Is Having Contradictory Beliefs Possible? Discussion and Critique of Arguments for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction which states that one cannot have, or cannot be described as having, contradictory beliefs. By differentiating two possible interpretations of PNC, descriptive and normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.

Keywords

EN

principle of non-contradiction; rationality; principle of charity; intentional stance; belief ascription; delusion; folk psychology

• Publisher: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
• Journal: Studia Semiotyczne
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 33
• Issue: 2

Dates

published

2020-10-20

Contributors