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**The issue of space and existence in the context
of the Heideggerian concept of dwelling
and the Arendtian figure of a stateless person**

Abstract

The article presents Heidegger's concept of dwelling and Arendt's figure of a stateless person in order to show a more profound existential dimension of the issue of the occupied territory. The juxtaposition of the above philosophical perspectives allowed for fully stressing the fact that the issues concerning refugees, migrants, repatriates are undoubtedly associated not only with legal or economic aspects, but primarily with how are we able to think about human existence in the context of the dwelling space.

Keywords: stateless person, refugees, migration, assimilation, human rights, space, territory, dwelling, building, existential, belonging.

1. Introduction

In Martin Heidegger's opinion the Cartesian *ego cogito* opened up an abyss between the spiritual entity and the material world. Thus it has become a ballast for modern philosophy, which has since started to look for the certainty of the knowledge of substantiveness which was alien to Ancient philosophy. Therefore, against the 19th and 20th century transcendentalism, the philosopher states that man is first a "being-in-the-world", and only then the consciousness capable of constructing any sense. Hence the world is not a correlate of consciousness, but a structure of meanings and references, the structure of sense, within the framework of which the beings we encounter become meaningful. This leads to a conclusion – fundamental to this discussion – that according to the author of *Sein und Zeit* the world is a place we feel at home in.¹ That is why from among the abundance of works by Heidegger we shall be primarily interested in *Building, Dwelling, Thinking*,² in which the philosopher in detail discusses the concept of dwelling from the ontic perspective, connected with space understood as territory. In this article, I shall obviously make no attempt to synthetically present the concept of dwelling entangled in the ontological domain or comprehensively outline Heidegger's philosophical project. Therefore, I shall leave out the perspective of the marriage of dwelling with Being, expounded on e.g.

¹ A. Przyłębski: *Hermeneutyczny zwrot filozofii*, WN UAM, Poznań 2005, p. 126, see also

² M. Heidegger: *Budować, mieszkać, myśleć* [in:] *Budować, mieszkać, myśleć. Eseje wybrane*, transl. K. Michalski, Czytelnik, Warszawa 1997.

in *Sein und Zeit*,³ in which dwelling in the truth of being constitutes the essence of *being-in-the-world*.⁴ I shall also omit the interpretation contained in *Letter on Humanism*, connected with homelessness, which Heidegger associated with being grounded in metaphysics, and consequently being entangled in technology.⁵

Having said that, in this article I shall look at the problem of dwelling expounded on by Heidegger in *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* and show its practical conditions which are hard not to be noticed in the situation of stateless persons, which is in turn theorized by Hannah Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.⁶ The abovementioned analyses will show unequivocally that the issue of stateless persons, migrants, or displaced persons is not only of a technical – economic and legal nature, but is connected with how are we able to think about human existence. In the European though it happens to be associated with habitation, sharing space in the ethical, cultural and political sense. Thanks to Arendt's profound analyses of the problem of terror at the beginning of the 20th century, the silent victims of which were all those who by misfortune lost legal protection guaranteed by the status of citizen, it was revealed that the issue of assimilation undoubtedly has an existential dimension the ignorance of which may lead to falsification or trivialisation of the image of social reality.

³ Polish translation: M. Heidegger: *Bycie i czas*, transl. B. Baran, WN PWN, Warszawa 1994

⁴ Ibidem, pp. 75–84, 149–161.

⁵ See M. Heidegger: *List o humanizmie* [in:] *Budować, mieszkać, myśleć. Eseje wybrane*, transl. J. Tischner, Czytelnik, Warszawa 1997.

⁶ H. Arendt, *Korzenie totalitaryzmu*, transl. D. Grinberg, Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2008, vol. I.

