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Polish-Ukrainian relations in 1918-1930

Abstract

The article was devoted to the Warsaw settlement. The present article contains analysis of the etiology of the war Polish - Ukrainian - Russian. In it an issue of the Ukrainian emigration was also addressed in the Second Polish Republic

Key words: Ukraine, Poland, settlement, emigration, population, independence.

INTRODUCTION

Polish - Ukrainian relations in the interwar period were determined at the outset by the events of the years 1918 - 1920. The paradox of history was that Ukraine was the first country with which The Second Republic of Poland led an armed conflict on the borders, and a year later the only ally who supported it actively in the war against the Bolsheviks in 1920. As a result of the First World War and the war with the Bolsheviks, the Poles won independence and their borders in the East, absorbing a large Ukrainian minority into their country and the Ukrainian independence movement suffered total defeat. Political frustration and unfulfilled hopes for their own state pushed a large part of the Ukrainian radical activists against Poland. This article aims to bring the subject of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the context of the Warsaw Settlement, Polish - Ukrainian - Russian war and Ukrainian emigration into the Second Republic.

WARSAW SETTLEMENT AND POLISH - UKRAINIAN – RUSSIAN WAR

In 1918 Ukraine proclaimed the independence of the state as a result of the internal distribution of Tsarist Russia and the favorable international configuration. "Too fast and rapid disintegration of the empire freed tide megalomania and maximalist growth ambitions of territorial – state among Ukrainian autonomists and a small group of independence supporters. They planned to build a United Ukraine, which, next to the central area, would involve the Kuban, Donskoy

Country, Crimea, Carpathian Ruthenia, the eastern part of Galicia and northern Bukovina, southern Belarus, Podlasie, Chelm and Lemkivshchyna¹.

At the same time the restaurant of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Bolshevik Russia began its aggression against them. In December, the Bolsheviks attacked the left bank, in February took Kiev and after a few months of fighting the young Ukrainian state has shrunk to Podolia and Volyn. In addition, combining with ZUNR in January 1919 URL had to commit forces to help the Galician Ukrainians. Thus it came into direct conflict with the Poland, with which it also led war in Volyn. Notwithstanding the power of the Polish army, Halicka Army surpassed in July 1919 Zbrucz and when combined with the active URL Army ousted Bolsheviks from Kiev. But it had to leave the capital since the fighting with the Volunteer Army A. Denikin started. At the end of September 1919 whiteguards, instead of fighting the Bolsheviks, directed their forces against the Ukrainians, displacing URL Army toward the Polish front after a long and grueling battle. In November of that year, the remnants of the Ukrainian troops were in the area of Lubar, and about 8 thousand soldiers were interned in Poland, in which was also a part of some URL government institutions. During the URL Army Command meeting in Lubar on 5 December 1919 it was established that the military will go into guerrilla warfare and the government into conspiracy, maintaining contact with the army by a specially delegated political speakers. Some members of the URL government remained in Kamieniec Podolski seized by the Polish army at the request of the Ukrainians, and Simon Petlura, the president of the Directorate at the night of 5 to 6 December along with several closest associates went to Warsaw for direct talks to the Chief of State, Jozef Pilsudski². Ukraine played a key role in Pilsudski's plans, who saw it as the best barrier separating Poland from Russia and a key element of the future federation of states led by the Poland between the Baltic and the Black Sea, which would be a counterbalance for Russia and Germany.

The minimum program assumed separation from Russia and binding the right bank of Ukraine with Poland, Pilsudski's supporters were ready for far-reaching concessions in the course of the border between the two countries. According to it, the delimitation would be in a form of so-called ethnic balance, leading to the division of eastern Galicia, leaving Zaglebie Lviv and Boryslav - Drohobych on the Polish side. When I. Paderewski became the Prime Minister there has been a change in policy towards Ukraine. Since that time the priority was to absorb the entire eastern part of Galicia³.

Due to the uprising of nationalist sentiment in Poland, during the war for Eastern Galicia, the agreement between the Polish government and the Petlura government was impossible. Polish public recognized both the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the foundation of ZUNR as hostile steps and UNR with the Germans were accused of another partition of Poland⁴. Polish Marshal's policy was viciously fought by the National Democratic Party. Dominated by it, Polish National Committee,

1 Potocki (1999) 34

2 Szajdak (2005) 48-70

3 Potocki (1999) 39-40

4 Pisuliński (2004) 392

sought the intervention of the Great Powers in the conflict in eastern Galicia and tried to block the support for the Ukrainian state.

