

## FREE CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT, LUCIFER'S EFFECT AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES

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### ABSTRACT<sup>1</sup>

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Since 2015, the migration crisis continues with varying intensity, and international security crisis as well as debt, institutional, and personnel crises are worsening, not only in the Eurozone. Probably war, economic and climate immigrants will continue to move into the Schengen area, showing how helpless the European Union is. Angela Merkel said there was no upper limit for the number of people admitted to escape political persecution. Germany leaves the Dublin system inconsistently, runs counter to Euro-

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pean cohesion and stops differentiating between immigrants and refugees. Migration is shared by the EU Member States. Between “old” and “new” EU countries, scissors are opened. Moreover, in some European regions (France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece) there are closed communities where majority law is not valid. Our current socio-political and economic existence is based on a traditional understanding of security. However, in the third decade of the 21st century the image of prosperity and security is to be seen from a different perspective than in previous years. Dramatic development has led to the mass migration of African and Asian people and to the division of the European Union, especially regarding the mechanism of redistribution of asylum seekers.

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#### **INTRODUCTION**


Most of the theoretical approaches to assessing the role of the security system of the European Union and the Nation States settle down and do not go beyond national and Union primary law. The mechanism of the functioning of the Czech Republic’s security system is a complex intertwining of both internal and external vertical and horizontal relationships, where there are numbers of friction areas and non-negligible security risks. The European Union stands at the threshold of the new decade of the 21st century facing new challenges and perspectives. It is not good enough to know about the (non)functioning of the European Union mechanism and keep silent. The Union, in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2000 (in Article I–8 referring to EU symbols) for the first time officially mentions that the motto of its activity is “United in diversity”. The European Union, in synergy with Nation States, will either return to its activities in order to meet this motto so that its council will go through some changes, or it

will collapse. Elections to the European Parliament 2019 took place from 23 to 26 May 2019 as the 9th in order since 1979. They were expected to be the first elections after the Brexit in the remaining 27 member countries and the first challenge for Europeans to introduce the fundamental changes.

## 1. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATION STATES, THEIR ROLE AT PRESENT

### 1.1. Democracy as a system of equality and openness to the public space

FIG. 1. DEMOCRACY – A SYSTEM OF EQUALITY AND OPENESS TO THE PUBLIC SPACE



Source: author.

How is it with the fragility of the balance of European democracy? The European Parliament is democratically legitimized, MEPs are elected. However, the rights and duties of this Parliament are restricted.<sup>2</sup> The European Council is indirectly democratically legitimized, as the heads of government were elected in the elections in the individual EU Member

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<sup>2</sup> P. Rožňák, *Mechanismy fungování Evropské unie. In quorum gratiam?*, Ostrava 2015, pp. 91–103.

States. It is a paradox; the nations whose power was to be broken had to be institutionally equipped with power in the Union. In order to start post-national development and to create supranational institutions, national governments had to agree. Only the governments of the sovereign democratic states had the right to concede or, eventually, submit the right of sovereignty to collective interest. For this purpose, an organ had to be set up where the democratically legitimized representatives of Nation States meet and where, according to the rules recognized by national parliaments, joint decisions could be made. This institution became the European Council. At first, the European Parliament – this representative of the European people – was powerless, but with every new EU treaty by which national sovereign rights were handed over to the Union, the rights and opportunities of the European Parliament grew. The European Commission, however, is quite another cup of tea. The Commission is an institution in which democratic legitimacy is completely denied. Commissioners are proposed by the Council of the European Union, on the basis of suggestions made by the national governments, and then appointed by the European Council after the approval of the European Parliament. It can be easily deducted that the triad of European Parliament, European Council and European Commission produces a black hole in which what we understand as democracy is disappearing.<sup>3</sup> The problem of EU remains that as far as supranational solutions are concerned, EU has very few competencies and it is not “Brussels” who is to be blamed, but those whom we can vote: national governments. This is the real EU drama: national democracy blocks post-national development, and post-national development destroys democracy.<sup>4</sup>

## **1.2. Theories of international relations and their approach to the security of the European Union and Nation States**

### **1.2.1 Liberal-idealistic approach**

A liberal-idealistic approach to the European security has two fundamental methods: collective security and arms control. The advocate and promoter of this method is Karen Mingst. The method puts emphasis on collective security, collective defence, hard security, and arms control.

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<sup>3</sup> R. Menasse, *Evropský systém. Občanský hněv a evropský mír*, Praha 2014.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*.

### **1.2.2 Realistic school**

The proponents of the realistic school claim that it is clear that states are characterized by inborn discordance and the main feature of their behaviour is their continued efforts to fulfil their national interests. There is a clear hierarchy of interests: (1) life, (2) survival, (3) conservation of territorial integrity, and (4) preservation of political sovereignty. However, the most important is the strength and determination of states to use it to achieve their goals. Significant representatives of the realistic school include Robert Cooper who says that being good may eventually be bad for the people you serve. Moral goals can also be achieved by thinking in terms of strength and keeping it instead of concentrating on what you think is morally good. The peace may only exist on the basis of a balance of power. The advocate of the theory of balance of power and deterrence was J. F. Kennedy. The theory was based on three assumptions: (1) The rationality of those who decide on behalf of the states; (2) No politician is willing to use weapons that have such a devastating force; (3) A war has always an alternative.

