

MIGRATION – A SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL SECURITY CONCERN FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

The article presents the view of migration seen as a serious global problem of the 21st century that must be seriously considered by the European Union. Particularly, uncontrolled mass migration is conceived as a global problem because it affects all areas of life of every society – political, economic and cultural. The article highlights the main causes of mass migration: poverty and its deepening in the world, and the war. These phenomena are briefly described and analysed in the first part of the article. The second part is concerned with the description and analysis of the possible consequences of uncontrolled mass migration for the European Union. Radicalism, extremism and terrorism were defined as the most serious consequences of uncontrolled mass migration in the article. Despite the fact that migra-

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tion is conceived as an important social and security issue, it is also defined as an important factor of the current European integration. At the end of the article it is concluded that if migration is not conceived as an important social and security issue which needs to be addressed, it can result in such phenomena as radicalism, extremism and terrorism in the European Union.

ARTICLE INFO

Article history

Received: 27.02.2019 Accepted: 15.03.2019

Keywords

security, security levels, aspects of security, migration, radicalism, extremism, terrorism, terrorist, humanity, otherness, intolerance and hatred

INTRODUCTION

International world system can be characterized as unstable and devoid of a central authority, and its structure resembles a spider web – a touch in any part of the web can cause vibrations in a different, often very remote location.¹ Multipolarity of power in international relations has significantly changed security environment, which, in turn, significantly affected two macrosocial processes: *globalisation*² and *the postmodern stage of the development of the world*. These processes have always been linked together, they have been overlapping and yet remaining in a strong mutual opposition.³ A *local elite* had to respond to such a changed environment and this elite grew into a *new local elite* – transnational elite, able to enforce local opinions and regulate the occurring *new disorder*. It means that in the future,

¹ G. Pike, D. Selby, *Globální výchova*, Praha 1994, p. 22.

² See the works: A. King, B. Schneider, *První globální revoluce*, Bratislava 1991; Z. Bauman, *Globalizace. Důsledky pro člověka*, Praha 2000; F. Škvrnda, *Terorizmus – najvýznamnejšia nevojenská bezpečnostná hrozba súčasnosti*, 2nd edition, Trenčín 2003, pp. 7–12; Z. Brzezinski, *Volba – globální nadvláda nebo globální vedení*, Praha 2004; K. Ivanička, *Globalistika. Poznávání a řešení problémů současného světa*, Bratislava 2006; R. Michelko, *Eseje o globalizácii*, Martin 2009, etc.

³ F. Škvrnda, *Sociologický pohľad na vybrané problémy budovania a fungovania ozbrojených síl slovenskej republiky na začiatku 21. storočia*, [in:] *Aktuálne problémy vojenskej sociológie (sociologický pohľad na OS SR)*, Liptovský Mikuláš 2011, pp. 8–28.

the global elite and extraterritorial elite⁴ may compete successfully only with a *global* and *extraterritorial state* – i.e. *transnational state* (so-called “new state”⁵) which has to ensure two fundamental objectives: *prosperity* and *security*.

If this is the case, then a *new state* will strive to defend its existence by identifying itself, i.e. attaining its identity. It is questionable whether these objectives can be achieved in its current form. It may be proved, however, that states with sufficient management of the cohesion forces of a given society (without a tie to a nation) are more successful than those that bet on “individualization”. The process of globalization creates new opportunities for individuals, social groups and societies (states), but the possibilities of their usage are weakened due to the weakening of the state.⁶ Countries that can productively use their strength of cohesion can also get the most out of their tensions and conflicts, and have a better position in the uncompromising competition to assert themselves in the globalization turmoil. The emergence of the national and transnational state requires the suppression of state-building ambitions of smaller groups (people and nations) and requires them to hand over part of the sovereignty for the benefit of the whole. The *global scene* is changing, it is becoming a *global policy* resulting in the emergence of *global democracy*.⁷ It will ensure the responsibility of national states, which form the transnational social system, for creating new

⁴ J. Sztumski, *Elity a ich miejsce i rola w społeczeństwie*, Katowice 2007, pp. 47–48; J. Sztumski, *Systemowa analiza społeczeństwa*, Katowice 2013, pp. 90–92.

⁵ A new state is an administrator of cohesion forces of a given society which does not always mean solidarity, also a conflict may lead to the fact that a society “sticks together” and the nation was the main medium in which cohesion forces were developing in the past. A relationship between a nation and a state was the key issue of the last century. Today the situation has changed dramatically, which reflects the change in the status of a modern state, which loses its tie to a nation. See: F. Novosad, *Alchymia dejín*, Bratislava 2004, p. 218.

⁶ The fact that the process of globalization and postmodernity weakens the national state is supported by the following arguments: 1. The economic power of multinational corporations is growing, the nation states are gradually subordinated to these corporations (first economically and later perhaps also politically); 2. The great power of international financial markets over national economies, and thus the nation states; and 3. The fulfilment of the commitments of nation states arising from their membership in international organizations that may weaken the sovereignty of nation states. See: M. Jiráňková, *Národní státy v globálních ekonomických procesech*, Praha 2010, pp. 103, 105.

⁷ A. Giddens, *Třetí cesta*, Praha 2011, pp. 117–120.

standards, traditions and culture, which will not suppress national standards, traditions and cultures.

Security and prosperity are the objectives of ensuring order in the country and the world, and it is becoming a new main criterion for the evaluation of the current security situation. Social structures, which mitigate or eliminate the existing tensions between economic prosperity and security in the field of “open” and “not closed” – i.e. the structures of the “new state” – are being strengthened. General security, which will also ensure the prosperity of the given society (state), is at the forefront.⁸ A wider theoretical view has been formed in the field of security, in which the military and political perception of security is enriched by further dimensions: the societal (social security in the economic and cultural spheres), the environmental (environmental safety) as well as the dimension of everyday life (work safety, health and family safety, psychological safety).⁹

It requires a systemic approach to the investigation of security, conceived as complex, internally structured, hierarchical social phenomenon with multiple factors, whose content, structure and function exceed the boundaries of entire scientific fields.¹⁰ Its essence lies in the fact that every social activity ensuring security is treated as a dynamically developing open system, which consists of a set of internal and external links.¹¹

Thus, if security is defined as the current balance between the currently recognised risks or threats and the readiness of a given entity to be effective in the elimination of these risks and threats in particular time and in

⁸ V. Šefčík, *Ekonomika a obrana státu*, Praha 1999, p. 9.

⁹ See: D. Alijevova, *Každodennost' ako objekt sociologického skúmania*, “Sociológia”, 1987, no. 4, year 19, pp. 393–409.

¹⁰ L. Hofreiter, *Apológia bezpečnostnej vedy*, “Obrana a stratégia”, 2008, year 3, no. 1, p. 107.

¹¹ The subject of security science cannot be boundless. It must, however, be functional. It cannot be disregarded that in causal terms security and military issues are secondary. They are produced as a derivative of the concatenation of the primary causes, various deviations and conflicts in economic, social, environmental and other areas. Security problems can only be solved by addressing the root causes which are the subject of security science: 1. Security as a pillar of sustainable development and the quality of life; 2. Advanced, comprehensive security concept and its application in teaching and learning; 3. Modernization of security and its application in the development of the security system; and, finally, 4. Modernization of security legislation and strategic documents. For further information see: A. Rašek *et. al.*, *Tvorba základů bezpečnostní vědy*, “Vojenské rozhledy”, 2007, no. 1/2007, year 16(48), p. 22.

particular security environment, it can be concluded that the unknown risks and threats disrupt this balance.¹² To ensure a high level of security, it is, therefore, necessary not only to detect and analyse as many risks and threats as possible, but also to ensure the quality of the preparation of a given entity for their elimination.

The article has three parts. The first part defines the term ‘migration’ with an emphasis on the European territory – to be precise, the European Union. In the second part poverty, instability and war are characterized as the social phenomena which are the root cause of mass migration. Finally, the third part defines phenomena such as extremism, radicalism and terrorism inside and outside the society as possible consequences of uncontrolled mass migration in the context of humanity, otherness, and intolerance.

1. MANIFESTATIONS OF MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Migration is a phenomenon that significantly affects a given society. Migration processes are closely linked to wider social, economic and political events which have influence on the increase in mobility. However, migration can be viewed in a much broader context. It is linked to the issues of multiculturalism and cultural diversity, as well as the unequal status of minorities in society, discrimination, as well as human rights.¹³ There is an unprecedented boom of migration. Migration is a process in which individuals and groups of people leave their homes due to various reasons. The current mobility of people is higher than ever before in the modern history and it is still growing. It thus becomes one of the key global issues¹⁴ of the 21st century.¹⁵

¹² See the works: L. Hofreiter, *Bezpečnosť, bezpečnostné riziká a obrozenia*, Žilina 2004, pp. 11–21; Š. Volner, *Problémy bezpečnosti v 21. storočí*. B. Bystrica 2005, pp. 245–249.

¹³ B. Holubová, *Národné indikátory násilia páchaného na ženách*, Bratislava 2009, p. 5.

¹⁴ Global issues are different from local problems not only due to the universal human impact they have, but also due to the mechanism of their formation. A global issue may become a problem threatening human beings and nature due to cumulative or synergistic interaction of the local impacts of human activities. The current paradox is the fact that there exist no global, only local means to solve global issues. See: K. Ivanička, *Globalistika, op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁵ See more in: S. Mészárosová, S. Obonová, *Výročná správa o migrácii a azyle v Slovenskej republike za rok 2017*, Bratislava 2018; *Analýza možností využitia migrácie do EÚ pre rozvoj podnikania v SR*, Bratislava 2018, p. 32, www.sbagency.sk/sites/default/files/9_analyza_moznosti_vyuzitia_migracie_do_eu_pre_rozvoj_podnikania_v_sr_e.pdf; *Migrácia vo svete*, Bratislava 2018, www.iom.sk/sk/migracia/migracia_vo_svete.html; etc.

