

TOMOO UEDA \*

## KANTIAN PRAGMATISM AND THE HABERMASIAN ANTI-DEFLATIONIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH

**SUMMARY:** In this paper, I aim to characterize the pragmatist and anti-deflationist notions of truth. I take Habermas's rather recent discussion (1999) and present the interpretation that his notion of truth relies on the reliabilist conception of knowledge rather than the internalist conception that defines knowledge as a justified true belief. Then, I show that my interpretation is consistent with Habermas's project of weak naturalism. Finally, I draw some more general implications about the pragmatist notion of truth.

**KEYWORDS:** pragmatism, truth, deflationism, consensus theory of truth, reliabilism, weak naturalism, Habermas.

### 1. Introduction

The focus of this paper is on the anti-deflationist notion of truth and its role in what Habermas calls “Kantian pragmatics”.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, I shall discuss Habermas's version of Kantian pragmatics; Habermas (1999, *Einleitung*) characterizes Kantian pragmatism in the following way:

---

\* Hosei University, Faculty of Law. E-mail: ueda.tomoo@hosei.ac.jp. ORCID: 0000-0001-8493-5636.

<sup>1</sup> This work is supported by JSPS KAKENHI JP20K12781. An earlier draft of some parts of this paper was presented at the 2019 PhiLang Conference (Łódź, Poland). I would like to thank the organizers and anonymous reviewers of the conference as well as the audience who provided good discussions in and after the session. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers of the journal as well as Lena Kästner, Shuhei Kimoto, Shigeki Noya and Kichiro Oishi for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Kantian pragmatism [...] relies on the transcendental fact that subjects capable of speech and action, who can be affected by reasons, can learn—and in the long run even “cannot not learn [*nicht nicht lernen können*]”. And they learn just as much in the moral-cognitive dimension of interacting with one another as they do in the cognitive dimension of interacting with the world. By the same token, the transcendental formulation of the issue expresses the postmetaphysical awareness that even the best results of these fallible learning processes remain, in a significant sense, our insights. Even true assertions can realize only those ways of knowing that our sociocultural forms of life make available to us. (Habermas, 2003, pp. 8–9; see Habermas, 1999, p. 16)<sup>2</sup>

This citation needs three clarifications: first, one may well wonder how “Kantian” Habermas’s position actually is; certainly, historians of ideas have been interested in whether and to what degree Habermas’s position qualifies as Kantian. For example, Bernstein (2018, p. 194) claims, “Habermas’s Kantianism is far removed from the “historical” Kant, but he appropriates what he takes to be the core insight of Kant’s transcendental project”.

Second, putting these interpretative issues aside, if we inquire solely after the theoretical content of the “transcendental formulation”, one may also wonder what he intends by predicating something as “transcendental”; this point is an important one. The question must be asked: what is the “transcendental fact” Habermas is talking about? According to Habermas, it concerns the subject’s ability of learning speech and action (or inability thereof).<sup>3</sup> This learning capacity is called a “transcendental fact” because it depends on a reflective capacity of the subject, which constitutes the “background assumptions that for Kant ensured the status of the unavoidable conditions of the possibility of cognition as rational and as atemporal” (Habermas, 2003, p. 9; see 1999, 17). It is this transcendental fact that affects the notion of truth.

Finally, the concept of “postmetaphysical awareness” must be explained. Habermas’s conception of “metaphysical philosophy” is very broad, but, according to Baynes’s interpretation, it involves the view that

there is a form of inquiry and knowledge proper to philosophy that is, on the one hand, quite distinct from that found in the natural and social sciences and, on the other, one that can nonetheless yield a special and authoritative insight into questions concerning both the meaning of life and how the world, in the broadest sense, “hangs together”. (Baynes, 2018, p. 72)

---

<sup>2</sup> Passages from *Wahrheit and Rechtfertigung* (Habermas, 1999), except from Chapters 2 and 5, are translated by Barbara Fultner (Habermas, 2003). I shall quote her translation unless otherwise indicated and refer to both page numbers.

<sup>3</sup> Oishi (in personal conversations and email correspondence) pointed out that Habermas stresses the “reflexivity” of natural languages (Habermas, 1971, p. 122). This suggestion is of importance since the theme of this paper might have a much broader scope and concern Habermas’s whole philosophical project. However interesting this is, I cannot go into this larger topic in this paper.

It is this task that Habermas resists ascribing to philosophy. In Habermas's post-metaphysical thinking (1988), the task of philosophy rather consists in "its persistent tenacity in posing questions universalistically, and its procedure of rationally reconstructing the intuitive pretheoretical knowledge of competently speaking, acting, and judging subjects—yet in such a way that Platonic anamnesis sheds its nondiscursive character" (Habermas, 1992, p. 38; see 1988, p. 46).

To sum up: Habermas is pursuing a sort of pragmatist project that seeks to identify the universal and unavoidable (*unhintergebar*) conditions for communicative rationality.