In this theory he also concludes that the war is not inevitable, rationality is essential to ensure security, and finally, there are viable non-military solutions to conflict of interest. The weakness of the realistic security school is that it strikes hard not only on the liberal-idealistic approach of the European security. Why? Their opponents argue that it cannot be proved that international anarchy must have exactly the same consequences as the realists claim. Everyone has to agree with the view that the realists and the neo-realists describe international security relations in too static and cyclical way and overestimate the importance of state preferences.

### **1.2.3 Constructivist approach**

There are no fixed, unchanging, natural structures in international security relations. The behaviour of states and other security policy actors is not pre-determined by laws of a mechanical nature. International security relations depend on the interpretation of individual actors and are therefore socially constructed. This is why more or less significant changes to the international security environment are happening. Constructivists declare a safety method called 2 + 1. Structures enable mitigations of international tension and expand space for non-aggressive behaviour. The states usually act as the security policy makers. And then there is something like security culture.

### **1.2.4 Critical theory**

The critical theory provides guidance on strategic action towards an alternative security arrangement. It is based on the fact that the existing security arrangement is full of inequalities and injustice on a global dimension. It has, so to say, an alternative world vision up its sleeve. It differs by its “critical approach to the security studies”. And besides the question “What is a security?”, it asks two more questions: (1) “Who is secure, and against whom, in the forthcoming international order?”, and: (2) “Whose security should we care about?”.

### **1.2.5 Radical theories**

They assess the arrangement of international security relations as a result of historical development. They attribute a great importance to the economic and social contexts, which at the same time are considered as determinants of security relations.

## **2. INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY OF THE EU COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY**

The EU Treaty (hereinafter TEU) refers to the institutional aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereinafter CFSP). The European Council is the CFSP Coordinator of the EU. The European Council comprises the heads of state or government of the EU Member States, along with the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. While the European Council has no formal legislative power, it is a strategic (and crisis-solving) body that provides the union with general political directions and priorities, and acts as a collective presidency. The European Commission remains the sole initiator of legislation, but the European Council is able to provide an impetus to guide legislative policy. In this composition, the European Council gives the Union the necessary impetus for its development and defines its general policy orientations and priorities; identifies strategic interests, sets targets, and defines common guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including matters relating to defence. The European Council adopts the necessary decisions (Article 15 (1) and Article 26 (1) TEU). Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been exercised currently by a high representative and the Member States using national funds. The Commission is also entitled to address questions, recommendations and suggestions to the Council of Ministers to convene

an extraordinary Council meeting within forty eight hours. The Member States and the EU presidency country may also give an impetus to call for a summit. The EU Council is the main player in the CFSP. Foreign Ministers have the task of making the necessary decisions, implementing the EU CFSP policy, ensuring its “unity, coherence and the effectiveness of the procedures”.

If the Council is to act by a simple majority, it shall act by a majority of its members' votes. Since 1st November 2014, the qualified majority has been defined as at least 72% of the members of the Council representing the Member States that form at least 65% of the Union's population. If not all the members of the Council participate in the vote, the qualified majority is defined as 55% of the members of the Council representing the Member States that form 65% of the Union's population. The blocking minority must be formed by at least as many members of the Council as representing at least 35% of the population of the participating Member States and one more member, otherwise a qualified majority is deemed to be achieved. Moreover, abstention from voting is not an obstacle to the adoption of a Council resolution calling for unanimity. One may be surprised at what the provisions of primary EU law after Lisbon Treaty actually mean.

The Council of the EU is the body that adopts common positions and actions for which unanimity must be reached. Exceptions may be made only to procedural questions and cases where the EU Council decides to apply a qualified majority when voting on individual specific items of the joint action. The Council, acting by qualified majority, decides when to adopt a resolution that defines an action or position of the Union on the basis of a decision of the European Council on the Union's strategic interests and objectives. It shall adopt a decision defining the action or position of the Union on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, or a decision to implement a decision defining an action or position of the Union (Article 31 TEU).

The assistant of the Council is the Political and Security Committee, which exercises political supervision and strategic management in crisis management operations. It is certainly remarkable that the Council may, for the purpose of a crisis management operation and for a period of time as it designates, authorize the committee to take appropriate decisions on political supervision and strategic management of the operation (Article 38 TEU). The EU Treaty also defines the position of the European Parliament in the context of the CFSP. The country holding EU presidency should

consult the EP on the main aspects and basic alternatives of the CFSP. The EP is to be regularly informed by the Commission and the CFSP Council, it has the right to question the Council and make recommendations to it, and once a year it is obliged to hold a discussion on the achievements of the CFSP (Article 7 TEU).

The EU treaty also touched the complicated issues of administrative and operational expenditures. These should be covered by the Union budget. It is also possible to reverse the process whereby the Council can decide that the costs of operational activities will be borne by the Member States. The expenditures that are not covered by the Union budget, will be paid by the Member States according to the gross national product key unless the Council decides unanimously otherwise (Article 41 TEU). The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy is controversial and problematic.

Its final form (CFSP of EU) is called in the professional circles as the “gap between expectations and outcomes” and as a contradiction „between common goals and the capabilities of the EU institutions to implement them”. The second pillar is referred to as a “disappointing compromise” or as a document that “has created as many questions as it has answered” (from a financial and institutional point of view, as well as from the links between individual organizations – the WEU, NATO and the EU).

