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AGENDA-SHAPING POWERS, EU ENLARGEMENT AND DANISH COUNCIL PRESIDENCY – “FROM COPENHAGEN TO COPENHAGEN”

1. The “anticipatory adaptation” of the CEECs

From the beginning of the 1990s, the new market economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have seen economic growth and EU membership, *i.e.* marketisation and harmonisation with EU norms, as public goods, as “official discourses” and “valens issues”, *i.e.* issues on which all parties and elite groups declare the same objective, but dispute each other’s competence in achieving the desired policy” [Innes, 2002, 85], thereby shaping a path-dependency and a “transition in the (already on-going) transition”. The political elites have seemed willing to accept EU membership as an *a priori* good thing.

Thus, future EU membership has been a “top-priority” subject among the political elites in the CEE countries, thereby signifying that these countries wish to “return to Europe” and, as it was hoped, at the same time “catch up” with the West, both economically and socially. The structural conditions from outside, that means the demands put forward by the IMF and EU, have been extremely strict and therefore difficult to meet. Dismantling the command economy has been unexpectedly difficult to manage. Before long politicians faced shrinking public budgets combined with a huge increase in demand. Just as the economic crisis receded in the most successful economies, a new set of policy constraints emerged, as the EU applicant countries had to fulfil the EU accession requirements, the “Copenhagen criteria” adopted at the EU Copenhagen summit in 1993, *i.e.* a functioning and competitive market economy, a Western European style political democracy, efficient administration

(also named “the Madrid criterion”), a transparent justice system and effective law enforcement. As rightly noted by *Attila Ágh* [Ágh, 2002], in the transition from a planned economy to a market economy and the ongoing adaptation to the EU, the applicant countries faced a double challenge, globalisation and europisation.

Furthermore, the adaptation to the EU was “anticipatory” in the sense that the applicant countries introduced EU laws and rules, expecting EU accession, but without any guarantee that the expectations regarding membership would be fulfilled. In spite of the fact that most politicians from the EU expressed a broad commitment to enlargement, there was in fact been no *binding* commitment. In addition, uncertainty increased due to the lack of trust on both sides and the absence of enthusiasm from the side of the voters in the EU, especially in countries like Germany and Austria, where the degree of knowledge about the state and impact of enlargement has, in general, been rather low, *e.g.* regarding the movement of labour from East to West.

From the outset, each applicant state had to demonstrate a good record on almost everything from the banking sector to human rights, harmonise its relevant national legislation with EU regulations, *i.e.* adopt in full the EU “*aquis communautaire*”, the existing rules, regulations and agreements of the European Union. In the yearly “progress reports” the EU Commission made clear several times that the rate of adapting to EU law was inadequate. At least in principle, the *aquis communautaire* had to be fully implemented *before* joining the EU. However, this demand has been impossible to fulfil and gave rise to increasing “euro-scepticism” and “euro-realism” in the applicant countries. This requirement might, if followed in full, have posed serious budgetary problems for all the acceding states, as the contributions to the EU budget from the side of the accession countries has to be paid from the state budgets, while most money from the EU goes to municipalities and the regional level or to farmers [Innes, 2002, 90].

In addition, EU enlargement has met with “mixed feelings” among the EU-15 countries. From the outset, in the Scandinavian countries the enlargement of the EU was met with great enthusiasm for obvious geo-strategic, historical and economic reasons. In the case of the Southern European countries the southern dimension and the deepening of the EU had a higher priority. For this reason, the negotiations on enlargement were brought to a stand still at the end of the 1990s. After the Nice summit in December 2000 and the adoption of the new “road map” the negotiations were speeded up, thus moving the negotiation process from a standstill to the “end game”, that culminated with the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002. The accession treaties were

signed in Athens in April 2003 under the Greek Presidency. However, ratification of the treaty required time, and due to this (and for financial reasons), it was decided that the ten candidate countries would become members of the EU on 1 May 2004.

At the European Union summit in Copenhagen eight "post-communist" countries received invitations to join Western Europe's "exclusive club" in mid 2004. However the question is, whether the assimilation of thousands of pages of EU law means that the acceding countries had also adopted the *aquis communautaire* at the time of accession. As noted by Alan Mayhew [Mayhew, 2000], after EU accession there will be some years during which the EU rules and norms ("aquis") will not be implemented perfectly by the new EU member states (as in the case of previous enlargements and also in the EU-15, not to forget). However, this was felt by the present EU countries to be a rather small cost compared to that of delaying enlargement beyond 2004.