2. Building, dwelling, preserving

At the beginning of the essay *Building, Dwelling, Thinking*, Heidegger asks two fundamental questions: “What is it to dwell?” and: “How does building belong to dwelling?”⁷ It may be initially recognised that it is one of the forms of the question about *being*, that is according to the author of *Sein und Zeit*: The first task of human thought. By posing those two questions the philosopher problematizes issues that are apparently of secondary importance: dwelling and building, and at the same time explains that although they may seem an ordinary everyday experience with no relation to our existence, as a matter of fact they are the essence of being. In pursuing an answer to the question about what is to dwell the philosopher starts with the etymological level. He indicates the dual meaning of the Old High German word “buan”, which means to dwell, stay, remain, but also build. Then he traces the word “buan” to its etymological roots: “bin”, and German “Ich bin” means “I am” in English. Thus, for the author of *Sein und Zeit* the manner in which I am on the earth means dwelling/building. Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth. But this old word also means caring, tilling the land; thus we learn that building at the same time spares and preserves – because it provides care.⁸

Already at the beginning it should be stressed that from Heidegger’s perspective we do not dwell because we have built something, but we are building and have built because

⁷ M. Heidegger: *Budować, mieszkać, myśleć* [in:] *Budować, mieszkać, myśleć. Eseje wybrane*, op. cit., p. 316.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 318–319.

we dwell, more precisely: because we are dwellers.⁹ To confirm this thesis the philosopher again employs the etymological method: he emphasises that the word “Friede” (English: peace) means the same as “das Freie” (English: free space, the sky), while the root “fry” means: preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something, safeguarded. We preserve somethings when we leave it in peace, for example by enclosing it we leave it in its nature.¹⁰

Summing up, to dwell actually means to remain enclosed in free space, which preserves everything in its nature. Thus preservation is a fundamental characteristic of dwelling.¹¹ What is more, from Heidegger’s perspective human existence consists in dwelling, while dwelling is the stay of “mortals on the earth”, while being “on the earth” we are at the same time “under the sky.” Both of these also mean “remaining before the divinities”, but at the same time belonging to men’s being with one another. It is to be noted that those four abovementioned modalities form something called *the fourfold (Geviert)*, which at the same time is the oneness of what is divine, mortal, earthy, heavenly. Existing on the earth we move around within those four spheres and each of our activities is at the same time included in the simplicity of them all and cannot be accomplished beyond the limits of its influence. Since we dwell, and in accordance with the above we exist in this *fourfold*.¹²

According to what has been said at the beginning, to dwell actually means to remain enclosed in free space, which preserves everything in its nature. In turn, the essence of dwelling

⁹ Ibidem, p. 320.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 320.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 322.

¹² Ibidem, p. 321.


is to spare, to preserve. Mortals dwell preserving the four – that is giving free space to its essence, one may say: to its *fourfold*. Already at this juncture a conclusion may be drawn that mortals dwell in the way that they save the earth. Heidegger emphasizes that the fact of saving the earth cannot mean to master it or subjugate it – on the contrary: Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky, “they leave (...) to the seasons their blessing and their inclemency; they do not turn night into day nor day into a harassed unrest. (...) They do not make their gods for themselves and do not worship idols.”¹³ In this context it is also important that mortals dwell if they obey their own nature, that is they live in concord with their own mortality. What is important, dwelling is not only being in the four: earth – sky – divinities – mortals, but is also staying with things. Things themselves secure the *fourfold* only when they themselves as things are let be in their presencing, that is when “mortals nurse and nurture the things that grow, and specially construct things that do not grow.”¹⁴

In this place Heidegger passes to the second question of those asked at the very beginning of *Building, Dwelling, Thinking*, namely: In what way does building belong to dwelling? In order to answer it the author invokes an example of a built thing that is a bridge which by connecting the banks of a river causes that they start relate to each other. Moreover, it gathers the land around itself, brings stream and bank and land into each other’s neighbourhood, provides also for mortals a way to cross from one side to the other. Its firmament shades the current of the stream as it is under the sky. In other words it is a structure inherent in the fourfold

¹³ Ibidem, p. 322.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 323.

postulated by Heidegger, or in other words in the space of the four. “The bridge gathers to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals.”¹⁵ The embedding of artefacts such as a bridge into the fourfold roots or four different modalities is presented by the following graph:



Such a thing as a bridge by gathering in it the above mentioned fourfold, at the same time allows a space for it, a potential location.^x In Heidegger’s opinion space becomes grasped and perceived only thanks to things – constructions (brought out thanks to building), which - when they become locations – provide an enclosure for an area. A space is something that has been made room for, something that lies within a boundary. A boundary is not that at which something stops but (...) the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. That for which room is made is always granted and hence is joined, that is, gathered, by virtue of a location, that is, by such a thing as the bridge.”¹⁶ Thus, the location of the fourfold of mortals, divinities, sky and earth in space is of necessity connected with ma’s activity which consists in building.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 324.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 326.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 326–327.

3. Space dwelled with thought

In this context, there are other questions that need to be answered. First: What is the relation between location and space? Second, which seems to be most important from the viewpoint of this article: What is the relation between man and space?¹⁸ It is important that space founded by such locations as edifices is different from that which is delineated mathematically or expressed in analytical and algebraic relations. The former is directly cohered with man. Heidegger notes: “for when I say <a man>, and in saying this word think of a being who exists in a human manner—that is, who dwells—then by the name <man> I already name the stay within the fourfold among things.”¹⁹ Even when we think about faraway things, the essence of this thinking is being right here and “by no means at some representational content in our consciousness;” what is more, thinking about the bridge “we may even be much nearer to that bridge and to what it makes room for than someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing.”²⁰ Explaining the relation of mortals to space from a slightly different perspective, Heidegger notes: „ Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man.”²¹ As a result if we are – that is dwell, spaces become locations of our stay. We never occur in them as isolated bodily figures since even our thoughts independently move through space – I am here and at the same time I am where I am going to; in the worlds of the author of *Sein und Zeit*: “When I go toward the door

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 327.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 329.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 329.

²¹ Ibidem, p. 329.

of the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there.²²

Moreover, human activity such a building bring to daylight the location which not only provides shelter to human stay, but also “admits the fourfold and it installs the fourfold”, is its housing.²³ The things such as buildings, that is locations “preserve the fourfold, save the earth, receive the sky, await the divinities, escort mortals - this fourfold preserving is the simple nature, the presencing, of dwelling.”²⁴ From Heidegger’s perspective dwelling is the fundamental characteristic of being, it is actually “impossible to stop dwelling just as it is impossible to suspend participation in one’s own life.”²⁵ What is more, thinking belongs to dwelling in the same degree as building. But building and thinking alone are insufficient for dwelling; they should listen to one another and only then they form proper dwelling.²⁶

4. Is it possible to “be” without dwelling?

In connection with the outlined above concept of dwelling of necessity bound with the occupied territory, migration of people or for example forced resettlements become problematic. A question arises: What about stateless people transferred to the locations with which they have no bonds, which are not their home, with which they do not identify themselves? Do stateless people, deprived of legal status and place

²² Ibidem, p. 329.

²³ Ibidem, p. 330.

²⁴ Ibidem, p. 331.

²⁵ K. Zabokrzycka: *“Etos” jako miejsce w filozofii Martina Heideggera*, Pisma Humanistyczne 2014, no. 12, p. 154.

²⁶ M. Heidegger: *Budować, mieszkać, myśleć*, op. cit., p. 333.

of permanent residence, actually exist? Obviously, “do they exist?” according to Heidegger, who believes that in order to exist one should dwell responsibly, care for the location, respond to the essence and whatever happens in space, which has been “always” utilised by somebody, whereas migrants and resettlers are deprived of such possibilities.