1.1 MIGRATION

Migration is a kind of social mobility (spatial mobility). It expresses movement and also the ability of an individual or a social group to move in the horizontal plane in a specific political, economic and demographic area that is associated with their transition to other community (society or social group). From the point of view of various aspects, migration can be defined as:

- **emigration**, which is defined as a migratory movement in which individuals (social group) leave previously inhabited place (place of residence);
- **immigration**, which is defined as a migratory movement in which individuals (social groups) come to a new inhabited place (place of residence);
- **migration across the societies** (or groups) is a movement in which individuals (social groups) leave the inhabited places across the national borders;
- **migration inside the society** (inside a group) is a movement when individuals (social groups) leave their home without crossing the national borders;
- **net migration** is the total gain (increase) or loss (decrease) of the population in a given territory (habitation) due to emigration and immigration.¹⁶

Nowadays the European Union suffers mainly from immigration, on which there are two diametrically opposed views. *Proponents of immigration* glorify this concept unilaterally and refuse its negative interpretation. *Opponents* of this concept see immigration in much more negative light, but in a broader context. These differences relate to the fact that the first group views immigrants only through the prism of economics and sees only the immigration process itself; e.g. the subsequent adaptation of migrants is no longer of interest to them. The view of the second group, in turn, is more complex, because it is directed not only to immigration process but also the process of integration and adaptation.

While economic forces act in the direction of greater openness of states towards immigration, political forces can act in the opposite direction – the direction of closing themselves off from immigration. In this context, Hollifield mentions the *liberal paradox*, according to which governments need to open their economies and societies for the market, investment and mobility to achieve the benefits of competitiveness, but the movement of

¹⁶ For further information see: P. Hamaj, M. Martinská, J. Matis, *Vybrané problémy zo všeobecnej sociológie*, Liptovský Mikuláš 2005, pp. 72–76.

people may involve greater political risks, for example those related to the security of the country and the welfare of its citizens.¹⁷

It can be concluded from the above that immigration brings benefits only if immigrants successfully integrate themselves into the host society.¹⁸ Immigrants must respect the rules and values of the society that receives them and the society must provide opportunities for the full participation of immigrants in its activities. Today, it appears that not only have the process of integration and the process of acceptance ceased to perform their functions, but also that there is complete absence of these processes in real coexistence. At present, the biggest problem is not the arrival of immigrants, but their adaptation to the new environment – the integration¹⁹ which may fit in the following basic models:

- **assimilation** model, in which migrants are equal members of the society, provided that they accept cultural patterns of the host country (one-sided process of adaptation);
- **segregation** model, which perceives migration as only a temporary entry of migrants into the labour market; since the integration of migrants into the majority society is not expected, their contacts with members of the majority society are minimized;
- **multicultural** model that fully accepts the group identity, diversity and the special characteristics of migrants and their culture, which develops cultural diversity in the majority society, which means that migrants are

¹⁷ J.F. Hollifield, *The Emerging Migration State*, “International Migration Review”, 2004, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 885–912, DOI 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00223.x.

¹⁸ In relation to migration it is necessary to note a requirement declared in the Global Forum organized by the UN. This is the requirement for “triple win”. Migration should be managed in a manner beneficial for migrants as well as host country and country of origin. See: J. Filadelfiová, M. Hliničanová, *Diskusia o kultúrnej diverzite a migrácii: trendy a výzvy pre verejnú politiku*, [in:] J. Filadelfiová, O. Gyárfašová, M. Hliničanová, M. Sekulová, *Sondy do kultúrnej diverzity na Slovensku*, Bratislava 2010, p. 106.

¹⁹ Integration of migrants is a process of gradual incorporation of migrants into the host society, in its various areas, into its core, relationships and institutions. It is an interactive process including migrants and members of the majority society. Majority society is influenced by the culture of migrants, it opens its institutions and allows access to its individual components. On the side of migrants it means socialization, or acculturation, learning the culture of the host society, internalisation of rights and obligations, and building social relationships and ties with the society. See: M. Sekulová, O. Gyárfašová, *Indikatory integrácie migrantov. Aktuálne skúsenosti a budúce výzvy*, Bratislava 2009, http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/docs/migracia/indikatory_migranti_book.pdf

clearly distinguishable from the majority society and the state takes over the tasks related to integration of the population, while reflecting their different cultural and social background; and finally

- the model of **individual civic integration**, which can be seen as a compromise because it contains so-called two-way adaptation, i.e. migrants accept the political framework of the majority society and contribute to the formation of the common culture, the majority society respects and promotes diversity, and the state defines the rules.

If the main cause of migration, i.e. people's decision to leave their homes and search for new ones, may be striving for a "better life" or "the preservation of life", then migration can be differentiated horizontally, vertically and structurally depending on which variable we observe as the dominant factor.

Koser has created four pairs of the categories of migrants:²⁰

- the **first pair** consists of migrants who decided to emigrate **willingly** or were **forced** to migrate;
- the **second pair** consists of migrants who have left their country for **political** (refugees) or **economic** (economic migrants) reasons;
- the **third pair** consists of migrants who migrated either **legally** or **illegally** (the latter rather occurs in an irregular manner²¹);
- the **fourth pair** are **skilled** or **unskilled** migrants; a particular group of migrants as seen from this perspective consists of so-called ICTs

²⁰ A migrant is a member of non-autochthonous (non-indigenous) population living in a given country. According to the recommendations of the UN, a migrant is a person who changes their country of usual residence. See: *Recommendations on statistics of international migration – Revision 1*, New York 1998, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesM/SeriesM_58_rev_1E.pdf.

Migrant is defined by the OECD in a similar way. A long-term migrant is a person who moves to a country which is different from the country of their usual residence for a period of at least one year (www.oecd.org).

In terms of migrant population, the term migrant refers to the members of several groups, namely: the foreign population permanently living in the host country; foreign temporarily living population; naturalized population; refugees and asylum seekers; illegal migrants; returnees; resettled persons; de facto refugees and other categories of persons as well as the second generation – the children of migrants. See: B. Divinský, *Zabranická migrácia v Slovenskej republike – Stav, trendy, spoločenské súvislosti*, Bratislava 2005, pp. 12, 17, 18.

²¹ In foreign language scientific literature, the term *irregular migration* is used in order to avoid using the term illegal migration, which is associated with crime and has negative connotation. See: B. Divinský, *Migračné trendy v SR po vstupe krajiny do EÚ (2004–2008)*, Bratislava 2009, pp. 59–62.

- Inter-Corporate-transferees – employees of companies who regularly migrate, but still work in the same company or international corporation.²²

Foreign migration can be defined either as the spatial mobility of the population, the essence of which being the movement of persons across borders to settle in another country; or as the movement of a person (or group of persons) from one geographical unit to another across administrative or political boundaries in order to settle definitively or temporarily at a location other than the place of origin of the person²³ to ensure to oneself a better life. In the latter context, the means of achieving the migrant's goals is an appropriate job with an appropriate salary.

Rolný and Lacina mention that various types of migration due to work abroad have one common feature – the motivation to increase one's standard of living. Therefore, we often speak about *working* (economic) *migration*, which is further divided into bidding and demanding migration.²⁴

According to Fárek, the motivation and direction of migration movement can be identified on the basis of three main motive forces:

- firstly, an attempt to gain economic benefits,
- secondly, poorly functioning state and its institutions in the home country,
- thirdly, a network of friends and relatives living abroad.²⁵

As Martinová claims, seven trends contribute to the current boom in international migration:

- growing economic integration and globalization;
- formulation of new geopolitical interests;
- changes in demographic trends and the status of particular genders in societies;
- increasing transnationalism – i.e. the ability of migrants to live in two or more countries in parallel;
- growing role of technological innovations;
- increased activity of intermediaries and traffickers, including human traffickers;

²² See: K. Koser, *International Migration: A Very Short Introduction*, New York 2007, pp. 16–18.

²³ B. Divinský, *Migračné...*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

²⁴ I. Rolný, L. Lacina, *Globalizace etika – ekonomika*, 1st edition, Boskovice. 2001, p. 248.

²⁵ J. Fárek, *Mezinárodní ekonomická migrace: přínosy a rozpory*, „Mezinárodní politika”, 2008, vol. 6, pp. 8–10. ISSN 0543-7962.

– regional and international harmonization of migration policies.²⁶

Based on the above, it can be concluded that in terms of economics, migration appears to be a relatively positive phenomenon that brings benefits not only to migrants, their families and the country from which migrants come, but also to an employer, and even to the state in which migrants have settled and now they live (the principle of a threefold benefit – ‘triple win’). Outside the economy, migration appears to be much more negative, because the term is often used interchangeably with the terms ‘integration’ or ‘adaptation’.