According to the decisions taken in Copenhagen, the EU Commission may limit the rights of the accession countries, e.g. voting rights and financial support in cases of serious flaws in the assimilation of national laws and rules to the *aquis communautaire*. Not to forget, due to the enlargement of the union, European integration faces two major challenges: the issue of EU institutional reform and the issue of how far the union's borders should extend.

2. Some theoretical perspectives on the negotiations about EU-enlargement

The negotiations about EU enlargement have been studied from different theoretical perspectives. One theory, called *liberal intergovernmentalism*, as formulated by Andrew Moravcik, is based on the rational choice approach, mainly focusing on the formation of preferences and the bargaining power of the governments involved, at the same time downplaying the role of the EU Commission in the negotiations. In other words, the core of liberal intergovernmentalism is based on three essential "assumptions":

- the assumption of the rational behaviour of states,
- a liberal theory of the formation of national preferences,
- an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.

The assumption of the *rational behaviour of states* provides a general framework of analysis, within which the costs and benefits of economic interdependence are the primary determinants of national preferences. According to Moravcik, the relative intensity of national preferences, the

existence of alternative coalitions and the opportunity for linking issues or "package deals" provide the basis for an intergovernmental analysis of the resolution of distributional conflicts among governments" [Moravcik, 1993, 480–481]. In the case of the enlargement negotiations, the intensity of the national preferences of the accession countries were *high*, however, the influence capacity of the accession countries were *low*, thereby minimizing the prospects of package deals and entering alternative coalitions.

The Danish social scientist Lykke Friis has formulated her own so-called "*Moravcik plus*" model, taking Moravcik and liberal intergovernmentalism as the point of departure, but at the same time including some qualitative variables by adding neo-institutional explanations, thereby underlining the role of the EU Commission in the negotiations on enlargement. Seen in this perspective, Lykke Friis distinguishes between what she calls the *logics* and the *strategies* of negotiations. Among the "logics" we find "club logic", this is illustrated by the fact that before finding a common position in the negotiations with the accession countries the EU-15 had agree *among themselves*. Therefore, the negotiations can be seen as a *inside-outside game*, consisting of at least two "games", first *inside* the EU-15 (e.g. on formulating common positions) and subsequently *outside*, i.e. negotiations between the EU-15 and the accession countries. This has not been an easy task, especially in the case of the agriculture chapter and budget and finance chapters.

Theories about the adaptation of *small states* to the European integration have focused, among other things, on the so-called "*integration dilemma*" and seen in this perspective the different strategies and ways of adopting followed by small states to the EU, e.g. strategies of *balancing*, i.e. a high degree of participation and strategies of demands, commitments, counterweight and concessions, of *quiescence*, i.e. a policy of non-commitment and/or *acquiescence*, i.e. a policy of concessions and strategies of bastions, in which case the countries involved focus on a few subjects during negotiations [Kelstrup, 1993].

Furthermore, adaptation theory assumes that foreign policy consists of policy-makers' actions manipulating the balance between their society (i.e. the internal environment) and their external environment, in order to secure the adequate functioning of social structures in situations of interdependence. This is a conception somewhat similar to the conceptualisation of foreign policy as a *two-level game*, in which policy-makers try to balance their external and internal environments against each other. The *control capacity* is a function of the positive and negative measures by which decision-makers may influence their societies on a given issue. Adaptation to the *external* environment can take different forms, de-

pending on the underlying balance between internal and external factors. The foreign policy of a country depends to a great extent on its degree of control over its external environment, *i.e.* its *capability to influence*.

In the case of the applicant countries, due to their low influence capacity, the smaller countries tended to follow a bastion strategy, *i.e.* focusing on a few topics in the negotiations, in the case of Lithuania the questions of nuclear power (Ignalina) and taxation (*e.g.* taxes on cigarettes) were prominent. As the largest accession country, Poland has aimed to follow a balancing line, entering coalitions and trying to profit from its relatively high capacity to influence. The forthcoming referenda on EU membership will show the extent of the control capacity of the accession countries' governments.