### 1.1. Varieties of Validity Claims and Truth

It is well known that Habermas's consensus theory (2009a; 1981, esp. Chap. 3) applies not only to the truth (*Wahrheit*) of factual statements, but also to the rightness (*Richtigkeit*) of normative statements, and to the truthfulness (*Wahrhaftigkeit*) of statements about subjective experience.<sup>4</sup> According to Habermas, each class of statements raises a distinct validity claim (namely, that of truth, rightness or truthfulness). And each must be justified in a discourse, a special sort of dialogue, in which the validity claim is directly questioned and its justification is required. Although the focus of this paper is restricted to the notion of truth, we should bear in mind that Habermas's discussion of truth is applicable to the other validity claims.<sup>5</sup>

In this paper, we shall pick the notion of truth because Habermas (1999) explicitly discusses this validity claim and its relationship to his Kantian pragmatism.<sup>6</sup> A descriptive statement is true if and only if the statement's validity claim of truth is justified in a discourse. Theories of truth that satisfy this formulation belong to the "consensus theory of truth".

### 1.2. The Traditional Notion of Truth

Since the central focus of this paper is the notion of truth, let me begin by characterizing the traditional notion of truth for the comparison with Habermas's notion.

The traditional notion of truth, which Habermas calls the "semantic truth concept", consists of three assumptions:

---

<sup>4</sup> Initially (Habermas, 2009a), there were four sorts of validity claims, but since *Theorie der kommunikativen Handelns* (1981), Habermas only names these three validity claims. So, in this paper, I shall only discuss these three sorts of validity claims.

<sup>5</sup> We shall come back to this point later.

<sup>6</sup> It is also worth noting that Habermas keeps this basic structure in his later works (1999) that we are going to analyze, although there are substantial differences between his early works (such as in 1981; 2009a) and later ones. See Section 4.1.1. below.

- (i) Truth is a property; some beliefs and statements exemplify it and some don't.
- (ii) It's a substantive property, in that we can reasonably expect an account of what truth is, of its underlying nature. And (iii) this account should provide explanations of various important things about truth: including, why the methods appropriate for its detection are what they are, and why we are well-advised to pursue it—that is, to strive for true belief. (Horwich, 2010, p. 13, original emphasis)

There are many important arguments against these three, but what Habermas focuses on is the paradox of self-reference. For example, imagine a card that says “What is written on the reverse of this card is false” on one side, and “What is written on the reverse of this card is true” on the other. If we assume the semantic concept of truth, this card leads to an obvious paradox. This paradox is caused by the fact that the semantic concept of truth does not differentiate between object languages and metalanguages.

This counterargument leads to the conclusion that there is no such abstract property as truth. This thesis is commonly assumed by the positions I shall examine below.

### 1.3. The Pragmatist Notion of Truth

This paper mainly discusses the pragmatist notion of truth, which states that if there is a role that the notion of truth plays, it should play a pragmatic role (or a role in a discourse). In other words, the question of truth concerns the proper use of truth predicates such as “... is true,” rather than characterizing truth as an abstract property.

Let me briefly clarify three issues concerning the pragmatist notion of truth: first, there is a debate about whether the notion of truth plays any role in pragmatism at all (Misak, 2013, p. 66; Okochi, 2017); however, in the course of this paper, it should become clear that neither Habermas nor I agree to the deflationist claim. Second, this label of the “pragmatist notion of truth” is often associated with the notion of utility. For example, the slogans “The truth is what works” (Brandt, 1994, p. 285) or “What we find it helpful in practice to believe” (Horwich, 2010, p. 3) illustrate the utilitarian character of the pragmatist notion of truth. Although it is popular to ascribe such definitions to pragmatism, I shall not consider the problem of utility here.

Thus understood, the final and most important point is that the notion of truth is characterized in terms of justification. Therefore, the following discussions will be about the relationship between the universal and atemporal notion of truth, and justifications that are given in a particular time and place. According to Habermas, the notion of truth “transcends justification although it is always already operatively effective in the realm of action” (2000, p. 49; original emphasis; see 1999, p. 264).

## 1.4. Outline

I am going to examine the following questions: first, what is the relationship between knowledge and truth according to the pragmatist notion of truth? Second, is truth deflationist?

In the first part of this paper, I shall argue against the deflationist account of truth. First, I shall characterize the relationship between truth and justification (Section 2), and analyze the deflationist account of truth, especially disquotationalism (Section 3.1). Then, I shall formulate Habermas's criticisms of disquotationalism (Section 3.2). Finally, I shall sketch my answer to the first question and then argue that it is faithful to Habermas's position (Section 4).

## 2. Justification and Truth

According to a pragmatist stance towards content, the truth predicate "... is true" applies to the content of an utterance (which is called a "statement [*Aussage*]" ) rather than of a sentence. Furthermore, pragmatists analyze the usage of truth predicates in terms of the notion of truth.

In this section, I shall first sketch what the pragmatist notion of truth looks like (Section 2.1). Then, in order to locate Habermas's Kantian pragmatism in this context, I shall lay out his argument against the correspondence theory of truth (Section 2.2).

### 2.1. The Pragmatist Notion of Truth

From the pragmatist stance, it immediately follows that the classical correspondence theory of truth, which is a version of the semantic concept of truth, is inappropriate for the analysis. It claims that a content (or a statement) is true if and only if it corresponds to reality. However, this theoretical dependence on reality presupposes certain metaphysical assumptions that pragmatists are profoundly against. For, the pragmatists are "best viewed as pursuing the speech-act and justification projects. Pragmatic accounts of truth have often focused on how the concept of truth is used and what speakers are doing when describing statements as true" (Capps, 2019, Sec. 4).