The first try of an agreement had already been taken in May 1919, when the fighting in Galicia seemed to fade. URL authorities, after the failure of talks to the allies in the issue of fight against the Bolsheviki, frantically searched for an ally. The possibility of closer alliance with ZUNR or agreement with the Polish over the heads of the Galician Ukrainians were the options. As a result of supporters of the second option, Boris Kurdynowski came to Poland as a Petlura delegate. May 24 Ukrainian delegate and Polish Prime Minister I. Paderewski have signed a document known as a Kurdynowski – Paderewski agreement.

The system, which was the original agreement of April 1920 consisted of 8 articles. For the Polish important articles were the first and second, in which the Ukrainian side has renounced its rights to the Eastern Galicia and Western Volyn up to the line of Styr. In return, the Polish side agreed to recognize the independence of Ukraine (under a condition of reorganizing the government), to assist in the fight against the Bolsheviki and to reorganize the army. UNR government pledged to return the Poles their lost possessions and coordinate its foreign policy with Warsaw. The last two points of the agreement were to ensure appropriate rights for national minorities of the two countries. The declaration concluded with an announcement of a separate military convention. This system did not come into force due to the Ukrainian government distanced themselves from it⁵, however, according to the Polish government agreement of May 24 did its job - removed the issue of Galicia from the agenda of peace conference in Paris.

Contacts on the line Poland - Ukraine lasted throughout 1919 and resulted in more or less permanent contracts⁶.

September 1, 1919 “Agreement on ceasefire between the army Polish and Ukrainian” was signed in Warsaw by a delegation of the URL General Forces Command and a delegation of the Supreme Command of the Polish Army.

In October, the Ukrainian political mission led by Andriy Lewycki, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military mission, headed by gen. Victor Zieliński arrived to Poland. December 2, 1919 Polish government has been introduced to the official purpose of the mission in the form of the “Declaration of the Government of the Ukrainian Republic to the High Government of the Polish Republic”⁷. The Ukrainian side has renounced its rights to parts of eastern Galicia and Volyn, The Peace Conference in Paris was to decide about the final location of the borders. They also announced a separate agreement due to the Polish request about land ownership in Ukraine. The declaration contained a list of demands, on which Poles initially agreed, they concerned the obligation to sign commercial and military conventions, and exempt interned and imprisoned in Poland Ukrainian

5 Bakula (2003) 157

6 Wiszka (2004) 122

7 Stępień, Piłsudski, Petlura (1999) 37

citizens⁸. The ZUNR representatives, who were a part of the delegation, opposed the words contained in the declaration. They refused to sign it and demonstratively left the mission. However, this was ignored by the Poles and Petlura who arrived at that time to Warsaw and announced in a letter dated December 11, that despite the ZUNR representatives opposition he considers the declaration of December 2 as binding⁹. The first meeting of the leaders of Poland and Ukraine occurred in the night from 9 to 10 December. It began a series of mostly nocturnal meetings between the two politicians. Simon Petlura knew that Jozef Pilsudski and his Eastern Europe remodeling project was a guarantee of the construction of the Ukrainian state. Therefore it was necessary to bring the Ukrainian - Polish alliance at all costs¹⁰ and that was the reason of the presence of the Chief Ataman in Poland.

Pilsudski's survived statements and his previous actions like offensive to the Ukraine for the restitution of its statehood, was in his plans at the turn of 1919 and 1920 and the declaration of December 2 was a preliminary step to this end. Petlura was perceived as the best candidate for the Polish ally in the fight against the Bolsheviks, as directed by him URL government at that time had no real alternative. In addition, Petlura was the only major Ukrainian politician, who rejected any ties with Russia and opted for cooperation with Poland and Romania. He also enjoyed popularity among the army, which allowed for the acquisition of debris URL army and insurgent troops.

April 21, 1921 Polish - Ukrainian political agreement was signed and has passed into history as the Pilsudski - Petlura pact.

The most important aspect of it was the recognition of Ukrainian independence and the Directorate of Petlura at its head by Poland. On the border issue, they agreed on the line of the river Zbrucz, former Austrian border to Wyszogródka, over the Krzemienieckie hill and then, after a east line of Zdolbunow, along the eastern border of the county Rivne, then along the borders of the province of Minsk to the Pripjat River. The fate of the Dubieński, Rivne and parts of Krzemieniec counties, which fell to Poland, were to opt for negotiations at a later time. There was a conversion project of such areas for around Kamjanets where Poles lived¹¹. Both sides have declared they will not conclude international agreements, which would violate the interests of allies and promised to conclude military convention and trading system.