The authors do not agree that a positive side of immigration, as it is often mentioned, is that it may have a potential positive impact on population growth in the future. One can agree with the views that European population is aging – the number of new-born babies each year is declining – and that European countries will have a shortage of labour in the productive age, etc. But the authors do not accept the view that only intense immigration from Third World countries will solve it. Although immigration is the fastest way to achieve growth of the European population and its rejuvenation, in any case it is not the best way.²⁷

1.2 MASS MIGRATION

One of the main problems of contemporary Europe is the still-rising mass influx of foreigners into the developed European countries. This mass migration into Europe is a crisis of epic proportions. These migrants cannot be named refugees,²⁸ because they leave their territory for economic reasons and not for the fear for their lives.²⁹ Mass unregistered (illegal) migration does not enable at all (or at least hinders considerably) the integration of migrants into the receiving culture or a country of destination because the country has no time for an accurate review of migrants and the regulation of their numbers. Does this fact mean the collapse of multiculturalism?

²⁶ B. Divinský, *Migračné...*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

²⁷ See more in: S. Mészárosová, S. Obonová, *Výročná...*, *op. cit.*; B. Divinský, *Zabraněná...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–30 and 105–121.

²⁸ The term *refugee* applies to anyone who, due to the fear of persecution on account of racial, religious, ethnic, social-group or political reasons, is outside the country of their nationality and because of these concerns cannot or does not want to use the protection of their country. It can be either a stateless person outside the country of their former permanent residence, their return not being possible due to the consequences of these events, or they do not want to return home due to fear.

²⁹ See more in: *Analýza...*, *op. cit.*, p. 32; *Migrácia...*, *op. cit.*

Concerning the opinions on the collapse of multiculturalism, Europeans are divided into optimists and pessimists.

Optimists, striving to create an integrated European union (so-called United States of Europe), claim that migrants can help to build “a new European nation” deprived of nationalism. It is new, really multicultural society that is hope for Europe.³⁰

Pessimists claim that multiculturalism in connection with radical Islam (there are also opinions that with Islam as such) is a serious danger for the further integration of the European union. If immigrants are not willing to merge, i.e. integrate into the culture of a given country, it can lead to the formation of new focal points of ethnic and national unrest that may disrupt the integrity of the beneficiary country and the whole European Union. The worst scenario is the emergence of combat groups that will try to impose their religious, cultural as well as political objectives on the others by means of armed violence (terrorist attacks, civil war, etc.).

There are various causes of migration. The factors that encourage emigration known as “push factors” include: political instability; poor standard of living; poverty; diseases; armed conflicts or other types of conflict, etc. The factors that influence the selection of a target country known as “pull factors” include: social security; respect for human rights; better economic opportunities; justice; security, etc.

From the geographic point of view, migration into Europe has three main destinations:

- migration into the current member states of the European Union;
- migration into new member states of Central and Eastern Europe;
- migration into states that will border with the extended European Union.

It can be concluded that there is a need to differentiate between migration as such and refugee crisis, which the European Union faces nowadays.³¹

³⁰ According to the UN, one of the scenarios to maintain a stable growth of the European Union population points out that the Union will need more than 47 million immigrants by 2050. From this point of view, migration can represent a positive element for a labour market. On the other hand, the citizens of the European Union have great concerns about the influx of labour from Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe proposed to establish a European Migration Monitoring Centre which will be responsible for close monitoring of the whole migration, integration policies and the effectiveness of the measures taken.

³¹ The difference in understanding the concepts of migration and refugee crises results mainly from the difference in the content of the concept of migrant and refugee. The use of one term for both migrant and refugee is inaccurate because the refu-

Refugee crisis is at its worst; however, it will end one day. There is no need to dramatize a refugee flow which can be observed at present, but it is necessary to take measures within the European Union to handle this problem. Based on the experiences so far, it is necessary to carefully prepare for the world with greater migration. If Europe fails, mass migration will lead to the resistance of the population of target countries towards migrants, which may result in the sinking of multiculturalism, the rise of radicalism and extremism, the restoration of neo-fascism and the transfer of the fight against terrorism onto the territory of the European Union countries.³² In turn, if the European Union countries cannot cope with radicalism and extremism against migrants in theory and practice, this resistance will increase. For the reasons mentioned above, there is a need to recognise that the European Union must be thoroughly prepared for combating terrorism in its territory with emphasis on preventive measures. It must, however, also carefully analyse the causes and consequences of massive unregistered migration, and look for the possibilities of addressing these causes and consequences outside the European Union.

2. INSTABILITY, POVERTY AND WARS – SIGNIFICANT SOURCES OF MIGRATION

It should be noted that security environment, characterized as changeable, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, is always to a greater or lesser extent in the state of dynamic instability.³³ The achievement of stability in the world requires moving away from market fundamentalism of the neo-lib-

gee is a person who has been granted a special treatment in contrary to the migrant. The approach to a group of migrants and refugees by the host country is different in terms of their protection. The Office of the High Commissioner of the UN for refugees therefore recommends that in a situation where you need to identify the movement of people having different reasons (the so-called. “mixed migration”), both terms, namely “migrants and refugees”, should be used. (Z. Številová, *Migranti a migrácia*, [in:] *Utečenci a migrácia: Dojmy a pojmy*, <https://euractiv.sk/section/spravodlivost-a-vnutro/opinion/utecenci-migracia-dojmy-pojmy/>).

³² See more in: Directorate-general for Communication EK, *EÚ a migračná kríza*, 2017, DOI 10.2775/765313 (PDF), DOI 10.2775/35798 (paper version); Directorate-general for Communication EK, *EÚ a utečenecká kríza*, 2017, DOI 10.2775/52891(PDF), DOI 10.2775/146592 (HTML), DOI 10.2775/034514 (paper version).

³³ L. Hofreiter, *Teoretické východiská predikcie bezpečnostnej situácie v prostredí kritickej infraštruktúry*, “Krizový manažment”, 2013, no. 2/2013, p. 73.

eral policy of the late 20th century.³⁴ Controlled globalization brings new balance between public and private, as well as between social and individual interests. So-called humanistic economics will gradually become the core of economics.³⁵

Poverty, unemployment, wars and migration are social phenomena that are closely related. Unemployment breeds poverty, which is the main cause of migration of people to areas where they expect to fulfil their hopes for a better life. These phenomena have different dimensions: the international (global), the national, the social (societal), the economic, the qualitative, and the security dimension; and they are the cause of instability and conflict in particular societies and in the whole world.³⁶

2.1 INSTABILITY AND CRISIS

Security and stability (i.e. peace) is currently understood not only in their negative aspect – the absence of danger and instability (i.e. the absence of the causes of wars and conflicts), but also in their positive aspect related to law, cooperation, contacts and common values, whose mission is to replace such means of ensuring security and stability as previously used power, dominance and deterrence (especially nuclear).³⁷ It is necessary to change the view of the three main systems (pillars) of ensuring the security and stability in Europe, i.e. the system of *power*, the system of *sovereignty* and the system of *values*.³⁸

The review of the instrument for supporting stability and peace, which aims to: 1. respond to urgent situations, crisis situations or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts; 2. provide longer-term support for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness; and finally, 3. provide solutions in response to global, transregional and emerging threats, is currently being more and more discussed in Europe (especially in the European Union).³⁹

³⁴ A. Giddens, *Třetí... , op. cit.*, pp. 125–129.

³⁵ For further information see: I. Haluška, *Budúcnosť globálnej ekonomiky*, Bratislava 2011, pp. 9–10.

³⁶ For further information see: S. Križovský, *Migrácia, chudoba, nezamestnanosť – bezpečnostné aspekty. Zborník príspevkov z vedeckej konferencie s medzinárodnou účasťou*, [in:] *Migrácia–chudoba–nezamestnanosť*, D. Šlosár (ed.), Košice 2009, pp. 77–78.

³⁷ See: J. Eichler, *Evropska bezpečnosť a stabilita po Kosovu*, „Mezinárodní vztahy”, 2000, vol. 4, pp. 17–27.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 17–27.

³⁹ From the geographical point of view, it is an instrument to promote stability and peace worldwide, aimed at responding to crises in the third countries. A possible revision of this instrument should be limited to the addition of a new feature that makes this

Instability, understood as the disturbance of balance, is considered a significant social risk that is interconnected with the crisis of an individual, group or society. *Crisis* is currently understood as a long-term chronic condition of nature or society, such as drought, famine or clan wars. There are definitions of crisis which indicate that it is a phenomenon (natural, technological or social) that substantially disrupts the balance of a natural, social or even technical system.⁴⁰ If we speak about crisis as a social phenomenon, it has two inseparable aspects: the static one, which refers to crisis as a state (a state of crisis), i.e. the disruption of the social structure (of the whole society or of a certain group) or of the “structure” of an individual, i.e. personality; and the dynamic one, which refers to the course (process) of crisis, i.e. the violation of the sequence of consecutive operations that ensure the stability of a social system (society or a social group).

Crisis of society or a nation-wide crisis is understood as a social phenomenon which disrupts the balance of society and its social groups in all its spheres: political, economic, cultural and social.

Crisis of an individual is usually described as emotional upset, which is often accompanied by feelings of confusion, anxiety, depression, anger and disorganization in relationships and social functioning. It is a break in the normal course of human life. Subjectively, it is experienced as a threat to one’s identity and the loss of the ability to freely shape one’s own life; as a decrease in one’s self-esteem, a decreased ability to concentrate, and the general disturbance of psychosocial balance, which can also be manifested by somatic problems.

Crises of an individual, a group and the entire society are interconnected and caused by great social changes that are also interconnected regionally and globally. These crises in the European context arise, among others, from problems associated with the enlargement of the European Union, related to the differentiation of social structure, the changes in the labour

instrument able to address the current shortcomings in the provision of support to all actors in the field of security (including the military), which would make it possible to provide training and equipment to deal with urgent short-term and medium-term needs in an effort to achieve sustainable development. See: Capacity building in support of security and development. Accompanying document. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) No. 230/2014 of 11 March 2014, establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace, p. 4.