So, the question for pragmatists is: when is the truth predicate used properly? The answer is that it is used properly in our first-order practice of justification: "[All pragmatist perspectives] claim that we should not add anything metaphysical to the first-order research. We must distill the concept of truth out of our practices of research, reason-giving, and consideration" (Misak, 2013, p. 66; my translation).<sup>7</sup>

The distinction between first-order and second-order justifications corresponds, for example, to the justifications for "Elephants have long noses" on one

---

<sup>7</sup> The original English version has yet to be published.

hand, and “‘Elephants have long noses’ is true” on the other. Using a truth predicate is pragmatically justified only if there is a proper first-order justification for the relevant statement (i.e., in the above example, for elephants having long noses).<sup>8</sup>

The notion of first-order justification is directly related to the content of the relevant utterance, such as “Elephants have long noses,” rather than the content of “‘Elephants have long noses’ is true”. The relevant first-order justification, of course, includes scientific justifications about elephants and their noses, but it is not restricted to these. Testimonies, for example, in television documentaries or encyclopedias, provide such justifications too.

The relationship between truth and justification is not straightforward, since the notion of truth is universal and atemporal while justifications are made at a specific time and place. In other words, first-order justifications are necessary for using the truth predicate. However, they are not sufficient to define truth because the notion of truth goes beyond each individual justification, as Habermas (2000, p. 49; see also 1999, p. 264) puts it, truth “transcends justification”. Actual justifications can, in principle, turn out to be wrong, even if they are made in a very controlled setting. This fallibilist assumption, that the best justification can turn out to be wrong, is important for pragmatists.

## 2.2. Realism After the Linguistic Turn

Habermas’s critique of the correspondence theory stems from his critique of conceptual realism. According to conceptual realism, the objective world is conceptually articulated independently of our minds. Thus, the knowledge about the objective world assumed in conceptual realism is a sort of knowledge that is specific to philosophy rather than the natural sciences.

One apparent problem with conceptual realism is the ontological status of abstract entities such as propositions or the property of truth; in other words, conceptual realism is committed to the view that such abstract entities belong to the objective world. However, for Habermas, this is not acceptable:

If the “world” that is presupposed according to formal pragmatics is all that is the case—“the totality of facts, not of things” [(Wittgenstein, 1922, 1.1)]—then abstract entities such as propositional contents or propositions must also be taken to be “something in the world”. (Habermas, 2003, pp. 30–31; my insertion; see also 1999, p. 41)

Habermas argues against this kind of ontological commitment on many occasions (i.e., Habermas, 1999, *Einleitung*).

---

<sup>8</sup> Because of this characteristic, the pragmatic notion of truth is a type of epistemic notion of truth (see, for example, Wrenn, 2015, Chap. 4; esp. Sec. 4.4). It is worth noting that the deficiencies that Wrenn (2015, p. 64) ascribes to Peirce and James will be resolved in the Habermasian consensus theory of truth.

A similar, rather historical argument against conceptual realism might be constructed from Habermas's (1988, Chap. 2) critique of "metaphysical thinking". Metaphysical thinking consists of the idea that the world is already structured in such a way that "theoretical reason will rediscover itself in the rationally structured world, or that nature and history are given a rational structure by reason itself" (Habermas, 1992, p. 34; my emphasis; see 1988, p. 42). While Habermas (1988, p. 36) ascribes this position to a wide range of philosophers, one typical view he associates with conceptual realism is the philosophy of subjectivity or *Bewusstseinsphilosophie*. Both the metaphysical thinking found in *Bewusstseinsphilosophie* and conceptual realism share a certain important feature: an ignorance of intersubjectivity. Inattention to the role of intersubjectivity in a theory of truth is unacceptable for Habermas because he (1999, sec. 5.2) accepts the linguistic turn (of which he relies on Rorty's characterizations). Once this is accepted, intersubjectivity becomes an integral part of the pragmatist theory of truth. A true statement is a statement about the objective world, but, as Habermas says,

[t]he objective world is no longer something to be reflected but is simply the common reference point for a process of communication [*Verständigung*] between members of a communication community who come to an understanding with one another with regard to something. (Habermas, 2000, p. 35; see also 1999, p. 237)

However, it is essential to distinguish between conceptual realism and the kind of realism Habermas commits himself to:

Because acting subjects have to cope with "the" [objective] world, they cannot avoid being realists in the context of their lifeworld. Moreover, they are allowed to be realists because their language games and practices, so long as they function in a way that is proof against disappointment, "prove their truth" [*sich bewahren*] in being carried on. (Habermas, 2000, p. 48; my insertion; see also 1999, p. 262)

This kind of realism is not conceptual realism because the objective world is not articulated conceptually; rather, it is merely constituted by objects and events that are not conceptual.

For Habermas, after the linguistic turn, the notion of truth became associated with his Kantian pragmatism, in which linguistic interaction and communication (*Verständigung*) constitute the intersubjective conditions of experiencing the objective world.