The “Maastricht compromise” is reflected in the three basic features of the CFSP of the EU: (1) The pillar construction itself of the so-called Maastricht temple. This has confirmed the separation of the external relations resulting from the EU’s common trade policy and CFSP despite repeated calls to maintain the maximum consistency of both activities; (2) The objectives of CFSP set in general (strengthening democracy, protection of values, etc.) without further specification and without details as to which concrete measures and in which way should be taken in the EU CFSP area; (3) The EU Treaty on CFSP issues offers too much scope for the states that do not want to participate in CFSP actions and attitudes. This weakens the overall system’s performance. The CFSP of the EU is currently “mixed in character” (on the one hand the foreign policy of the Czech Republic has not been abolished and, on the other hand, it is beyond the framework of intergovernmental activity). The EU Treaty has opened a number of issues towards a common foreign and security policy.

There are number of disputes such as whether the CFSP is conceived efficiently enough, how to approve and implement joint EU CFSP actions, how to improve communication with the third parties, how to deal with the



compatibility of EU and NATO membership<sup>5</sup> and, last but not the least, there is the problem of personification and the funding of CFSP EU27. The European Union, thanks to the exclusive (shared and complementary) powers entrusted and assigned to its institutions in treaties (primary EU law), affects many areas of our lives.

The EU has the right to adopt and define rules, and the Member States can intervene in these areas only with the Union's authorization. The Maastricht Treaty is a breakthrough into Member States' cooperation in the two new areas: (1) Common Foreign and Security Policy, and (2) Cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. A new strategy, the so-called Lisbon, is emerging. This strategy concerns mainly relations with the new neighbours. The EU Council may decide that certain specific activities under the EU CFSP will not be covered by the common budget, even in case it does not concern military and/or defence actions. As far as the military and defence expenditures are concerned, the costs will be borne by the EU Member States according to the GNP (GDP) key. EU Member States may decide otherwise by unanimous vote in the EU Council.

If any state has made use of the provisions of Article 23 of the EU Treaty, such a state does not have to participate in the financing of the activity in question (Article 28 of the EU Treaty). Among other things, a new model of vote was adopted so called *constructive abstention*. The new voting option allows the EU Member States to oppose the specific activity in the EU CFSP area of the European Union, it is called the European Neighbourhood Policy. The goal of this "new" policy is to improve the competitiveness of the overall EU economy in the world. EU policy, starting with Maastricht, focuses on the issue of anti-discrimination; fight against fraud; health and safety at work; taxes; intellectual property; financial services; economic and monetary union; coordination of social security systems for migrants; culture; multilingualism and audio-visual, economic and social cohesion; justice and home affairs; research; company law; gender equality; EU budget and enlargement; social protection; common commercial policy; *common foreign and security policy*; common agricultural policy; education and training; employment; and healthcare.

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<sup>5</sup> J. Ušiak, *Slovakia's perspective on NATO*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies", 2018, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 125–137, DOI 10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.004.

### 3. COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EU

The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union of its Member States is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It provides the Union with an operational capability that relies on both civilian and military resources. The Union may use them for missions outside the Union to maintain peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

For the implementation of the CSDP, the EU Member States are making civilian and military capabilities available to the Union to contribute to the achievement of the objectives defined by the Council, while the Member States undertake to gradually improve their military capabilities (Article 42 of the EU Treaty). The EU Common Security and Defence Policy is subject to special rules and procedures. It is defined by the European Council and the Council unanimously unless the Treaties specify otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts is excluded. The Common Foreign and Security Policy shall be conducted in accordance with the Treaties by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by the EU Member States.

Until the Treaty of Lisbon was countersigned, foreign policy, security and defence policy was fully in the competence of the EU Member States and the Member States also retained an independent supervision of this area. After the Treaty of Lisbon, this area is moving slowly but surely elsewhere. Lisbon underlines that the Member States actively and unconditionally support the Union's foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, and respect the Union's activity in this field (Article 24 (3) TEU).

It seems that the architects of the former Warsaw Pact could not have written it better. The EC decided at the Helsinki summit in 1999 to "create a rapid deployment force". It consists of up to 60,000 members of the armed forces. This "European rapid deployment unit" can be deployed within 60 days, while at the same time this activity cannot be vetoed at EU level. The Member State does not vote, but if the decision is adopted, it accepts the fact that the decision binds the EU as a whole. At the same time, a Member State that has not voted "has an obligation to refrain from any action that might conflict with the Union's action". (Article 23 of the EU Treaty).


At the same time only a group of states which, in the sum of their votes weighted, account for a maximum of one third of the total votes in the Council can abstain from vote. If this limit is exceeded, then the EU's CFSP decision is not adopted and maintained for at least one calendar year (this is not a European army). The forces of this rapid deployment are subject to national command. For the time being, their role is limited to humanitarian and rescue tasks. It is to maintain the peace and fulfil other crisis management challenges – with an emphasis on the EU. A major breakthrough for the EU's security and defence policy was the summit in Nice in December 2000. It was when it was decided to create a new permanent political and military structure within the EC, and then the three new bodies emerged:

1. Political and Security Committee (PSC)
2. EU Military Committee (EUMC)
3. EU Military Staff (EUMS)

That is how the security system finds itself in the rhomboid of political forces.