⁴⁰ See: V.T. Míka, *Krízológia – všeobecná teória krízy*, 2016, <http://www.akademickyrepozitar.sk/sk/repozitar/krizologia-vseobecna-teoria-krizy.pdf>

market and the associated social risk – increasing poverty, which affects not only all levels of society, but also societies themselves – poor regions or poor countries.⁴¹

2.2 POVERTY

Poverty can be regarded as a serious social and ethical problem of mankind in every developed human civilization. Individuals, social groups and societies as wholes do not, as a rule, become poor on their own will, so it is necessary to define this phenomenon, describe it, identify its causes and take actions to remove or relieve it.

Reflections on the elimination or mitigation of this social phenomenon can be divided into at least two directions:

- *the first direction* involves reflections on the further growth of welfare and standard of living of individuals, social groups and societies (regions, states),
- *the second direction* involves reflections on the redistribution of sources performed on the basis of accepted special social standards.⁴²

In real life, however, these reflections are not put into practice in a rigorous manner. They are implemented in a mixture, in which either one or another direction prevails. There are many definitions of poverty. We will therefore show only some. Poverty is understood as “a situation in which an individual or a social structure cannot satisfy the most urgent necessities of life by its own resources”.⁴³ In the European Union, poverty is described as a condition in which an individual or a social group do not participate fully in the economic and social life of the society, while their access to income and other resources of a given society hinder the achievement of acceptable standard of living. These individuals and social groups do not have access to basic human and civil rights. The European understanding

⁴¹ E.g. in 2013 the annual ranking of twenty-five countries with the most damage to the economy was published. The ranking was compiled based on twelve indicators of social, economic, political and security areas and included: Eritrea, Liberia, North Korea, Uganda, Syria, Burgundy, Ethiopia, Niger, Kenya, Nigeria, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Pakistan, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Haiti, Afghanistan, Yemen, Chad, South Sudan, Sudan, Congo, Somalia. Source: *Krajiny, v ktorých sa žije ako v stredoveku*, “Finweb”, 19.07.2013, <https://finweb.hnonline.sk/serialy/583084-krajiny-v-ktorych-sa-zije-ako-v-stredoveku>

⁴² J. Košta, *Sociológia*, Bratislava 1996, p. 43.

⁴³ B. Geist, *Sociologický slovník*, Praha 1992, p. 25.

of so-called “new” poverty does not only include the issues of hunger and deprivation, but also the exclusion of people from the life in the society, which is a major risk of a fair and democratic society.⁴⁴

Poverty denotes the status of people and social groups whose material, cultural and social resources are limited to such an extent that they exclude them from the minimum acceptable lifestyle according to the standards in the states in which they live.⁴⁵ Poverty is, therefore, not only associated with material lack of property but also with spiritual poverty. Poverty in connection with misery does not only result in physical miseries of hunger and diseases, but it also causes spiritual degradation and emotional absence in relations, not only in families, but also among people in general.⁴⁶ It is associated with inequality (extreme unevenness), or the isolation of a certain part of the population; it is not only isolation from the rich, but also from the whole rest of the population. Poverty can also be defined by means of factors which include: *severe shortage of physical comfort, lack of health, lack of safety and security, lack of sociability and lack of respect.*⁴⁷

From the above definitions it is evident that poverty is a multidimensional social phenomenon. Meanwhile, individual definitions of the economic, political, cultural and social dimensions of poverty have been more or less successful. However, the permanent problem is the interconnection of these dimensions and the definition of their interactions. Ultimately, it would create a synthetic view of this serious social phenomenon.

One must mention Friedman’s four discourses of poverty, namely: *bureaucratic, moralistic, academic* and ultimately *practical-empirical* (of the poor). The bureaucratic discourse deals with the determination of poverty line by bureaucratic criteria. The moralistic discourse evaluates the relationship of the poor to their own poverty. The academic discourse analyses poverty as a result of social mechanism, e.g. the Marxist sociologists see it as the exclusion of the poor from participation in the activities of the society. The practical-empirical discourse refers to the issues of the social helplessness of the poor.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ V. Tkáč, *Európa a chudoba*, [in:] *Chudoba – spoločenský problém súčasnosti: zborník príspevkov z vedeckej konferencie s medzinárodnou účasťou*, Banská Bystrica 2005, p. 14.

⁴⁵ D. Kováčiková, *Chudoba v minulosti a v súčasnosti*, [in:] *Chudoba ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁴⁶ B. Šimonová, *Chudoba v obraze detských protagonistov v slovenskej literatúre pre deti a mládež*, [in:] *Chudoba...*, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁴⁷ P. Mareš, *Sociologie nerovnosti a chudoby*, 1st edition, Praha 1999, pp. 75–76.

⁴⁸ P. Mareš, *Sociologie...*, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

It is interesting to look at the definition of poverty from different observation distances. The most general view considers poverty to be a social phenomenon, i.e. that poverty is a property of the society. The narrower one (the general one) talks about the poverty of certain sectors of the society (layers, groups, regions, etc.). The even narrower one (the individual one) speaks about poverty in relation to some otherwise defined social groups (the elderly, women, rural population, etc.). The even narrower (the more individual one) speaks about poverty in different types of households according to various criteria. And finally, the narrowest speaks about social assistance and social work; therefore, it addresses the question “Who are the poor?”⁴⁹

It must be asserted that globalization has the most fatal impact on the emergence and the further deepening of poverty – on the individual, group, as well as nation-wide level⁵⁰ – despite the promises that the process would be carried out in a kind of mature spirit of a modern society without borders between the rich and the poor.⁵¹ In fact, globalization only creates transnational luxury for certain classes at the expense of low and middle classes.⁵² Two cultures are being created in the world – the culture of the poor and the culture of the rich with a deepening crisis between them. This crisis leads to possible wars and armed conflicts.

2.3 WAR AND ARMED CONFLICT

War is a particular social phenomenon, characterized as a form of social conflict, in which the contradictions between the parties are resolved by massive armed violence. It is distinguished from other forms of social conflict by the following features: *violence* (it is a violent armed act), the *mass character*, *intentionality* and *purposefulness*, *organization*, the *scope* and *duration* of the armed conflict, the *independence* of warring parties and

⁴⁹ S. Konečný, *Chudoba ako sociálna udalosť*, [in:] *Chudoba...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 128–129.

⁵⁰ O. Satmár, *Mobilita a migrácia obyvateľstva ako dôsledok globalizácie*, “Logistický monitor”, <http://www.logisticymonitor.sk/en/images/prispevky/satmar.pdf> (accessed: 26.08.2017).

⁵¹ See: *Bohatí ostanú bohatými, chudobní chudobnými. Slovensko nie je výnimkou*, “Trend.sk”, 20.06.2016, <https://www.etrend.sk/ekonomika/bohati-ostanu-bohatymi-chudobni-zostanu-chudobnymi-slovensko-nie-je-vynimkou.html> (accessed: 26.08.2017).

⁵² M. Kreuzzieger, *Kultura v době zrychlené globalizace*, Praha 2012, p. 23; I. Pauhovofová, *Bohatstvo a chudoba vo svete a na Slovensku*, Bratislava 2007, p. 8; O. Suša, *Globalizace v sociálních súvislostech súčasnosti. Diagnóza a analýza*, Praha 2010, pp. 194, 195.

finally, the *legal character* (i.e. violation which is regulated by legal provisions, i.e. legitimate violence).

The main essence of war is the *political* and *mass armed violence* taking the form of armed conflict (fighting), conducted for achieving political, economic, ethnic, religious and other objectives. Another essential element of war are the *activities of social forces* that complement and ensure military actions that directly or indirectly assist the political objectives of the war, including activities in the economic and diplomatic field, and ultimately also in the field of foreign policy.

Wars are either classified as wholes, or the type of war waged by each warring party is classified separately. Based on the different approaches, wars are classified according to:

1. the emergence and type of warfare: *offensive* or *defensive*;
2. objectives of war: *just* or *unjust*;
3. range: *local* or *world* wars;
4. number of participants: wars *between two participants* or *coalitions* (coalition wars);
5. duration: *short-term* or *long-term* wars;
6. methods of leadership: *dynamic* (manoeuvring) or *static* (position) wars;
7. the types of weapons and military equipment: *strategic* (total), *nuclear wars*, *nuclear wars at a battle field* (limited nuclear wars) and *conventional wars*.⁵³

The political nature of a war is reflected in the fact that it is understood as a separate part of policy. It can be concluded that war always has political motives, a political sense and a political purpose. War is the continuation of policy by other means – the violent ones.⁵⁴ It is a result and a product of a given policy, its continuation and it is an instrument for the achievement of the objectives of the policy. If we want to understand the causes of a given war, its leaders and objectives, it is necessary to analyse the policy of the states (coalitions) before the outbreak of war.

The relationship between war and policy can be analysed from two points of view: *genetic* and *functional*. From the *genetic* point of view, it is policy that causes a war. War is thus a result of specific policy. From the *functional* point of view, war is an instrument and means of policy for

⁵³ J. Matis, P. Hamaj, M. Martinská, *Sociológia armády*, Liptovský Mikuláš 2008, pp. 36–38.

⁵⁴ C. von Clausewitz, *O válce*, Brno 1996, pp. 23 and 26.

the achievement of certain objectives. War is considered to be a separate part of policy. War is a result as well as means of the specific policy.

