

THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL UNREST AND THE MILITARY DOCTRINE CHANGE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD: ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL (2011–2015)

MOHAMMAD BADRY EID*

ABSTRACT

The “Arab Spring” uprisings are a historic milestone from Israel’s national security perspective, regarding to the political and security changes in the regional strategic environment, as Israel’s geographic neighboring, Egypt and Syria, have become more threatening.

As a serious scientific attempt under the umbrella of the balance of power theory in the political science literature on military doctrine change, this paper aims to examine conditions under which a domestic political change or unrest in a state may affect, positively or negatively, the change of the military doctrine of another state or states in neighborhood. By applying this research question to the case of the Arab uprisings and Israel, the study examines, from Israeli elite’s perspective, why and how the aforementioned uprisings affect the Israeli military doctrine, and explores whether the particular components of this doctrine have been affected to the same degree.

* Mohammad Badry Eid, M.A., Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences, Cairo University, Egypt; correspondence address: “Al Anba” Newspaper, Al Shuwaikh, Press Street, Airport Road, 13100 Kuwait; e-mail: mohammedalbadry2012@gmail.com

The study uses elite approach, and discourse analysis as key methodological tools. The general findings indicated that the Arab uprisings have strong and diversified impacts on the components of the Israeli military doctrine. These impacts may be compared to those of regional wars and military conflicts, as they have reshaped the map of security risks and threats.

ARTICLE INFO

Article history

Received: 14.02.2019 Accepted: 07.03.2019

Keywords

Arab Spring, Israeli military doctrine, Israel's security, Israeli deterrence, the Middle East

INTRODUCTION

The Uprisings that broke out in several Arab countries in 2010 and early 2011, dubbed by the media “the Arab Spring”, have been the main focus of political, military and academic circles, specifically in the Middle Eastern countries, with Israel in the forefront. This is because of the deep and long-term impacts of these developments on the regional strategic environment.

The Arab Uprisings impacts, positively and negatively, exceed the borders of the states within which they occurred, and reach to the regional geographic neighborhood, including Israel.

In light of the challenges and/or opportunities posed by these impacts for Israel's national security, this study aims to examine why and how the uprisings in Egypt and Syria have affected the Israeli military doctrine.

The review of political science literature on general military doctrine, and on the Israeli military doctrine in particular, shed the light on this topic from different dimensions (definition, history, components, pillars, its discrepancies and common points with strategy etc.).

Scholars discuss internal, external and technological factors that may explain the change of military doctrine. These factors may include the change of the political system or ideology; changes in the balance of the civilian-military relationship; the increases and decreases of the military budget; the estimates of the geography of the future battlefields of major wars; changes in the capability or intentions of the adversary; shifts in the

balance of power in the international system; as well as major changes in military technology.

This study seems to be a serious attempt to examine why and how a domestic political change or unrest in a state may affect the change of the military doctrine in another state or states in the geographic neighborhood, especially in a strategic region like the Middle East.

Based on the aforementioned, the study consists of five main sections. **The first** one describes the research design and includes information on: the research question, the time period of the study, the conceptual framework, the theoretical framework, literature review, methodology and data sources. **The second section** highlights the pillars of Israel's military doctrine, its major components, as well as its changes over past decades. **The third** discusses the changes in the regional strategic environment in light of the Arab Uprisings from the Israeli elite perspective.

The fourth section traces impacts of the Arab uprisings on the military doctrine from the perspective of the Israeli national security, while **the fifth section** examines the prospects of this doctrine in the post-Arab Uprisings era. Finally, conclusion and recommendations for future research are presented.

I RESEARCH DESIGN

1. RESEARCH QUESTION

The intensive and increasing attention of Israeli elite concerning the impacts of the Arab uprisings on Israel's military doctrine raises an important question about the extent to which political instability or internal unrest in a country may affect the military doctrine of another state or states in neighborhood, especially if there is a previous legacy of conflict or war between these two states, even if they conclude a peace agreement (as in the case of Egypt and Israel), or are in a war status, or a "non-war, non-peace" status (as in the case of Syria and Israel).

A great debate has taken place among the Israeli intellectual elite, concerning the effects of the Arab uprisings on Israel's national security. In regard to this debate, three major trends have emerged concerning the changes that the Arab Uprisings have made on the regional strategic environment, especially in terms of changing the map of the security threats and challenges that affect Israel's military doctrine.

Based on the foregoing, the main research question is: why and how the Arab uprisings affected Israeli military doctrine?

A number of sub-questions are linked to this as following:

- Are the different components of the doctrine equally affected?
- What component (or components) has been most affected by these developments?
- Do the Arab uprisings affect the Israel's military doctrine in the short, medium or long term?
- Are the changes in the components of the Israeli military doctrine caused by these uprisings, adaptive or fundamental?

2. THE TIME PERIOD

The study covered the period between 2011 and 2015, as it was long enough to demonstrate and explain the changes which have occurred in the Israeli military doctrine after the Arab uprisings. During this period there were many dramatic developments in the strategic environment, in the light of them, one could compare the regional situation before and after 2011, and then , discover the type of changes in the Israeli military doctrine in the post-Arab Uprisings era.

3. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The study uses three key concepts. It has adopted procedural definitions for them, as follows:

- **The Arab Uprisings:** the term refers to the events that occurred in some Arab countries in late 2010 and during 2011, which led to removal of the regime from power in some countries, as in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, while others have destabilized their regimes, as Syria did.
- **The Military Doctrine:** for the purposes of this study, Chapman's definition of military doctrine has been adopted, which defines it as the basic law of the state in the military sphere, which expresses the official view in the matter of armed conflict, including, on the one hand, intellectual concepts and essential political, military, psychological and technological principles, and on the

other hand, the rules on national security which explain how and when to resort to the means of armed conflict.¹

- **The Israeli Elite:** for the purpose of this study, Ygal Alon's definition of the elite is used. According to Alon, the most famous founder of Israeli strategic thought, the elite includes official decision makers, information providers (intelligence), advisors, think tanks, academics, and public opinion makers.²

The study focuses on the Israeli intellectual elite, which includes e.g. former senior officials and advisors in important political and security institutions, such as former chiefs of the Military Intelligence (AMAN), the Public Security Service (Shabak), and the Foreign Intelligence Service (Mossad); it also includes the advisors and experts of the ministries of defense and foreign affairs, senior security commentators in the Israeli media (press and television), as well as academic and historians.

4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are three major perspectives or theories in political science literature that provide the potential explanations of the military doctrine change: *balance of power* (the *systemic* theory), the *organizational* theory, and the *interservice rivalry* theory.³

This study bases, theoretically, on the *balance of power* (*systemic*) perspective. The main assumption of this theory is that the need to survive in the

¹ B. Chapman, *Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook*, Santa Barbara 2009, p. 11.

² Alon Y., *Security of Israel*, Nicosia 1986, p. 66.

³ See e.g.: J.M. Acuff, *Generational Analysis and the Evolution of Military Doctrine and Strategy*, [in:] *Theory and Application of the "Generation" in International Relations and Politics*, B.J. Steele, J.M. Acuff (eds), New York 2012, pp. 177–201; A. Coffey, *Doctrinal Orphan or Active Partner? A History of US Army Mechanized Infantry Doctrine*, a master's dissertation written at US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth 2000, pp. 106–123; J. Black, *Military Organizations and Military Change in Historical Perspective*, "The Journal of Military History", 1998, vol. 62, pp. 871–892; K. Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991*, Princeton 1993, pp. 181–196; J.P. DiMarco, *Service Culture Effects on Joint Operations: The Masks of War Unveiled*, a master's thesis written at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth 2004, pp. 89–97; C.T. Mayer, *Committed Service in the Military: Bringing Together Selflessness and Self-Fulfillment*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville 2010, pp. 72–75.

competitive international environment will force states to organize for war as efficiently as possible. According to this perspective, military doctrine is a function of the international system.

This means that military change is a rational response to changing strategic circumstances; states adopt new military practices, and emulate the best practices of the others, in order to keep up with the competition.⁴ In other words, states change their military doctrine in response to environmental factors, such as: shifts in the balance of power in the system; the geography of expected future battlefields; new military technology; changes in the intentions of the enemy threat or their military capabilities.⁵ In contrast to *organizational* and *interservice rivalry* theories, which make priority to internal state variables, the *balance of power* perspective stresses that external variables play the most important role in explaining the change or continuity in the military doctrine.

This study focuses on a new aspect in the context of the *systemic* theory – the aspect embodied in the impacts of domestic political change or unrest in a state on the military doctrine of another state or states in neighborhood.

5. LITERATURE REVIEW

A – LITERATURE REVIEW ON MILITARY DOCTRINE

The political science literature on military doctrine is sparse; studies in this field could be categorized into three groups, as follows:

- **A1: War and peace studies** – this group of literature focuses on military developments, including military doctrine, from the perspective of war and peace. International relations scholars, traditionally, place emphasis on the causes of war, as well as its patterns and outcomes.⁶ Other

⁴ T. Terriff, T. Farrell, *Military Change in the New Millennium*, [in:] *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, T. Terriff, T. Farrell (eds), London 2002, p. 271; B.R. Posen, *Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power*, “International Security”, Fall 1993, no. 2, pp. 82, 118; K.N. Walz, *Reductionist and systemic theories*, [in:] *Neorealism and its Critics*, R.O. Keohane (ed.), New York 1986, pp. 47–69.

⁵ G.H. Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System*, New York 1977, p. 127; J.W. Long, *The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine: from Active Defense To Airland Battle and Beyond*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1991, p. 122.

⁶ See e.g.: S. Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, Princeton, NJ 2004; *The Changing Character of War*, Strachan H., Scheipers S. (eds), Oxford 2012; J. Childs, *The Military Revolution I: The Transition to modern Warfare*, [in:] *The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War*, C. Townshend (ed.), Oxford 1997;

studies shed light on the components of military doctrine, especially on deterrence.⁷ This group, in general, do not mention military doctrine as a “big title”, or as a dependent or independent variable – scholars mainly study it within history of war.

- **A2: Fundamental studies on military doctrine** – in this group of studies, the military doctrine is the main topic. This literature, traditionally, focuses on all aspects of it: its definition, importance to the state security, history,⁸ the discrepancies and common points between doctrine and strategy,⁹ or the internal and external factors that shape military doctrine.¹⁰
- **A3: Studies on the changes in military doctrine** – literature on military doctrine change and evolution is not large. However, political science scholars observe in their studies many domestic, external and technological factors that may explain this change during wartime and peacetime, which are concisely summarized below.

J. Black, *The Military...*, *op. cit.*; J. Weltman, *World Politics and the Evolution of War*, Baltimore 1995; L.H. Addington, *The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*, Bloomington 1984; G. Cashman, L.C.

⁷ See e.g.: K. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Age*, Lexington, KY 1996; P. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, Beverly Hills, CA 1977; P. Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, Cambridge 2003.

⁸ See e.g.: B. Chapman, *Military...*, *op. cit.*; J. Gooch, *Introduction: Military doctrine in Military History*, [in:] *The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine*, J. Gooch (ed.), *Occasional Paper*, September 1997, no. 30; A.P. Jackson, *The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in the Practice of Warfare*, Fort Leavenworth, KA 2013; H. Høiback, *Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, London 2013.

⁹ See e.g.: A.P. Jackson, *Doctrine, Strategy and Military Culture: Military Strategic Doctrine Developments in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (1987–2007)*; Ontario Trenton 2013; H.R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport 2008.

¹⁰ See e.g.: A.J. Goodpaster, S.P. Huntington, *Civil-Military Relations*, Washington, DC 1977; S.P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge 1985; A. Legault, J. Sokolsky (eds), *The Soldier and the State in the Post-Cold War Era*, Kingston 2002; R.M. Farley, *Transitional determinants of Military Doctrine*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at the University of Washington, 2004; R.L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, London 2009; D.D. Avant, *The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at the University of California, San Diego 1991.

