Przeciw dualizmowi psycho-fizycznemu. Analiza i porównanie stanowisk Johna Searle'a i George'a Lakoffa

• Authors: Daniel Milewski

Title variants

EN

Against psycho-physical dualism. An Analysis and comparison of George Lakoff's and John Searle's accounts

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

This paper discusses John Searle’s biological naturalism and George Lakoff’s embodied mind hypothesis. These theories are presented as examples of a certain part of the philosophy of mind that breaks with the tradition launched by Descartes. In both cases, the break from this tradition is indicated to be a radical one as the theories argue not only against Cartesian dualism - the basic philosophical categories utilized by Descartes are being questioned. This attempt of departure from distinctions that seem to form a great part of the contemporary philosophy of mind may stand for a chance to provide a new perspective for some old philosophical problems.

Keywords

PL

John Searle; George Lakoff; Rene Descartes; mind-body problem; biological naturalism; embodied mind; cognitive metaphor; first-person ontology; philosophy of mind; philosophy of cognitive science

• Publisher: Copernicus Center Press
• Journal: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
• Year: 2014
• Issue: 56
• Pages: 57-92

Dates

published

2014-09-18

Contributors

author

Daniel Milewski