#### 4. THE SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE RHOMBOID OF POLITICAL FORCES

FIG. 2. THE SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE RHOMBOID OF POLITICAL FORCES



Source: author.

The European Union and the Nation States (NS) security systems are set up between the Council of Europe (CE), the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC) and NATO. Quite understandably, there are a variety of interests, multi-directional political forces and varied pressures among these rhomboid vertices of the security system of the European

Union and the Member States. The force field is determined generally by the primary law of the EU and the NS.<sup>6</sup> In the Lisbon Treaty, Title I: Common Provisions, Article 3 states that (1) “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people”, (2) “The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”.<sup>7</sup> European Council defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union. European Council nominates and appoints, with the agreement of the President of the European Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy (HR/VP CFSP EU). The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the gradual definition of a common defence policy that could lead to common defence. The Member Nation States actively and unreservedly support the Union’s foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, and respect the EU’s activity in this area.<sup>8</sup> If we add NATO and especially the US requirements to overall situation, it is clear that the political oppressive atmosphere in the EU and the national Member States’ security rhomboid is simply a day-to-day accompanying phenomenon of the functioning mechanism of the Union.

##### 5. HUBRIS SYNDROME AND LUCIFER’S EFFECT<sup>9</sup>

Owen is particularly interested in leaders who were not ill in the conventional sense, and whose cognitive faculties remained working, but who developed what he calls the *hubris syndrome*. “Hubris is inextricably linked to the possession and exercise of power. If an individual is deprived of power, the syndrome usually wears off”, Owen says. “In this sense, it is a disease associated with persona swell as with a particular position. Moreover, the

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<sup>6</sup> *Lisabonská smlouva: konsolidovaný text Smlouvy o Evropské unii a Smlouvy o fungování Evropské unie ve znění Lisabonské smlouvy*, Praha 2008, p. 508.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 25–26.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 35–39.

<sup>9</sup> Sections 5 and 5.1 of the article are fragments already published, prior to minor textual alterations and updates, as part of: P. Rožňák, *Migration and national security of the Visegrad Countries. Does the Nation State have a superstate?*, “Central European Review of Economics & Finance”, 2019, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 24–27.

circumstances in which this function (position) is performed, affect the likelihood that the leader will succumb to it".<sup>10</sup> A hubris feature is the inability to change the direction of politics, as it would be necessary to admit one's mistake. Owen, in this context, talks about the so-called hubristic career, and hubris is understood as a certain loss of the abilities. According to the author, such political leaders experience a certain loss of capacity; they become too self-confident, manifesting contempt towards any advice that contradicts their beliefs, or even towards any advice whatsoever. Such leaders begin to act as if they were trying to challenge the prevailing circumstances.<sup>11</sup> Usually, though not always, they are punished for that deed by Nemesis. As the Pulitzer Prize winner Barbara W. Tuchman says, the art of ruling is to restrain one's own ambitions and keep the head open. However, we do not seem to realize that power begets foolishness and brings an inability to think. Structurally induced stupidity is typical for behaviour of detached ruling classes and, unfortunately, is ubiquitous. The elite that loses connection with the majority of those they govern, want to control (and, in fact they do control) society without really knowing what it is going on in it. The society today (frequently) consists of a small elite and the remaining majority of the population. Both groups differ sharply from each other in lifestyle, thoughts and interests. Only a few people realize that it can, ultimately, cause a destabilization of delicately balanced internal state security. It is better to avoid thoughts about the implications of the foolish behaviour of politicians and elite that have impact on external security. A politician-statesman is responsible for the welfare of their nation and must act according to different rules than an intellectual sitting in the café. Such a politician becomes then a statesman. Unfortunately, various players on the Czech political playground are playing the games falsely, and their behaviour represents an immediate security threat for everybody. Apart from few exceptions, politicians are not doing what they are paid for. These "high-ranking snakes in suits" as aptly characterized by Robert Hare and Paul Babiak,<sup>12</sup> subject their entire holding to Lucifer's effect (give me a power and I will give you prosperity and security), and are political psychopaths and parasitic predators. We can see a profound discrepancy

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
<sup>10</sup> D. Owen, *The Hubris Syndrome. Bush, Blair and the intoxication of power*, Grantham 2012.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. D. Owen, *The Hubris...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup> P. Babiak, R.D. Hare, *Snakes in Suits: When Psychopaths Go to Work*. New York 2006.

between the performance of (not only Czech) political entrepreneurs and the reward (income) that he/she will receive from voters.

FIG. 3. HUBRIS SYNDROME – A VICIOUS CIRCLE



Source: author.