- **domestic factors** – these factors concern the state itself and the internal interactions within it. They include, for example: the political system, public opinion and ideology,¹¹ the culture of the military organization,¹² the nature of the civilian–military relationship, military budget,¹³ the influence of military leaders (junior, mid-grade and senior), and the estimates of the geography of future battlefields.¹⁴
- **external factors** – these factors include: the aftermath of major wars, especially military defeats or failures; changes in the capabilities or intentions of the adversary; shift in the balance of the power in the international system, such as the rise or collapse of a great power; shift in the nature of threats.¹⁵
- **technological factors** – changing in the military doctrine is affected greatly by developments in military technology.¹⁶

¹¹ See e.g.: *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, T. Terriff, T. Farrell (eds), London 2002, pp. 3–20; P.P. Everts, *Democracy and Military Force*, New York 2002, pp. 333–337; W. Millonig, *Impact of the Religious and Political Affiliation on Strategic Military Decisions and Policy Recommendations*, Carlisle Barracks, PA 2006, pp. 8–11.

¹² See e.g.: D. Denise, *Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*, Ithaca 1994, p. 39; D. Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S., and Israel*, Palo Alto, CA 2010, p. 43; E. Kier, *Changes in Conventional Military Doctrine: The Culture Roots of Doctrinal Change*, a Ph.D. Dissertation written at Cornell University, 1992, pp. 19–25.

¹³ See e.g.: *The Defense Reform Debate*, A.A. Clark, P.W. IV Chiarelli, J.S. McKittrick, J.W. Reed (eds), Baltimore 1984, pp. 66–87.

¹⁴ See e.g.: S.P. Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, Ithaca, NY 1991, p. 76; *Military Leadership*, J.H. Buck, C.J. Korb (eds), Beverly Hills 1981; R.A. Gabriel, *No More Heroes: Madness & Psychiarity in War*, New York 1987, pp. 72–75.

¹⁵ See e.g.: E. Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars*, Princeton, NJ 1997, pp. 50–52; W.E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror*, Lawrence, Kansas 2011, pp. 71–77; C.C. Moskos, J.A. Williams, D.R. Segal (eds), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford 2000, pp. 11–32; J.F. Dunnigan, R.M. Macedonia, *Getting it Right: American Military Reforms after Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond*, New York 1993.

¹⁶ See e.g.: M. Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 – Today*, New York 2006; M. O’Hanlon, *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare*, Washington, DC 2000; B. Holley Jr., *Technology and Military Doctrine Essays on a Challenging Relationship*, Maxwell Alabama 2004; P. Salminen, *The Impact of Arms Technology on Military Doctrines*, “Finnish Defense Studies”, 1992, no. 5.

The clearest examples of this are: the nuclear weapons,¹⁷ helicopters,¹⁸ carrier aircrafts, ballistic missiles, robots, drones, cyber weapons etc.

B – LITERATURE ON ISRAELI MILITARY DOCTRINE

Literature on Israeli military doctrine, in Hebrew, English and Arabic, could be classified into three major groups as follows:

- **B1:** General overview of **Israel's National Security**, which includes the discussion on its definition, foundations, aspects, and its history since the establishment of the state in 1948.¹⁹ Some famous studies within this group focus on Israeli military doctrine.²⁰
- **B2: IDF and National Security.** This group of studies concentrates on Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a military organization, its historical contributions to Israeli society, civil-military relations in Israel, Israeli military and foreign policy etc.²¹
- **B3: External developments and Israel's national security.** This group of studies focuses on the impacts of the major international and regional

¹⁷ See e.g.: S.D. Sagan, K.N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate*, New York 1995; L. Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, London 1981.

¹⁸ See e.g.: C.J. Horn, *Military Innovation and the Helicopter: A Comparison of Development in the United States Army and Marine Corps, 1945-1965*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at Ohio State University, Columbus 2003.

¹⁹ See e.g. A. Levite, *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine*, New York 1990; I. Tal, *National Security: The Israeli Experience*, Westport 2003; Y. Ben-Horin, B. Posen, *Israel's Strategic Doctrine*, Santa Monica 1981.

²⁰ See e.g. Y. Allon, *The Making of Israel's Army*, London 1970; Y. Allon, *Contriving Warfare*, Tel Aviv 1990, [In Hebrew], translation into Arabic: Palestine Foundation of Studies 1991; E.A. Cohen, M.J. Eisenstadt, A.J. Bacevich, *Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution*, Washington, DC 1998; S.A. Cohen, *Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion*, New York 2008; U. Bar-Joseph, *Israel's National Security towards the 21st Century*, New York 2001; A.A. Hussien, *Enlargement in the Israeli Strategy*, Beirut 1989 [in Arabic].

²¹ See e.g.: T. Bowden, *Army in the Service of the State*, Tel Aviv 1976; K.S. Brower, *The Israel Defense Forces (1948-2017)*, "Mideast Security and Policy Studies", 2018, no. 150; N.E. Refaat, *The Israeli Military Organization: From David to Goliath*, Cairo 1991 [In Arabic]; M. van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Forces*, New York 1998; Y. Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy*, Washington DC 2006; Z. Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army (1870-1974)*, San Francisco 1974.

events on Israeli national security, regardless of the involvement of Israel in these developments. This includes: Arab-Israeli conventional wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973),²² the limited confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza Strip (2014, 2012, 2009–2008), Palestine Intifadas in 1987 and 2000,²³ the Second Gulf War of 1991, and the September 11 attacks. There are, however, few scientific studies that shed light on the impacts of the Arab Uprisings on Israeli security, and in particular, on Israeli military doctrine specifically.²⁴

6. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES

The study uses the elite approach to analyze the perspectives, or visions, of Israeli elite concerning the impacts of the Arab Uprisings on Israel's

²² See e.g.: A. Bregman, *Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947*, New York 1987; C. Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, New York 1982; U. Lebel, E. Lewis (eds), *The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Reshaping of Israeli Civil-Military Relations*, Washington, DC 2015; E. Inbar, *Israel's National Security Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War*, New York 2008; R. Donovan, *Israel's fight for survival*, New York 1967; T. Segev, *Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East*, New York 2008; M. Dayan, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign*, London 1965; Z. Schiff, *October Earthquake*, Tel-Aviv 1974; Z. Drory, *Israel's Reprisal Policy 1953–1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation*, London – New York 2005; M. Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973*, Berkeley 1980; A. Awad al-Faouri, *Regional Transformations and its Impact on Israeli Security Theory (2006–2012)*, a master's dissertation written at Amman: Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Middle East University, 2011 [In Arabic]; D. Mahmud al-Sayed, *Continuity and Change in Israeli Defense Policy: A Comparative study of the post-wars October 1973 and June 2006*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 2013 [In Arabic]; G.I. Rabiea, *Israeli Strategy (1948–1967)*, a master's dissertation written at Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1976 [In Arabic]; G.I. Rabiea, *Israeli Strategy (1967–1979)*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1985 [In Arabic].

²³ See e.g.: M. Ganem Rosen, *Deterrence and Proportionality in Israeli Military Doctrine: The Second Lebanon War*, a master's dissertation written at The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Brandeis University, Waltham. Massachusetts, USA, 2011; A. Harel, A. Issacharoff, *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon*, New York 2008; *The second Lebanon war: Strategic dimensions*, M. Elarm, S. Brom (eds), Tel Aviv 2007; Z. Schiff, E. Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, translated by I. Friedman, New York 1984.

²⁴ See e.g.: M.A. Yunis, *Israeli Military Doctrine after the Arab Revolutions*, "Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya", July 2013, no. 193 [In Arabic]; E. Banu, *The Arab Spring: implications for US-Israeli relations*, "Israel Affairs", 2014, vol. 20, no. 3, DOI 10.1080/13537121.2014.922802.

military doctrine.²⁵ It adopts discourse analysis as a key methodological tool; specifically, it applies the model devised by a famous British scholar, Stephen Toulmin, for argument analysis.²⁶

Basically, the study relies on Israeli sources linked to its topic, including the sources issued in English, and the sources in Hebrew translated into Arabic.

The study examines and analyzes the arguments and visions of nearly 250 Israeli former military officers, political figures, academics, defense commentators, and about 17 most famous Israeli think tanks. These materials can be categorized into two main groups. The **first** one includes studies, reports, estimates, seminars and conferences. The **second** consists of writings (analyses, opinion articles), interviews and statements for Israeli and international media (press, radio, and television channels).

II ISRAELI MILITARY DOCTRINE: BASES AND CHANGES

The Israeli military doctrine is based on several geographical, demographic, economic, and intellectual pillars, which have contributed to shaping that doctrine over decades.²⁷ Based on these pillars, the founding leaders of Israel formulated unwritten traditional components of the military doctrine, aiming to achieve two main goals: first, finding alternative solutions to the dilemma of the absence of strategic depth (Israel's territory is narrow in shape, its area is ca. 20,000 km², and it has no strong natural borders, which means that the state is vulnerable to its neighbors in case of war), and the demographical imbalance between Israel and its neighbors; and second, realizing the best use of military force, including the situations in which Israel must launch war.²⁸

This paper focuses on the main components of the Israeli military doctrine as following:

1. Deterrence. It is the cornerstone of Israeli military doctrine. It means preventing adversaries from launching an open war against Israel in a way that threatens its existence. It also means empowering Israel – when

²⁵ The Elite Approach is a methodological tool based on the assumption that official and informal elites have a causal effect on the public policy. Thus, changes in the political regime and its internal and external policies could be explained by the influence of the elite.

²⁶ S.E. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument*, Updated Edition, Cambridge 2003, pp. 87–114.

²⁷ Y. Ben-Horin, B. Posen, *Israel's...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–9; M.A. Heller, *Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy*, London 2000, pp. 9–13.

²⁸ Z. Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, Ann Arbor 2006, DOI 10.3998/mpub.166167, p. 7.

necessary – to defeat its adversaries with the least possible loss of human lives and economic resources, by launching the counter-attack.²⁹

2. **Early warning.** it means that the Israeli army and intelligences are capable of warning, as soon as possible, the political and military leadership against any possible attack.³⁰
3. **Deduction.** It is based on the need to punish the enemies who wage war against Israel, and to prevent them from threatening it again. This includes moving the battle to the land of the opponent as soon as possible, and avoiding war on more than one front simultaneously.³¹ In this sense, the deduction contributes to the maintenance of deterrence. Hence, deduction, early warning and deterrence are linked together.
4. **Offensive maneuver warfare.** The founders of the state, as Israel's first prime minister David Ben-Gurion, have perceived it as a small country surrounded by much larger and more powerful enemies, so they have elaborated a military doctrine that claimed to be defensive in nature, but that could quickly become offensive under threat.³²
5. **Priority for short war.** On the one hand, this priority has been set because Israel cannot afford the human and economic cost of a long-term war.³³ On the other hand, quick termination of wars sooner rather than later reduces the prospect of military and diplomatic interventions of international powers to make pressure on Israel. In other words, offensive maneuver warfare offers an elegant solution to Israel's territorial, economic, human, and diplomatic difficulties.³⁴
6. **Self-reliance in military affairs.** It means preparedness to remove any threat by Israel's own military force.³⁵

²⁹ For more details, see: U. Bar-Yusuf, *The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli Thinking*, "Security Studies", 1998, vol. 7, no. 3, DOI 10.1080/09636419808429353, pp. 145-181; A. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, New York 1998, pp. 31-32.

³⁰ A. Levite, *Offense...*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

³² D. Horowitz, *The Israeli Concept of National Security*, [in:] *National Security and Democracy in Israel*, Y. Avner (ed.), London 1993, p. 22.

³³ A. Levite, *Offense...*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

³⁴ Y. Ben-Horn, B. Posen, *Israel's...*, *op. cit.*, p. 36. 34

³⁵ D. Rodman, *Israel's National Security Doctrine: An Introductory Overview*, "Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)", September 2001, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 79.

7. Great power patronage. It is a central element of the effectiveness of Israeli deterrence. David Ben-Gurion, explaining the conviction on which this component is based, he said: “A small state with limited resources could not simply afford to find itself isolated in the world community during wartime. To protect Israel’s national security interests, the military, economic, and diplomatic support of a great power, preferably the United States, would be absolutely vital”.³⁶

On that basis, Israel was keen to establish strong security relations with Britain, as the major global power up to the first half of the twentieth century, and it retained this attitude throughout the 1950s. Then, in the early 1960s, Israel chose to hide under the security umbrella of the United States, which became, since then, one of the most important component of Israel’s military doctrine.³⁷

Over the past decades, some components of Israel’s military doctrine have undergone various changes, in light of several factors. These changes were associated, most often, with the consequences of the conventional wars between the Arabs and Israel (in 1967 and 1973), or with the consequences of low-power military confrontations in the West Bank (Palestinian Uprisings of 1987 and 2000), in Gaza Strip (2008, 2012 and 2014), and against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Other changes to some components of the Israeli military doctrine have been associated with the technological revolution in the military sphere, particularly the nuclear weapons.