During the negotiations the Polish side requested to include three representatives of the Polish community in Ukraine into the URL Government, proposing to grant them ministers of health, agriculture and internal affairs. This has been interpreted as evidence of a lack of trust in the URL government and the desire of supervision. In addition, the acquisition by a Pole (Stanislaw Stempowski) control on the Ministry of Agriculture aroused the suspicion of the possibility of withdrawal of

8 Szajdak (2005) 102

9 Pisuliński (2004) 181-183

10 Potocki (1999) 33

11 Potocki (1999) 58-59

land reform and returning them to Polish landowners. All this hampered Petlura's efforts to accept the pact by his own society¹².

The settlement was criticized by the majority of the Ukrainians, especially Galicia (for Haliczanie the Warsaw agreement, including the entire province into Poland, was the end of their political aspirations), also in Poland many voices of protest were heard. The press and the parliament accused the government of conducting politics outside parliament, Stanislaw Grabski demonstratively resigned from chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee position, the press introduced a password that Poles will not die for Ukraine. "In the eyes of Poles Pilsudski - Petlura agreement was a kind of political compromise, because of the need to return to the borders of 1772. However, due to the settlement Poland not only gave the First Republic a large area from Kiev to Zbrucz but also for the first time since the B. Khmelniński emphasized the existence of independent Ukraine and for the first time in history to recognize the right of Zaporozhian Sich descendants to full independence and their own state"¹³.

Following the arrangement of Polish - Ukrainian agreement political representatives of both countries have concluded a secret military convention three days later. Signing military convention was the need of the moment, because at that time the Polish troops occupied offensive positions.

The Convention provided a joint action of troops on both sides against the Bolsheviks; Poles pledged to help with the organization of the Directorate of the Ukrainian branch and provide equipment for the three infantry divisions. The gains of war, with the exception of movable taken in battle, had fall on the Ukrainian side, which was required to supply Polish troops with provisions on the territory of Ukraine. An important element of the system were issues relating to civil and military administration on liberated areas. It was decided that the administration in the URL territories so far occupied by the Polish army will be gradually transferred to the Ukrainian side, the Polish authorities were to assist in the organization of the Ukrainian authorities. Also the board of the civilian and military areas taken from the Bolsheviks had to be in the hands of the Ukrainian. The Polish side has reserved for themselves the right to secure lines of communication and control the railways¹⁴.

April 26 Polish and Ukrainian armies offensive began in Podolia. On the same day the Supreme Commander issued an appeal to the Ukrainians, declaring, that the offensive is aimed at the liberation of Ukraine and creation of an independent Ukrainian state, and that Polish troops will withdraw from Ukraine, as soon as the state authorities are appointed and army rebuilt¹⁵. On the same day also S. Petlura issued a proclamation. It was about the current struggle for an independent Ukrainian state and explained the reasons and the need for joint military action¹⁶.

12 Pisuliński (2004) 220-221

13 Potocki (1999) 64

14 Szajdak (2005) 107

15 Pisuliński (2004) 227

16 Chojnowski (1979) 61

The presence of Ukrainian units (15 thousand soldiers) alongside Polish troops (65 thousand)¹⁷ was to facilitate control and pacification of sentiment in the country and provide a basis for numerical growth of the URL army. In addition, the possession by the URL of their own army would raise its credibility and prestige in the society, and its rapid expansion and taking over the burden of warfare would reduce the presence of Polish troops to a minimum¹⁸.

In expedition to Kiev 3rd Iron Division participated, formed in Podolia and created in spring 1920, first in Ukrainian Cumulative Hostel in Lancut, and later in Brest 6th Rifle Division. Three other divisions - 1 Zaporoska, 2 Volyn and 4 Kiev - operated on the back of the enemy within the Winter parade (December 6, 1919 - May 5, 1920.). May 6, 1920 they merged with the 3 Iron Division and then occupied the southern sector of the front. Already during the campaign 5 Chersońską Division and Mounted Division were formed¹⁹.

Allied armies quickly occupied large swathes of the country and 7 May marched into Kiev, the same day URL government moved to Vinnitsa from Kamjanets. Despite the success of the offensive Pilsudski decided not to let the Polish forces into the Ukraine, because he was afraid of negative public response to the prolonged stay of foreign troops on its soil, especially because of theft and rape committed by Polish soldiers.