Politics is implemented through mass armed violence. It is not possible to identify everything with the politics. Only in exceptional extreme cases the policy is implemented through mass armed violence, with the help of an armed and trained social group – the army. What distinguishes the society in war from the society peace is that mass armed violence is used to achieve political goals. The war is a violent act aimed at forcing the opponent to submit to our will.⁵⁵

The impact of economy on war is reflected in the development of the methods of warfare, the forms of the organization thereof, and in military construction. Economy has always significantly influenced the massification of armies; their equipment, e.g. weapons; and combat techniques. Political development towards war is indeed determined by the economy, but it has its relative autonomy and a certain independence. War is not the result of the action of bare economic necessity. If one considers economy to be the only cause of war, one risks sliding to vulgar economism, i.e. to the claim that economy is significantly linked to policy, which is the contents of the essence of war. However, the course of war is also influenced by a variety of other circumstances, such as population, the geographical location of a country, the international balance of power, the features of the social system and the system of government, etc.

At the beginning of the 21st century, some new insights were outlined on the preparation and the conduct of wars,⁵⁶ which is also reflected in the field of international relations in which the process of globalization has brought the following long-term fundamental changes:

- a shift from security of one country against another towards the common security – at least in Europe, where countries are not considered a threat to each other;
- a significant decrease of military threat;
- a significant increase in the importance of “soft power” and its balanced replenishment of “hard power”, where not only the military strength of

⁵⁵ C. von Clausewitz C., *O válce, op. cit.*, p. 556.

⁵⁶ New views on warfare in the 21st century: 1. the continued transformation of most armies from conscription (mixed) military to professional military; 2. nuclear weapons have become “obsolete” as a military-political instrument and are complemented by non-nuclear strategic weapons; and ultimately 3. armament entered the outer space. See: O. Krejčí, *Válka*, Praha 2010, p. 142.

a winner, but also the attraction of their lifestyle, perceived as a complement of their military strength, plays a role,

- the openness of the security system of co-operating regions – an unfortunate condition international organized crime;
- increase in the severity of asymmetric threats (indefinable enemy);
- a shift from exclusive to inclusive security (security for all, thus removing barriers and differences between insiders and outsiders);
- the overcoming of inequality in the development process of globalization, leading to “two-speed” globalization – one speed for “marginalized”, poor areas of the world and the other speed for the rich parts of the world).⁵⁷

In this post-modern (or even post-postmodern) world it is necessary to realize that there are five fundamental changes in the perception of military:

- the interconnection of civil and military spheres is structurally, as well as culturally, growing;
- the differences in the implementation of military service among the individual components of armed forces, ranks, and combat support positions are disappearing;
- in the objectives of armies (military organizations) there is a shift from the traditional fighting to so-called international peacekeeping missions that do not require the traditional thinking of the importance of military;
- deployments of the army (armed forces) in international missions are more often decided internationally – that is, outside national and multinational states;
- there is the internationalization of the armed forces.

It is increasingly recognized that the role of ensuring security in the military area is also available to emergency groups. These groups are of a military and non-military nature and are the military, police, rescue and fire brigades, as well as rescue and security services.⁵⁸ A change in the fulfilment of the external features of the army can be considered a significant impact after the collapse of the “Yalta” bipolar system of global security.

⁵⁷ Processed according to J. Eichler, *Terorismus a války v době globalizace*, Praha 2011, p. 33.

⁵⁸ For further information see: J. Matis, J. Maciejewski, *Sociologická analýza disponibilních skupín*, Liptovský Mikuláš 2017, p. 200; and J. Maciejewski, *Grupy dyspozycyjne. Analiza socjologiczna*, Wrocław 2012, pp. 50–60.

The external feature of the army as a deterrent to war is almost over.⁵⁹ Armies start to perform their external function in the form of fight with asymmetric, and, to the prevailing extent, vaguely defined enemy.⁶⁰

The armed forces begin to fulfil the tasks of their external function in a new life cycle, which has two stages: 1. the first stage “out of deployment” (preparation for deployment and the relaxation and regeneration of forces after deployment) and the second stage of “deployment” (direct combat deployment and rest in deployment). Therefore, there is a need to transform them as soon as possible to such a new organizational form that would ensure the highest quality and most effective fulfilment of these new challenges.

Knowledge and experience in military conflicts of the post-confrontational period, i.e. after the end of the Cold War – after the collapse of the bipolar world – were also reflected in the changes in the objectives and forms of combat training of the armies of states with the major burden of combat operations.⁶¹ The experience of these armies can be summarized in the following prognoses for the future:

- Wars and war conflicts of the 21st century will be irregular.
- An enemy will attempt to kill the largest number of people belonging to Euro-Atlantic civilization (not just soldiers) and will be very brutal, well prepared and trained.
- An enemy will not fight by rules and principles of humanitarian of warfare.
- The enemy will be very malicious and well organized in irregular military units.
- In the wars and military conflicts of the 21st century only small, highly mobile, self-acting, well-trained troops able to manoeuvre (by movement and fire) will be successful.

⁵⁹ Armies have always been built for two reasons: to win wars and to intimidate a possible enemy. War begins only after the fail of deterrence. See: O. Krejčí, *Válka, op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁶⁰ Wars are fought in parts of the world defined by Francis Fukuyama in his book *The End of History and the Last Man* as historical (parts of the world where security interests of the state might not always be the cause of wars). See: J. Eichler, *Terorismus...*, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁶¹ These are mainly countries that gained the most experience of these struggles, namely: Australia, the UK and the USA. For more information see: J. Eichler, *Terorismus...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 324–326.

Countries involved in conflicts are thus preparing themselves for wars in the 21st century against asymmetric enemies, who are recruited mainly from the ranks of insurgents, criminals and terrorists. The provision of security in the postmodern era by nation states (facing the transition from modern to postmodern war)⁶² will lead to massive strain on the provision of defence sources, in particular: personal (human), material (military technique, armament, equipment and services – including logistics) and also financial resources (defence budgets, ensuring not only the activities of the armed forces, but the entire defence infrastructure). An accompanying feature of these modern wars and conflicts will be a mass exodus – uncontrolled mass migration of the population, for which other countries, mainly the neighbouring ones, have to prepare themselves. If they fail, the consequences may involve deeper poverty, instability and conflicts among the groups that may, in the context of otherness, intolerance and hatred, become the major cause for the rise of radicalism, extremism and terrorism.

3. RADICALISM, EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM – THE CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION

In the previous section, we characterized poverty, instability, as well as war and armed conflict as the social phenomena that give rise to mass migration. As we already indicated, mass migration, together with otherness, intolerance and hatred, forms one of the causes of deepening of radicalism, extremism and terrorism. It is necessary to briefly analyse these social phenomena, so that we could understand their causes and consequences, and efficiently use this understanding for the adoption of measures.

3.1 RADICALISM AND EXTREMISM

The threat of extremism and radicalism is now becoming highly topical. It relates to all democratic states. The misunderstanding of otherness and viewing it through the prism of intolerance and hatred is being transformed into the manifestations of hatred against the members of other races, nations, national minorities, ethnic groups and religions that bring a high degree of risk of direct danger to the proper functioning of a democratic society due to radicalism and extremisms.

⁶² For more information see: *Historie moderní války*, Ch. Townshend (ed.), Praha 2007, pp. 9–10.

Most people mainly associate these negative phenomena with racism and xenophobia, as racially motivated attacks have always been and remained a wider issue. Not all manifestations of radicalism and extremism are, in fact, apparently striking. Radicalism and extremism are not identical concepts, although closely related to the manifestations of humanism⁶³ and humanity.⁶⁴

Radicalism can be seen as a summary of opinions aimed at changing the accepted and recognized norms and principles of the functioning of a social system, moving at the limit of their non-infringement. While the purported change is not directed towards the destruction of the social system, the application of radical views leads to extensive changes. In contrast, *extremism* is a summary of views and activities seeking to change already recognized standards and principles for the functioning of a social system, which ultimately leads to the liquidation of the social system. It is a dangerous social phenomenon, which is known for actions that significantly deviate from normal behaviour – love of extremes, extravagance, violent radical action, radical behaviour and opinions, in which there is not drastic but violent extreme action (radical action with violence or excitement).⁶⁵

Radicalism and extremism as social phenomena (affecting the whole society or particular groups) are directly dependent on the configuration and the state of society in which they are expressed and also internally differentiated. If the sociological aspect of each society consists of three basic spheres – political, economic and cultural, which overlaps a social sphere (referring to the whole society or to a group), then we can find the following fundamental types of radicalism and extremism: political, economic and cultural (not only political, religious, racial, ethnic and ecological).

⁶³ *Humanism* is a historically changing system of views, recognizing and highlighting the value of a human as a personality, their right to freedom, happiness, development and application of forces and capabilities; it is striving for humanity and the dignity of human living conditions; it is the assessment of social institutions in terms of human welfare; it is an effort to ensure that the principles of justice, equality and humanity have become the norms of relations between people in personal and social life. See: M. Zelina, E. Komárik, *Humanizácia výchovy*, Bratislava 1998, p. 8.

⁶⁴ *Humanity* is a moral ideal, based on respect for human dignity and the implementation thereof, which is instantiated through moral principles and standards, defining specific ways of the realization of humanity in the life of an individual, of a given moral community and of the entire human community. For further information see: V. Gluchman, *Človek a morálka*, Prešov 2005, p. 151–154.

⁶⁵ M. Ivanová-Šalingová, *Vreckový slovník cudzích slov*, Bratislava 1993, p. 256.