III ARAB UPRISINGS AND THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Arab Uprisings have provoked a major debate among the Israeli elite, both at its beginnings and during transitional periods. The visions and estimates of the elite have undergone a qualitative evolution dur-

³⁶ A.S. Klieman, *Israel and the World after 40 Years*, Washington, DC 1990, p. 42.

³⁷ J.A. Dabis, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: what drives it, and how it impacts developments in the region*, a master’s thesis supervised by Dr. Magid Shihade, presented at the Institute for Higher Education at Birzeit University, Birzeit 2012, pp. 28–36 [In Arabic]; H. Malka, *Crossroads: The future of U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership*, Washington D.C. 2011, pp. 1–18, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf, (accessed: 9.07.2012).

ing the period of study; one can distinguish between two major phases, as follows:

- The **first period** (25th January 2011 to mid-2013) witnessed significant developments; in Egypt, political Islam, represented in the Muslim Brotherhood, came to power in June 2012. In Syria, the possibility of a Western (mainly American) military strike against the regime of Bashar al-Assad has escalated after the use of chemical weapon by this regime against Syrian people.
- The **second period** (from July 2013 to the end of 2015), in which the Muslim Brotherhood has been removed from power in Egypt on 3rd July 2013. In Syria, opposition factions have expanded their control over some areas of land at the expense of the Assad regime, which controlled only one third of the country's area, so Iran and Russia threw their military weight to ensure the survival of the Syrian regime.

In general, the Israeli elite have argued that the Arab Uprisings have created a new and completely different Middle East from what has prevailed since the October war in 1973.³⁸ According to the Israeli perspective, the Arab Uprisings established unstable strategic environment in the Middle East that would bring trouble to Israel.³⁹

³⁸ D. Rothschild, *Israel in the Eye of Storms*, a working paper presented at the 12th Hertzliya Conference, 30 January–2 February 2012, http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/HerzliyaAssessment_E.pdf (accessed: 4.03.2012); M. Milenstein, *A New-Old Middle East: Current developments and its repercussions on Israel*, "Strategic assessment", April 2011, pp. 4–5, <http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291303041146.pdf> (accessed: 22.08.2013).

³⁹ Y. Zeev, *A New Uncomfortable Regional Reality*, "Palestine Today", no. 2129, 10 April 2011, p. 43 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Maarev", 9 April 2011]; Y. Amos, *Winds of Change in the Middle East from an Israeli perspective*, lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 30 March 2011, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/Yadlin20110330.pdf> (accessed: 21.04.2011); Y. Firer: *Arab tsunami hits the Middle East*, "Palestine Today", no. 2124, 5 April 2011, p. 55 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Ha'aretz", 4 April 2011]; U. Rabi, *Arab Spring plunges Middle East back into 1950s for Israel*, An Interview to "Russia Today", "Russia Today", 17 June 2012, <https://www.rt.com/news/arab-spring-israel-ramifications-018/> (accessed: 18.06.2012); D. Rothschild, *The Arab Spring and Regional Security in the Middle East: A View from Israel*, "Carnegie Moscow Center", 5 September 2011, <http://carnegie.ru/2011/09/05/arab-spring-and-regional-security-in-middle-east-view>

Overall, three major trends can be distinguished among the Israeli elite in this regard: the traditional **pessimistic** trend, the **optimistic**, and the **cautious pragmatic** one.

1. THE TRADITIONAL PESSIMISTIC TREND

Those who adopted this trend, which is traditionally called inside Israel “disability literature”, viewed the Arab Uprisings from a negative perspective on national security, asserting that these developments had produced real security risks for Israel. They considered that the potential negative repercussions of Arab Uprisings were so great that it erupted in parallel with the relative decline in the global role of the United States and the shift in its strategic priority from the Middle East towards the Pacific Ocean.⁴⁰

Supporters of this trend have based their pessimistic vision on a set of arguments that reflect the potential risks experienced in the post-2011 regional strategic environment, which were as follows:

Argument 1A – The Arab Uprisings increased Israel’s geostrategic insecurity because instability in neighboring countries, Egypt and Syria, has spread over Israeli borders. The clearest example was Islamic radicalism which became closer to Israel’s border, as Al-Qaeda affiliated groups and other radical Islamist forces have intensified their activities in the region, in Syria, Gaza, and Sinai, which have become “buffer zones” and potential hotbeds of Israeli security tension rather than just borders.⁴¹

from-israel/alcx (accessed: 10.12.2011); S. Brom, *Regional Implications of Arab Spring*, [in:] *One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications*, “INSS Memorandum”, March 2012, no. 113, M.A. Heller, Y. Guzansky (eds), pp. 67–68, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/one-year-of-the-arab-spring-global-and-regional-implications> (accessed: 7.05.2012); E. Zisser, *The Syrian Uprising: Implications for Israel*, “Strategic Assessment”, 9 August 2011, <http://jcpa.org/article/the-syrian-uprising-implications-for-israel/> (accessed: 23.10.2011).

⁴⁰ E. Kam, *The New Middle East: An Era of Uncertainty, Strategic Assessment*, April 2011, vol. 14, no. 1., pp. 25–40, [http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/\(FILE\)1304500885.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/(FILE)1304500885.pdf) (accessed: 14.09.2014); E. Inbar, *The Arab Uprisings and Israel’s National Security*, “Mideast Security and Policy Studies”, February 2012, no. 95, <http://besacenter.org/mideast-security-and-policy-studies/the-2011-arab-uprisings-and-israel%C2%92s-national-security-3-2/> (accessed: 20.03.2012); E. Inbar, *The Israel National Security Amidst Unrest in the Arab World*, “Washington Quarterly”, Summer 2012, pp. 59–73.

⁴¹ E. Eran, *Israel and the neighboring weak countries: Lessons from the Israeli experience in Lebanon*, [in:] *Israel and the Arab Spring: Opportunities for Change*, N. Goren, J. Yudkevich (eds), Ramat Gan – Herzliya Pituach, 2013, pp. 211–213, <http://www.mitvim.com>

Some observers considered these Jihadist groups more dangerous to Israel than the Arab-Israeli conflict. From the Israeli perspective, these groups cannot be deterred by military means, and they are capable of launching attacks without early warning.⁴²

Because of these fears, some Israeli strategists called to reoccupy the “Philadelphia” Corridor between Egypt and Gaza Strip.⁴³

Another possible danger is the extensive Iranian presence and influence across Syria, which is becoming a weak and failing state.⁴⁴

Argument 1B – On the one hand, the Uprisings have increased Israel’s isolation, as Tel Aviv lost its regional allies. On the other hand, Israel became more cautious concerning the policies of the new regimes in the Arab Uprising countries. The new Arab leaders, whatever their orientation, cannot build a strong friendship with Israel, because they take into account the reactions of anti-Israel public opinion.⁴⁵

org.il/images/Book_notification_-_Israel_and_the_Arab_Spring_2.pdf (accessed: 30.10.2014).

⁴² Y. Schweitzer, *Al-Qaeda and Arab Spring*, [in:] *One Year... , op. cit.*, pp. 113–119, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/one-year-of-the-arab-spring-global-and-regional-implications>; Y. Schweitzer, O. Einav, *The Islamic State: How Viable Is It?*, Tel Aviv 2016, pp. 66–69, <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-islamic-state-how-viable-is-it/> (accessed: 3.06.2017); B. Ganur, *The threat of armed groups to Israel after the Arab revolutions*, [in:] *Arab Spring: Israel and the rest of the world*, E. Inbar (ed.), Ramat Gan 2013; A. Fishman, *Afghanistan at Israel's borders*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3020, 29 October 2013, p. 49 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Yediot Aharonot”, 28 October 2013]; Ron Ben Yishai, *Armed Islamist militias and the breakdown of Sykes-Picot*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3248, 14 June 2014, p. 43–44 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Yediot Aharonot”, 13 June 2014]; E. Sevan, *Jihadists coming*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3251, 27 June 2012, p. 55–56 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Ha’aretz”, 26 June 2012]; Reuters, *Israel is ringing the alarm... Islamic militants on the doors*, 3 September 2014; G. Siboni, *Considering a New Strategic Course*, “INSS Insight”, 15 October 2014, no. 616, <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/No.%20616%20-%20Gabi%20for%20web.pdf> (accessed: 15.10.2014).

⁴³ E. Sneh, *What can we do? Occupation of the Philadelphia axis*, “Palestine Today”, no. 2090, 23/2/2011, p. 9 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Yediot Aharonot”, 22 February 2011].

⁴⁴ E. Eran, *Israel... , op. cit.*, pp. 211–212.

⁴⁵ Y. Alpher, *Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies*, London 2015, pp. 7–11; T. Segev, *Future of Israel after Arab Revolutions*, [in:] *One Year... , op. cit.*, pp. 81–82, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/one-year-of-the-arab-spring-global-and-regional-implications>; D. Rothschild, T. Steiner, *Israel in the wind*, a working paper presented

Argument 1C – The domination of political Islam in some Arab Uprisings, especially the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, poses an existential threat to Israel, for many reasons, as follows.

First, it increases the possibility of war, two-state or multi-state, with the new Islamic regimes because of their extremist ideology which aims to destroy Israel.⁴⁶

Second, the Arab Uprisings changed the regional balance of power that existed before 2011 for the benefit of regional powers, either anti-Israel (Iran), or rival (Turkey). The central Arab countries (Egypt, Syria and Iraq) are engaged in the internal problems, which gives Tehran and Ankara a favorable opportunity to increase their influence and extend their territorial control.⁴⁷

Third, there are fears of the establishment of an “Islamic ring of allies” against Israel, including Egypt under the rules of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Turkey, and Iran, which could pose an existential threat to Israel and increase its territorial isolation.⁴⁸ This potential ring will have implications for the map of alliances in the Middle East, which will be based on religious factors rather than pragmatic interests as it was before 2011. This may result in threats to the strategy on Israeli security in the medium and long term.⁴⁹

at the 12th Herzliya Conference, 31 January – 2 February 2012, pp. 20–21, <https://www.idc.ac.il/en/research/ips/pages/2012/hc2012.aspx> (accessed: 7.03.2012); A. Lael, *Interview to Israeli Public Radio*, “Palestine Today”, 13 May 2011, p. 8 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

⁴⁶ Y. Ettinger, *Israel’s Bad Neighborhood*, “Israel Hayom”, 9 August 2013, <http://theettingerreport.com/OpEd/OpEd---Israel-Hayom/Israel%E2%80%99s-Bad-Neighborhood.aspx> (accessed: 9.08.2013); Y. Amidror, *The Muslim Brotherhood must be curbed*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 10 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Israel Hayom”, 13 February 2011]; *Editorial of “Yediot Aharonot” newspaper*, 10 February 2011, “Palestine Today”, 11 February 2011, p. 14 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

⁴⁷ E. Inbar, *The Arab...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6.

⁴⁸ M. Kedar, *Confrontation along Israel’s Borders: New Realities and a New Challenge*, “Perspectives Papers”, 17 May 2011, no. 139, www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives139.html (accessed: 31.07.2011); B. Berti, *The Arab Awakening and the Rise of Political Islam*, [in:] *Strategic Survey for Israel 2012–2013*, A. Kurz, S. Brom (eds), Tel Aviv 2013, pp. 194–197, http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/INSS2012Balance_ENG_Berti.pdf; Z. Mazel, *Arab Revolutions and its impacts on Israel*, “Strategic assessment”, 5 September 2011, pp. 11–12.

⁴⁹ E. Kam, *op. cit.*, p. 7; J. Renhould, *What Arab Spring?*, “BESA Bulletin”, April 2012, no. 28, <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/bulletin.htm> (accessed: 19.11.2012).