By *integration dilemma* Morten Kelstrup means the dilemma of an "either/or": *either* the state gives up a substantial part of its sovereignty with the danger of being "*entrapped*" in the integrated system, *i.e.* being so constrained that it loses its freedom of action and thereby its ability to pursue its own interests, *or* the state insists on its independence with the danger of being "*abandoned*", *i.e.* not included in the system with the disadvantages which might ensue" [Kelstrup, 1993]. We may refer to this "logic" as the dialectic of inclusion/exclusion. Seen from the point of the applicant countries, the negotiations with the EU have been asymmetric with the EU as the clearly strongest negotiating pole and unexpectedly tough negotiating partner, especially when negotiating on the most "sensitive" negotiation chapters, *e.g.* on agricultural policy and the budget.

3. The powers of the EU Council Presidency

Regarding the role of the Council Presidency, as rightly noticed by *Jonas Tallberg* [Tallberg, 2002], the existing literature is overwhelming sceptic. According to most observers, the presidency's ability to promote private concerns has been considered highly limited. Typically, the presidency has been depicted as a "*responsabilité sans pouvoir*", taking care primarily of technical administrative problems. Gradually the role of the chairmanship has expanded. Thus looking at *e.g.* the Swedish and Danish EU Chairmanships, the basic and simplified view has to be modified not least as regards the enlargement negotiations. Due to the expansion of the EU, the rotating EU Chairmanship is expected to be abolished after the adoption of the forthcoming EU Constitution.

Each EU Presidency has at least two main tasks. One is to get the work done. All the proposals on the Council's table must be dealt with.

This applies both to matters that have a high political profile and those that are important, but do not make headlines in the newspapers. *Hendrik Voss* and *Emilie Bailleul* [Voss and Bailleul, 2002, 5] both underline that the European President is in charge of organisational and administrative-technical affairs: presiding over debates, signing reports and conclusions. It is also the president who decides how much time will be devoted to an item on the agenda and when to proceed to the vote. Secondly, the president lays down the agenda of the meetings and jointly with the Commission, a programme of priorities is developed which serves as a basis for the provisional agendas of the Councils. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the president is expected to play a mediatory role as well, *i.e.* seek a common denominator and forge compromises. Fourthly, a president also has a representative function, being the face and mouthpiece of the Union in the media, *vis-à-vis* the other European institutions and on the international scene. In these cases, the president is assisted by the Commission and especially by the General Secretariat of the Council, not only technically, but also substantively. Furthermore, the Secretary General's staff help to work out compromises. The presidency seems to have focused on structuring the work in the Council. Over time the work in the Council has become more streamlined, with fewer but stronger Council configurations. At the same time the meetings of the European Council seem to have been better prepared and the agenda drawn up to focus on fewer and more comprehensive measures.

Jonas Tallberg develops a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda-shaping: agenda setting, agenda structuring, and agenda exclusion.

Typically, he argues, influence has been equated with the introduction of new issues on the agenda, *i.e.* agenda-setting. In other words, agenda-setting refers to the introduction of *new issues* on the policy agenda. In contrast, agenda structuring refers to the emphasising or de-emphasising of issues already put on the agenda. Finally, agenda-exclusion refers to the active barring of issues from the policy agenda. Furthermore, we can distinguish between at least three *types* of EU Chairmanships: the consensual, *i.e.* aiming at compromises, the entrepreneurial, *i.e.* actively leaving one's mark on the agenda, and the dominating, *i.e.* pushing forward one's own national interests.

In spite of French ambivalence regarding enlargement, other priorities, the 2002 election and dominant type French EU Chairmanship, *e.g.* manifested during the Nice summit in December 2000, the enlargement process was speeded up by the decisions taken at the summit. The "Amsterdam leftovers", the outstanding institutional questions related to the

enlargement, were in three areas: the size and composition of the Commission, the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the Council, and the weighting of votes in the Council. Also the proposals in the EU Commission's "Strategy Paper" from November 2000 regarding greater flexibility on the treatment of transition periods, the possibility of "setting aside" chapters and a "road map" for the negotiations were accepted in Nice.

The Swedish presidency, which followed at the beginning of 2001 was expected to be far more positive towards enlargement than the French, but Sweden needed strong allies among other member states to fulfil the platform of the presidency. According to the "road map", it was under the Swedish presidency in the first half of 2001 that the final phase, the so-called "end game" in the negotiations on enlargement should start.