Despite the transition from the transcendental (or reflective) subjectivity of consciousness to the detranscendentalized (or prereflective) intersubjectivity of the life-world (cf. Habermas, 1981, p. 451), the problem of conceptual realism remains. As Habermas writes,

Only the realist presupposition of an intersubjectively accessible objective world can reconcile the epistemic priority of the linguistically articulated horizon of

the lifeworld, which we cannot transcend, with the ontological priority of a language-independent reality, which imposes constraints on our practices. (Habermas, 2003, p. 30; original emphasis; see also 1999, p. 41)

Thus, Habermas introduces a dichotomy between the life-world and the objective world. The discursive participants (or us) are, as language users, always already (*immer schon*) in the life-world. The life-world is articulated linguistically or conceptually while the objective world is not (otherwise, it would be conceptual realism).

As far as subjective experience is concerned, Habermas (2003, p. 30; see also 1999, p. 41) commits himself to the thesis that “[a]ll experience is linguistically saturated such that no grasp of reality is possible that is not filtered through language”. The necessary conditions for objective knowledge through experience are the intersubjective conditions for linguistic interpretation and communication (*Verständigung*).

Thus construed, truth, for Habermas, involves two principles: first, truth is related to referents in the objective world, but not to the facts that belong to the life-world. Second, intersubjective communication is a necessary condition for the possibility of objective knowledge. From these conditions, Habermas characterizes the notion of truth in terms of (intersubjective) justification; hence, the Habermasian notion of truth is a pragmatist notion of truth.

### 3. Deflationism

Using truth predicates is justified only if the speaker has a first-order justification for claiming the relevant content. Let’s call positions on truth that follow this central idea “pragmatist”. Beyond agreeing on this central idea, there are disagreements among pragmatists about whether uses of the truth predicate play a distinctive role (see Misak, 2013, p. 66).

One such pragmatist understanding of truth is defended by deflationists. Deflationist theories “are characterized by a cluster of four interlocking ideas about the truth predicate” (Horwich, 2010, p. 14): the truth predicate (1) has a special kind of utility, (2) is non-predicative and non-explanatory, (3) is not naturalistic and (4) is not significant.

- (1) The truth predicate has a special kind of utility although theorists’ views vary over which kind of utility has priority (e.g., the truth predicate can be used as a device for emphasis, concession, generalization or anaphora; see Horwich, 2010, p.14).
- (2) According to deflationism, the meaning of the truth predicate is not empirical. That is, there is no empirical predicate  $F$  for any content  $x$  such that  $x$  is true if and only if  $x$  is  $F$ . Nor is the truth predicate an abbreviation of a complex non-empirical expression such that it will explain the use of the truth predicate.



- (3) Because the truth predicate does not have any empirical characteristics, there cannot be any naturalistic reduction. Furthermore, no natural laws can relate truth with empirical experience (Horwich, 2010, p. 15).
- (4) Truth is not “a deep concept and should not be given a pivotal role in philosophical theorizing” (Horwich, 2010, p. 16; original emphasis).<sup>9</sup> That is, the notion of truth cannot be the basis for our conception of meaning.

The central conclusion that deflationists draw from the above discussion is two-fold. First, since claiming something to be true is nothing more than claiming it, “truth is not a concept that has an important explanatory role to play in philosophy” (Brandom, 2009, p. 158; original emphasis; see also Horwich, 2010, pp. 14–16).

Second, since the notion of truth does not play any explanatory role in philosophical theories, there is no such property as truth. That is, unlike other predicates, the truth predicate (“... is true”) does not designate any real property. If this is the case, the logical form of the truth predicate must be different from first-order predicates.

### 3.1. Disquotationalism

One kind of deflationist theory of truth is disquotationalism (DQ), which is based on the following disquotational scheme:

DQ: For every *S*, “*S*” is true if and only if *S*.

DQ presupposes a distinction between an object language and a metalanguage; that is, while the occurrence of *S* on the left-hand side of DQ is simply mentioned, that on the right-hand side of DQ is being used. Hence, the paradox of self-reference does not occur in this formulation of truth. This makes the disquotationalist theory of truth more attractive than the correspondence theory.

Disquotationalists respect the common pragmatist assumption that the justification for the assertion “‘Snow is white’ is true” is the same as the first-order justification for the assertion “Snow is white”. From this, they infer that claiming something to be true is nothing but claiming it. So, there is no pragmatic difference between these two claims.<sup>10</sup> Hence, disquotationalists conclude that there is no distinctive nature of truth to be investigated. In this sense, the disquotationalist theory of truth is deflationist. In the following section, I argue that this theory is inappropriate.

---

<sup>9</sup> Rorty (2000b, p. 56) also made a similar point in his reply to Habermas (2000).

<sup>10</sup> Interestingly, Frege (1983, p. 211 [“Einleitung in die Logik”]) also makes a similar point.