In mid-June 1920 URL army numbered about 20 thousand soldiers, but only less than 10 thousand in a line. The others were in the up units and oversized camps²⁰.

5 June 1st Cavalry Army of Semyon Budyonny broke the Polish front. Soon Polish - Ukrainian forces were forced to retreat behind Zbrucz. Ukrainian lands were again in the hands of the Bolsheviks, and Poland was in mortal danger.

June 11, commanded by gen. Rydz – Śmigły, 3 Army evacuated from Kiev. Fighting in its composition 6 Rifle Division, which provided insurance retreating Polish troops, fought an exhausting fight against the Bolsheviks from Kiev to Chełm and Krasnystaw. August 19 it passed to Zamosc, where its commander, Colonel (later General) Marko Bezruchko, general commander of the troops of the Polish Army, with almost 600 staff officers and substantial support of the inhabitants of Zamosc and the surrounding areas (for 4 days and nights 5 - 6 thousand people worked), organized an effective defensive belt and moving points on the wings of the fortifications, through which 16 - thousand Budionny Riding army could not get to Warsaw. At the beginning of September 6 Division moved to Stanisławow and merged with other units of the URL army²¹.

Mobilization of Polish society and France in mid-August 1920 helped to provide an effective counter-attack by Wieprz on the left wing of Mikhail Tukhachevsky troops advanced up to Warsaw. This “miracle by Vistula” made possible thanks

17 Szajdak (2005) 145

18 Szajdak (2005) 108-109

19 Wiszka (2004) 23

20 Szajdak (2005) 176-177

21 Kolańczuk, Tułapkanycz (1999) 82

also to the Ukrainian units, which constituted the core of the main strike force in the assault on the Bolsheviks near Warsaw. Other Ukrainian divisions at the time hedged the southern flank of the front against attack by the troops of Alexander Yegorov. This way, they maintained territorial link with Romania, from where supplies were coming to Poland. Despite initial Polish fears about the loyalty side of the Ukrainians, they have kept the conditions of the April pact. Tukhachevsky and Yegorov groups were broken, and the front moved east, behind Zbrucz and Horyn, where Polish armies stopped²².

From April to October 1920 Ukrainian army faithfully kept the alliance, and despite staffing issues they represented the power supply of 1 - 2 full-fledged Polish divisions. Between Petlura's and the Polish armies conflicts didn't occur, on the contrary, the participants of those events emphasized the positive ties between the soldiers of the allied armies²³.

Pilsudski's victory in the Battle of the Vistula saved Polish independence, but did not save Ukraine. Exhausted by the war The II Republic sought quickly to peace. Since mid-August 1920 first in Minsk, then in Riga Polish - Soviet peace talks took place. Despite finalizing ceasefire discussions with the Bolsheviks, Poles, intended to help Ukrainians to bring about a shift future armistice line to the east, including providing support for the arming and provisioning. At that time (mid-September 1920) URL army numbered about 17,500 soldiers. Polish troops fight ended with the moment of signing, 12 October 1920, peace Preliminaries between Poland and Soviet Russia.

The signing of the preliminaries did not mean the total Petlura aid plans renunciation by the Head of State. Pilsudski until the Treaty of Riga validation welcomed URL representatives despite the protests of the Russians, he also was interested in the preparations for the uprising.

October 18, 1920 Supreme Commander in a special letter goodbyed URL troops, thanking them for their participation in the fight against the Bolsheviks, he also sent a letter of similar content to the Chief Ataman commander of the 6 Army gen. Stanisław Haller.

Ukrainian army was no match for the Bolsheviks, November 21, on the basis of previously concluded agreements in Wołoczyska, Ukrainian troops crossed Zbrucz and stayed in administered by the Poles Eastern Galicia.

March 18, 1921 on the power of Riga Peace Treaty the Polish side retreated its support for URL, recognizing the Bolshevik government. Ukrainian lands were divided between Poland and Bolshevik Russia. Polish - Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 did not achieve the intended goal, but allowed the URL army to continue the struggle for independence and after its defeat gave soldiers and government the opportunity to shelter in Poland. After 1926, the settlement was unofficially in force as the basis for civil - military conspiracy. Thanks to the Pilsudski - Pet-

22 Wiszka (2004) 24

23 Potocki (1999) 61-62

lura pact Ukrainian fight for independence has become a matter of international interest and contributed directly to the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by the Soviet Russian, a substitute of statehood, which allowed to develop Ukrainian science, social and cultural institutions²⁴.

