependence on imports to maintain local production as well as to meet consumption needs directly; (3) a declining capacity to produce commodities for export, to maintain world market shares of exports, combined with poor prices and poor prospects for their products; and (4) poor integration of different sectors of economic activities and particulary public investments, so that money spent does not expand production of goods to meet people's needs. The most dramatic manifestations of crises have been in regard to the supply of food, to food production and agricultural exports, for the state, in rising food imports, falling revenues and foreign earnings from agriculture, and unsuccessful agricultural and "rural development" polices.

These are all concerned with the relations between the economies of the African countries and the international economy, and with managing the consequences for African countries of crises in the world, economy. They are all manifested in declining terms of trade for many African countries, declining trade between Africa and other countries and the management of unpayable debts claimed by international banks.

Their consequences are felt by all, in different ways. Some are well placed to take advantage of the opportunities they create. Some have a capacity to respond to and cope with the difficulties created. The consequences are worst for the poorest and the least powerful.

These material problems have their origins in institutional structures which shape economic activities — making some sorts of activities possible

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and encouraging, discouraging or even preventing others. These problems can only be addressed, in theory or in practice, by examining these institutional structures directly, and in particular, that complex of institutional structures which make up the state, and which give shape to the interaction of the sets of social relations which make up a society.

2. CRISES OF STATE POLICY

There are no paradigms adequate for explaining state polices and practices in Africa today, whatever light different perspectives may cast on aspects of these problems.

There is not one common crisis across Africa. Contrary to World Bank regional diagnoses or media presentations of distress and starvation in "Africa", the major problemes in Mali and not the same as problems in Nigeria; those of Etiopia are not the same as those in Tanzania. If they share anything, it is, firstly, in the centrality of state activity in attempting to direct and manage the diverse problems of different countries. Secondly, it lies in the widespread failure of state policies to implement their intended objectives, let along to solve the problems faced by the people of the countries concerned.

To put it normatively, states in Africa (and not only in Africa) tend to do too little of what they could or should do, and too much of what they can't or shouldn't do, and tend to do most things badly.

There are plurality of problems, in different combinations, in each country. These problems exacerbate and complicate one another. Each may block the means for solving others. Partial solutions may therefore fail to deal with the issues they address. These problems have specific historical origins and particular conesequences. Among their consequences are the institutional structures created to deal with the problems themselves. Sometimes these are even created to bypass the existing state structures. Consequently, periods of crisis tend to prodeuce effusion and elaboration of bureaucratic agencies.

Therefore, a satisfactory explanation of state practices and adequate approach to the problems of state policy must be historical — not as background and context but as specifying the object of study itself. History does not go into reverse. Present problems cannot simply be solved by reversing previous policy errors since this alone will neither retore the previous situation nor create the conditions for dealing with current circumstances.

Formulae abound for dealing with complex problems by addressing one element, without attending to their wider and historically structured context. Thus governments are told to "get prices right", as if they had instruments to divine and impose correct prices, to "return to the market" as if "it" existis as a neutral and impersonal mechanism for allocating resources or to diffuse technological innovations among receptive "progressive" farmers without respect for the experience, practical knowledge and scepticism of peasant producers. Problems of public sector management are to be solved by invoking "Management by Objectives, and Programme and Performance Budgeting" (Udoji, 1974, p 13) and their acronymic progeny. To deal with several problems at once, development projects are relabelled "Integrated Development Projects". To eliminate corruption and inculcate socially responsible behaviour, campaigns may be initiated to make ,War on Alcoholism" or to conduct a "War Against Indiscipline". States, and their official and academic spokesmen, elaborate such formulae as symbols for the real and complex issues which they cannot grasp. Chasing symbols becomes the self-perpetuating task of bureaucracies.

3. THE COLONIAL STATE

The construction of capitalist, just as much as of socialist, economies required the prior formation of the modern state. In Africa, the colonial form of the modern state expanded the scope for commodity production and the activities of capitalist enterprises, both foreign and indigenous.

From the onset, colonial states in Africa acted to estabilish the administrative, legal, fiscal and financial conditions for capitalist firms to operate. They financed they building of the railways and, selectively, of a road network. They responded variously to the economic requirements of certain clients, recruiting labour and regulating its movement to meet the needs of mining companies, plantations and settler farms. Cotton manufacturers were particularly favoured by administrative regulations and, in some instances, compulsory cotton cultivation.