The situation of stateless people becomes additionally problematic in the context of Heidegger’s understanding of *ethos*, expounded on in the *Letter on Humanism*. He notes that the word originally meant whereabouts, place of residence, more precisely: the place in which man lives.²⁷ In turn ethics (the term originates from Greek ἠθός), as Heidegger claims, concerns the stay of man in a space that is open to the presentation of God.²⁸ The return to the etymological roots of both ethics and ethos shows that the customs observed in a given community differ depending on the inhabited territory. In this way the philosopher emphasises the difference between communities coming from different geographical locations and shows that social order may be disturbed as a result of migrations. It happens because incoming groups, even unconsciously, having enrooted diverse codes of values, sanction a code of ethics difference than the one binding in the place where they arrived. Mostly because they have not absorbed from birth with the customs of the indigenous community and have had no impact on the share of the rules and emergence of the local ethos, as a result of which they may not understand, may not sense or share ethical norms that are alien to them.

²⁷ M. Heidegger: *List o humanizmie* [in:] *Budować, mieszkać, myśleć. Eseje wybrane*, op. cit., pp. 118–119.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 119.

The text of *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* may be interpreted as an anti-imperialist or even anti-consumptionist one, as in an obvious manner it negates the fact of occupying a territory without dwelling on it, without being in the space which has been actually captures from the indigenous population. For the German philosopher colonialism would mean depriving the people inhabiting an occupied territory of authentic being and reducing them to a biological thoughtless form of life. However, it is impossible to omit the essence of the view contained in the text presented above. On one hand, as a naturalist – living close to nature in a hut in Schwarzwald – Heidegger seems to have denounced war and annexation of conquered territories proclaiming peace and concerns for one's immediate vicinity. On the other hand, however, Heidegger's text seems to inscribe itself in the German thinking in the categories of race, in Arendt's opinion originating from political romanticism, which in turn comes from the striving to unite the nation against foreign domination which emerged after the defeat inflicted on German by Napoleon.²⁹ However, the question: "Does somebody who does not dwell and does not tend to a given location actually exist? Since – according to Heidegger – dwelling is the fundamental characteristic of being and stateless people have never dwelled on the territory they have been tossed to by history and fate, since they are repatriates, refugees, emigrants – do stateless people exist? Of course, do they exist in the existential sense of being, though evidently this question arouses concern, especially when compared with the events that took place during World War II, such as the extermination of people stripped of their citizenship.

²⁹ H. Arendt, *Korzenie totalitaryzmu*, op. cit., vol. I, p. 240.

5. Human rights vs territory

The repercussions of looking at being from the viewpoint of dwelling, belonging to a location, are on a more practical plane shown by Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* discussing the issues of citizenship and human rights inseparably linked with territory. She explains that “Not only did the loss of national rights in all instances entail the loss of human rights; the restoration of human rights (...) has been achieved so far only through the restoration or the establishment of national rights. In her opinion “The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.”³⁰ Moreover, Arendt notes that already Edmund Burke expressed concern in connection with inalienable natural rights, which can only confirm “the right of the naked savage, because only savages have nothing more to fall back upon than the minimum fact of their human origin, people cling to their nationality all the more desperately when they have lost the rights and protection that such nationality once gave them.”³¹

Arendt’s reflections on the issue of stateless people deprived of their rights many a time lead her to a conclusion corresponding with the essence of Heidegger’s concept of

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 416.

³¹ E. J. Payne: *Foreword* [in:] E. Burke: *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, London 1790, quoted after H. Arendt: *Korzenie totalitaryzmu*, op. cit., vol. I, p. 417.

dwelling. The philosopher notes, among others, that “The first loss which the rightless suffered was the loss of their homes, and this meant the loss of the entire social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the world.”³² She notes that in accordance with the sense of the classical Greek thought “Our political life rests on the assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can act in and change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals.”³³ It is in line not only with the thinking of Ancient Greeks, but also with the way of Heidegger’s understanding of ethos. Moreover, the philosopher notes that “The <alien> is a frightening symbol of the fact of difference as such, of individuality as such,”³⁴ which of necessity reveals the limits of human actions and thus puts “the alien” in the animal realm. This conclusion allows us to reveal the Greek core contained in Heidegger’s thought – acting within a given territory (“looking after” it) puts himself into the *fourfold*, only the existence in which makes him human. It is exactly like the Aristotelian conviction that there is human nature which is characterised by two basic categories: *zoon logon echon* (rational animal), and *zoon politikon* (political animal), while man is not able to live outside of a political community. In his *Politics* he outlines a thesis that the state is a creation of nature and man has been by nature created to live in the state, while he who lives outside of the polis must be either a beast or a god.³⁵ Such an approach to humanity without

³² H. Arendt, *Korzenie totalitaryzmu*, op. cit., vol. I, p. 408.