Argument 1D – Iran has strengthened its regional standing, in the light of the international preoccupation with the Arab Uprisings and the diminished interest of the great powers in the imposition of restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear program. They now give priority to political dialogue rather than military options against it, contrary to what Israel wants.⁵⁰

Argument 1E – There is a threat of the erosion of the Israeli deterrence towards Hezbollah in the light of the Syrian civil war, as the party has improved its intelligence capabilities, got experience in ground battles and improved its missile arsenal, with high prospect of acquiring part of the Syrian chemical weapons.⁵¹

Argument 1F – There is an increasing threat posed by ISIS to the Israeli home front in the light of the growing number of youths of “Arabs of Israel” joining ISIS in Syria and Iraq since the outbreak of the Arab uprisings.⁵²

2. THE OPTIMISTIC TREND

In contrast to the pessimistic trend discussed above, the optimistic trend has seen the Arab Uprisings as a source of strategic opportunities to improve Israeli national security. Supporters of this trend believed that these uprisings have strengthened this security more than ever before, as well as removed the previously existing threats to Israel. This trend justified its vision by several indicators, as follows.

Argument 2A – The prospect of conventional wars between Israel and the major Arab armies (Egypt, Syria and Iraq) is diminishing because of the internal problems in these states; they no longer have either the desire or the ability, or the time, to form a collective military alliance against Israel. Moreover, these states have no capability of continuing to modernize their armies in such a manner that they could compete with the Israel, thus ensuring the continuity of Israeli military superiority.⁵³

⁵⁰ E. Inbar, *The Arab...*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁵¹ Golan, *30 years to the first Lebanon War Conference*, December 2012, “The Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) Monthly Bulletin”, January 2013, no. 29, p. 7.

⁵² Israel’s Public Security Service (Shabak) estimated the number of persons affiliated with this extremist organization at a few dozen (41) in 2015, in addition to 32 others on the battlefield in Syria. The number of such detainees has almost doubled (83) by the end of 2016, see: *Security assessment of (Shabak) Data 2015*, [in:] *Palestinian Strategic Report 2014–2015*, Ramallah 2015, pp 78–81; “Ha’aretz”, 26 February 2017, p. 31, newspaper issue translated and published by Foundation for Palestinian Studies [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

⁵³ R. Bedahtzur, D. Halutz, A. Gilboa, *An interview to Israel Army Radio*, “Palestine Today”, no. 2931, 24 July 2013, pp. 21–22 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew];

Argument 2B – Security tension in Sinai after January 25 Revolution indirectly reinforced the security of Israel, as it led to intensive security and intelligence cooperation between Cairo and Tel Aviv, in an unprecedented manner since the signing of the peace agreement in 1979. In addition, this has secured the Israeli border, due to the control over the behavior of militant groups and due to the destruction of the tunnels on the border between Egypt and Gaza, which has contributed to preventing arms smuggling to the Hamas movement in the strip.⁵⁴

Argument 2C – Hamas lost regional support, which reduced strategic risks against Israel, as the movement lost the alliance with Iran and the relationship with Cairo after the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power. All of this has reduced the margin of Hamas maneuver in any future confrontations with Israel.⁵⁵

Argument 2D – The Sunni-Shiite conflict has escalated after Arab Uprisings, which has reduced international attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This improves Israel's chances of establishing and strengthening its regional and international relations.⁵⁶ Also, this helps Israel appear, from perspective of the Arab countries, a less serious threat compared to Iran.⁵⁷

A. Rababurt, *An interview to the Israeli public Radio*, "Palestine Today", 4 June 2014, p. 32 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew]; Y. Melman, *The Decay of the Middle East serves Israel*, "Palestine Today", no.3594, 1 June 2015, p. 56 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Maarev", 31 May 2015].

⁵⁴ A. Khahna, *Sinai and Hamas Ban*, "Palestine Today", no.2978, 22 September 2013, p. 50 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Maarev", 21 September 2013]; Haim A., Ididia Y., *Fighting in another way: the new combat doctrine and the principles of a dispersed maneuver*, Beirut 2015, pp. 14–15 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

⁵⁵ A. Yadlin, *An interview to Israeli Public Radio*, 17 February 2014, "Palestine Today", no.3132, 18 February 2014, p. 42 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

⁵⁶ S. Feldman, *Israel in the Whirlwind: A New Government Meets a Changing Security Environment*, Lecture organized by The Washington Institute for Improving the Quality of U.S Middle East Policy, Washington D.C., 3 June 2013, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israel-in-the-whirlwind-a-new-government-meets-a-changing-security-environm> (accessed: 24.05.2015); A. Rababurt, *Arabs forgot Israel*, "Palestine Today", 18 June 2013, p. 45 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Maarev", 17 June 2013].

⁵⁷ O. Pingio, *What are the implications of the Sunni-Shiite conflict on Israel?*, "Jerusalem Post", 25 February 2014; *Arab Spring breezes turn into storms of sectarian strife*, "Israeli selections", November 2011, no. 203, p. 65 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Maarev", 16 October 2011].

This sectarian conflict also facilitates Israel's task of developing a strategy towards both Iran and extremist groups.⁵⁸

Argument 2E – The security impacts of the Arab Uprisings have strengthened the moderate alliance between Egypt, Jordan, Gulf states and Israel in the face of radical Sunni Islam and Iran.⁵⁹

3. THE CAUTIOUS-PRAGMATIC TREND

The third trend among the Israeli elite agrees with the pessimistic one in terms of the fact that the Arab Uprisings have had security risks for Israel. However, this trend distinguishes between short term and the long term risks.

Overall, the pragmatic trend stresses that all types of these risks do not pose an existential threat to Israel; the danger is in the growing probability of the “intersection between risks”, meaning that they can occur simultaneously.⁶⁰

The supporters of the cautious-pragmatic trend among the Israeli elite have classified the security risks posed to Israel by the Arab Uprisings into three main groups, according to their time range:⁶¹

- **A – Short-term risks**, or immediate risks, i.e. those occurring in the time-span of the outbreak of the uprisings (1–3 years). These include the destabilization of existing Arab regimes and the removal of some of these regimes from power, which threatened Israel's security and its internal front.
- **B – Medium-term risks** (5–10 years), i.e. the concerns about the attitudes of new Arab governments towards Israel, especially related to the strong presence of political Islam.

⁵⁸ Y. Shtayren, *Why is Israel afraid of Arab revolutions?*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 14 June 2014, pp. 6–7 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Ha'aretz”, 12 June 2014].

⁵⁹ Former Israeli Defense minister Shaoul Mofaz, an interview to AFP, 3 August 2014, www.afp.com/en.

⁶⁰ E. Fouda, N. Goren, *Israel and the Arab Spring: realizing opportunities and dealing with challenges*, [in:] *Israel and the Arab Spring: Opportunities for Change*, N. Goren, J. Yudkevich (eds), Ramat Gan – Herzliya Pituach 2013, pp. 9–11, http://www.mitvim.org.il/images/Book_notification_-_Israel_and_the_Arab_Spring_2.pdf, pp. 9–11; E. Avidar, *There are new alignments in the Middle East*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3337, 10 September 2014, p. 58 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Maarev”, 9 September 2014]; A. Yadlin, *Winds...*, *op. cit.*

⁶¹ *Strategic Survey for Israel 2013–2014*, Tel Aviv 2014, p. 5–6; <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/strategic-survey-for-israel-2013-2014> (accessed: 18.02.2014).

- **C – A long-term risk** (more than 10 years) includes the increased risk posed by non-state actors, especially global jihad groups.

According to this trend, Israeli security threats in the post-Arab Uprisings era have undergone qualitative changes. However, not all border fronts are threatened and none of the threats are of existential nature.

IV THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAELI MILITARY DOCTRINE

Despite the debate among the Israeli elite concerning the impacts of the Arab Uprisings on the regional strategic environment, there is general consensus that these great developments had strong and diversified impacts on Israel's military doctrine.

The Israeli elites argue that the changes which had occurred in the regional strategic environment as a result of the Arab Uprisings, affected negatively on the majority of the components of Israel's military doctrine, especially *deterrence*, *early warning* and *military deduction*, while the impacts of the Arab Uprisings on the strategic partnership between Tel Aviv and Washington and on peace agreement with Egypt were temporary and less dangerous.

1. RESTRICTIONS ON DETERRENCE ON VARIOUS MILITARY FRONTS

From the perspective of a large sector of the elite, the Arab Uprisings have imposed restrictions on the Israeli deterrence on various fronts: southern (Egypt), northern (Syria), as well as the front against the Hamas movement in Gaza Strip. In this regard, the erosion of deterrence will increase security-related and financial burdens that Israel will face in the post-Arab Uprisings era.⁶²

On the one hand, deterrence has been relatively affected by Egypt, as Israel can no longer make an appropriate military response against the growing security risks from militant groups in Sinai after January 25, with the exception of the defensive response,⁶³ and even then, it is better for Tel Aviv to refrain from reacting so as not to provoke these organizations against itself.⁶⁴

⁶² G. Shafer, *Forget deterrence*, "Palestine Today", no. 2659, 28 March 2012, p. 37 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Ha'aretz", 27 March 2012].

⁶³ A. Fishman, *The Trap on the border with Egypt*, "Palestine Today", no. 2556, 12 December 2011, p. 45 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Yediot Aharonot", 11 December 2011].

⁶⁴ A. Harel, *ISIS in Sinai: A New Deterrent Equation!*, "Palestine Today", no. 3480, 23 February 2015, p. 40 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Ha'aretz", 21 February 2015].

On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt (June 2012 – 30th June 2013) has increased the value of the political price that Israel can incur in any military action against Hamas.⁶⁵

Some Israeli observers claim that Pillar Of Cloud military operation in 2012 proved that Israel is capable of waging a limited and deliberate military action in Gaza to protect its security without provoking Cairo's wrath.⁶⁶

On the other hand, however, Israeli deterrence on the northern front became weakened because of the Syrian crisis; if President Bashar al-Assad's regime falls completely or the Syrian central state is dismantled, Israel will lose the qualitative advantage of its deterrent force in the Golan Heights.⁶⁷

In addition to above, the change in the main sources of threat to Israel in the post-Arab Uprisings era from the threats posed by conventional armies to the threats posed by non-state armed actors will force Israel to replace its existing deterrence based on absolute military superiority to deterrence based on balance of relative terror.⁶⁸

2. RELATIVE DECLINE IN EARLY WARNING AND DEDUCTION

The Israeli strategists considered that these two components of military doctrine had become more complex in the post-Arab Uprisings era than before because of the changes in the nature of threats facing Israeli national security. The threats transformed from traditional confrontations against

⁶⁵ G. Eiland, *The Upheavals in the Middle East and Israel's Security*, "Strategic assessment", July 2011, p. 12, <http://din-online.info/pdf/ade14-2.pdf> (accessed: August 2011); B. Berti, *Hezbollah, Hamas, and the "Arab Spring": Weathering the Regional Storm?*, "Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs", September 2012, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 21, DOI 10.1080/23739770.2012.11446516, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23739770.2012.11446516> (accessed: January 2014).

⁶⁶ E. Shamir, *Operation Pillar of Defense: An Initial Strategic and Military Assessment*, "Perspectives Paper", December 4, 2012, no. 189, p. 3, <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/operation-pillar-of-defense-an-initial-strategic-and-military-assessment> (accessed: 11.01.2013).

⁶⁷ O. Perlov, *The Arab World: Challenges for Israel, Security Challenges of The 21st Century*, a paper presented at Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Annual Conference, 23 April 2013, pp. 5–6.