4. The Danish EU Council Presidency

Denmark took over the EU Presidency from 1 July 2002 to 31 December 2002. Nine years before, in 1993 the EU took its first step towards enlargement by formulating the so-called "Copenhagen criteria" for future EU membership. As mentioned above, over the last ten years the candidate countries had to adjust laws and rules to the EU "acquis communautaire", and the EU had to change as well, in order to be ready for enlargement. The Danish presidency came at a time when the EU was about to enlarge using the "road" map adopted in Nice and after four years of tough negotiations. The European Council in Copenhagen took place on 12–13 December 2002.

Facts about the presidency

- The member states take in turns to preside the EU.
- The country holding the presidency is to further the EU's work and establish the basis for necessary compromises. At the same time the country holding the presidency is to represent the EU regarding foreign policy.
- The country holding presidency is to chair EU meetings and host EU negotiations.
- As regards the Danish presidency, the biggest meeting was the *European Council summit of 12–13 December in Copenhagen, where the heads of state and government met.*

Source: Danish Foreign Ministry.

From the outset the Danish presidency was met with some reservation from the other EU-15 countries, due to the well-known Danish EU scepticism, which was manifested in the Danish opt-out of the Maastricht criteria (The Edinburgh agreement). Because of this opt-out, Denmark does not take part in any of the following: the supranational cooperation regarding legal matters and domestic affairs, EU citizenship, EU defence cooperation and the common currency, the euro. The opt-out had some consequences for the Danish EU Presidency. In defence matters Denmark had to relinquish the presidency. In this case, the presidency was taken over by Greece, which was the next country to assume the presidency. Moreover, Denmark is not participating in the euro and therefore could not assume the presidency of the group of euro countries. Finally, Denmark could not take part in decisions, which regard the opt-out, *i.e.* regarding legal matters and domestic affairs, but Denmark would be able to chair the negotiations.

Nonetheless, and maybe exactly due to this opt-out, the Danish government deeply involved itself in the EU chairmanship to show Denmark as distinct pro-European country capable of carrying out the enlargement and at the same time organise complex interstate negotiations. Another cause of the strong Danish involvement in the enlargement process was that EU enlargement had top priority for the Danish governments throughout the 1990s, however, provided that the enlargement became the "big bang" scenario, *i.e.* included all applicant countries and most or all of the three Baltic states.

The Copenhagen criteria

The candidate countries have to fulfil a number of criteria, in order to become members of the EU:

- The political criterion: the country must have a stable democracy, respect human rights and minorities.
- The economic criterion: the country must have a well-functioning market economy and be strong enough to be competitive in the EU Single Market.
- Moreover, the candidate countries have to live up to the commitments involved in EU membership, among others the adoption and application of the EU rules (the "acquis communautaire")

Furthermore, according to the later *Madrid criterion*, the candidate countries have to built up sufficient administrative capacity to be able to implement EU laws and directives.

From the beginning, the Danish presidency set more or less clear goals within at least five areas. As said, the enlargement had top priority. However, other subjects were also on the agenda and some results achieved, including such subjects as liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets in the EU, the establishment of a single European airspace and adoption of new rules on food safety. A tax package was designed, among other things, to ensure fair taxation of interest accrued on savings hidden in banks in other countries inside the EU, as well as in key countries outside the EU.

With respect to the Middle East issue, the presidency launched a number of peace initiatives, however, as in other cases of peace proposals, without any great success. Also, the question about intensifying the EU's relations with Russia was important. In that respect the Danish chairmanship was a failure to some extent, although this was primarily due to the Chechen conference that took place in Copenhagen at the same time as a Chechen terrorist act in Moscow. In spite of pressure from the Russian government, the Danish government refused to cancel the conference. For that reason Vladimir Putin refused to take part in the EU-Russian summit in Copenhagen. Instead, that meeting with Putin took place in Brussels. After long and difficult negotiations, the EU summit in Brussels succeeded in reaching a common understanding with Russia on the question about transit of Russian citizens from Kaliningrad to Russia after Lithuania and Poland became membership of EU. The agreement ensures rather smooth and un-bureaucratic transit to and from Kaliningrad.