In economies such as Nigeria (or Ghana or Uganda) the capacity of peasant smallholders to expand production of export crops and the interests of colonial firms trading in these crops encouraged colonial policies designed to favour peasant producers over plantations or settlers. The colonial administration intervened little in the production and distribution of crops. Colonial firms consolidated their oligopolistic control over commodity imports and exports to the exclusion of African traders. However, in Nigeria, the expanding trade in goods produced and consumed within the country, notably food such as grains, roots, beans and livestock, and kola nuts, remained in African hands. By the 1980s, the social relations of agricultural production in these countries (outside settler farms or capitalist plantations) were organised through commodity-producing households, whose male heads relied on their capacity to control the labour of subordinate men and of women.

Between the two world wars, African producers of crops for exports and local markets suffered from precipitous falls in prices in 1921, 1929, 1931, 1934/5 and 1937. After 1921, prices never returned to their pre-war levels, and in the 1930s were generally less than half the levels reached in 1927/8. Increased dependence on cash income to "pay for" socially necessary consumption and taxation, and a lack of alternative sources of income, meant that commodity exports continued to expand during this period.

For foreign trading companies, the 1930s saw a succession of speculative booms, followed by collapsing prices and crises of profitability in export markets. They blamed their problems on "middlemen", formed cartels ("pools") and invoked the support of the state to try and pass the costs of the crisis on to African producers of export crops and consumers of imported goods. This generated opposition from African traders and farmers to colonial firms, notably in the Gold Coast cocoa hold-up of 1937, and elsewhere to colonial "native authorities", for example in Kilimanjaro and Bukoba in Tanzania in the same year.

For the colonial state, the 1930s was therefore a period of falling revenues from imports and exports, (and sustained levels of direct taxation), and one of political unrest as well as economic instability. The state was called in to intervene directly in regulating crop marketing and forming cooperatives, and state officials increasingly lost confidence in leaving economic activities to markets (perfect or imperfect) and acquired a belief in the virtues of state regulation and direction of economic activity. The colonial state came to see itself as responsible for promoting "colonial development and welfare", and the imperial government passed successive acts declaring these objectives.

4. THE "DEVELOPMENTAL STATE"

The post-war period saw a coming together of étatiste theories, specific measures of state intervention and a more general extension of state regulation of critical aspects of the economy. Herein lies the origin of the contemporary "development state".

The colonial state first took control of exports and imports during the war. They were organised into state monopolies and state-regulated private monopolies or oligipolies. State monopolies and regulation were continued after the war to manage colonial resources to meet the needs of the reconstruction of the metropolitan economies. Stabilisation of export prices and financing colonial development were put forward to justify the export of capital to the metropolitan centres.

The state controlled access to critical, and expanding, sources of funds and of economic advantages. It appropriated resources from export producers through its control of prices and taxes, making them available for redistribution. The state allocated contracts and licenses to buy and sell specific commodities. Control of political and administrative office became the means for creating constituencies of state beneficiaries and clients.

During the 1950s, export prices improved for most primary commodities. They paid for increased employment, wages, education, investments in transport and imports. Import and exchange controls were relaxed or abandoned. However, there was no revival of the pre-war economic structure. State-management and regulation of marketing, expanded levels of state expenditure and a commitment to state promotion of "development" were enduring legacies of war-time and post-war changes.

Administrative and political decisions tended to become more centralised, moving upwards from local level "Native Authorities" to (regional and) central government. Despite, or perhaps bacause of, the formal democratisation of political institutions, the "transfer of power" vested political office in new oligarchies. Central (and regional) governments used their powers to determine the finances and the policies of, and tenure of office in, subordinate local authorities, which become clients of the central government. The tendencies to political oligarchy complemented the tendencies to economic oligarchy, and each reinforced one another.

Political power was transferred to politicians who succeeded in articulating the demands of different classes and social groups in the alternating languages of nationalist ideology and of ethnic solidarities. New ethnic, as well as national, identities came to be defined around the administrative and electoral structures constructed by the colonial state. Initially, support of electorally relevant constituencies provided, and legitimated, access to political office. As successful politicians consolidated their control of state power, they used their command of state resources to create their own constituencies of clients.

