Oświecony egoizm a zachowania prospołeczne

• Authors: Giovanni Tondini , Luca Zarri

Title variants

EN

Enlightened Self-Interest and Pro-Social Behaviours

Abstracts

EN

In today's affluent post-industrial societies, a growing number of scenarios involve relevant forms of socio-economic interaction in which the behavioural motivation of the various agents is complex and multi-faceted, rather than merely unilateral. The degree of material development reached by these societies in the last decades of the 20th century enables individual members to give expression to their motivational complexity through forms of interaction whose role was wholly marginal when the need to survive was pre-eminent (see on this Tondini and Zarri (2005)). First of all we should understand that while it is often true that our intentional actions are oriented towards the pursuit of self-interested goals in the short term (i.e. the prospect of an immediate material gain, in traditional economic theory), it is equally true that ever more frequently circumstances are arising in which personal interest is undoubtedly pursued, but only in the medium-long term.

PL

We współczesnych zamożnych społeczeństwach postindustrialnych coraz większe znaczenie mają takie formy interakcji społeczno-ekonomicznych, w których zachowania ludzi motywowane są raczej w sposób złożony i wieloaspektowy niż tylko jednostronnie. Stopień rozwoju materialnego, jaki społeczeństwa te osiągnęły w ciągu kilku ostatnich dziesięcioleci XX wieku, daje ich członkom możliwość wyrażenia swoich motywacji w całej ich złożoności za pomocą takich form interakcji, których rola w czasach, kiedy dominowała potrzeba przetrwania, była jedynie marginalna (o czym więcej w: Tondini, Zarri 2005).

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Problemy Zarządzania
• Year: 2007
• Volume: 5
• Issue: 1(15)
• Pages: 162-175

Dates

published

2007

Contributors

author

Giovanni Tondini

• Wydział Zarządzania, Uniwersytet w Weronie

author

Luca Zarri

• Wydział Zarządzania, Uniwersytet w Weronie

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Identifiers

Biblioteka Nauki

34112059