UKRAINIAN EMIGRATION IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC

Ukrainian troops that crossed Zbrucz have been disarmed and deployed in internment camps. The exodus of troops from Nadnieprzańska Ukraine was preceded in November 1920 by a wave of a few thousand civilian refugees including students and faculties of the Kamieniecki University, pro-independence party activists and their families. In mid-November government officials, members of the URL Government and S. Petlura emigrated from Kamjanets to Eastern Galicia. Earlier, the Polish minority was grown by a group of nadnieprzańscy Ukrainians, who decided to emigrate as a result of intraukrainian political struggle. Since September 1919 Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission, together with the Military Section, which in August 1920 was transformed into Ukrainian Military Mission acted in Poland. With the final defeat of Ukrainian army their staff turned into emigrants²⁵.

According to incomplete data The Second Republic's border was trespassed by 17 464 soldier and about 20 thousand civilian refugees, including 2 thousand women and children²⁶.

According to earlier agreement the goods of Ukrainian army were taken by Poles as a deposit, the officers could keep personal weapons. UNR authorities assumed that staying in the camps will be transitory, so the individual divisions have not been disbanded, but entirely with their staff officers went to the camps in Aleksandrow Kujawski, Bydgoszcz, Czestochowa, Kalisz, Lancut, Pikulice in Przemysl, Piotrkow, Strzałków under Krakow and Wadowice. In Tarnow government had established the URL headquarters and Chief Ataman Petliura Simon, the leadership of political parties, 65 MPs (Members), and scientific – technical associations stayed there²⁷.

Initially the situation in interned camps was very difficult. The Polish side did not have the means to prepare the prison camps to accommodate them with emigrants. An additional difficulty was the harsh winter. A major problem was the supply of food, especially bread. The situation improved in the spring of 1921. When it was possible to hire interned people for seasonal work.

From the beginning of October 1921 on the basis of the resolution the Council of Ministers passed the matter of refugees to the civil authorities locating interned Ukrainians in three camps: Kalisz, Strzałkowo and Szczypiorno.

24 Stępień, Piłsudski, Petlura (1999) 43

25 Wiszka (2004) 25

26 Potocki (1999) 183

27 Szajdak (2005) 269

Signing a peace treaty between Poland, Soviet Russia and Ukraine March 18, 1921 had a serious impact on the situation of interned civilians and Ukrainian soldiers. The authorities in Moscow protested against the activities of Ukrainian immigrants and functioning of the Ukrainian government. In response, the Polish government said that Petlura's and URL government ministers' staying is done on the basis of an universal right of asylum.

However, under Soviet pressure there was an appointment in mid-1921. Ukrainian Central Committee, apolitical organization, which was to represent the interests of refugees, replaced the reduced because of political reasons URL state structures. UKC gathered the majority of emigrants, whose number was assessed at 43 thousand²⁸. Among them were about 100 generals, 4 thousand officers, 65 members of the Ukrainian parliament, 14 ministers and about 1,680 officials²⁹.

According to the UKC status it was to cover the whole Polish territory, and its basic functions included the care of the immigrants material state, legal and social care and meeting religious, educational, and cultural needs³⁰.

Besides the Ukrainian Central Committee in the territory of The Second Republic, there were also small professional academic and social organizations.

Despite the difficult living conditions in the detention centers culture and education developed. In various camps several newspapers have appeared, in June 1921 Lancut established Ukrainian National University with mathematical - natural, historical - philological, economical and military departments. Initially 585 students studied there and after moving the camp to Strzałkowo - 758. In the same year in Kalisz academic courses for staff officers were established, while in Lancut, Wadowice and Kalisz - NCO schools. Besides officers training they developed a system of general and professional education for all the soldiers and created lower secondary schools for officers' children in Tarnow, Lancut, Kalisz and Szczypiorno³¹. All these activities were to prepare personnel to take power after achieving independence by Ukraine. A lot of attention was paid to the scientific institutions and archives relating to the history of Ukraine development, development of historio - philosophical and socio - political thoughts, literature and above all maintaining "military emergency" through veteran organizations. Emigration reserve in Poland was estimated at 1,200 officers and 5,000 soldiers, while the possibility of emigrants mobilization on Polish territory within a month of the announcement of the "X" hour was estimated at 100 thousand soldiers³².