Through its capacity to allocate material resources and economic opportunities to its beneficiares, the state is able to shape the class structure of society, and the allocation of class positions within it. The state is an instrument through which social groups and classes pursue their economic interests and political goals. At the same time, it is an instrument for the formation of classes and of other social and political groups. The state's command of resources makes it a focus for economic competition and political conflict. This generates the creation and recreation of factions rivalries among the political oligarchy. The state creates, and acts for, a "political class" and the factions into which it is divided.

State power offered African politicians and businessmen a means of displacing foreign capitalists from their monopoly of foreign trade. By controlling access of foreigners to African markets, they are able to negotiate a more lucrative partnership with foreign firms, on whom they continue to depend for credit, supplies, management and technical services. Socialism, in Africa, becomes another word for nationalism.

5. THE EXPANSION OF "DEVELOPMENTAL STATE"

The state therefore became the main instrument for the pursuit of both private and public goals. The state came to define and determine who would be able to make which decisions, of administrative, political and economic significiance. Political and administrative positions became the most fruitful means of securing economic resources and controlling economic opportunities. The state came to be the most important avenue for realising private goals.

The state, and its beneficiaries, seek to expand the arenas of social and economic activity within their sphere of decision-making. Hence the elaboration of new bureaucratic and parastatal institutions, not only to expand state employment, but to extend the state's reach into society. This brings it into areas which are more difficult for the state to bring under its effective control and, at the time, extends the limited administrative resources of the state beyond their capacities. It may be easier for the state to give support to the commercial and agricultural activities of its beneficiaries and incorporate rural traders and richer peasants into their networks of clients than to expand its activities directly.

The power arising from the capacity to allocate resources depends on the exclusion of alternative courses of access of. Hence the tendency of politicians and of administrators to organise the provision of services and the exchange of commodities along monopolistic lines. They prefer not to leave any aspect of the society beyond the institutional control of the state. Within the state itself, there is a similar tendency to exclude outsiders and to form a cartel of insiders. This depends on the coercive capacity of the state. In this way, as Marx says "force... is itself an economic power."

The claim of the state to define public goals and the legitimate means for pursuing private goals is formally recognised in the notion of „national sovereignty". The expansion of state economic management is justfied by the notion of "national development". The state's capacity for coercion gives content to these otherwise vacuous concepts.

"Socialism", in this version, provides justifications for expanding state activities in the name of development and for increasing African access to the profits of foreign trade. It also provides ideological legitimacy to the monopolies over political office and legitimate political activity exercised in one- (and no- and even multi-) party states, and thus to the command over economic resources claimed and enforced by dominant factions of the "political class'.

6. THE CRISES OF DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

The state's own expansion of the scope of its activities is matched by an expansion of claims made upon the state by a variety of clients. This gave a futher boost to state activities in the period after independence, in turn extending the dependence of different groups on the state for the pursuit of their goals.

The range of activities undertaken by the state soon exceeds both the administrative resources available to it (justifying the expensive expansion of places in higher education), and its capacity to raise revenues to pay for them. Foreign personnel ("experts") can be imported, very expensively, to meet some of the "manpower" deficiencies. Foreign aid pays for the expansion of the "development state". State "development" policies tend to try to reproduce the industrial revolution, usually in its nineteenth century forms. "Import-substitution industralisation" substituties one form of imports for another, and intensifies import dependency by making local production depend on the supply of imported parts and materials. The foreign costs require increased exports of primary products.

Production of consumer goods (beer, cigarettes, textiles) is followed by investment in basic producer industries (such as iron and steel, and petrochemicals) and technologically advanced industries (such as cars, tractors and trucks). Value added locally tends to be smaller (obscured by high levels of protection), and import dependence and state funding greater than with initial industries. The development of these industries exaggerated the lack of integration among economic sectors, and the distance between what the economy could produce and what most people wanted or needed to consume.

African countries inherited export marketing monopolies, which could easily be used to impose high taxes on export producers and to avoid raising direct taxes from employees, or farmers, and, often, any taxes at all from traders and businessmen. State dependence on taxing exports (and imports) to meet current revenue needs makes it difficult to reduce taxes when world prices fall. The result is falling prices for export crops, while state expenditure increases other economic opportunities, particularly in urban areas. Not surprisingly, the volume, price and world market shares of export crops of several African countries have fallen — though others, such as the Ivory Coast, with more considered price policies, have benefited from selling their neighbour's produce.