³³ Ibidem, p. 418.

³⁴ Ibidem, 419

³⁵ Arystoteles: *Polityka*, [in:] *Dzieła wszystkie*, transl. L. Piotrowicz, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2001, vol. 6, Book I, p. 27.

doubt provides a solid basis for excluding whatever seems alien in relation to free citizens covered by laws they have themselves adopted.

A seemingly innocent conception of dwelling presented by Heidegger, inspired by the thought of Classical Greece, becomes particularly dangerous in the face of events which cause migrations of people, such as forced repatriations, exile, emigration. In Arendt's opinion "The great danger arising from the existence of people forced to live outside the common world is that they are thrown back, in the midst of civilization, on their natural givenness, on their mere differentiation," since they remain not only without citizenship, but also without any trade, without activity which shapes the world and provides it with meaning.³⁶ People deprived of their homeland appear as a symptom of a possible move away from civilisation since only those feature will remain which can be expressed only in the private sphere, as "Since the Greeks, we have known that highly developed political life breeds a deep-rooted suspicion of this private sphere, a deep resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact that each of us is made as he is—single, unique, unchangeable. This whole sphere of the merely given, relegated to private life in civilized society, is a permanent threat to the public sphere, because the public sphere is as consistently based on the law of equality as the private sphere is based on the law of universal difference and differentiation."³⁷ What is more, in the philosopher's opinion, we are not born equal, we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights, and

³⁶ H. Arendt, *Korzenie totalitaryzmu*, op. cit., vol. I, p. 419.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 418.

depriving anybody of the right prevailing on the territory they stay in in consequence may lead and in certain historical period did lead first to herding them into ghettos and concentration camps, and when no country would claim these people – to the gas chambers.³⁸

Even human rights that have been enacted in order to emancipate, include the outlaws from the very beginning were paradoxical since they addressed an abstract human being that does not exist in any given place. For this reason they may be exercised only territorially; what is more, they occur in a strict relation with sovereign nation-states. Arendt concludes that even the rights of man based on law rather than the divine commandment or historical custom, regardless of privileges of social strata, are also attributed to a sovereign state.³⁹ The Declaration of Human Rights acts as a protection, but within the framework of a definite political order it is guaranteed by the government and the constitution of a given state; This, moreover, had next to nothing to do with any material problem of overpopulation; it was a problem not of space but of political organization. Nobody had been aware that mankind, for so long a time considered under the image of a family of nations, had reached the stage where whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed communities found himself thrown out of the family of nations altogether.⁴⁰ Whoever as a result of the figment of fate lost the government and at the same time its legal protection, lost it not only in his own country but at the same time in all other countries. Although international agreement between the existing countries many a time

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 411.

³⁹ Ibidem, p. 404–406.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 408–409.

imposed certain difficulties, “for instance, a German citizen under the Nazi regime might not be able to enter a mixed marriage abroad because of the Nuremberg laws.” However, the situation of stateless people was incomparably worse as they found themselves “out of any legality.”⁴¹

What is more important, Arendt notes something extremely significant: it is not backwardness, but, on the contrary, because there was no longer any uncivilized spot on earth connected with the arrangement of practically all of humanity into organized communities led to a situation whereby millions of people were deprived of their belonging to the communities enjoying political rights.⁴² After World War I, practically each political event resulted in the exclusion of a new group from citizenship. Beginning with the collapse of Austria-Hungary, to the expulsion of one and a half million people by Soviet Russia, to the cancellation of naturalization of Germans of Jewish descent and sending them to concentration camps. There were such places as Vilnius where after World War II the registered nationality of its inhabitants was changed every year. It frequently happened that people took refuge in statelessness in order to remain where they were and avoid being deported to a “homeland” where they would be foreigners.⁴³

Although in the 19th and 20th century it was a widespread practice that “civilized countries did offer the right of asylum to those who, for political reasons, had been persecuted by their governments. The trouble arose when it appeared that the new categories of persecuted were far too numerous to be handled by an unofficial practice destined for exceptional

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 409.