Also, the question of Turkey became a key issue. At the Copenhagen summit it was decided that if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and recommendation by the Commission, determines that Turkey fulfils the political criteria from Copenhagen, the European Union will then initiate accession negotiations with Turkey as soon as possible. Cyprus seemed to be about to join the EU as a partitioned island. The Turkey question has become a reason for huge debate in itself. EU leaders have been split as to when, if at all, Turkey, should be given a date for starting accession negotiations. France and Germany started the ball rolling by saying Ankara should be allowed to first start negotiations in July 2005. England supported the quickest possible opening of negotiations, mostly due to the need for Turkey's cooperation in the case of war against Iraq.

At the Copenhagen summit we could also note agreement on the question about the future agreement between NATO and EU concerning security and defence (ESDP). The EU wanted to reach an agreement with NATO on the use of its assets for the EU's operations, but had until then

been held up by the conflicting interests of Greece and Turkey. Turkey, a NATO member, but not for the foreseeable time an EU member, has been concerned about the EU getting access to NATO assets. Furthermore, during the Danish presidency the EU countries continued the work of creating a common asylum policy and strengthening their efforts against international crime. The implementation of the EU's action plan for combating terrorism, that started during the Belgium presidency in the second half of 2001, continued and police cooperation became strengthened, in order to eradicate drug smuggling and child pornography, among other things.

In summary, we can say that the conclusion of the accession negotiations with the first ten new member states was the Danish EU Presidency's greatest task. As enlargement was also popular among the Danish population, a successful conclusion might increase the Danish government's control capacity by increasing popular support for the EU in general and improving the prospects of getting rid of the Danish opt-out at a future national referendum. Maybe such a referendum will take place at the same time as the referendum on the new EU treaty planned to take place in 2004. Thus, the strategy followed by the Danish government should be seen as an integral part of the adaptation policy primarily aimed at reducing the specific Danish integration dilemma and increasing the control capacity that has existed ever since accession to the EU in 1972.

From the outset of the chairmanship, the Danish presidency drew up a strategy for the negotiations, that was aimed at clearing the highest possible number of negotiation issues before the meeting of the European Council in Brussels on 24 and 25 October. This included issues such as Estonia's right to the continued production of oil shale (a special Estonian energy resource, extracted by mining), Malta's right, for a limited period of time, to continue giving state aid to certain industries, including shipyards, and Poland's ability to comply with the EU rules on Justice and Home Affairs (for instance on border control). In the end, the strategy proved successful.

At the Brussels summit outstanding questions regarding the *financial package* also had to be dealt with, the negotiation chapter with the highest priority and closely linked to the agriculture chapter. An agreement was reached concerning the phasing-in of the candidate countries into the system of direct payments in the agricultural sector. It was the Danish Presidency's goal to reach agreement with the EU member states on the price of the enlargement at the EU Council meeting in October. This means that also questions of budget compensations were resolved. This plan succeeded, at least partly. A decision was made on the amount that

the candidate countries are to receive from the EU structural funds. A decision was also made on the phasing-in of the candidate countries into the EU system of direct payments to individual farms (with a 10 years transition period). In addition, it was decided that no candidate country was to be in a poorer position after accession in relation to the EU budget than before, when they received support from the EU for their accession preparations.

Immediately before the meeting of the European Council in Brussels, the EU Commission presented its annual assessment of the preparations by the candidate countries for membership. In that final progress report the Commission concluded that the ten countries had made so much progress in their preparations for EU membership that they would be ready for accession by the beginning of 2004. The Brussels European Council adopted this assessment. This was the prerequisite for completing the enlargement negotiations. During the period leading to the Copenhagen European Council, the Danish Presidency, together with the Commission, conducted intense individual negotiations with the ten candidate countries, at the same time respecting the decisions taken at the Brussels European Council.

Another issue to be sorted out at the Copenhagen summit was the accession "roadmap" for Bulgaria and Romania, who will not join the EU with the other ten in 2004, but most likely in 2007, maybe later. The financial terms of their accession package had to be agreed by the EU leaders.

With the enlargement achieved, the work in the convention will become a crucial political task for the EU. The aim is to ensure that the future EU with 25 member states will also be able to function. Most important is to simplify decision making procedures and emphasise common values. The use of qualified majority voting and the co-decision procedure has to be expanded, the work of the EU has to be more transparent and under more strict democratic control. The different opinions on the war against Iraq underlined stronger Atlanticism and at the same time also a soft euro-scepticism among the accession countries, mainly directed against the French and German plans about creating a "avant-garde group" of EU countries and a (semi) federal structure with greater influence given to large countries and with the original ("old") EU-6 countries as the new post-enlargement "avant-garde". In the convention negotiations about the new EU treaty the accession countries are facing an integration dilemma, to some extent reminding us of the soft euro-sceptical attitudes to the EU in the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom.