⁶⁸ U. Bar-Yusuf, *Concept of The Israeli Security is crashed: the balance of terror as alternative*, "Palestine Today", no. 3543, 9 April 2015, p. 41 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Ha'aretz", 8 April 2015].

state armies to guerrilla warfare against non-state armed groups, which are very difficult to defeat by military deterrence.⁶⁹

Military deduction has also been negatively affected because of a relative decline in the possibilities of transferring the battle to the enemy territory as soon as possible, while the importance of securing the “home front” has grown as a central dimension of Israel’s national security⁷⁰ as developments in Syria have increased strategic importance of the border areas and strategic depth as an essential compound in the Israeli military doctrine, as it was before the war of 1967.⁷¹

3. WEAK CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES PATRONAGE

The majority among the Israeli elite argued that after the weakness shown by the U.S. under Obama administration toward the Arab Uprisings, Washington had faced a problem with credibility in fulfilling its core obligations – especially on the security level – to its allies in the region, Israel being foremost among them.⁷²

According to Israeli strategists, this decline of the role of the U.S. in the Middle East has resulted in risks to Israeli security from many dimensions: – The weakening of Israeli deterrence, as the decline in the role of the United States may encourage some regional powers, particularly Iran, to attack Israel in the future.⁷³ Moreover, this decline will reduce the

⁶⁹ A. Yadlin, *The Strategic Environment of 2015*, a paper presented on the 8th Annual Conference of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, 23–24 January 2015, p. 13.

⁷⁰ M. Villnani, *Gaps in the wall of the Israeli army*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3621, 27 June 2015, p. 34 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Maarev”, 26 June 2015].

⁷¹ G. Ghreinstein, An interview to “Ha’aretz”, no. 3103, 20 January 2014, “Palestine Today”, 27 June 2015, p. 34 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Ha’aretz”, 20 January 2014].

⁷² A. Fishman, *The world does not want to fight for the Syrians: a lesson for Israel*, “Palestine Today”, no. 2957, 2 September 2013, p. 44 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Yediot Aharonot”, 1 September 2013]; A. Ben Zvi, *Dilemma of the United States in Egypt*, “Palestine Today”, no. 2937, 31 July 2013, p. 33 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Israel Hayom”, 30 June 2013]; A. Ben Zvi, *Obama raising a white flag*, “Palestine Today”, no. 2999, 26 September 2013, p. 62 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source “Israel Hayum”, 25 September 2013].

⁷³ N. Shai, *The U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East puts Israel in the face of security challenges*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3145, 5 March 2014, p. 18 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Ha’aretz”, 4 March 2014].

flexibility available to Tel Aviv to launch limited military operations in the region.⁷⁴

- Israel's regional isolation is likely to increase, as until 2011 some countries in the region were keen to improve their relations with Tel Aviv as the best way to strengthen their relations with Washington.⁷⁵

The elite concluded that the lesson learned for Israel from the contradiction between the American political rhetoric and its behavior towards the Arab Uprisings is that Israel can only rely on its own military capability to maintain its existence.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, a fraction of the Israeli elite argued that the strategic partnership between Washington and Tel Aviv is distinctive and will remain so, because it based on common interests.⁷⁷

4. A THREAT THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT

The majority of the Israeli elite expressed fears that the peace treaty with Egypt, which had become a cornerstone of Israel's military doctrine since 1979, would be at risk of amendment, freezing or cancellation under Mubarak's successors, who might be less friendly to Israel, if not even hostile. This may endanger the Israeli national security.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ O. Gentler, *Israel in the face of strategic challenges: strategic estimation*, Ramat Gan 2011, pp. 7–8

⁷⁵ S. Kadmon, *Israel cannot rely on the United States in the crisis, Why is Israel afraid of Arab revolutions?*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 41 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Yediot Aharonot", 4 February 2011]; A. Ben Zvi, *Obama... Another shift in the leadership*, "Palestine Today", no. 2959, 4 September 2013, p. 46 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Israel Hayum", 3 September 2013].

⁷⁶ Y. Dror, *Israeli Statecraft: National Security Challenges and Responses*, New York 2011, pp. 199–201; E. Gelbova, *A critical reading of American policy towards the Arab uprisings*, [in:] *Arab Spring...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–135.

⁷⁷ Arens M., *When Obama Gives Orders to Israel*, 2015, Moshearens.com/2015/06/22/when-obama-gives-orders-to-israel (accessed: 7.07.2015).

⁷⁸ *How do we keep the peace?*, Editorial of "Ha'aretz" newspaper, "Israeli selections", March 2011, no. 195, p. 65 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Ha'aretz", 8 February 2011]; S. Rosner, *The Democracy in Egypt does not matter*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): weekly information report. Read in the Israeli press*, 10 February 2011, p. 20 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Maarev", 7 February 2011]; A. Benn, *Collapse of the strategic alliance between Egypt and Israel*, "Israeli selections", March 2011, no. 195, p. 39 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Ha'aretz", 14 February 2011]; D. Elder, *Black prediction*, "Israeli selections", April 2011, no. 196,

This fear bases on a possible shift in the new official position of Cairo – from the position of an allied state with a strategic asset to Israel, as it was before 2011, to the position of a hostile state; and also from being a potential threat, as it was before the Arab Uprisings — which means it had no intention of waging war — to being an existing threat requiring strategic warning, which means an increased possibility of a military confrontation between the two countries.⁷⁹

In contrast, another subtrend among the Israeli elite said that the peace treaty with Egypt will not be influenced negatively by the changes occurring after January 25. Its advocates expected that Mubarak’s successors, whatever their political orientations and ideologies, would not risk cancelling the treaty or even freezing it for long, but there might be a temporary decline in relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv, without an essential impact on the future of the peace treaty.

Supporters of this trend based their argument on the following reasons:

- The new government in Cairo has been keen on the continuation of the Egyptian–American partnership. This was because of the military and economic benefits of this partnership to Egypt, at the same time, Washington urges Cairo to ensure its commitment to peace with Israel.⁸⁰
- Military organization plays a central role in the Egyptian political life, and it does not permit a model of political Islam as it is in Iran.⁸¹

p. 33 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Ha’aretz”, 19 February 2011]; H. Fresh, *The Expected Consequences of the Arab Revolutions*, [in:] *Arab Spring... , op. cit.*

⁷⁹ D. Shiftan, An interview to the Chinese news agency “Xinhua” commenting on the departure of Mubarak, 14 February 2011; E. Shaked, *Peace is the first victim of the new situation in Egypt*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 15 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Yediot Aharonot”, 30 January 2011]; S. Mansheh, *The Egyptian–Israeli relations after rising of Islamists*, “Palestine Today”, 2 February 2011, p. 43 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Yediot Aharonot”, 21 February 2011].

⁸⁰ Y. Metal, *Future of the Camp David Agreement and the partnership between Egypt and America*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 32 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Ha’aretz”, 12 February 2011].

⁸¹ E. Beaudet, *Cairo is a Queen again*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 35 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Yediot Aharonot”, 13 February 2013]; Z. Barel: *The New Egypt*, “Israeli selections”, December 2012, no. 216, pp. 31–32 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Ha’aretz”, 19 November 2012]; U. Baram, *The Arab Spring is a challenge for Israel*, “Israeli selections”, August 2012, no. 212, p. 44 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Israel Hayum”, 3 July 2012].

- The new authorities in Cairo are concerned with internal economic and social problems, which will make them prefer not to be dragged into any military confrontation with Israel.⁸²
- The joint interests between Egypt and Israel in preventing the security vacuum in Sinai after January 25, and their desire to coordinate and eliminate the activities of terrorist groups there.⁸³

V THE FUTURE OF ISRAELI MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE POST-ARAB UPRISINGS ERA

The Israeli elite presented a package of recommendations to official decisionmakers to help them in minimizing the negative effects of the Arab Uprisings on some components of military doctrine, and in repairing the damages which have occurred in other components.

1. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DETERRENCE

The Israeli strategists stressed that the restoration of deterrence in its overall dimensions was necessary to guarantee the survival of the state. In this regard they recommended to take all reasonable measures to prevent non-state armed actors from endangering the Israeli security, in particular preventing Hezbollah and global jihadist groups from acquiring chemical or biological weapons in the wake of the Syrian crisis.⁸⁴

⁸² M.M. Lecker, *Peace with Egypt is safe*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 37 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Yediot Aharonot”, 13 February 2011]; M. Marzouk, *Fears after January 25*, “Palestine Today”, no. 2085, 20 February 2011, p. 22 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Maarev”, 19 February 2011, p. 22]; M.A. Heller, *Case of the Missing Missile: Principle and Pragmatism in Egyptian-Israeli Relations*, “INSS Insight”, 5 August 2012, no. 360, pp. 1–3, <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/360.pdf> (accessed: 15.10.2013).

⁸³ E. Kam, *Future of the Peace between Israel and Egypt*, “Strategic Assessment”, April 2011, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 4–6, http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/INSS-2012Balance_ENG_Kam.pdf (accessed: December 2013).

⁸⁴ Y. Dror, *Suggested Policy Directions, 2013–2014*, [in:] *2013–2014 Annual Assessment*, no. 10, B. Geltman, R. Tal (eds), Jerusalem 2014, p. 29, <http://jppi.org.il/new/en/article/aa2014/part-1/policy-directions/israel-diaspora-relations> (accessed: February 2014).

2. RESTORING THE MOMENTUM OF THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S.

The Israeli elite called to restore the partnership between Washington and Tel Aviv after the Arab Uprisings, stressing that the maintenance of these relations will remain one of the cornerstones of the Israeli military doctrine⁸⁵ due to the following reasons:

- Absence of a credible international alternative power to Israel's strategic relationship with the United States in the foreseeable future, including Russia and China.⁸⁶
- The United States is likely to continue as the dominant global superpower at least for the next 20 years,⁸⁷ which means that Israel will further need the American umbrella.⁸⁸ Otherwise, it will face regional isolation and deep threats in the post-2011 period.⁸⁹

To restore the strategic partnership with Washington, the Israeli elite proposed the following:

- understanding the security relations between the two sides from a comprehensive perspective by linking the U.S. annual aid package over the coming decades to Israel's ability to confront a coherent and simultaneous set of serious threats, including Iran's nuclear program, Hezbollah, terrorism, Hamas, and ISIS;⁹⁰ and making Israel capable of seeking

⁸⁵ Y. Amidror, *Out with the Old. In with the New*, „Perspectives Paper”, 16 January 2017, no. 395, p. 2, <https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Amidror-Yaakov-Out-With-the-Old-PP-395-16-Jan-2017.pdf> (accessed: 19.01.2017).

⁸⁶ A. Yadlin, *A Time for Decisions: Toward Agreements and Alternative Plans*, [in:] *Strategic Survey for Israel 2013–2014*, Tel Aviv 2014, p. 27, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/strategic-survey-for-israel-2013-2014> (accessed: February 2014).

⁸⁷ D. Merdor, *Interview to Channel 2 on Israeli television*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3212, 8 May 2014, p. 8 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

⁸⁸ U. Segal, *The Widening Gap between Washington and Tel Aviv*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3577, 13 May 2015, p. 44 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Maarev”, 12 May 2016].

⁸⁹ D. Schueftan, S. Feldman, *Israel in the Whirlwind: A New Government Meets a Changing Security Environment. Policy Analysis*, “The Washington Institute for Improving the Quality of U.S. Middle East Policy”, 7 July 2013, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israel-in-the-whirlwind-a-new-government-meets-a-changing-security-environment> (accessed: September 2014).

⁹⁰ *United States–Israel Relations*, O. Eran (ed.), 2013, Tel Aviv 2013, pp. 1–5; O. Eran, *U.S. faces Challenges in The Middle East*, [in:] *One Year...*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

- additional assistance to counter any new and unexpected dramatic negative developments in the Middle East,⁹¹
- pre-coordination with the United States on the “proactive policy”, diplomatic and military, which Israel must embrace towards the developments in the region; but at the same time, taking it into consideration that maintaining the strategic partnerships with the United States must not be a substitute, but a supportive and complementary action to the strengthening of military self-reliance.⁹²

3. MAINTAINING THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT

The Israeli elite stressed that the continuity of this treaty was a strategic goal for Israel, no less important than maintaining Israel’s survival, because maintaining the peace agreement with Cairo means that there is no prospect of war with it.⁹³ In this context, some observers have argued that from the perspective of Israeli security interests, the continuity of peace relations with Egypt is the second most important issue after the strategic partnership between Tel Aviv and Washington.⁹⁴

In this regard, the Israeli elite recommended the following: to deepen the cooperation with the Egyptian military; to further allow the Egyptian military to increase its forces and mechanisms in Sinai (to a greater extent than it was stated in the military appendices to the peace agreement); and

⁹¹ Y. Ettinger, *Israel and the changes in the strategic context in the Middle East*, “Palestine Today”, no. 2089, p. 71 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: Bemshyfa Center for Strategic Studies, March 2011]; C. Valensi, U. Dekel, *The Current Challenges in the Middle East diamond a Joint Unites States- Israel Strategy*, “Strategic Assessment”, April 2016, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 34–35, http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/adkan19-1ENG_3_Valensi-Dekel.pdf (accessed: 27.04.2016).