### 3.2. Habermas's Argument Against Disquotationalism

In his discussion of Rorty's paper (1994),<sup>11</sup> Habermas criticizes the disquotationalist position.<sup>12, 13</sup> Habermas's criticism is twofold:

(1) Habermas criticizes the uninformativeness of the disquotational function "because it already presupposes the representational function [*Darstellungsfunktion*]" (Habermas, 2000, p. 43; my insertion; see also 1999, p. 252). In order to understand the expression "... is true," you should understand the right-hand side of DQ: For every *S*, "*S*" is true if and only if *S*. The right-hand side of DQ is used in the metalanguage. This requires that "[b]efore an assertion can be quoted it must be 'put forward'" (Habermas, 2000, p. 43; see also 1999, p. 252). The content must be asserted before it can be quoted in the use of "... is true". There is a problem here because of fallibilism, according to which actual justifications can, in principle, turn out to be wrong, even if made in a very controlled setting. Fallibilism implies that the right-hand side of DQ could turn out to be false even if it were asserted with the best possible argumentation.

The difference between deflationists and Habermas consists in the question of whether fallibilism is applied to a second-order claim, that is, a claim of the form "'*S*' is true". While deflationists answer the question affirmatively, Habermas should answer it in a negative way. Thus, for Habermas, there must be something more to the notion of truth than just an assertability of the quoted sentence; that is, there is an important distinction between a statement's being justified and its being known.

In this respect, it is helpful to understand Habermas's critique of Rorty's deflationism. According to Rorty (2000, p. 4), "it is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word 'true', than it is to have one about the nature of danger, or the meaning of the word 'danger'". Habermas argues against this position by referring to the regulative role of truth.<sup>14</sup> The notion of truth is said to be regulative if truth works as

<sup>11</sup> This paper is a shortened version of Rorty's (2000a; for the explanation, see p. 25, fn. 1).

<sup>12</sup> Habermas (1999, Sec. 5.5) includes this position in the "semantic conception of truth". However, as I argued in Section 3.1, the disquotationalist position is actually a sort of pragmatist but deflationist position.

<sup>13</sup> Misak (2007, Sec. 3) discusses another version of deflationism (the so-called prosententialist position) that is introduced by Grover, et al. (1975) and defended by Brandom (1994, Chap. 5; see also 2009b). It would be very interesting to explore whether Habermas's critique of disquotationalism applies to prosententialism too; however, this requires another paper because he does not explicitly discuss prosententialism.

<sup>14</sup> Wellmer (2007a) criticizes Putnam, Habermas and Apel, and argues that truth is not regulative. His assumption is that, in order to discern justifications and truth, the consensus theorists of truth must introduce the notion of "the last consensus". However, it should be noted that the position of Habermas that Wellmer aims to criticize is his former position (esp. in 1981; 2009a), and Wellmer's criticisms of truth as a regulative idea do not apply to Habermas's current position (1999).

the “reference point” in such a way that it gives “the fallibilist consciousness that we can err even in the case of well-justified belief” (Habermas, 2000, p. 48; see also 1999, p. 262). This reference point stems from the life-worldly distinction between believing and knowing that “relies on the supposition, anchored in the communicative use of language, of a single objective world” (Habermas, 2000, p. 48; see also 1999, p. 262).

This criticism implies that, for Habermas, the notion of truth “transcends justification although it is always already operatively effective in the realm of action” (2000, p. 49; original emphasis; see also 1999, p. 264). From this, it follows that truth claims, namely, claims of the form “‘S’ is true,” are second-order claims and they are not fallibilistic.

(2) Habermas’s second criticism of disquotationalism concerns the use of “... is true”. Of course, truth plays an essential role in scientific knowledge, which requires absolute justifications, but truth is also used in everyday situations. And even if the scientific uses could be explained in terms of disquotationalism, Habermas claims, “a semantic [i.e., disquotational] conception of truth simply does not help us at all” because of the contextual expressions in pretheoretical uses of truth predicates (Habermas, 2000, 43; my insertion; see also 1999, p. 253). If disquotationalism were right, there would have to be an instance of DQ for everyday uses of the truth predicate; however, it is hardly clear how to formulate any instance of DQ in a way disquotationalists would accept. Take “‘I am in good health now’ is true” as an example. If DQ is applied to this example, it is true if and only if I am in good health. However, if there are plenty of cases where the utterer of the embedded statement, “I am in good health,” differs from the truth claim, then DQ does not work. Hence, an integral part of the analysis of the use of truth predicates is an examination of the discursive situation shared by the speaker and the hearer.

### 3.3. Proper Uses of Truth Predicates

According to Habermas, claiming “S” is (pragmatically) distinct from claiming “‘S’ is true”. The question is, then: what is the difference? The key to answering this is in his notion of validity claims. In the following, I shall briefly intro-

---

Independent of applicability, Wellmer’s claim (2007a, Sec. 9) that a regulative idea is not necessary for truth is wrong. He argues that the trans-subjective rational consensus is the telos of argumentation, but that it falls short of truth because “rationality” just means “justified” (*begründet*). However, Habermas (1999, Chap. 5) requires reached consensus to function as the shared foundation for future intersubjective actions. Here, the notion of truth is understood performatively and regulates the rational actions of both interlocutors because “[a]n assertion that has been disposed of argumentatively in this way and returned to the realm of action takes its place in an intersubjectively shared lifeworld from within whose horizon we, the actors, refer to something in a single objective world” (Habermas, 2003, p. 47; see also 1999, p. 261).