3.1.1 POLITICAL RADICALISM AND EXTREMISM

Both of these concepts can be defined as the sum of ideas and actions aimed not only to disturb the balance of the society, but to destruct it. The need to distinguish between the concepts of *political radicalism* and *political extremism* arose in political science practice, because it was very difficult to make a precise dividing line between constitutional conformal behaviour and extremism.⁶⁶

- *Political radicalism* can be understood as a summary of political views and activities. Their aim is not to liquidate the society directly. Their practical application, however, leads to significant changes in the society,
- *Political extremism* is an activity directed against the society in order to destruct it.⁶⁷

From the definitions of these concepts it can be concluded that political radicalism is still seen as part of the spectrum of constitutional conformity (the area of persistent loyalty to the political system of the society), but it already has potential for the transition towards extremism – left-wing or right-wing.⁶⁸ On the basis of these definitions, it is also possible to define more precisely the place of left-wing and right-wing terrorism and so-called non-democracy (left-wing and right-wing dictatorship).⁶⁹

Broadly defined concepts *radical right* (ultraright or extreme right) or *radical left* (ultraleft or extreme left), including both right and left-wing extremism and the right and left-wing radicalism, are also used interchangeably.

⁶⁶ The differentiation between political extremism and political radicalism and the roots of both phenomena have been specified in German political science, which is also commonly used in the Czech environment and seems to be suitable for Slovakia as well. The distinction between radicalism and extremism has, however, no such tradition e.g. within Anglo-Saxon political science schools, where both terms are used interchangeably. Mareš also points out that in view of the poorly defined border between radicalism and extremism it is often better to “perceive the facts which are referred to by these concepts as a whole”. See more: M. Mareš, *Politický extremismus a radikalismus v ČR 1*, Brno 2003, p. 33.

⁶⁷ J. Charvát, *Současný politický extremismus a radikalismus*, Praha 2007, p. 13.

⁶⁸ J. Matis, *Terorizmus ako sociálny fenomén*, [in:] *Zborník príspevkov zo 6. medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie „Medzinárodné vzťahy 2005“*, Mojmirovce, Bratislava 2006, pp. 437–441.

⁶⁹ M. Mareš, *Politický...*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

Milza claims that political scientists use also other terms such as *extra-parliamentary right* (or left), or *right-wing right*, to avoid repetition of the same concept in the text.⁷⁰ When inner contradictions start increasing in a certain society, the most radical and extreme attitudes⁷¹ and activities are reaction to them and then radicalism and extremism seem to be the products of this democratic society. Unfortunately, there have not been enough effective defence mechanisms to defend everything that it is harmful in any democracy. If democracy had such mechanisms, then it would not be democracy but a dictatorship. Therefore, every democracy is ultimately faced with extremism, the representatives of which are not only individuals – extremists,⁷² but also various extremist groups and movements.⁷³

3.1.2 ECONOMIC RADICALISM AND EXTREMISM

In the economic sphere, radicalism and extremism (economic radicalism and extremism) are really dangerous, especially because they totally connect radicalism and extremism with intolerance. They constitute a hidden danger because they deliberately use only the scientific theory whose

⁷⁰ See: P. Milza, *Evropa v černých košilích*, Praha 2005, p. 14.

⁷¹ These attitudes are based on different content evaluation of activities which basically can be divided into three groups. The first one seeks the realization of noble and human goals, but in a manner that breaks the law more or less, with its members promoting human values in an undesirable manner. The second one tries to impose their ideas about the nature of society in contradiction to the general standards of morality and humanity in a way allowed by applicable law. The third one tries to implement their inhuman and unlawful ideas in unlawful and inhuman ways. This group can be rightly described as extremists. See: J. Chmelík, *Extremismus a jeho právní a sociologické aspekty*, Praha 2001, p. 11.

⁷² Extremists are persons with the following features: they reject generally binding regulations; they have extreme opinions, including racial or ethnic intolerance; they lack material incentives; they have an intrinsic motivation for misconduct; they behave in an aggressive way with the objective to harm physically or to disturb public order. See: *Návrh koncepcie boja proti extrémizmu*, Bratislava 2006, p. 4.

⁷³ See: D. Milo, *Rasistický extrémizmus v Slovenskej republike. Neonacisti, ich hnutia a ciele*, Bratislava 2004, p. 13.

essence is the technocratic understanding of the society (the society as a technical rather than a social system).⁷⁴

The society based on market mechanisms, which change the society into the so-called transaction society⁷⁵ with largely weakened social relationships,⁷⁶ gradually becomes intolerant. The absence of solutions and the constant pursuit of profit that creates conflicts lead to the creation of a mycelium for political radicalism and extremism (left-wing and right-wing) and to the transition to dictatorship (left-wing or right-wing).⁷⁷

Economic radicalism can be defined as the sum of economic ideas, theories and actions that lead to major economic changes in the society, which is, as the whole, conceived as an object of economic experiment with only assumed outcome. We assume that the vast economic changes always change a given society in two ways in minimum:

- *in the positive direction* – i.e. towards the improvement of the quality of people's lives and thereby the strengthening of the society – so-called positive economic radicalism,⁷⁸
- *in the negative direction* – i.e. towards the reduction of the quality of people's life and thus also towards the gradual disintegration of the society – the so-called negative economic radicalism.

Negative economic radicalism is linked to economic extremism which can be defined as any economic activity (theoretical or practical) directed

⁷⁴ They culminate into so-called market fundamentalism understood as an extreme belief in the market mechanism and its self-regulatory ability. For further information see: G. Soros, *Kríza globálneho kapitalizmu: otvorená spoločnosť v ohrození*, Bratislava 1999, pp. 134–136; and I. Haluška, *Budúcnosť...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–106.

⁷⁵ Families and marriages still exist, but banking investments and transactions completely repudiated social relationships (personal and social). For further information see: G. Soros, *Kríza...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–99.

⁷⁶ For further information see: G. Soros, *Kríza...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–99; and I. Haluška, *Budúcnosť...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 141–186.

⁷⁷ The connection of capitalism and democracy is nowadays insufficient in the best case. This results from the fact that they follow different principles and also have different interests. In capitalism the accounting unit is money (it expresses wealth) and in democracy it is the voice of a citizen (it expresses authority). For further information see: G. Soros, *Kríza...*, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

⁷⁸ It is not possible to perceive the term radical only in its pejorative sense, because every opinion, a theory, or an act which is a strict solution of certain problems of a particular society can be considered radical. It depends on the influence of the achieved result for the society. See: Š. Danics, *Radikalizmus...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–63.

against a given society with the aim to destruct its economic and political nature. Economic extremism has three stages of development:

- The first stage is characterized by instincts, irrationality, and in particular, the absence of the strategic planning of people's own activities. Activities are based on a sense of threat, people are motivated by the forms that they have chosen as a way of solving the problems of economic violence. This stage may be referred to as *harmful activities as a means of change*.
- The second stage is characterized especially by purposeful efforts to partially or completely change the economic and political system. It is accompanied by association, event planning and promotion. The activities are characterized by a high degree of demagoguery, and breaches of law occur. The greatest danger of the second stage is inhumanity associated with radical solutions and methods. This stage may be named *a change without a new vision*.
- The third stage involves the establishment of clearly formulated economic theory, which is becoming the core of the ideology, including especially the political agenda, of a given group (a political party or movement). By means of this theory, the group tries to gain power and it can also achieve a change in the system in this way. Extremist programs (especially economic) are characterized mainly by offering simple, fast and resolute solutions to complex problems and therefore they give rise to the positive response within various layers of the society. This stage may be called *a change with a new vision*.⁷⁹

3.1.3 CULTURAL RADICALISM AND EXTREMISM

The cultural sphere of the society is currently affected by radicalism and extremism mainly due to the failure of the project of multiculturalism in European economically developed countries (France, Netherlands, Scandinavia – multicultural assimilating model; Switzerland, Austria and Germany – multicultural discriminating model).⁸⁰

The main reason for failure is lack of understanding of otherness, resulting in intolerance and even violence, which together form the basis for racism, radicalism and extremism in the following forms: *pseudo-scientific*,

⁷⁹ See: D. Milo, *Rasisticky...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–87.

⁸⁰ The cultural sphere of the society is composed mainly of: science; education; culture and art, religion; national, ethnic and racial awareness; and ultimately, the relationship of a human to nature and to their own self. See P. Hamaj et al., *Vybrané...*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

pseudo-educational, pseudo-cultural, artistic, religious, ethnic, racial, and also, regarding human's relationship to nature – *ecological* and *environmental*:

- *Pseudo-scientific* radicalism and extremism are dangerous because they exploit the results of social sciences to form radical and extreme procedures for solving the problems of a given society, region, or of the whole world. Its theoretical models and practices highlight the position of a leader (an authority or a dictator) and infer the only possible solutions from the position of “either-or” due to a black-and-white view of the reality of a given society.
- *Pseudo-educational* radicalism and extremism focus on the development of forms, methods and means of education, which unilaterally develop leadership qualities with emphasis on elites, while the selection criteria of elites are pseudo-scientific (racial or class origin). Education and training is an instrument for the promotion of radical and extremist theory and guidelines on antisocial activity, whose core is violence and military training (right-wing extremism – armed fascist or Nazi semi-military troops; left-wing extremism – armed semi-military worker troops – People's Militia).
- *Pseudo-cultural-artistic* radicalism and extremism are aimed at young people who do not have great social experience (its attribute is social immaturity). This type of radicalism and extremism uses culture for the spread of radical or extreme ideas; this particularly refers to music production and song texts, and to art (painting expressions). A special means is graffiti (an extremist community of “graffiti painters”) and the Internet (extremist Internet community). At present, especially in the context of right-wing radicalism and extremism, there is a rise of extremism in sports – the so-called fan violence (hooligans).
- *Ethnic* radicalism and extremism are the most intolerant forms of nationalism which elevate one nation/ethnicity over the other. They focus on the leaders and elites of a given nation (ethnic group), the rest of the nation/group being fed with radical and extreme messages, including social solutions based on the pathological perception of the society. These forms of radicalism/extremism are also referred to as regional or ethno-regional radicalism/extremism, which is characterized by such features as: proclaiming cultural and political exclusivity, the use of violence to achieve the stated objectives (up to terrorism) and separatism.
- *Racial* radicalism and extremism consider racial, national or ethnic hatred to be a motive for antisocial acts with extremist traits without the mate-

rial motif for action. Due to its ideology and the characteristics of its supporters, this type of radicalism/extremism overlaps with right-wing extremism.