⁹² A. Yadlin, *Disagreement over Defense Aid: Bridging the Gaps The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)*, “INSS Insight”, 3 May 2016, no. 818, pp. 12–13, <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/No.%20818%20-%20Amos%20for%20web511715948.pdf> (accessed: 28.05.2016).

⁹³ Z. Barel, *The peace agreement between Egypt and Israel proved its strength*, “Palestine Today”, no. 2974, 20 September 2013, p. 15 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Ha’aretz”, 11 September 2013]; E. Nahoshtan, *An interview to Israeli Public Radio*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3027, 27 October 2013, p. 15 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

⁹⁴ Y. Millman, *Peace with Egypt is Israeli priority*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3725, 18 October 2015, p. 28 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: “Maarev”, 17 October 2017].

finally, to intensify security coordination with Egypt and Jordan on the protection of the border triangle Taba – Eilat – Aqaba.⁹⁵

4. COMBINING DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY

In addition to the above, the elite proposed to create a new component of the Israeli military doctrine, based on the combination of diplomacy and negotiation, that would support activities in the area of security. They argued that this new strategy would allow Israel to avoid high human and economic cost in future military confrontations and in case of a war breaking out, the new component could cause that the duration of the conflict is not excessively prolonged. Moreover, negotiation could prevent the beginning of war between Israel and its enemies.⁹⁶

CONCLUSION

The Arab uprisings have been a milestone that produced dramatic changes in the strategic environment structure in the Middle East, including both opportunities and challenges from the perspective of Israel's national security, with greater relative weight given to potential risks compared to the expected "window of opportunity", especially in the time period 2011–2013.

The Israeli elite concluded that the security challenges and risks in the post-Arab uprisings era, though dangerous, are not existential threats to Israel. However, they claim that there is a possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of a few of these risks, which could maximize the human, military, economic and psychological costs on Israel.

The findings of this study indicated that:

- The domestic political change or unrest in a state may cause changes in the military doctrine of another state or other states in the neighborhood. This possible impact occurs under some conditions, the foremost of which being that domestic political change or unrest should produce essential change or shift in structure of security-related and political challenges and opportunities in the strategic environment of the region where these states are.

⁹⁵ A. Fishman, *The global jihad activity in Taba is not only an Egyptian problem*, "Palestine Today", no. 3123, 18 February 2014, p. 32 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Yediot Aharonot", 17 February 2014].

⁹⁶ E. Marom, *Israeli security perception based on five pillars*, "Al-Quds al Arabi", 1 November 2013, <http://www.alquds.uk/index.php/archives/343155> [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew, source: "Yediot Aharonot", 31 October 2013].

- The Arab uprisings in Egypt and Syria specifically have clear impacts on the Israeli military doctrine due to the qualitative changes that have occurred in the strategic environment in the Middle East in the wake of these uprisings. These changes include: the coming of the political Islam, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, to power in Egypt; the decline of the role of the United States as a prominent actor in Middle Eastern interactions; and the shift from traditional security challenges, such as the conventional warfare with state armies, to new risks, particularly in the form of asymmetrical military confrontations with non-state armed groups, most notably those affected by the ideology of Al-Qaeda and ISIS. According to the perspective of the Israeli elite, the Arab Uprisings have reshaped the map of security risks and threats as well as their hierarchy and response mechanisms, due to which their impact is equal to that of regional wars and military conflicts.
- Some of the components of the Israeli military doctrine have been negatively affected by the Arab uprisings, most importantly the following ones: deterrence, early warning and military deduction. The impacts of the Arab Uprisings on these “operational” components of the military doctrine were profound and sustainable. The clearest example of these impacts was that on deterrence, which has been restricted in the short term, whereas in the long term it underwent a shift from absolute military superiority to relative balance of terror, all of which happened because of the changes on the map of security risks after 2011.
- The impacts of the Arab Uprisings on the other components of the doctrine, which one can call “political” components, were temporary and not profound. They include the following:
 - » A threat to the peace treaty with post-Mubarak Egypt, that lasted between 25th January 2011 and the removal of Muslim Brotherhood from power on 30th June 2013. After that time, Israeli-Egyptian relations have restored, gradually, their strength.
 - » The decline of confidence in the U.S. as a creditable ally during the Obama administration. The strategic partnership between Tel Aviv and Washington has regained a great deal of credibility under Donald Trump presidency since 20th January 2017. The clearest indicator of the increasing warmth of the restored partnership was the unprecedented optimism shown by a large sector of the Israeli elite about Trump’s arrival in the White House, some of them describing it as a “New Kippur Day” for Israel.

Israeli military doctrine has undergone evolutionary, not revolutionary, changes over the decades. It has adapted and evolved in response to particular changes in military geography, technology, and international politics. At the same time, it shows certain continuity. This continuity reflects enduring constraints of that military such as the absence of strategic depth and imbalance in demographic and economic capabilities.

As for future, because of the above mentioned constraints, Israeli military doctrine will probably adapt and evolve in response to future developments, much as it has in the past.

Further research on Israeli military doctrine should focus on a number of topics. First, the impacts of domestic political developments in neighboring states on Israeli foreign policy and security strategy should be researched, with a special emphasis on the changes in its regional alliance. Second, the future of civilian-military relations in Israel in the post-Arab Uprisings era should be forecast by researchers in the light of the new roles of the Arab armies since 2011. Third, the influence of military seniors on Israeli doctrinal change should be determined, because we still know little about the roles of those leaders concerning this point.

REFERENCES

1. *2013–2014 Annual Assessment, no. 10*, B. Geltman, R. Tal (eds), Jerusalem 2014, <http://jppi.org.il/new/en/article/aa2014/part-1/policy-directions/israel-diaspora-relations/> (accessed: February 2014).
2. Acuff J.M., *Generational Analysis and the Evolution of Military Doctrine and Strategy*, [in:] *Theory and Application of the “Generation” in International Relations and Politics*, B.J. Steele, J.M. Acuff (eds), New York 2012, pp. 177–201.
3. Adamsky D., *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S., and Israel*, Palo Alto, CA 2010.
4. Addington L.H., *The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*, Bloomington 1984.
5. Allon Y., *Contriving Warfare*, Tel Aviv 1990, [In Hebrew], translation in to Arabic: Palestine Foundation of Studies 1991.
6. Allon Y., *Security of Israel*, Nicosia, 1986.
7. Allon Y., *The Making of Israel’s Army*, London 1970.
8. Alpher Y., *Periphery: Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies*, London 2015.

9. Amidror Y., *Out with the Old. In with the New*, „Perspectives Paper”, 16 January 2017, no. 395, pp. 19–28, <https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Amidror-Yaakov-Out-With-the-Old-PP-395-16-Jan-2017.pdf> (accessed: 17.01.2017).
10. Amidror Y., *The Muslim Brotherhood must be curbed*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 10 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
11. *Arab Spring breezes turn into storms of sectarian strife*, “Israeli selections”, November 2011, no. 203, p. 65 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
12. *Arab Spring: Israel and the rest of the world*, E. Inbar (ed.), Ramat Gan 2013.
13. Arens M., *When Obama Gives Orders to Israel*, 2015, Moshearens.com/2015/06/22/when-obama-gives-orders-to-israel (accessed: 26.06.2015).
14. Avant D.D., *The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at the University of California, San Diego 1991.
15. Avidar E., *There are new alignments in the Middle East*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3337, 10 September 2014, p. 58 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
16. Awad al-Faouri A., *Regional Transformations and its Impact on Israeli Security Theory (2006–2012)*, a master’s dissertation written at Amman: Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Middle East University, 2011 [In Arabic].
17. Banu E., *The Arab Spring: implications for US–Israeli relations*, “Israel Affairs”, 2014, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 281–301, DOI 10.1080/13537121.2014.922802.
18. Bar-Joseph U., *Israel’s National Security towards the 21st Century*, New York 2001.
19. Bar-Yusuf U., *The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli Thinking*, “Security Studies”, 1998, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 145–181, DOI 10.1080/09636419808429353.
20. Bar-Yusuf U., *Concept of The Israeli Security is crashed: the balance of terror as alternative*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3543, no. 9 April 2015, p. 41 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
21. Baram U., *The Arab Spring is a challenge for Israel*, “Israeli selections”, August 2012, no. 212, p. 44 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

22. Barel Z., *The New Egypt*, "Israeli selections", December 2012, no. 216, pp. 31–32 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
23. Barel Z., *The peace agreement between Egypt and Israel proved its strength*, "Palestine Today", no. 2974, 20 September 2013, p. 15 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
24. Beaudet E., *Cairo is a Queen again*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 35 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
25. Bedahtzur R., Halutz D., Gilboa A., *An interview to Israel Army Radio*, "Palestine Today", 24 July 2013, pp. 21–22 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
26. Benn A., *Collapse of the strategic alliance between Egypt and Israel*, "Israeli selections", March 2011, no. 195, p. 39 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
27. Ben Yishay R., *Armed Islamist militias and the breakdown of Sykes-Picot*, "Palestine Today", no. 3248, 14 June 2014, pp. 43–44 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
28. Ben Zvi A., *Dilemma of the United States in Egypt*, "Palestine Today", no. 2937, 31 July 2013, p. 33 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
29. Ben Zvi A., *Obama... Another shift in the leadership*, "Palestine Today", no. 2959, 4 September 2013, p. 46 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
30. Ben Zvi A., *Obama raising a white flag*, "Palestine Today", no. 2999, 26 September 2013, p. 62 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
31. Ben-Horin Y., Posen B., *Israel's Strategic Doctrine*, Santa Monica 1981.
32. Berti B., *Hezbollah, Hamas, and the "Arab Spring": Weathering the Regional Storm?*, "Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs", September 2012, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 21–29, DOI: 10.1080/23739770.2012.11446516, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23739770.2012.11446516> (accessed: January 2014).
33. Berti B., *The Arab Awakening and the Rise of Political Islam*, [in:] *Strategic Survey for Israel 2012–2013*, A. Kurz, S. Brom (eds), Tel Aviv 2013, pp. 187–208 http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/INSS2012Balance_ENG_Berti.pdf (accessed: May 2015).
34. Biddle S., *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, Princeton, NJ 2004.

35. Black J., *Military Organizations and Military Change in Historical Perspective*, "The Journal of Military History", 1998, vol. 62, pp. 871–892.
36. Boot M., *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 – Today*, New York 2006.
37. Bowden T., *Army in the Service of the State*, Tel Aviv 1976.
38. Brecher M., *Decisions in Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973*, Berkeley 1980.
39. Bregman A., *Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947*, New York 1987.
40. Brom S., *Regional Implications of Arab Spring*, [in:] *One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications*, "INSS Memorandum", March 2012, no. 113, M.A. Heller, Y. Guzansky (eds), pp. 62–71, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/one-year-of-the-arab-spring-global-and-regional-implications/> (accessed: April 2012).
41. Brower K.S., *The Israel Defense Forces (1948-2017)*, "Mideast Security and Policy Studies", 2018, no. 150, pp. 88–101.
42. Cashman G., Robinson L.C., *An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq*, Plymouth 2007.
43. Chapman B., *Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook*, Santa Barbara 2009.
44. Childs J., "The Military Revolution I: The Transition to modern Warfare", [in:] C. Townshend (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War*, Oxford 1997, pp. 38–51.
45. Coffey A., *Doctrinal Orphan or Active Partner? A History of US Army Mechanized Infantry Doctrine*, a master's dissertation written at US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth 2000.
46. Cohen A., *Israel and the Bomb*, New York 1998.
47. Cohen E.A., Eisenstadt M.J., Bacevich A.J., *Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution*, Washington, DC 1998.
48. Cohen S.A., *Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion*, New York 2008.
49. Creveld M. van, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Forces*, New York 1998.
50. Dabis J. A., *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: what drives it, and how it impacts developments in the region*, a master's thesis supervised by Dr. Magid Shihade, presented at the Institute for Higher Education at Birzeit University, Birzeit 2012 [In Arabic].
51. Dayan M., *Diary of the Sinai Campaign*, London 1965.
52. Denise D., *Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*, Ithaca 1994.