State marketing monopolies, and regulations, create private and often localised monopolies under state patronage. Some African states have sought to monopolise the marketing of local, and of imported, food and of basic consumer items. The aim may be to reduce the cost of living, particularly for urban consumers. Price controls may be imposed on basic commodities. The results of these measures are to pass the costs of state marketing and private black markets onto consumers and producers. They discourage production for official markets, create scarcities and protected private monopolies (at the disposal of state officials) and encourage speculative hoarding. The privileged few may find some protection from these conditions by gaining access to goods at cheap prices. For the vast majority, prices rise for goods, when they can be bought at all. States may then resort to importing staple goods in place of local crops to supply urban consumers.

Consequently, the "developmental state" generates a revenue crisis and a foreign exchange crisis.

States may print money to cover their internal commitments. This produces an increase in claims for scarce, especially imported, goods and thus monetary inflation and a fall in the effective exchange value of the local currency. States may try to hold public sector wages and salaries below the rate of inflation, or delay or not even pay the salaries of some employees (especially teachers). Public employees naturally devote their time, attention and whatever public resources they can use to private economic activities and to extorting payments from the public.

The most obvious way of filling the foreign exchange gap is to attract foreign investments, foreign aid and foreign loans. However, both aid and investments tend to encourage import dependence and rarely generate the export earnings needed to repay their foreign exchange costs.

Rural development projects extend the state's reach into the countryside. They seek to direct farmers' production in accordance with the priorities of state policies and the current fashions in international agencies. They substitute technical and managerial solutions for changes in the conditions under which farmers adopt particular methods of production and respond to economic opportunities. They commonly feature the expensive distribution of imported technologies inappropriate to local economic and ecological conditions and ignore the practical knowledge of farmers themselves.

The combination of expenditure commitments, industrialisation strategies and agricultural polices left most African states unable to respond flexibly to the dramatic changes in the international economic environment since 1970. Having initiated their industrialisation and transport policies, and expanded car ownership, in a period of cheap oil prices, oil-importing African countries were especially vulnerable to the rise in oil prices between 1973 and 1985.

Mineral exporters (such as Zaire, Zambia, and later Nigeria) were briefly able to take advantage of rising prices of their exports to raise loans from foreign banks, but not to sustain the cost of interest and repayments when export prices fell, import costs rose and interest rates increased. The poorest countries continued to rely on aid transfers, without avoiding rising debts. Most African countries have delayed payments of commercial debts, thus raising the cost of imports. Today, most African countries are effectively bankrupt.

7. THE CONTRADICTIONS OF REFORM FROM ABOVE

The shortage of resources, the inflation of demands, especially for imported goods, and the fall in the effective exchange rates of the currencies lead states to adopt policy instruments intended to manage the allocation of scarce resources by direct controls. The state increases its central control over economic activities.

Unable to reduce the foreign-exchange costs of imported goods and foreign debts, states attempt to lower these cost in local currencies by maintaining the official exchange rate of their currencies and monopolising that exchange into convertible currencies. Concomitant restrictions are placed on the import of goods. State officials thereby acquire control of the right to acquire foreign exchange and imported commodities at prices far below those available to others. In effect, they distribute licences to print money.

These measures do nothing to increase the country's import capacity. Rather the reverse is the case. Foreigners avoid any direct investments in the economy. They prefer to sell services or to realise profits by raising the import cost of commodities. Attempts to respond by inspecting invoices before shipment or payment add further to the delays and cost involved in importing goods and open new avenues for corruption. Africans with access to foreign exchange, whether they are politicians, military and civil officials, or private businessmen, have every incentive to export money and to hold it abroad.

Productive activities are constrained by the unavailability of imported (or even locally-produced) parts, tools and materials. Access to them depends on becoming clients of state officials, or their patron. Businessmen become importers, and realise higher returns from importing goods than from organising their production. State officials, in their turn, become businessmen, privatising state resources to their own profit. New forms of factional competition develop among "commercial triangles" (Turner, 1975) of foreign and local businessmen and state officials or, cutting out the middlemen, between foreign firms and government bureaucrats directly.