See also Apel’s (2011) for his critical discussion of (Wellmer, 2007a).

duce the Habermasian notion of validity claims and then sketch the pragmatic role of the truth predicate using the notion of validity claims.

### 3.3.1 Validity claims.

According to Habermas (esp. in 2009a), when a person makes a claim, for example, “Susan is clever,” in addition to making the claim, the speaker also claims that the content of their claim is true, and claiming it is normatively right, and he claims it sincerely. The speaker asks the listener to agree to these claims. These three sorts of claims are called “validity claims” (*Geltungsansprüche*), and they play an essential role in Habermas’s consensus theory. Namely, what Habermas calls “discourse” in which justifications for the validity claims are given only if the listener questions (one of) the validity claims and requires justification for the relevant validity claim(s).

Let’s focus on the validity claim of truth. If you claim “Susan is clever” and your interlocutor raises a question as to whether the claim is true, a discourse kicks in and you have to give justification for the claim. In such a discourse, both you and your listener will only focus on justifications and take hypothetical attitudes towards the truth of the claim. If you and your listener reach a consensus that the validity claim of truth has been justified in the discourse, the truth of the claim is established.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.3.2. Pragmatic roles of the truth predicate.

Although truth claims are indeed about providing justification, they only deliver one specific sort of justification about one specific validity claim; however, claiming something (e.g., “Susan is clever”) without any specifications might be subject to the responsibility to provide a variety of justifications. In other words, “‘Snow is white’ is true” should be rewritten as “In terms of a truth-related justification,<sup>16</sup> snow is white”. Therefore, the use of truth predicate is not deflationist.

This is clearly in the spirit of Habermas when he says, “All of these utterances imply validity claims” (2009a, p. 229, my translation), and every discourse has one of these validity claims about which justifications are given (see Section

---

<sup>15</sup> As we shall see later (in Section 4), Habermas changed his opinion concerning the conditions in which the relevant consensus will be reached. In his original position (2009a), this consensus can only be reached in the ideal speech situation, while in the version that we are analyzing (1999), the consensus has to be reached in an actual discursive situation.

<sup>16</sup> By a “truth-related justification,” I mean a justification about the objective world as the “system of possible referents—as a totality of objects” (Habermas, 2003, p. 27; see also 1999, p. 37). Note that the objective world consists of objects and events rather than facts. It is not clear from his writing whether properties will count as a subclass of referents, but I assume that should be so. In contrast, facts clearly do not constitute the objective world (Habermas, 1999, p. 42).

1.1). A truth claim only focuses on the validity claim of truth in the first instance.<sup>17</sup>

#### 4. The Pragmatic Role of Truth: A Provisional Externalist Interpretation<sup>18</sup>

In the previous sections, we examined Habermas's truth theory from pragmatist perspectives. In this section, I shall present a provisional but positive account of truth claims and their role, which I argue is a natural extension of what Habermas (1999, Chap. 5) defends. Essentially, Habermas's revised position (1999, Chap. 5) is a consensus theory of truth in which the notion of truth is characterized in terms of a consensus reached in an actual discourse rather than a consensus in an ideal speech situation. So, the issue for this revised consensus theory of truth is how to discern truth from justification; for truth is universal in character while justifications are bound to a specific time and place.

This provisional account of truth must meet two conditions: first, it must be anti-deflationist; second, it must characterize the conditions in which truth claims are justified (Section 4.1). I shall further argue (in Section 4.2) that my provisional account is Habermasian in spirit.

#### 4.1. Anti-Deflationism and Justification for Truth Claims

Anti-deflationism claims that the concept of truth cannot be explained away; rather, it plays an essential role in our daily (linguistic) practice. In other words, the justification for asserting "'S' is true" is not the same as the justification for asserting "S".

What, then, does the justification for a truth claim look like?

To answer this, I shall discuss the consensus theory of truth, which is characterized in terms of the life-world, which, in turn, depends on the reliabilist conception of knowledge (Section 4.1.1). This will make the notion of justification for a truth claim naturalistic (Section 4.1.2). The naturalistic notion of truth is not deflationist (Section 4.1.3).

##### 4.1.1. Reliable life-worlds.

In a previous paper of mine (Ueda, 2019), I argued that Habermas's theory of truth relies on the reliabilist conception of knowledge (Goldman, 1979).<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> Of course, one can easily imagine a context in which the truth claim itself will be criticized from the normative point of view. However, as Habermas (2009a) argues, this kind of criticism constitutes a metadiscourse.

<sup>18</sup> This interpretation is provisional, partly because it does not yet cover other discursive properties, such as the rightness (*Richtigkeit*) of normative assertions (see Section 5.2).

<sup>19</sup> Brandom (1994, Chap. 4) also relies on the reliabilist notion of knowledge. However, for Brandom, the reliabilist notion of knowledge is the source of entitlement to form perceptual beliefs.