53. DiMarco J.P., *Service Culture Effects on Joint Operations: The Masks of War Unveiled*, a master's thesis written at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth 2004.
54. Donovan R., *Israel's fight for survival*, New York 1967.
55. Dror Y., *Israeli Statecraft: National Security Challenges and Responses*, New York 2011.
56. Dror Y., *Suggested Policy Directions, 2013–2014*, [in:] *2013–2014 Annual Assessment*, no. 10, B. Geltman, R. Tal (eds), Jerusalem 2014, pp. 13–19, <http://jppi.org.il/new/en/article/aa2014/part-1/policy-directions/israel-diaspora-relations/> (accessed: February 2014).
57. Drory Z., *Israel's Reprisal Policy 1953–1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation*, London – New York 2005.
58. Dunnigan J.F., Macedonia R.M., *Getting it Right: American Military Reforms after Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond*, New York 1993.
59. *Editorial of "Yediot Aharonot" newspaper*, 10 February 2011, "Palestine Today", no. 2079, 11 February 2011, p. 14 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
60. Eiland G., *The Upheavals in the Middle East and Israel's Security*, "Strategic assessment", July 2011, pp. 7–14, <http://din-online.info/pdf/ade14-2.pdf> (accessed: August 2011).
61. Elder D., *Black prediction*, "Israeli selections", April 2011, no. 196, p. 33 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
62. Eran E., *Israel and the neighboring weak countries: Lessons from the Israeli experience in Lebanon*, [in:] *Israel and the Arab Spring: Opportunities for Change*, N. Goren, J. Yudkevich (eds), Ramat Gan – Herzliya Pituach, 2013, pp. 41–52, http://www.mitvim.org.il/images/Book_notification_-_Israel_and_the_Arab_Spring_2.pdf (accessed: 30.10.2014).
63. Eran O., *U.S. faces Challenges in The Middle East*, [in:] *One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications*, M. A. Heller & Y. Guzansky (eds), Memorandum no. 113, Tel Aviv 2012, pp. 11–26.
64. Ettinger Y., *Israel and the changes in the strategic context in the Middle East*, "Palestine Today", no. 2089, 26 February 2011, p. 71 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
65. Ettinger Y., *Israel's Bad Neighborhood*, "Israel Hayom", 9 August 2013, p. 9, <http://theettingerreport.com/OpEd/OpEd---Israel-Hayom/Israel%E2%80%99s-Bad-Neighborhood.aspx> (accessed: 9.08.2013).
66. Everts P.P., *Democracy and Military Force*, New York 2002.

67. Farley R.M., *Transitional determinants of Military Doctrine*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at the University of Washington, 2004.
68. Feldman S., *Israel in the Whirlwind: A New Government Meets a Changing Security Environment*, Lecture organized by The Washington Institute for Improving the Quality of U.S Middle East Policy, Washington D.C., 3 June 2013, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israel-in-the-whirlwind-a-new-government-meets-a-changing-security-enviro nm> (accessed: 24.05.2015).
69. Firter Y., *Arab tsunami hits the Middle East*, "Palestine Today", no. 2124, 5 April 2011, p. 55 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
70. Fishman A., *Afghanistan at Israel's borders*, "Palestine Today", no. 3020, 29 October 2013, p. 49 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
71. Fishman A., *The global jihad activity in Taba is not only an Egyptian problem*, "Palestine Today", no.3123, 18 February 2014, p. 32 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
72. Fishman A., *The Trap on the border with Egypt*, "Palestine Today", no. 2556, 12 December 2011, p. 45 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
73. Fishman A., *The world does not want to fight for the Syrians: a lesson for Israel*, "Palestine Today", no. 2957, 2 September 2013, p. 44 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
74. Fouda E., Ghoren N., *Israel and the Arab Spring: realizing opportunities and dealing with challenges*, [in:] *Israel and the Arab Spring: Opportunities for Change*, N. Goren, J. Yudkevich (eds), Ramat Gan – Herzliya Pituach, 2013, pp. 9–16, http://www.mitvim.org.il/images/Book_notification_-_Israel_and_the_Arab_Spring_2.pdf (accessed: November 2015).
75. Freedman L., *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, London 1981.
76. Fresh H., *The Expected Consequences of the Arab Revolutions*, [in:] *Arab Spring: Israel and the rest of the world*, E. Inbar (ed.), Ramat Gan 2013, pp. 74–92.
77. Gabriel R.A., *No More Heroes: Madness & Psychiatry in War*, New York 1987.
78. Ganem Rosen M., *Deterrence and Proportionality in Israeli Military Doctrine: The Second Lebanon War*, a master's dissertation, The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Brandeis University, Waltham. Massachusetts, USA, 2011.

79. Ganur B., *The threat of armed groups to Israel after the Arab revolutions*, [in:] *Arab Spring: Israel and the rest of the world*, E. Inbar (ed.), Ramat Gan 2013, pp. 117–131.
80. Gelboa E., *A critical reading of American policy towards the Arab uprisings*, [in:] *Arab Spring: Israel and the rest of the world*, E. Inbar (ed.), Ramat Gan 2013, pp. 160–171.
81. Gentler O., *Israel in the face of strategic challenges: strategic estimation*, Ramat Gan 2011.
82. Ghreinstein G., An interview to “Ha’aretz”, 20 January 2014, “Palestine Today”, no. 3103, 27 June 2015, p. 34 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
83. Golan Y., *30 years to the first Lebanon War Conference*, December 2012, “The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) Monthly Bulletin”, January 2013, no. 29, pp. 5–11.
84. Gooch J., *Introduction: Military doctrine in Military History*, [in:] *The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine*, J. Gooch (ed.), Occasional Paper, September 1997, no. 30, pp. 10–15.
85. Goodpaster A.J., Huntington S.P., *Civil-Military Relations*, Washington, DC 1977.
86. “Ha’aretz”, 26 February 2017, newspaper issue translated and published by Foundation for Palestinian Studies [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
87. Haim A., Ididia Y., *Fighting in another way: the new combat doctrine and the principles of a dispersed maneuver*, Beirut 2015 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
88. Harel A., *ISIS in Sinai: A New Deterrent Equation!*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3480, 23 February 2015, p. 40 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
89. Harel A., Issacharoff A., *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon*, New York 2008.
90. Heller M. A., *Case of the Missing Missile: Principle and Pragmatism in Egyptian-Israeli Relations*, “INSS Insight”, 5 August 2012, no. 360, pp. 1–9, <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/360.pdf> (accessed: 15.10.2013).
91. Heller M. A., *Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy*, London 2000.
92. Herzog C., *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, New York 1982.
93. Holley B. Jr., *Technology and Military Doctrine Essays on a Challenging Relationship*, Maxwell Alabama 2004.

94. Horn C.J., *Military Innovation and the Helicopter: A Comparison of Development in the United States Army and Marine Corps, 1945–1965*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at Ohio State University, Columbus 2003.
95. Horowitz D., *The Israeli Concept of National Security*, [in:] *National Security and Democracy in Israel*, Y. Avner (ed.), London 1993, pp. 58–72.
96. *How do we keep the peace?*, Editorial of “Ha’aretz” newspaper, “Israeli selections”, March 2011, no. 195, p. 65 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
97. Høiback H., *Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, London 2013.
98. Huntington S.P., *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge 1985.
99. Hussien A.A., *Enlargement in the Israeli Strategy*, Beirut 1989 [in Arabic].
100. Inbar E., *Israel’s National Security Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War*, New York 2008.
101. Inbar E., *The Arab Uprisings and Israel’s National Security*, “Mideast Security and Policy Studies”, February 2012, no. 95, pp. 6–15, <http://besacenter.org/mideast-security-and-policy-studies/the-2011-arab-uprisings-and-israel%C2%92s-national-security-3-2/> (accessed: 20.03.2012).
102. Inbar E., *The Israel National Security Amidst Unrest in the Arab World*, “Washington Quarterly”, Summer 2012, pp. 59–73.
103. *Israel and the Arab Spring: Opportunities for Change*, N. Goren, J. Yudkevich (eds), Ramat Gan – Herzliya Pituach, 2013, http://www.mitvim.org.il/images/Book_notification_-_Israel_and_the_Arab_Spring_2.pdf (accessed: July 2014).
104. Jackson A.P., *Doctrine, Strategy and Military Culture: Military Strategic Doctrine Developments in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (1987–2007)*; Ontario Trenton 2013.
105. Jackson A.P., *The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in the Practice of Warfare*, Fort Leavenworth, KA 2013.
106. Kadmon S., *Israel cannot rely on the United States in the crisis, Why is Israel afraid of Arab revolutions?*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 41 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
107. Kam E., *Future of the Peace between Israel and Egypt*, “Strategic Assessment”, April 2011, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 151–165, <http://www.inss.org>.

- il/uploadImages/systemFiles/INSS2012Balance_ENG_Kam.pdf (accessed: 27.06.2011).
108. Kam E., *The New Middle East: An Era of Uncertainty, Strategic Assessment*, April 2011, vol. 14, no. 1., pp. 25–39, [http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/\(FILE\)1304500885.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/(FILE)1304500885.pdf) (accessed: 14.09.2014).
 109. Kedar M., *Confrontation along Israel's Borders: New Realities and a New Challenge*, "Perspectives Papers", 17 May 2011, no. 139, pp. 19–29, www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives139.html (accessed: 31.07.2011).
 110. Khahna A., *Sinai and Hamas Ban*, "Palestine Today", no. 2978, 22 September 2013, p. 50 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
 111. Kier E., *Changes in Conventional Military Doctrine: The Culture Roots of Doctrinal Change*, a Ph.D. Dissertation written at Cornell University, 1992.
 112. Kier E., *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars*, Princeton, NJ 1997.
 113. Klieman A.S., *Israel and the World after 40 Years*, Washington, DC 1990.
 114. Kretchik W.E., *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror*, Lawrence, Kansas 2011.
 115. Lael A., *Interview to Israeli Public Radio*, "Palestine Today", no. 2153, 13 May 2011, p. 8 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
 116. Lebel U., Lewis E. (eds), *The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Reshaping of Israeli Civil–Military Relations*, Washington, DC 2015.
 117. Lecker M. M., *Peace with Egypt is safe*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 37 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
 118. Legault A., Sokolsky J. (eds), *The Soldier and the State in the Post–Cold War Era*, Kingston 2002.
 119. Levite A., *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine*, New York 1990.
 120. Long J. W., *The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine: from Active Defense To Airland Battle and Beyond*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1991.
 121. Mahmud al-Sayed D., *Continuity and Change in Israeli Defense Policy: A Comparative study of the post-wars October 1973 and June 2006*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 2013 [In Arabic].
 122. Malka H., *Crossroads: The future of U.S.- Israel Strategic Partnership*, Washington D.C. 2011, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf (accessed: 9.07.2012).

123. Mansheh S., *The Egyptian-Israeli relations after rising of Islamists*, "Palestine Today", 2 February 2011, p. 43 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
124. Maoz Z., *Defending the Holy Land*, Ann Arbor 2006, DOI 10.3998/mpub.166167.
125. Marom E., *Israeli security perception based on five pillars*, "Al- Quds al Arabi", 1 November 2013, <http://www.alquds.uk/index.php/archives/343155> (accessed: 1.11.2013) [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
126. Marten Zisk K., *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991*, Princeton 1993, pp. 181–196.
127. Marzouk M., *Fears after January 25*, "Palestine Today", no. 2085, 20 February 2011, p. 22 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
128. Mayer C.T., *Committed Service in the Military: Bringing Together Selflessness and Self-Fulfillment*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville 2010.
129. Mazel Z., *Arab Revolutions and its impacts on Israel*, "Strategic assessment", 5 September 2011, pp. 1–16.
130. Melman Y., *The Decay of the Middle East serves Israel*, "Palestine Today", no. 3594, 1 June 2015, p. 56 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
131. Merdor D., *Interview to Channel 2 on Israeli television*, "Palestine Today", no. 3212, 8 May 2014, p. 8 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
132. Metal Y., *Future of the Camp David Agreement and the partnership between Egypt and America*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, pp. 3–17, [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
133. Milenstein M., *A New-Old Middle East: Current developments and its repercussions on Israel*, "Strategic assessment", April 2011, pp. 1–22, <http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291303041146.pdf> (accessed: 22.08.2013).
134. *Military Leadership*, J.H. Buck, C.J. Korb (eds), Beverly Hills 1981.
135. Millman Y., *Peace with Egypt is Israeli priority*, "Palestine Today", no. 3725, 18 October 2015, p. 28 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
136. Millonig W., *Impact of the Religious and Political Affiliation on Strategic Military Decisions and Policy Recommendations*, Carlisle Barracks, PA 2006.
137. Mofaz S., an interview to AFP, AFP, 3 August 2014, www.afp.com/en.