### 5.1 Hubristic behaviour, security threat and national security of the Visegrad countries

A typical feature of hubristic behaviour is the inability to leave the troughs in time. Even the Book of Books states that humility coheres with the conception of truth. Where there is a boundless pride and where there are no restrictions for such an individual, he or she then sets off inexorably on the path to the intoxication by power. It seems that nothing is impossible and threats are ephemeral: from the given examples it can be concluded that hubristic behaviour posing a security threat is carried out according to a regularly recurring pattern:

(A) An individual gains glory and admiration, and despite expectations achieves a certain success. → (B) This experience goes straight into his/her head. → (C) He/she starts to treat others with contempt and despise. → (D) He/she gains the faith in own abilities, thinks he/she can do anything. → (E) This excessive self-confidence leads to incorrect perception of reality and mistakes. → (F) In the end, he/she meets his/her goddess of reprisal, Nemesis, who will destroy him/her.<sup>13</sup>

Hubris syndrome affects people in power and is defined as a pattern of behaviour in a person who has three or four symptoms of the following list:

- 1) narcissistic attitude to see the world primarily as an arena in which he or she can exercise power and seek glory, and not as a place with problems that require pragmatic and not self-centred approach;
- 2) venturing into the events which will probably throw him or her in a bad light, i.e. which do not improve his or her image;
- 3) showing disproportionate concern for own image and presentation;
- 4) exhibiting messianic zeal and exaltation in speech;
- 5) conflating self with nation or state into such a measure that the prospects and interests of both entities are considered to be identical;
- 6) using the third person or royal 'we' when speaking about oneself;
- 7) showing excessive self-confidence, accompanied by contempt for advice or criticism of others;
- 8) immense self-confidence, escalating to a feeling of own omnipotence, as far as what can be personally achieved;
- 9) shows accountability not to a "secular" instance of justice or colleagues but only to a higher court (history or God);

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<sup>13</sup> P. Rožňák, *Mechanismy...*, *op. cit.*

- 10) displaying unshakeable belief that he or she will be vindicated in that court;
- 11) resorting to restlessness, recklessness and impulsive actions;
- 12) losing contact with reality, gradual solitude;
- 13) allowing moral rectitude to obviate consideration of practicality, cost or outcome; and displaying incompetence as regards nuts and bolts of policy making;
- 14) so-called hubristic incompetence where supreme overconfidence leads to inattention to details, the speech can be spoiled because a leader influenced by his or her exceeding self-confidence did not go into trouble to solve its practical aspects.<sup>14</sup>

The hubris syndrome is set off by a trigger, which is power. Hubristic traits and the hubris syndrome appear after the acquisition of power. Among the key external factors influencing such a behaviour clearly belong:

- 1) prevailing success in the acquisition of power and its holding;
- 2) political environment where there are minimal restrictions on the personal authority of a leader;
- 3) substantial power over a length of time.

## 6. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE FURTHER DECADE<sup>15</sup>

### 6.1 More money for defence

In the sphere of foreign and security policy, the Union has over the last years managed to do more than it had in the past decades of its existence. Although the rise in national defence budgets, on which Washington insists within the North Atlantic Alliance, causes widespread indignation in many countries, more money for European defence is accepted in a more positive way. Preparations for UK leaving the EU created room for the introduction of new instruments of the Common European Defence. 2019 was claimed to be a time when these tools should be fully implemented. When European countries invest in purchasing US systems, the White House is full of praise of these activities. As soon as Brussels opens a debate on “strategic autonomy”,

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<sup>14</sup> D. Owen, *The Hubris...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup> The part of the article from Section 6 till the ending was already published, prior to minor textual alterations and updates, as part of: P. Rožňák, *The European Union and the nation countries, their role at present, challenges and opportunities for the further decade*, [in:] *Security Forum 2019. Conference Proceedings from the 12th Annual International Scientific Conference, February 6th–7th, 2019, Banská Bystrica 2019*, pp. 127–135.



there are voices drawing attention to the duplication of European defence structures and NATO.<sup>16</sup> With an increase in projects and plans in the coming decade there will be more and more discussions about how the European defence can effectively complement NATO.

Brussels has planned to allocate up to EUR 13 billion (equivalent to CZK 338 billion) for joint European defence between 2021 and 2027. The question remains, however, whether the money will be distributed only among giant arms producers or even among smaller companies. It is necessary to increase the defence budget due to new security threats, be it an Islamic terrorism or a migration crisis. The European Commission's proposal was supported by MEPs in the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) at the end of November. The European Parliament is to comment yet.

Billions of investments are part of the so-called European Defence Fund<sup>17</sup> set up by the European Commission (2017). The governments of the Member States are to contribute to the fund and then they can borrow from the fund for their joint defence programmes. The European Defence Fund has two components:

1. **Research.** The research component of the fund already yields results. For the first time, the EU will offer grants for cooperative research on innovative defence technologies and products, funded fully and directly from the EU budget. Projects eligible for EU funding will focus on priority areas on which the Member States have previously agreed and which could typically include electronics, meta-materials, cryptographic software or robotics. Funding were planned be as follows: EUR 90 million by the end of 2019, EUR 500 million annually after 2020.<sup>18</sup>
2. **Development and Acquisitions.** The Fund creates incentives for Member States to co-operate on the joint development and acquisi-

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<sup>16</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2016; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 2017, <https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2017>; European Political Strategy Centre, 2017.

<sup>17</sup> European Commission, *A European Defence Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe's defence capabilities*, 7 June 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_17\\_1508](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1508).