Prices of exports, expressed in local currencies, are reduced relative to prices in convertible currencies. Producers are penalised from producing for exports through official channels. They are encouraged to sell goods across borders with countries with stronger currencies and to use the proceeds to import commodities. Controls constrain the growth of the market for local products, increase the risks, costs (and profitability) of cross-border trade, and penalise inter-African, relative to intercontinental trade. Officers of the state tend to repress smuggling the better to regulate it to their own private advantage.

Nor do these measures increase the ability of people to purchase imported goods. For most consumers, for much of the time, prices are determined by the relative scarcity of commodities, not by their import prices as defined according to official exchange rates. Bureaucratic procedures and usual, if irregular, payments, raise the cost and slow the supply of imported commodities. Worst placed are those without access to, and at a distance from, official points for distribution. The entire apparatus for regulating currency and commercial transactions is an instrument of class exploitation, exacerbating economic and political inequalities.

The elaboration of state controls, increasing dependence on state decisions and the concentration of lucrative opportunities in state hands leads to a centralising of decisions within the state itself in the hands of a "political class" of politicians, military and civil officials, and their close associates.

Officials are unwilling to delegate decisions (and thus their prerogatives) and subordinates are required to refer decisions upwards. Nepotism and clientism determine preferment. Formal procedures are used as instruments of personal power. "Patrimonial" structures displace "rational-legal" forms of administration.

The central state itself comes to determine the outcome of regional and local conflicts and thus, as it appropriates more decisions to itself, to become the focus of political competition and conflict through society. Unable, therefore, to arbitrate among competing claims, the state produces factional conflicts, within its own bureaucracy and conflicts between groups in society at large.

Lacking the means to meet public expectations and to legitimate its authority throughout the whole society, the "political class" seeks to legitimate its authority by offers to different client groups, defined in regional and ethnic, and also in institutional, terms to protect their interests and to prevent others from excluding them from access to resources. This generates an atmosphere of factionalism and tribalism, as well as of continuing political uncertainty.

Unable to translate their policies into practice, the state, and the political class, resort to corruption, extortion and protectionism to pursue their objectives. State authority depends more and more exclusively on control of the means of coercion. But the coercive capacity of the state may itself become privatised. Law and order may break down and central authority is surrendered, in lesser or greater measure, to those who can deploy arms to secure their aims.

The involution of the authority of the state and its agencies over society encourages an appeal to symbolic means to realise social goals. Shortages of goods are blamed on "middlemen" or better "middlewomen".

"Aliens" or minorities become scapegoats for both the economic problems and moral ills of society. New governments, especially military ones, appeal for moral rectitude, patriotic behaviour and social discipline. Populist appeals are made to the excluded majority of the population to support radical governments, in the absence of viable programmes for meeting people's needs.

The unpredictability of social and economic life forces people to respond to short-terms situations but not to undertake commitments involving longer term risks. Political instability accentuates this tendency among the "political class" and encourages them to take what they can while the going is good and, if they take thought for the morrow, to invest it abroad.

Fear of the consequences of exclusion from state office leads the factions which make up the "political class" to take advantage of all legitimate and illegitimate means at their disposal to pursue and to keep power. Successive governments tend to enter into renewed cycles of authoritarianism.

Sustained appropriation from declining resources creates a political economy in which profits and power depend on people's ability to find and to create opportunities to command scarce resources, and thus to perpetuate scarcities rather than to find ways of ending them.

8. QUO VADIS AFRICA?

The outcome of the process of expanded étatisation is a complex of crises, involving not only economic and political institutions, but the culture of the society itself. These crises are met by adaptations to current circumstances by different people and groups which tend to exacerbate existing problems and to create new ones for the society and the various groups which make it up.

The fiscal crisis of the "developmental state" extends from foreign debts and foreign exchange shortages to scarcities of both imported and locally-produced goods, to the poor provision and even breakdown of essential services, such as water, power or transport. Health and education services decline and public sanitation deteriorates.

Bribery and corruption became the normal form of official transactions, at all levels of the state apparatus, and a necessity for engaging in private economic activity. People come to involve themselves exclusively with providing for their own needs and those of their immediate families. Concern for public matters gives way to the need to solve pressing private problems. In a reversal of Adam Smith's model, the pursuit of the private gain of each tends to make more difficult the provision of the needs of all.

The expanded scope of state activity and regulation has the consequence of reducing the state's capacity to manage and control. Only through a contraction of its sphere of activities could the state regain some ability to direct changes in accordance with its own polices.