5. More about the agricultural chapter, finance and budget

From the outset, the problems in the agriculture chapter were difficult to resolve. They were also affected by the frequent changes of agricultural policy from the union side. Thus, the agricultural chapter was clearly one of the main negotiating problems ("high politics") and for that reason became the object of tough interstate negotiations, *i.e.* a high preference intensity, to use one of the concepts put forward by neo-liberalists. From the outset, the prospects for getting side-payments due to concessions on agricultural policy (the 10 year transition period) were modest, primarily because of the low influence capability and the policy of acquiescence of the accession countries. As the largest country, Poland tried to follow a balancing policy, but did not succeed. However, it was decided that some payments from the EU, intended to be given to organic farming in the accession countries, could be given to farmers as direct payments.

In the endgame, the negotiations were especially hard regarding very specific issues, like milk quotas and the amount and timing of money transfers. Thus, in agriculture, both member states and candidate countries held out until the last minute. The turning points were the acceptance by the EU-15 of the Commissions proposal about a 10 year transition period before the accession countries received direct payments to farmers on an equal footing with the EU-15 countries, and secondly the acceptance of the German-French proposal about "freezing" the expenditure on the common agricultural policy (CAP) from the year 2006.

The two biggest players were Germany and France, who argued that the later, "softer" package proposed by the Danish presidency offered too much to Poland, *e.g.* on converting structural orientated economic support for farmers to direct payments and renationalising some of the agricultural support for farmers, and too little to German and French farmers. In the end, during the Copenhagen summit the Germans gave some concessions as regards finance and budget, however, mostly in the shape of "speeding up" payments from the EU structural and regional funds. Tied up with this was the general issue of financial compensation, the new member states did not want to be worse off after they joined the Union than before it.

6. Concluding remarks

In conclusion, we can say that the Danish EU Presidency was successful, at least as regards the topic that had top priority for the Danes, the

enlargement of the EU to the east. The Danish chairmanship was of the *consensual* type, aimed at finding a "two-level compromise", on one hand between the EU-15 countries themselves and on the other between the EU-15 and the accession countries. Furthermore, the aim of the Danish government was to increase the control capacity, thus paving the way for removing the Danish opt-out.

The argument that the EU Chairmanship in some cases is better handled by small states has been confirmed in the case of the Danish chairmanship. Denmark did not need to act in "entrepreneurial" ways by raising new subjects on the agenda, mainly due to the significance of the enlargement question to the Danish government (and population). Furthermore, Denmark was not motivated to be "consolidating", *i.e.* deepening integration by institutional reforms, due to the Danish opt-out and widespread euro-scepticism in the Danish population as regards further integration and federalisation of the EU. Anyway, the end game of the negotiations about the new EU treaty at the EU Convention will take place *after* the Danish Chairmanship.

As we have seen, Denmark took over the chairmanship at the end of the "inside-outside enlargement game" and under intensive time pressure. In the light of the responsibilities of the chairing countries, we can conclude that "chairmanship" (and the Commission) do (at least to some extent) matter when forging inter-state compromises. In the end game (and inside-outside game) most subjects for negotiations constituted "high politics", if we use the neo-liberal intergovernmentalist terminology, including the budget and agriculture. For these reasons those negotiations were inter-state characterised by a high preference intensity and the important role played by the two "core EU-countries", France and Germany, as regards closing the chapters on agriculture and the budget. Thus, the breakthrough in the negotiations was due to two proposals from Germany, first in the shape of the French-German initiative on freezing the expenditure on CAP from 2006, and second in the shape of the German financial "offer" to Poland during the summit in Copenhagen.

Unlike during the Belgian chairmanship, no external shocks (if we exclude the terrorist act in Moscow in October 2002 and its negative impact on Danish-Russian relations) disturbed the performance of the presidency. A war in Iraq could have constituted an external shock. The handling of the enlargement negotiations by the Danish chairmanship are considered as successful by external and internal observers, criticism from the side of the opposition in the Danish parliament has mostly focused on other topics, *e.g.* food and animal safety, taxation, in which cases concrete results have been less visible or even missing.

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