⁴² Ibidem, p. 412.

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 387–388.

cases.”⁴⁴ The situation of the masses of the excluded became so absurd that since one was an exception from the norm in a civilized country unforeseen in the law of that country, it was frequently better to become a criminal in order to regain legal protection. In this context Arendt notes that “This is one of the reasons why it is far more difficult to destroy the legal personality of a criminal, that is of a man who has taken upon himself the responsibility for an act whose consequences now determine his fate, than of a man who has been disallowed all common human responsibilities.”⁴⁵

6. The existential dimension of statelessness, exile, migration

Both Arendt’s diagnoses of the issue of statelessness which may constitute efficient tools for analysing and assessing the political reality of the 20th century, as well as Heidegger’s conception of dwelling understood as the fundamental characteristic of being, undoubtedly bear signs of the Greek philosophical tradition. However, both thoughts, both philosophical perspectives are also focused on today’s man and contemporary world, though on different levels of theoreticality, the one and the other try to find an answer or make diagnoses as regards man entangled in the history of the world. Therefore, combining the narrations of both philosophers, a question should be asked: Taking into account the abovementioned theses put forth by Heidegger, is a stateless person excluded because he does not have the basic characteristics of being? In light of their reflections it seems that even today it is impossible to detach oneself

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 409.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 417.

from the Greek thinking about humanity based on belonging to a definite political community. Does not the above statement explain our everyday perception of the world and intuitive perception of a stateless person, a migrant, a repatriate as a stranger – that is somebody coming from the outside, from a different, incomprehensible world. Magdalena Środa notes that the perception according to the categories of “one of ours” and “a stranger” is a part of our substantiveness, it is in this manner that we learn and understand the world.⁴⁶ Notwithstanding whether the thinking in the categories “one of ours – a stranger” is the legacy of the Greek intellectual tradition rooted in culture or figures necessary for political consolidation of a community, it should not leave out the existential weight of migration and its inseparable lack of the sense of belonging and communion with the indigenous population.

Reflecting on the today’s reality through thinking in the Greek spirit Arendt notes a threat to the contemporary civilization: The danger in the existence of such (stateless – K.Z.) people is twofold: first and more obviously, their ever-increasing numbers threaten our political life, our human artifice, the world which is the result of our common and co-ordinated effort in much the same, perhaps even more terrifying, way as the wild elements of nature once threatened the existence of man-made cities and countrysides.⁴⁷ What is interesting, the mechanism or – in other words – social anxiety presented by Arendt includes the way of seeing the problem proclaimed by Heidegger: association of being with dwelling, that is in fact the affirmation of belonging

⁴⁶ M. Środa, *Obcy, inny, wykluczony*, Słowo / obraz terytoria, Warszawa 2020, p. 5.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 420.

to land. In the early 20th century practically anyone could become a stateless person, not only because of origin, but also political views. What is more, in Nazi Germany a citizen could have been deprived of citizenship even on the same day he or she were sent to a concentration camp. In this context, Heidegger's linking of being with dwelling on a concrete area where one has been born seems to give rise to some concern. It means that outside of its native territory man ceases to be human, the ethos by which he lives is no longer binding. In other words, such an approach to dwelling in consequence embodies man who has been stripped of his native land, his homeland, into the living conditions of "savages" who are ensnared in nature. Arendt notes that "Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity."⁴⁸ Both Heidegger, affirming the marriage of humanity with territory, as well as Arendt, pointing to activity as a sense-generating area, assume the perspective of the Greek thought. However, Heidegger seems to focus exclusively on the existential aspect, ignoring the political order, which only in the context of Arendt's texts turns out to be indispensable to the full disclosure and presentation of all consequences of the former.