Partial reforms tend to be ineffective in the absence of comprehensive changes in the social, political and economic environment. For example, the abolition of state export monopolies may offer private traders a means of acquiring and transferring foreign exchange abroad, in a situation where local currencies are unconvertible and overvalued. Improved prices for export crops may not stimulate increased official sales unless adequate transport is available and payment is made promptly in a currency in which desired goods can readily be purchased. Currency devaluation will not eliminate black markets or stabilise the effective exchange rate if the import of highly desired items is controlled. Given an unequal distribution of income, and of the means of acquiring it, free importation of goods may provide more quickly for the consumption patterns of the rich than for obtaining the means to expand local production or to meet the demands of poor producers.

The question is not whether the crises of the political economy will produce a fall in imports and a decline in living standards, but how this will take place, and how the costs of austerity will be distributed. Since state power provides access to marketable resources, and since money can buy state favour, the rich and powerful are better placed than anyone else to protect their position from the consequences of any form of austerity programme.

Since they can do little to change the conditions under which they operate, individuals and groups will try to solve the problems created for them by state policies by seeking to manipulate state decisions to favour themselves at somebody else's expense or even initiating new instruments of state action to meet their particular needs.

Lacking an effective capacity to direct economic and social changes, state officials are especially loth to sacrifice such controls as they have. Economic and political reforms designed to relax state control and central management tend to be qualified by measures designed to limit any untoward decisions by economic agents or local officials. In a situation of increasing scarcity, the private interests of the "political class" can only be secured by maintaining those levers which the state can provide for appropriating public funds.

The primary contradiction within such a system is that between the appropriation of the surplus value of producers by the ruling classes and their foreign and local associates. In this instance, the central and direct involvement of the state in the process of surplus appropriation lends to continuing expansion of the scope of state activity. However, this leads to the „diminishing reproduction" (Dutkiewicz and Shenton, 1986) of the social resources on which the state depends for its own reproduction, and of its capacity to appropriate them those resources and direct them to its own purposes.

In turn, this secondary contradiction generates a series of further contradictions, among state institutions, among different groups and classes, and between the centre and localities as each pursues its ends to the detriment of one another. Cooperation is fragile and temporary; antagonism and exclusion are the dominant motifs of such a system.

The contradictions of such system may lead to a consolidation of oligarchic rule and a stagnation of political life. At the opposite extreme, they may produce an escalation of military and civil violence. Those who make up the "political class" may adapt the system to deal with the problems generated by its own contradictions. Successive adaptations produce a cycle of renewal, reform and repression.

Public frustration arises with the inefficiency of the management of the economy and people's consequent difficulties in meeting their everyday needs, with manifest injustices and inequalities, and with their lack of effective means of democratic representation.

Public discontent may be manifested in various ways. Strikes, often with "economic" origins and demands, may provide a focus for wider political grievances. Local resistance may challenge central authority — and the government's dependence on military repression. Military intervention may capitalise on public frustrations and generate expectations of better times. So may a return from military to elected government.

Consolidation of the new regime requires exclusion as well as co-option. "Those who are not with us are againts us", be they defined as reactionaries seeking to restore the old regime or adventurists threatening the stability of the new order.

The new rulers use the instruments provided by the system to deal with some of its most glaring inadequacies. Changes are limited by the resources, political as well as economic, available to the rulers. Far-reaching reforms are constrained when they threaten to reduce the tenuous hold of the rulers on the levers through which they exercise power.

Renewal and reform thus tends to be followed by a further assertion of economic oligopoly and political oligarchy, mitigated only by their own ineffectiveness. Adaptations through crises are generally too long delayed, ineadequate to the situation, yet costly to most people, and are liable to add new problems and new institutions to compound the difficulties they inherited.

A further paper would be needed to explore the question: If problems cannot be solved by a "revolution from above", what are the prospects for a "revolution from below"? Suffice it to say that they appear to be weak. Oppressed classes and groups will resist particular forms of exploitation and repression. They will find ways of evading the controls which the state seeks to extend over their economic, political and social activities. They will even find ways of turning state activities to their own advantage. They may look to, or hope for, a new leader who will rule in their interest. But, as yet, there is little evidence of people creating and sustaining a movement and a set of institutions through which they may govern themselves.

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