<sup>18</sup> In 2018, the Commission has proposed a specific EU defence research programme with an estimated budget of EUR 500 million, making the EU one of the largest investors in the defence industry in Europe.

tion of defence material and technology by the means of co-financing from the EU budget and practical support from the Commission's side. For example, the Member States can jointly invest in the development of UAVs or satellite communications, or mass-purchase helicopters to reduce costs. Only co-operative projects will be eligible, and a certain part of the total budget will be earmarked for projects with cross-border participation by small and medium-sized enterprises. The EU announced the co-financing with the following means: a total of EUR 500 million for the years 2019 and 2020 within the framework of the specialized defence development programme. A programme with an estimated annual budget of EUR 1 billion will come into force in the period after 2020 year. The programme will allow the Member States leverage financing with an expected fivefold multiplier effect. It could therefore generate a total investment in defence capabilities of EUR 5 billion a year in the next decade.<sup>19</sup>

## **6.2 Reversing the under-funding trend of the Member States' defence**

One of the commission's proposals is to abolish the ban and to allow the EU budget and the investment of development banks to be used for military research. The next step by the European Commission to implement a plan to revitalize military research within the EU is to end billions of government cuts in defence budgets of the individual member countries.<sup>20</sup> The adoption of this plan and its subsequent implementation is intended to show the United States of America that the Union is willing to pay for its own defence. The new initiative is part of a wider range of proposals for a resumption of defence cooperation in the EU. The Members of the European Parliament, in this context, have taken a non-binding resolution on strengthening military cooperation between the Member States.

Another important part is the ending of regulations that do not allow the EU budget and individual development banks to invest in military research. The setup fund enables the governments of the Member States to contribute to it, on the one hand, and to borrow from it on the other hand. The funds embedded in it should be available in particular for joint defence programmes, including, for example, the purchase and develop-

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<sup>19</sup> T. Břicháček, *Unie ve víru migrační krize*, Praha 2016.

<sup>20</sup> NATO members are currently 22 EU countries, but only Britain, Estonia, Poland and Greece fulfil their commitments and allocate at least 2% of their GDP to their defence.

ment of drones, military helicopters or warships. The core of the fund thus consists of two basic €-measures.

The first one, exclusively serves to promote cooperative research in innovative defence technologies such as electronics, materials, and encryption software and robotics.

The second, “€-bag”, is dedicated to the joint purchase of military equipment to save to the states their costs. According to the Commission, countries could reduce costs by, for example, joint investments (e.g. drones or bulk helicopter purchases, etc.). The plan is based on effective funding and increased cooperation in the defence sector. However, it is not just the countries themselves, it is also important to support small and medium-sized enterprises that focus on military defense.<sup>21</sup> However, the already mentioned abolition of the prohibition to support military research from the EU budget and development bank investments, which governments must agree across the Union, is a must. For example, France and Germany are in agreement in that it is time to allow at least part of the EU budget to be used for military research. The budget has included ca. EUR 150 billion and the Commission could potentially allocate up to EUR 3.5 billion between 2021 and 2027 for these purposes. Many countries must therefore settle for an out-of-date military technology, including military aircrafts and helicopters. What is most disturbing is the readiness to immediately deploy military technology. “Europe must take care not to shift the under-investment into ever-greater technological weaknesses. Unless we do something about it, political consequences can be followed by the loss of Union influence in foreign policy”, said Federica Mogherini, called Madame PECEI, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in Prague in 2017. Andrassy, Grega, and Nečas in the scientific monograph *Crisis management and simulations* plastically depict the requirements for the training and preliminary action of the security community. It is necessary to point out that this must be a continuous process of generalizing the solution of other crisis situations by incorporating them into supporting

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<sup>21</sup> “The European Union must become a security provider. The new fund will support cooperative defence research and the joint development of defence capabilities. It will bring about fundamental changes for the EU’s strategic autonomy and the competitiveness of the European defence industry – including many small and medium-sized companies, which are the supply chain of the European defence sector” – Elżbieta Bieńkowska, Commissioner for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 2017.

documents, standards and regulations. They emphasize the need to use support tools to increase the efficiency and feasibility of preparation and readiness in the coming decade. They define simulation support tools that provide information sources for risk assessment purposes, complement the model of its possible evolution from a security environment point of view, and define causes that influence the origin, course, and process of the crisis itself. The authors are in agreement as to the need to use programmed algorithms and have crisis scenarios ready, which would enable to simulate the proposed measures, i.e. respective solutions aimed to prevent the negative effects of a crisis on human life and health, as well as on the environment or society. Simulation technologies are a current-time requirement and should be fully implemented and integrated into the education and training process of the armed forces of the Union's Nation States as an effective tool to support the training of crisis managers. In the coming decade of the 21st century, a broad spectrum of threats and risks associated with human activity (unwanted consequences of crisis events, emergencies, crises, disasters, accidents) requires the creation of new and concrete processes, the definition of individual steps, the allocation of resources and enhancing the capability of assigning the forces. *Security* is becoming a key term in the issue of risk management, defining their nature, as well as minimizing risks' consequences. Security is a specific state of the system in a concrete time and environmental conditions, influenced by many external and internal factors. To ensure the basic tasks, it is absolutely necessary to create a compact, complex system with defined capabilities to identify risks, identify steps to prevent or eliminate them, ensure readiness, command and control. *Crisis scenarios* seem to be an appropriate tool to keep the security system functioning. Of course, in order to prove the link between the practical and theoretical experiences of their creators, it is necessary to verify them. To verify the proposed crisis scenarios, simulation technology appears to be the right tool and platform.<sup>22</sup>