To recap, Habermas (1999, Chap. 5) defends a new consensus theory of truth, according to which truth is defined in terms of the actually reached consensus between interlocutors in a concrete discursive situation rather than in an ideal one (as defended in Habermas's earlier paper [2009a]). In order for Habermas's theory of truth to accommodate the fallibilist nature of well-justified statements, he points out that the discursive participants rely on life-worlds. The notion of a life-world, which he inherits from the work of Schutz and Luckmann (1973), is characterized as a class of background beliefs that are shared among the participants of a discourse. Constituents of a life-world, which are background information shared between the participants of a discourse, stay implicit between the interlocutors, but can be made explicit merely by asking an explicit question about them and asking for justification. This is exactly the same sort of question about validity claims that a speaker makes when she assertively utters some statement. And we (as the active participants of any discourse) rely on the background and implicit beliefs contained in the life-world shared between us.<sup>20</sup>

Our reliance should, then, be based on the fact that the life-world as a whole counts as knowledge without being explicitly justified; rather, life-worldly beliefs remain implicit. That is to say, one needs to make a belief shared among interlocutors in the life-world explicit if it is to be justified. That is exactly the function of a discourse.

In each discourse, we can rely on the life-world as a whole because life-worldly implicit beliefs are formed through reliable processes from the objective world or natural world (Schutz, Luckmann, 1973, Sec. 1.A). Namely, "The everyday life-world is the region of reality in which man can engage himself and which he can change while he operates in it by means of his animate organism" (Schutz, Luckmann, 1973, p. 3), and the totality of life-worldly beliefs is given "as a certain reliable ground of every situationally determined explication" (Schutz, Luckmann, 1973, p. 9).

To characterize implicit life-worldly knowledge, it is a natural step to attribute to Habermas an externalist notion of knowledge, namely, the reliabilist one (Goldman, 1979). To be more precise, the justification condition of the reliabilist knowledge concept is relevant. For, according to the reliabilist definition of knowledge, the justification condition of the internalist conception of knowledge, which is defined as a justified true belief (JTB), will be substituted by the external and reliable process of forming a belief. This is exactly the type of justification process that we take for granted to form life-worldly knowledge. So, as a natural extension of Habermas's theory of truth, the consensus theory should be based on the reliabilist conceptions of justification rather than the internalist notion used in JTB.

---

<sup>20</sup> The first-person plural nature of the discourse is important. Habermas (2000) criticizes Brandom (1994) on the grounds that the game of asking for and giving reasons, or discursive score-taking, does not capture the first-person plural nature of the discourse. Interestingly, Brandom (1994) acknowledges this criticism, saying he is "not really doing justice to the specific role of the second person" (2000, p. 362).

I shall argue for two theses: first, that my account of truth is consistent with Habermas's text (1999, Chap. 5). Second, that it answers Wellmer's criticism (2007b) of Habermas's (1999).

(1) My ought claims here are consistent with Habermas's new defense of the consensus theory of truth (1999, Chap. 5). This new defense represents a significant revision of his former position on consensus theory of truth (2009a), which is based on the classical internalist notion of knowledge as JTB.

The justification condition in the definition of knowledge as JTB is closely related to the idealization of discursive situations. As discussed above, the idealization of a speech situation is needed in order to distinguish truth from justification, the latter of which always occurs in a specific time and place. That is to say, if we characterize the notion of truth in terms of knowledge as JTB, we need idealized justifications; or the consensus that is reached between the speaker and the listener in a discourse remains fallible (i.e., it does not reach the truth that transcends justifications) regardless of how rigorous the arguments given by the speaker are.

However, the idealization of discursive situations has been heavily criticized; in particular, Wellmer (1993; 2004) argues that beliefs that are only justified in idealized discursive situations cannot count as knowledge that human beings can have. Habermas (1999, Chap. 5) accepts Wellmer's points.

The reliabilist construal of implicit life-worldly knowledge is consistent with Habermas's fallibilist position. In the reliabilist understanding, a statement "S" is justified reliably if S occurs in a (e.g., statistically) reliable manner. The famous example of "barn-façade" shows this type of justification is fallible. Hence, it makes sense to talk about a statement that is reliably justified, but false, nonetheless.

(2) My interpretation of the consensus theory of truth seeks to answer Wellmer's criticism (2007b) of the revised consensus theory of truth. His criticism is directed against the objective world as a "[w]orld objectified in a natural-scientific way [*naturwissenschaftlich objectierte Welt*]" (Wellmer, 2007b, p. 211; my translation) and is stated in the form of a dilemma:

Either the objective world refers to the domain of scientific objectifiables—then, it is useless to stake out the region of statements that are capable of truth and discourse; or this region also contains the historical-cultural reality—then, the word "objective" is nothing much more than just a word centrifuge against contextualism. (Wellmer, 2007b, pp. 211–212; my translation)

The first horn of this dilemma is especially important. According to Wellmer, the notion of truth is only applicable to the domain that can be examined through natural science. However, Wellmer claims that Habermas acknowledges that historical-cultural concepts such as personhood are constituents of the objective world because we can talk about persons; if so, the objective world characterized by Habermas is not sufficient for defining truth.