- *Religious* radicalism and extremism focus on supporting and strengthening the authority of a leader of a particular religious ideology community (sect, organization) that, due to its authoritarian leadership, feeds its members with radical and extreme ideas and problem solutions, stemming from the pathological perception of social reality. Internally, it is divided into the extremist streams of particular world religions (Catholic, Protestant, Islamic and Hindu extremism), as well as sects and cults, whose activities are inhuman and undemocratic (e.g. Satanism).
- *Ecological* radicalism and extremism characterized by anti-civilization and anti-human attitude regard all human activity as negative and the rest of nature as good. Its advocates proclaim opposition to technology, science, business, and also to any organizations. It is a relatively small, but rapidly developing and very popular form of extremism, because unlike racism and anarchism, ecology cannot be considered undemocratic.

One can see a relatively high risk of cultural radicalism and extremism in the fact that they directly or indirectly, and consciously or unconsciously, create an active base for economic and political radicalism and extremism, and thus ultimately also for the transition to a left-wing or right-wing dictatorship.

3.2 TERRORISM

Terrorism is defined as the purposeful use of means of individual or mass armed violence against non-participating parties (non-combatant soldiers and/or civilians) in order to achieve various objectives (political, religious, nationalist, economic, criminal, etc.). The core of this concept, its main feature (attribute), is spread of fear and horror. Additional features may include: purposefulness (political, religious, etc.), the use of violence (also a threat) and interest in media coverage and the impact on public opinion.

If war is the continuation of politics by violent means, then also terrorism is essentially a continuation of politics by violent means, also identified by some authors as *unconventional violence*.⁸¹ It can, therefore, be concluded that war and terrorism are, without politics, only violent acts, which are differentiated according to the means used – e.g. the war uses legalized means

⁸¹ F. Škvrnda, *Sociologický...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–19; and L. Hofreiter, *Bezpečnost'...*, pp. 85–89.

of violence (recognized under international war law), terrorists use illegal means and they illegally use legalized means.

A violent instrument of war is the threat or the use of armed conflict (fighting), which can be defined as the use of mass armed violence (conventional violence) against the military targets of the enemy (its armed forces and defence industry) following the known and agreed principles, customs and traditions enshrined in the laws of the international laws of war.

A violent instrument of terrorism is a terrorist act – terror, seen as an act which implies the use of violence (unconventional) or the threat of individuals, social groups, individual countries or groups of countries in various forms (up to mass armed violence – i.e. fighting), to intimidate other individuals, social groups and states up to their physical destruction or the severe violation of basic state functions.⁸²

It follows that the words ‘war’ and ‘terrorism’, which are acts of violence in their essence, are not identical. In case of state terrorism, where a ‘terrorist act’ is an instrument of the policy of a state (or a group of states), the terms ‘war’ and ‘terrorism’ significantly differ from each other due to the means used to achieve their goal. These means significantly influence their processes.

If ‘terrorism’ is a non-military threat, then it is necessary to answer the question: is it possible to declare war on terrorism and deploy regular armed forces on a fight? Basically, it is possible, but it is necessary to expect that the answer to terrorism is a special type of mass armed violence – a terrorist act. Not only the armed forces, but also the whole society must be prepared to eliminate it. It certainly will not be a classic armed fight, but rather unconventional fighting methods that can be called ‘anti-terror’. The war against terrorism with unconventional means of violence – the ‘anti-terror’ – is essentially “war in peace”.

The effort of each country to ensure its security and their response to the growing terrorism have become a new phenomenon of the 21st century, which requires a proper name and solution as soon as possible.⁸³ Not terrorism, but the pursuit of its elimination by means of “war in peace”, which aims to ensure the security of countries in the world, is a cause that increasingly blurs the line between military and non-military threats, and non-military threats are gradually growing into a serious military danger. Each democratic society,

⁸² F. Škvrnda, *Terorizmus...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–12.

⁸³ D. Pavolka, *Terorizmus*, [in:] V. Tarasovič et al., *Panoráma globálneho bezpečnostného prostredia 2004–2005*, Bratislava 2005, pp. 508–512.

especially its armed forces, must be ready for the fight (war) with terrorism (“war in peace”) nowadays. Thus, the content and nature of military work, and the role of military profession, are significantly changing.⁸⁴

It is possible to define the content of ‘anti-terror’ as a means of “war in peace” (war against terrorism) only after we successfully define terrorism as a social phenomenon. It will not be easy to investigate ‘terrorism’ as a social phenomenon because as such it is characterized by versatility and complexity with many manifestations and forms. It is characterized by high dynamics and variability.

A complex (comprehensive and holistic) view of this phenomenon requires a systematic approach that focuses not only on the identification of the general and significant factors of its influence, but also the identification of the factors that lead to the emergence of this social phenomenon in a significant and decisive manner.

‘Terrorism’ can be broadly described as a social phenomenon that has its own existence (it arises, changes, and eventually expires). It is a product of the previous activity, behaviour and interactions of people, which is found and detected as a ready social phenomenon, that has its relative autonomy and is gradually becoming part of people’s lives. If they are not able to change it at a given moment (as in other cases), they adapt or modify it.

As every social phenomenon, terrorism consists of two inseparable aspects: the *structural* and the *processual*:

- the *structural aspect*, defined as the essential network of functional relationships. This network also defines the places for the essential elements of the phenomenon to ensure its functioning and existence. These elements of terrorism are the following:
 - » the actors of terror, such as: the subject of terror (a terrorist) and the object of terror (a victim);
 - » the targets of terror (political, religious, national, criminal, etc.);
 - » the forms (individual, group, social, state), methods (murder, bomb attack, kidnapping, attack with weapons of mass destruction, combined method – hijacking and kidnapping or kidnapping and murder, etc.) and instruments (bomb, firearm, vaccine, gas and recently also a nuclear weapon) of terror;
 - » the signs of terror (fear, purposefulness, violence or the threat of its use, interest in media coverage and influence on public opinion),

⁸⁴ P. Hamaj, *Premeny vojenskej práce*, “SamO”, 2002, vol. 2, p. 60.

- » the environment of the terrorist act (the security environment – its level).
- *the processual aspect* expresses the sequence of successive and ever-recurring activities leading to the occurrence of a given change. Terrorism in its processual aspect consists of the following activities carried out in stages:
 - » the preparatory stage (it includes planning of a terrorist action with emphasis on: selection of a victim, environment, forms, methods and instruments, and the guarantee of the occurrence of the signs of terror);
 - » the motivational stage (it includes the selection and preparation of terrorists and of the environment for a terrorist act);
 - » the implementation stage (the performance of a terrorist action);
 - » control and assessment (the analysis of the action with a great emphasis on its publicity, and the preparation of the next action).

For detailed understanding of the social phenomenon of terrorism, it is necessary to analyse in detail every element that forms its structural aspect and each activity of its processual aspect. It is required so that the definition of the social identifiers of its creation and functioning could be devised, which would then assist individuals as so-called social indicators (social groups, societies and states) to timely and effectively detect and thereby prevent and gradually eliminate terrorism. This task is not easy because terrorism even in its most basic social form, when it is seen as a significant relationship between terrorists and victims, i.e. a specific social relation (traditional, pragmatic, rational and affective), is a very complex phenomenon.

However, it may be assumed that terrorism, as every social relationship, consists of a static (relational) and dynamic (social relation) component, where:

- the static (relational) component is composed of formal and informal relationships between terrorists and victims. These relationships are very deep (intense) in some methods of terror (especially kidnapping), even though they may not last long, because a victim and a terrorist usually fight for their lives. This aspect sometimes only has a potential form (bomb attack, murder) because the method used does not allow the relationship to deepen. In such cases we do not speak about social ties between terrorists and victims, but only about social contact (a strong connection of the survivors – no longer to a terrorist, but to the outcome of a terrorist attack that aims to create and root fear in humans).

Then it is possible to talk about terror actions with direct or indirect social ties;

- the dynamic component (i.e. the component of social intercourse) is formed by the social contact between a terrorist (or a group of them) and a victim (or a group of them). The dynamic component (also part of social contact) is based on the social contact between the terrorist (group of terrorists) and the victim (group of victims). It has three inseparable aspects (components): the interactive aspect (coexistence, coordination, cooperation, competition, rivalry and conflicts), the communication aspect (exchange of information) and, finally, the perceptual aspect (perception and empathy).