### **6.3 Enhancing the security of European citizens, economic and political links**

Greater cooperation on defence spending among the EU Member States has strong economic and political justification. It is estimated that the

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<sup>22</sup> V. Andrassy, M. Grega, P. Nečas, *Krízový manažment a simulácie*, 1st edition, Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski 2018.

lack of cooperation among the Member States in the field of defence and security entails costs between EUR 25 and 100 billion a year.<sup>23</sup> Since 80% of commissions and more than 90% of research and technological development that takes place at national level,<sup>24</sup> an aggregate purchase may save up to 30% of defence spending a year.<sup>25</sup>

This fragmentation in terms of defence also leads to unnecessary duplication and affects the capability of deploying defensive forces. There are 178 different weapon systems in the EU, compared to 30 in the United States. We have 17 types of major combat tanks, while the US uses only one.<sup>26</sup> For some helicopter programmes, we have more helicopter types in Europe than governments are able to buy.

On 9 June 2017, the then Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Bohuslav Sobotka, the then President of the European Commission; Jean-Claud Junckers; and the then Deputy Secretary-General of NATO, Rose Gottemoeller, met in Prague. The main topics of the Defence and Security Conference Prague (DESCOP), in which the author participated, were NATO and EU cooperation, the Security Union, and border protection. The Czech Prime Minister emphasized (fully aware of the fact that his days in the office were counted) and assured the EU and NATO leaders that the Czech Republic supported the strengthening of European cooperation in the field of security and defence, as well as that an increasing cooperation between the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union is a long-term priority. Mutual cooperation was of key importance to maintain a stability in neighbouring regions.

The second area, as emphasized by the Czech Prime Minister, where this cooperation was crucial, were hybrid threats. The Alliance remained a fundamental pillar of a common Euro-Atlantic defence architecture, and the Czech Republic was ready to fulfil its commitments. The closest objective of the Czech Republic was to reach a defence budget of 1.4% of

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<sup>23</sup> European Parliament, EPRS, 2013.

<sup>24</sup> European Defence Agency, 2014.

<sup>25</sup> *Munich Security Report 2017. Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?*, 2017, [https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/media/com\\_hsd/report/118/document/MunichSecurityReport2017.pdf](https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/media/com_hsd/report/118/document/MunichSecurityReport2017.pdf)

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*.

GDP by the 2020 year and Czech soldiers would continue to participate in the EU and NATO foreign operations.<sup>27</sup>

#### 6.4 Price for the Brexit

Hard Brexit would not only significantly slow the Czech economy. According to the newly released the Treasury forecast, that analyses the hard Brexit scenario for the first time, Britain's leave from the Union without agreement would mean a fall in GDP growth of six to eight tenths of a percentage point. If Britain were to leave the Union with an agreement, the domestic economy would grow by 2.5 percent this year. In case of hard Brexit the Czech economy would grow by about 1.7 to 1.9 percent.

Hard Brexit would increase the Czech economy growth by about 1.7 to 1.9 percent, the Ministry estimates. The departure of the United Kingdom without any agreement would probably mean introduction of customs duties and other trade barriers. Exporters, according to representatives of the Czech market, would lose this year CZK 30 billion. The economy would suffer most from the weakening of the entire euro zone economy.<sup>28</sup> The euro-zone economy is on a weak footing as it faces perilous uncertainties in 2019, and this will have further impact on the Czech economy.

It is not clear at this time whether the British want to participate in closer defence cooperation in the future, but it is not excluded that this could be the case. In this respect, the UK leave is perceived by Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium as removing the obstacle to implementing deeper defence co-operation. The fund is "supposed" to save up to EUR 100 billion a year after the Brexit. We will see whether this is the case. For example, the Slovak Prime Minister, Pellegrini, said, some time ago, with regard to the Brexit, that Britain would have to suffer. Few were so explicit, but this is in fact the EU's basic narrative about the Brexit.<sup>29</sup> Ideology, respectively

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<sup>27</sup> *Pražská konference o obraně a bezpečnosti – DESCOP*, "Vláda České republiky", 8 June 2017, <https://www.vlada.cz/cz/evropske-zalezitosti/aktualne/prazska-konference-k-obrane-a-bezpecnosti---descop-154937/>

<sup>28</sup> RTA Monitoring Association, *Report of the Ministry of Finance to Hard Brexit*, "Monitor", 1 February 2019.

<sup>29</sup> Narrative – way of submission. Relating to the same event, you can portray the story (verbally, in writing, etc.) in a different way, i.e. from a different point of view. The narrator of the story may emphasize different aspects of the plot than their predecessor. The cause may be, for example, different life experience of the interpreter or attempted manipulation with the listener, etc. The interpreters who interpret the same story differently in different times are predominantly politicians.

geopolitics have won over the economy. Well, the negotiations about the Brexit were led by the French with the German Deputy, and the Belgian representing the EP.

I bet, Zahradil says, that if they were Dutch and Danish, the negotiations and the outcome would end otherwise (that is why they were not there). The British government has never missed the land trap. The whole matter with the Irish border is an ideal tool for complications, the Irish government is quite willing to play its part. I would not exclude the fact that in the far future the United Kingdom will lose the Northern Ireland (which again embolden the Scots). That is the price for Brexit.<sup>30</sup>

Uncontrolled – the so-called “hard” – Brexit will be eventually paid by everyone. Brexit may become a trigger for another economic crisis, especially in Europe. According to the German and French governments, sharing resources and closer cooperation in the field of defence and military research is the only way to build and develop adequate military strength within the EU. Perhaps the biggest problem remains, however, when governments in this area prefer their national manufacturers. That is why there are 19 different types of infantry combat vehicles currently in the EU, while only one is used in the United States. However, Brussels estimates that the European Defence Fund will still save between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion a year as a result of planned bulk purchasing.