Analysing totalitarianisms not only from the philosophical, but also sociological, historical and political perspective Arendt recognised that it is impossible to guarantee protection of human rights in separation from a sovereign nation-state. She also stresses that the figure of a stateless persons was in a sense a legacy of the Minority Treaties

⁴⁸ Ibidem, p. 413.

established by the League of Nations,⁴⁹ which may be regarded as the offspring of the modern European emancipation thought. As it is known, this thought was based on the universalist narrations of the Enlightenment, such as for example Kant's *foedus pacificum* project,⁵⁰ i.e. such that are based on the conviction that man is a subject constructing sense in the world, is a pure transcendental consciousness constituting substantiveness. Being an opponent of universalist narrations, in particular Kant's transcendentalism, Heidegger claimed that man is primarily a "being-in-the-world", the structure of sense, meanings and references, and only them, at the point of arrival – consciousness.⁵¹ It is important since Heidegger transfers the weight of the discourse concerning occupation of a given territory onto the existential grounds since a purely economic and legal discourse does not solve any problems concerning migration, exile, repatriation, assimilation or integration. Reducing important existential problems to the issue of social matter and living conditions in the longer run does not favour any more profound reflection on the problem of statelessness and exile, which not only now but without doubt also in the future will constitute a significant issues from not only the social but also political and moral points of view.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 381–384.

⁵⁰ I. Kant: *Do wiecznego pokoju*, [in:] *Rozprawy z filozofii historii*, transl. M. Żelazny, T. Kupś, D. Pakalski, A. Grzeliński, Wydawnictwo Antyk, Kęty 2005, p. 175.

⁵¹ A. Przyłębski: *Hermeneutyczny zwrot filozofii*, WN UAM, Poznań 2005, pp. 127–133.

7. Conclusion

The article presents how Heidegger regarded dwelling, which he convincingly linked with *being*. The explication of this unobvious relationship between man and the territory he occupies reveals the importance of the sphere which is especially nowadays treated as trivial. It turns out that this domain which apparently does not give any greater meaning to human life many a time defines the essence of being, and actually makes man human since it allows him to “be”. Being (also with things) founded by “building” and “nurturing”, that is dwelling is equivalent to giving meaning to the world, i.e. participation in the community of people. It is important since for Heidegger the combination of belonging to earth with being not only constructs sense, but is also is a special relationship with the constitution of the subject.⁵²

The presentation of Heidegger’s conception as compared with Arendt’s figure of a stateless person even more powerfully shows the existential, and in consequent ethical aspect of the issue of space occupied by man. In Arendt’s opinion people gain equality by co-acting with their equals. Stateless people, refugees, migrants are naturally excluded from such sense-generating activity as by losing their homes and occupations they also lost the social communities in the midst of which they used to function. In accordance with Heidegger’s and Arendt’s thesis, due to uprooting they are unable to shape the world, give it some sense and co-create for it the legally sanctioned rules to be followed in their conduct. What’s worse, even human rights are applicable and

⁵² See St. Łojek, *Hermeneutyczna koncepcja podmiotu Martina Heideggera*, “Analiza i Egzystencja” 40 (2017), pp. 6–8.

sanctioned only in a strict relationship with the nation-state. In other words, to enjoy legal protection guaranteed by human rights an individual must have a country which would enforce those rights.

The juxtaposition of the above philosophical perspectives revealed the fact that the issues concerning refugees, migrants, repatriates, assimilation are associated not only with legal or economic, but existential aspects. At present, when the issues linked with broadly conceive statelessness are becoming a pressing political and social problem, which will undoubtedly have its consequences in the future, it is important to realise the complexity of the above outlined problem, its existential and ethical dimension. The way in which we recognise man's existence in the context of the space within which he dwells may be directly translated onto our attitude to people forced to settle on a foreign land.

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