138. Morgan P., *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, Beverly Hills, CA 1977.
139. Morgan P., *Deterrence Now*, Cambridge 2003.
140. Moskos C.C., Williams J.A., Segal D.R. (eds), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford 2000.
141. Nahoshtan E., *An interview to Israeli Public Radio*, "Palestine Today", no. 3027, 27 October 2013, p. 15 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
142. *National Security and Democracy in Israel*, Y. Avner (ed.), London 1993.
143. *Neorealism and its Critics*, R.O. Keohane (ed.), New York 1986.
144. O'Hanlon M., *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare*, Washington, DC 2000.
145. *One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications*, "INSS Memorandum", March 2012, no. 113, M.A. Heller, Y. Guzansky (eds), <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/one-year-of-the-arab-spring-global-and-regional-implications/> (accessed: 7.05.2012).
146. *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 14 June 2014 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
147. *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
148. *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): weekly information report: Read in the Israeli press*, 10 February 2011 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
149. *Palestinian Strategic Report 2014–2015*, Ramallah 2015.
150. Payne K., *Deterrence in the Second Age*, Lexington, KY 1996.
151. Peri Y., *Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy*, Washington DC 2006
152. Perlov O., *The Arab World: Challenges for Israel, Security Challenges of The 21st Century*, a paper presented at Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Annual Conference, 23 April 2013.
153. Pingio O., *What are the implications of the Sunni-Shiite conflict on Israel?*, "Jerusalem Post", 25 February 2014, p. 11.
154. Posen B.R., *Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power*, "International Security", Fall 1993, no. 2, pp. 28–43.
155. Quester G.H., *Offense and Defense in the International System*, New York 1977.
156. Rababurt A., *An interview to the Israeli public Radio*, "Palestine Today", no. 3239, 4 June 2014, p. 32 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
157. Rababurt A., *Arabs forgot Israel*, "Palestine Today", no. 2891, 18 June 2013, p. 45 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

158. Rabi U., *Arab Spring plunges Middle East back into 1950s for Israel*, An Interview to “Russia Today”, “Russia Today”, 17 June 2012, <https://www.rt.com/news/arab-spring-israel-ramifications-018/> (accessed: 18.06.2012).
159. Rabiea G.I., *Israeli Strategy (1948–1967)*, a master’s dissertation written at Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1976 [In Arabic].
160. Rabiea G.I., *Israeli Strategy (1967–1979)*, a Ph.D. dissertation written at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1985 [In Arabic].
161. Refaat N.E., *The Israeli Military Organization: From David to Goliath*, Cairo 1991 [In Arabic].
162. Renhoudt J., *What Arab Spring?*, “BESA Bulletin”, April 2012, no. 28, pp. 4–6, <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/bulletin.htm> (accessed: 5.07.2012).
163. Reuters, *Israel is ringing the alarm... Islamic militants on the doors*, 3 September 2014.
164. Rodman D., *Israel’s National Security Doctrine: An Introductory Overview*, “Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)”, September 2001, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 31–44.
165. Rosen S.P., *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, Ithaca, NY 1991.
166. Rosner S., *The Democracy in Egypt does not matter*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): weekly information report: Read in the Israeli press*, 10 February 2011, pp. 7–12. [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
167. Rothschild D., *Israel in the Eye of Storms*, a working paper presented at the 12th Hertzliya Conference, 30 January – 2 February 2012, http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/HerzliyaAssessment_E.pdf (accessed: 4.03.2012).
168. Rothschild D., *The Arab Spring and Regional Security in the Middle East: A View from Israel*, “Carnegie Moscow Center”, 5 September 2011, <http://carnegie.ru/2011/09/05/arab-spring-and-regional-security-in-middle-east-view-from-israel/alcx> (accessed: 12.10.2011).
169. Rothschild D., Steiner T., *Israel in the wind*, a working paper presented at the 12th Herzliya Conference, 31 January–2 February 2012, <https://www.idc.ac.il/en/research/ips/pages/2012/hc2012.aspx> (accessed: 8.03.2012).
170. Sagan S.D., Waltz K.N., *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate*, New York 1995.

171. Salminen P., *The Impact of Arms Technology on Military Doctrines*, "Finnish Defense Studies", 1992, no. 5, pp. 71–87.
172. Schiff R.L., *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, London 2009.
173. Schiff Z., *A History of the Israeli Army (1870-1974)*, San Francisco 1974.
174. Schiff Z., *October Earthquake*, Tel-Aviv 1974.
175. Schiff Z., Ya'ari E., *Israel's Lebanon War*, translated by I. Friedman, New York 1984.
176. Schueftan D., Feldman S., *Israel in the Whirlwind: A New Government Meets a Changing Security Environment. Policy Analysis*, "The Washington Institute for Improving the Quality of U.U Middle East Policy", 7 July 2013, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israel-in-the-whirlwind-a-new-government-meets-a-changing-security-environment> (accessed: September 2014).
177. Schweitzer Y., *Al-Qaeda and Arab Spring*, [in:] *One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications*, M. A. Heller & Y. Guzansky (eds), Memorandum no. 113, Tel Aviv 2012, pp. 120–134.
178. Schweitzer Y., Einav O., *The Islamic State: How Viable Is It?*, Tel Aviv 2016.
179. *Security assessment of (Shabak) Data 2015*, [in:] *Palestinian Strategic Report 2014–2015*, Ramallah 2015.
180. Segal U., *The Widening Gap between Washington and Tel Aviv*, "Palestine Today", no. 3577, 13 May 2015, p. 44 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
181. Segev T., *Future of Israel after Arab Revolutions*, [in:] *One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications*, M. A. Heller & Y. Guzansky (eds), Memorandum no. 113, Tel Aviv 2012, pp. 120–134.
182. Segev T., *Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East*, New York 2008.
183. Sevan E., *Jihadists coming*, "Palestine Today", no. 3251, 27 June 2012, pp. 55–56 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
184. Shafer G., *Forget deterrence*, "Palestine Today", no. 2659, 28 March 2012, p. 37 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
185. Shai N., *The U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East puts Israel in the face of security challenges*, "Palestine Today", no. 3145, 5 March 2014, p. 18 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].

186. Shaked E., *Peace is the first victim of the new situation in Egypt*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 22 February 2011, p. 15 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
187. Shamir E., *Operation Pillar of Defense: An Initial Strategic and Military Assessment*, “Perspectives Paper”, December 4, 2012, no. 189, pp. 4–18, <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/operation-pillar-of-defense-an-initial-strategic-and-military-assessment> (accessed: 11.01.2013).
188. Shiftan D., An interview to the Chinese news agency “Xinhua” commenting on the departure of Mubarak, 14 February 2011.
189. Shtayren Y., *Why is Israel afraid of Arab revolutions?*, [in:] *Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar): special report*, 14 June 2014 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
190. Siboni G., *Considering a New Strategic Course*, “INSS Insight”, 15 October 2014, no. 616, pp. 1–3, <http://www.inss.org.il/upload-Images/systemFiles/No.%20616%20-%20Gabi%20for%20web.pdf> (accessed: 15.10.2014).
191. Sneh E., *What can we do? Occupation of the Philadelphia axis*, “Palestine Today”, no. 2090, 23/2/2011, p. 9 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
192. *Strategic Survey for Israel 2012–2013*, <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/strategic-survey-for-israel-2012-2013/> (accessed: February 2013).
193. *Strategic Survey for Israel 2013–2014*, Tel Aviv 2014, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/strategic-survey-for-israel-2013-2014/> (accessed: February 2014).
194. Tal I., *National Security: The Israeli Experience*, Westport 2003.
195. Terriff T., Farrell T., *Military Change in the New Millennium*, [in:] *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, T. Terriff, T. Farrell (eds), London 2002, pp. 22–29.
196. *The Changing Character of War*, Strachan H., Scheipers S. (eds), Oxford 2012.
197. *The Defense Reform Debate*, A.A. Clark, P.W. IV Chiarelli, J.S. McKittrick, J.W. Reed (eds), Baltimore 1984.
198. *The second Lebanon war: Strategic dimensions*, M. Elarm, S. Brom (eds), Tel Aviv 2007.
199. *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, T. Terriff, T. Farrell (eds), London 2002.

200. *Theory and Application of the “Generation” in International Relations and Politics*, B.J. Steele, J.M. Acuff (eds), New York 2012.
201. Toulmin S.E., *The Uses of Argument*, Updated Edition, Cambridge 2003.
202. *United States–Israel Relations*, O. Eran (ed.), Tel Aviv 2013.
203. Valensi C., Dekel U., *The Current Challenges in the Middle East diamond a Joint Unites States– Israel Strategy*, “Strategic Assessment”, April 2016, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 25–39, http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/adkan19-1ENG_3_Valensi-Dekel.pdf (accessed: 27.04.2016).
204. Villnani M., *Gaps in the wall of the Israeli army*, “Palestine Today”, no. 3621, 27 June 2015, p. 34 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
205. Weltman J., *World Politics and the Evolution of War*, Baltimore 1995.
206. Walz K.N., *Reductionist and systemic theories*, [in:] *Neorealism and its Critics*, R.O. Keohane (ed.), New York 1986, pp. 32–43.
207. Yadlin A., *A Time for Decisions: Toward Agreements and Alternative Plans*, [in:] *Strategic Survey for Israel 2013–2014*, Tel Aviv 2014, pp. 205–226, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/strategic-survey-for-israel-2013-2014/> (accessed: February 2014).
208. Yadlin A., *An interview to Israeli Public Radio*, 17 February 2014, “Palestine Today”, no.3132, 18 February 2014, p. 42 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
209. Yadlin A., *Disagreement over Defense Aid: Bridging the Gaps The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)*, “INSS Insight”, 3 May 2016, no. 818, pp. 1–5, <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/No.%20818%20-%20Amos%20for%20web511715948.pdf> (accessed: 28.05.2016).
210. Yadlin A., *The Strategic Environment of 2015*, a paper presented on the 8th Annual Conference of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, 23–24 January 2015.
211. Yadlin A., *Winds of Change in the Middle East from an Israeli perspective*, lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 30 March 2011, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/Yadlin20110330.pdf> (accessed: April 2011).
212. Yarger H.R., *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport 2008.
213. Yunis M.A., *Israeli Military Doctrine after the Arab Revolutions*, “Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya”, July 2013, no. 193, pp. 46–51. [In Arabic].

214. Zeev Y., *A New Uncomfortable Regional Reality*, "Palestine Today", no. 2129, 10 April 2011, p. 43 [In Arabic, translated from Hebrew].
215. Zisser E., *The Syrian Uprising: Implications for Israel*, "Strategic Assessment", vol. 11, no. 15, August 9, 2011, pp. 2–18, <http://jcpa.org/article/the-syrian-uprising-implications-for-israel/> (accessed: October 2011).

CITE THIS ARTICLE AS:

M. Badry Eid, *The Domestic Political Unrest and the Military Doctrine Change in the Neighborhood: Arab Uprisings and Israel (2011–2015)*, "Security Dimensions", 2019, no. 29, p. 64–109, DOI 10.5604/01.3001.0013.4395.

Licence: This article is available in Open Access, under the terms of the Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0; for details please see <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the author and source are properly credited. Copyright © 2019 University of Public and Individual Security "Apeiron" in Cracow