## **6.5 Vision about the European Union in the following decades of the 21st century**

### **6.5.1 Vision about the EU of 21st Century**

Brussels's elites will stop building a European superstate against the will of their citizens, and the growth in European legislation will cease or at least slow down for the first time in history. The Member States will be connected by the power-supply lines and the energy sources will be diversified so that we do not have to worry about the energy security of the continent.

The single seat of the European Parliament will become a matter of course. The Union will be less dogmatic, less centralized and considerably flexible and open. A union that does not unnecessarily inhibit people, but instead allows them to live and work as freely as possible. The EU will present a functional mechanism based on the “flexible” and/or “multi-speed”

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<sup>30</sup> J. Zahradil, *Skeptický Evropan*, Praha 2016.

model of Europe, where each state will choose whether or not to join a particular area of cooperation. The only exception will present the internal market of the twenty-seven, which will be the cornerstone of the European Union. The eventual entry of the Czech Republic into the Eurozone must be approved or refused by the referendum. The Czech Government will negotiate a permanent exemption for the Czech Republic as far as adoption of EUR is concerned – it should become an option, not an obligation. Free trade zones will support Czech exports. Trade with third countries is an area where European integration has advanced the furthest, the foreign trade agreements are only negotiated at European level. The European Union has an excellent instrument called the Free Trade Agreement. This agreement is always concluded between the EU and a particular state, and its advantage is to ensure fair and favourable conditions for both parties. In the case of an export-oriented Czech economy, this is one of our crucial national interests, free trade creates opportunities for entrepreneurs and helps create jobs. In recent years the European institutions have become a huge, self-involved administrative machinery, requiring more and more power and money. The European Parliament has its own museum, a budget for unnecessary self-promotion, or more than thirty information offices across Europe. The European Commission feeds dozens of agencies and projects. Their effect is nil or controversial, but their competencies often duplicate or overlap. By simply cutting away unnecessary and totally absurd items or projects in the next decade, the European Parliament could save a quarter of its annual operating costs. Brussels must learn to save on itself and instead invest where it makes sense – for example, to break down the various barriers in the internal market, invest money into the energy and transport DOL project interfacing the continent, or into the science or research. MEPs and several thousands of European Parliament employees stop moving to Strasbourg every month for four days. One hour of such a meeting costs over half a million euros. Such wastage of public funds is no longer justifiable. From the original symbol of post-war reconciliation, Strasbourg became synonymous of absurdity and waste of money. In the next decade, the “moving circus” will be terminated. The more so as the Member States will decide about the seat of the European Parliament and, above all, France will be forced to make the necessary changes. Unnecessary regulation of the EU’s internal market will cease, such as the Working Time Directive, REACH, the Occupational Safety and Health Directive, an environmental



policy, and the forced support of so-called renewable resources – in other words, the loss of trillions of Czech crowns annually will stop.

#### CONCLUSION

The European Union rose from the ashes of two world wars in which about 80 million people died, and was inspired by the vision of Czech King Jiří of Poděbrady for lasting peace on the European continent. For 73 years, Europeans have enjoyed peace, that is, for three generations, which is the longest term in the whole history of our continent. One of the main strengths of the Union approach is the possibility of combining soft and hard power. In addition to security and defence tools, the European Union also has diplomacy, economic sanctions, development cooperation, and trade. Everything is focused on conflict prevention. The European Union further supports peace, inclusive growth, human rights, the rule of law, but also the protection of the environment at home country and beyond its borders. This integrated approach is a prerequisite for sustainable security. It is becoming increasingly clear that the problems of the European Union are not caused by some self-interest of national states, because people in individual countries do not understand the “great idea of integration”. Problems, on the contrary, are often caused by an absurd bureaucratic integration at all costs. Neither the Nation States, the Visegrad countries, nor the idea of co-operation of Europe states or the idea of integration itself is wrong, but the extremely bad implementation and the ideology of integration. It reminds in many ways of the unsuccessful attempt to implement the moral code of the builder of communism in the past times.

International social engineers from Brussels have to be stopped. Cooperation does not require integration of everything and even of that a member country does not wish. What the country wants or does not want, the people who live in it must say. Moreover, the mere vision of the EU as a superpower and the strengthening of the illusion of its power, as well as the permanent attempts of the United States at open or obscure export of democracy on bayonets, the efforts to advance NATO troops and shift the strategic military line of “the two worlds”, are not the guarantees of the security of Europe. The European elites, drunk by their previous success, facing the British exit, the tsunami of refugees wandering into the Eden of Europe, the problems associated with them in the largest founding countries of the EU (former colonial countries), are slowly sobering. Today's security threats and the risks of Europe have profound causes, based on often inconsider-

ate decisions and flagrant compromises of political (non)authorities. This applies also to the political (non)elites of the Czech Republic. More is at stake today, it goes about war or peace, our security, and our civilization.

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