Using Kreisel’s Way Out to Refute Lucas-Penrose-Putnam Anti-Functionalist Arguments

• Authors: Jeff Buechner
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Georg Kreisel (1972) suggested various ways out of the Gödel incompleteness theorems. His remarks on ways out were somewhat parenthetical, and suggestive. He did not develop them in subsequent papers. One aim of this paper is not to develop those remarks, but to show how the basic idea that they express can be used to reason about the Lucas-Penrose-Putnam arguments that human minds are not (entirely) finitary computational machines. Another aim is to show how one of Putnam’s two anti-functionalist arguments (that use the Gödel incompleteness theorems) avoids the logical error in the Lucas-Penrose arguments, extends those arguments, but succumbs to an absurdity. A third aim is to provide a categorization of the Lucas-Penrose-Putnam anti-functionalist arguments.

Keywords

EN

functionalism; Computational Liar; Gödel incompleteness theorems; finitary computational machine; mathematical certainty; finitary reasoning; epistemic refutation; metaphysical refutation; epistemic justification; recursively unsolvable; epistemic modality; finitary computational description

PL

functionalism; Computational Liar; Gödel incompleteness theorems; finitary computational machine; mathematical certainty; finitary reasoning; epistemic refutation; metaphysical refutation; epistemic justification; recursively unsolvable; epistemic modality; finitary computational description; functionalism; Computational Liar; Gödel incompleteness theorems; finitary computational machine; mathematical certainty; finitary reasoning; epistemic refutation; metaphysical refutation; epistemic justification; recursively unsolvable; epistemic modality; finitary computational description

• Publisher: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
• Journal: Studia Semiotyczne
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 34
• Issue: 1

Dates

published

2020-11-14

Contributors

author

Jeff Buechner