For the Polish state to maintain such a large number of the internees was a serious problem, which is why the decision about gradual liquidation of the camps was made, making it easier for Ukrainians to return to their homeland or further emigration to Western Europe or find work in Poland.

28 Wiszka (2004) 19

29 Kolańczuk, Tułapkanycz (1999) 87

30 Potocki (1999) 192

31 Kolańczuk, Tułapkanycz (1999) 88-89

32 Kolańczuk, Tułapkanycz (1999) 93-94

Internees were employed by the eastern border in saw mills, sugar factories, field works, railway lines Brest - Kovel and Lublin – Rozwadów repair, works in the area of Bialowieza forest, and about 1,500 people were assigned to auxiliary work in the Polish Army³³.

In 1922 after the announcement of the “amnesty” by the authorities in Moscow and Kharkov a small part of the Ukrainians returned to their homeland. Their return was the result of a loosen military discipline and, above all, the lack of prospects for improving living conditions in Poland. Several thousand people have left in search for work abroad, mainly to France.

In 1923 Polish side started massive layoffs of internees who claimed the Polish, Latvian, Estonian and Romanian citizenship, and those who had an impeccable reputation and livelihood after releasing from the camp. A large number of former soldiers and officials lapped work in Polish institutions of civil part, the Ukrainian scholars took over the cathedral at universities or cooperated with Polish scientific institutions, many former UNK soldiers continued higher studies in Poland or abroad³⁴.

In 1924 Ministry of Internal Affairs have taken steps to finally resolve the camps. Interned people receive financial grants, and after registration in the organs of state power gained the status of political refugees, allowing them to navigate across Poland and settle in any given city³⁵.

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1924 10,234 registered Ukrainians stayed in Polish territory. Big groups of emigrants existed in Volyn, near Łódź and Warsaw, Wielkopolska and along the Polish - Ukrainian and Belarusian - Ukrainian ethnic border.

The social composition of emigration is not exactly known. A high percentage of emigrants were young people (high school students, seminarians, officers) 90% of the whole community were soldiers, usually without families. They often married Polish women, which raised the problem of mixed families³⁶.

The authorities of The Second Republic agreed elderly, disabled, sick and senior commanders of the UNR army to remain in Kalisz. This way, thanks to Ukrainian Central Committee initiative in August 1924 Ukrainian Army Hostel was created, which soon became a thriving center of Ukrainian immigrants. Several institutions worked within it like a kindergarten, a large library, choir and amateur theater, church, Ukrainian Shevchenko Gymnasium, which in the years 1924 to 1934 graduated 874 graduates, 136 of which passed a higher education, and some served as contract officers in the Polish army. In 1929 a Ukrainian War - Historical Association was founded, it was issuing memories about independence of Ukraine struggle.

33 Szajdak (2005) 277-278

34 Potocki (1999) 187-188

35 Szajdak (2005) 279

36 Potocki (1999) 191

The final Hostel elimination took place in May 1939 mainly because of poor state of the buildings³⁷.

Ukrainian emigration in the interwar period was very diverse in terms of intellectual, material, views on economic and political issues, but combined the idea of restoration of an independent Ukrainian state. Refugees became the spokesman of the nation to the world community, they became its collective diplomatic representative³⁸.

SUMMARY

The history of Polish - Ukrainian relations is usually viewed from the perspective of conflicts. Their history in Poland comes down to line: Cossack uprising - Khmelnitsky - Human - 1848 - Polish-Ukrainian War - massacres in Volyn and in Eastern Galicia - UPA activities in People's Poland. In turn, the Ukrainians see the relationship differently: the struggle for Cossack and Orthodox freedom - fight for being recognized as a nation - discrimination in the Second Republic. Meanwhile, mutual relations in the last few hundred years were not so clear. You can still recall the equality of the Orthodox Ruthenian nobility or Ukrainian provinces accession to the Crown in 1969. However, historical events, in the second half of the nineteenth century still played an important role, faded towards the birth of the modern Ukrainian nation, who wanted to realize their statehood aspirations. Poles encountered the "Ruthenian issue" as it was then called, in 1848. Suddenly it turned out that at the side of Poles a new nation developed. Currently, Polish-Ukrainian relations at the level of interstate are arranged like the best. However, at the level of small homelands it still comes to friction. Let us hope that in Przemyśl and Lviv, over the years, mutual animosity will disappear. Only then we can talk about a new era in Polish-Ukrainian relations.

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37 Potocki (1999) 200-202

38 Wiszka (2004) 10

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