To conclude, it should be emphasized that if the complex and multifaceted social phenomenon of terrorism is not examined comprehensively (though in the form of examining sub-problems), then we cannot define its social indicators (identifiers) and face it efficiently and effectively.⁸⁵

4. DISCUSSION

In the article we have discussed several security issues of the globalising world. We have defined migration as a serious security problem for the European Union. We did not intend to address migration in detail as many scientific articles and publications have been written on this issue. We have emphasised the new phenomena – overcrowding and inability of control – i.e. uncontrolled mass migration. The control of the external border of the European Union has proved to be ineffective and inadequate, which is also noted in the annual report of the Frontex Risk Analysis for 2016.⁸⁶ During the outbreak of migration and refugee crisis in full in the summer and autumn 2015, thousands of people without control and monitoring were fleeing to Europe. The border guards were unable to monitor who was coming to Europe and they were not able to distinguish between eligible applicants for international protection from economic migrants, and the Islamic fighters and potential criminals.⁸⁷ The uncontrolled mass migration is becoming a significant security threat for the European Union in the

⁸⁵ L.C. Ibáñez, *Logika terorizmu*, Praha 2009, p. 19.

⁸⁶ See: Frontex European Border And Coast Guard Agency, *Risk Analysis for 2016*, 2016, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf

⁸⁷ Břicháček T., *Unie ve víři migrační krize*, Praha 2016, p. 28.

21st century.⁸⁸ The European Union may successfully face this situation only if it has:

- developed more precise migration rules to ensure quality human capital;
- adopted quality integration policies concerning migrants and refugees to ensure the effective use of this quality human capital.⁸⁹

In the second part of the article we focused on the definition and brief analysis of the causes of the current uncontrolled mass migration – the war, instability and poverty. The number of people who were forced to leave their homes because of the war, persecution or violence has exceeded 60 million, which is the most ever in the history of the UN. According to statistics from 2015, 24 people in average were forced to leave their home country each minute.⁹⁰ Half of the global number of refugees came mainly from three countries: Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia. We have concluded, that this fact in a great extent relates also to Europe as there was the largest mass movement of people since the World War II in the last two years. More than a million refugees and migrants came to the European Union, while the vast majority of them were fleeing from the war and terror in Syria⁹¹ as well as other countries that were facing various difficulties.

In the article war was described as the social phenomenon with two aspects: a technical aspect – armed conflict (a fight) and a political

⁸⁸ In the countries of the European Union 650 000 people (the first applicants) applied for asylum in 2017. The largest group of applicants (15,8%) were refugees from Syria (102 000), it was followed by the citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan (7% from each country), Nigeria (6%) and Pakistan (5%). Almost one third of the refugees applying for asylum in Europe lodges an application in Germany (198 000 in 2017, i.e. 31% of all applications). It was followed by Italy (127 000), France (91 000), Greece (57 000), Great Britain (33 000) and Spain (30 000). Source: Eurostat, *Asylum Statistics*, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics

⁸⁹ See further: V. Baláž, *Migrácia: problém alebo príležitosť?*, “Sevis.sk”, 18.12.2015, <https://www.sevis.sk/page/index.php/sk/zaujímavosti/item/615-migracia-problem-alebo-prilezitost.html>

⁹⁰ See further: *Utečenci a migrácia*, 09.09.2016, “UNIS Vienna – United Nations Information Service”, <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/sk/topics/refugees-migration.html>

⁹¹ From the beginning of crisis in Syria, the country has been left by more than 4.9 million people. Where have they been now? They have mainly stayed in the region or fled to the neighbouring countries – 2.7 million to Turkey; 1.03 million to Lebanon; 657 000 to Jordan; 249 000 to Iraq and 117 000 to Egypt (data valid on June 30, 2016). From April 2011 to June 2016 one million people from Syria applied for asylum. See: *Utečenci..., op. cit.*

TABLE 1. THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND PAKISTAN
(THE BEGINNING OF 2001 – THE HALF OF 2011)

killed combatants		killed civilians	refugees
foreign soldiers, contractors, local soldiers	resistance movement		
31 741	20 000 – 50 893	172 300 – 174 500	national: 2.1 mil to abroad: 5.7 mil.

Source: O. Krejčí, *Válka, op. cit.*, p. 10.

aspect – politics (a fight for power or influence).⁹² The war and armed conflict are strong catalysts of the growth of migration and immigration (see Table 1).

In the article we have stated that the war along with globalization has a strong influence on the formation and the further deepening of poverty at the individual, group as well as national level without the borders between the rich and the poor ones.⁹³ Then, we have defined radicalism, extremism and terrorism in the article as social phenomena that present an important consequence of uncontrolled mass migration. We have also drawn attention to the concepts of extremism and radicalism which are often interchanged (confusing) in technical language. We have defined *radicalism* as the sum of opinions, ideas or actions that directly or indirectly lead to significant changes in certain areas within the society, but do not attempt to change the constitutional system as opposed to *extremism*. We have defined extremism as any ideology or activity directed against the existing political system in order to replace it with its own alternative.⁹⁴

⁹² O. Krejčí, *Válka*, Praha 2011, pp. 28–29, http://www.blisty.cz/files/knihy/krejci/krejci-oskar_valka.pdf; and J. Matis, P. Hamaj, M. Martinská, *Sociológia armády*, Liptovský Mikuláš 2008, pp. 49–50.

⁹³ O. Satmár, *Mobilita...*, *op. cit.*

⁹⁴ See: R. Štefančík, *Teoretické východiská výskumu politického extrémizmu*, [in:] *Pravicový extrémizmus a mládež na Slovensku*. Brno 2013, p. 14.

We have also highlighted that Islamism, which is perceived as a form of political and religious fundamentalism, is currently ranked as a new form of the political extremism.⁹⁵

The reaction to the penetration and behaviour of Muslims in non-Muslim societies results in the emergence of Islamophobia. It arises as a reaction to the lack of integration of Muslim immigrants in the countries of the Western civilization. The expansion of Islamophobia and related activities of extremist groups were affected by, among others, the so-called migration and refugee crisis.⁹⁶

In the article, terrorism has been defined as one of the main causes of endangering the state security in the 21st century. We have agreed with the definition which classifies terrorism as violent and illegal means of action and policy of the state or certain social classes or groups (social, religious, ethnic, criminal, etc.) in the struggle for political power and its maintenance or achievement of certain profit of religious, ideological, ethnic, social or economic nature. The events of 11 September 2001 in the United States showed that the arsenal of means of terrorism has been expanded and this phenomenon has become a major threat also for the great powers.⁹⁷

In the article we have tried to show the interdependence of the various social phenomena that are analysed as global problems currently related to the globalization process.

CONCLUSION

The above theoretical analysis leads to the conclusion that not only the European Union but the whole world faces enormous intellectual, moral, political, economic, civilization-related and security-related challenges and tasks. In the current post-postmodern world, the point is to prevent humankind from overhearing this global ethical challenge and going with the flow of global (world) revolution. The world revolution, which manifests itself in tensions and conflicts in different places of the planet, develops

⁹⁵ Ministry of Interior of the SR, *The concept of the fight against extremism for years 2015–2019*, 2015, <https://www.minv.sk/?VRAX&subor=225999>

⁹⁶ V. Lichner, D. Šlosár, K. Šiňanská, L. Tóthová, J. Plavnická, M. Hovanová, V. Vasilová, T. Žiaková, J. Kahan, Ján Šimko: *Extrémizmus a radikalizácia*. Košice 2018, <https://unibook.upjs.sk/img/cms/2018/ff/extremizmus-a-radikalizacia-web.pdf>

⁹⁷ M. Kulich, V Tarasovič, J. Nižňanský, P. Link, *Terorizmus – destabilizujúci fenomén súčasnosti a boj proti nemu (study)*, Bratislava 2002, pp. 25–26.

spontaneously and in an uncontrolled way, as if it had no internal bonds and starting ideological base, and fully hit the old conservative Europe.

The world revolution is produced by a range of geopolitical movements, as well as the system of economic, technological, environmental, cultural and ethical factors. Their interconnectedness and evolutionary nonlinearities may ultimately easily lead Europeans to the unknown and unpredictable future. The European Union must prepare for the fact that the process of its integration in the process of political globalization will be retarded rather than accelerated. This actually means that the transnational integration of the activities in the public sector in the globalization process will occur more slowly than it did on the economic layer of globalization.

In the long-term perspective, globalization may bring new challenges. In the article, we highlighted migration, which we have defined as a serious security problem for the European Union in the event of failure to resolve the overcrowding and illegality and to adopt an efficient and effective model of the integration of migrants into mainstream society.

Massification and illegality of migration can be stopped by means of the preventive solutions for its causes, i.e. poverty, instability, wars and conflicts, both within and outside Europe. The adoption of an effective and efficient model of the integration of migrants into mainstream society can, in turn, be performed by taking preventive measures against the occurrence and spread of extremism and radicalism and by fighting terrorism inside and outside the society, as they are all possible consequences of uncontrolled mass migration.

There may be a significant contribution to the abovementioned processes from two regulatory factors: the intrinsic activity of the institutions of nation states and the external pressure of large multinational institutions (the institutions of the integrated European Union), the latter of which, after the stage of distribution and redistribution of markets and power in the global expansion will eventually begin to prefer the creation of stable environment.

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CITE THIS ARTICLE AS:

J. Matis J., L. Nagyová, *Migration – a Significant Social Security Concern for the European Union*, “Security Dimensions”, 2019, no. 29, p. 22–63, DOI 10.5604/01.3001.0013.4393.

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