I think Wellmer confuses Habermas's uses of "truth" (*Wahrheit*) and "falseness" (*Falschheit*) with their everyday uses; while we talk about something

normative (or belonging to the “social world”) as “*wahr*” or “*falsch*,” Habermas evaluates these kinds of uses on the basis of the pair of “rightness” (*Richtigkeit*) and “wrongness” (*Falschheit*) in his theory. As I mentioned above, Habermas tries to capture the everyday uses of “*wahr*” and “*falsch*” in addition to the uses of these terms in the natural sciences. However, capturing the everyday uses does not mean that he should cover all the everyday uses under one single sort of discourse in which one single sort of justification should be given and, accordingly, one single pair of evaluative concepts should be applied;<sup>21</sup> indeed, he should not. There is a distinction between factual and normative statements even in everyday discursive situations; and we give a different sort of justification in each of these discursive situations.

To sum up, the internalist conception of knowledge as JTB leads to the idealization of discursive situations, however, I have argued that the idealization of discursive situations ought to be abandoned. It is, therefore, plausible to interpret Habermas’s more recent defense of his theory of truth as depending on an externalist conception of knowledge.

So far, I have argued that Habermas (1999, Chap. 5) revised his position significantly from his former one and that the revision consists in the use of an externalist and reliabilist notion of knowledge.<sup>22</sup> This is exactly the same version of the consensus theory of truth as the one I have put forward (Ueda, 2019), according to which a statement  $p$  is true only if

- 1) the discursive participants actually reach an agreement on the justification of the validity claim about  $p$  in the discourse,
- 2) the agreement makes some of the life-worldly and implicit background assumptions explicit, and
- 3) the agreement, as a whole, captures the objective world in a reliable manner.

#### 4.1.2. Weak naturalism about truth.

The externalist conception of knowledge has a certain affinity with naturalism, a version of which Habermas indeed commits himself to (1999, Einleitung).<sup>23</sup> In the following sections, I shall first characterize Habermas’s distinction

---

<sup>21</sup> This point should not be confused with another essential point concerning statements and their evaluation, namely, that everyday statements often raise multiple validity claims at the same time (see the example in Section 3.3.1 and also, Habermas, 2009a). The point here is that there are several different sorts of discourse in accordance with which there must be distinctions among evaluative terms, and Habermas is quite right in distinguishing them.

<sup>22</sup> One significant consequence of this revised consensus theory of truth is that the externalist justification relations are holistic. Habermas (1999, Chap. 5) is aware of this consequence, and I think it is a positive feature (cf. Ueda, 2019).

<sup>23</sup> According to Misak’s understanding of pragmatism, “All the pragmatist viewpoints on truth are naturalistic viewpoints, too” (2013, p. 19; my translation). However, the



between strong and weak naturalism. Then, I shall argue that my proposal is consistent with weak naturalism.<sup>24</sup>

(1) Habermas (1999, p. 37) draws a distinction between strong and weak naturalism.<sup>25</sup> Naturalism is strong if it is reductionist; in Habermas's words:

All cognition is ultimately to be reducible to empirical processes. The transcendental architectonic drops out, as does the difference between the conditions of how the world is constituted (or of world disclosure), which call for conceptual analysis, on the one hand, and states of affairs and events in the world, which can be explained causally, on the other. (Habermas, 2003, p. 23; see also 1999, pp. 32–33)

In contrast, weak naturalism “makes no reductionistic claims” (*Ansprüche*; Habermas, 2003, p. 27; see also 1999, p. 38); again, as Habermas states:

[W]eak naturalism contents itself with the basic background assumption that the biological endowment and the cultural way of life of *Homo sapiens* have a “natural” origin and can in principle be explained in terms of evolutionary theory. (Habermas, 2003, pp. 27–28; see also 1999, p. 38)

There are two important points for the current discussion: first, the learning process plays a central role in weak naturalism. Habermas assumes

that “our” learning processes, that are possible within the framework of sociocultural forms of life, are in a sense simply the continuation of prior “evolutionary learning processes” that in turn gave rise to our forms of life. (Habermas, 2003, p. 27; see also 1999, p. 37)

This is the kind of learning process that was necessary for Kantian pragmatism (see the quote in the introduction).

Second, Habermas's view is not a reductionist position on discursive argumentation, which is characteristic of the consensus theory of truth. Every time you make a statement, for example, “It is snowy today,” you raise validity claims. If your interlocutor does not agree with you, she can ask for the explicit justification for your validity claim of truth. In such a case, you have to justify your validity claim by making the implicit background (or life-worldly) assumptions explicit and, thereby, explaining how the objective world is constituted.

Hence, one can argue that the explicit discursive argumentation relevant for the notion of truth plays a distinct role that refutes the reductionist project.

---

question remains open as to whether Habermas's weak naturalism is consistent with Misak's interpretation.

<sup>24</sup> Note that I shall defend a rather weak thesis here. I shall not go so far as to argue that the consensus theory of truth should always be interpreted as weakly naturalist.

<sup>25</sup> The discussion of the relationship between naturalism and religion will be a central theme of Habermas's later works (see Habermas, 2005). However, this paper does not cover the topic of religion.

(2) As I have stressed in the introduction to this paper, it is central to Habermas's Kantian pragmatics to evaluate how the subject's ability to learn (or inability thereto) affects the notion of truth.

Since the relevant ability to learn is characterized in terms of an evolutionary process and the learning process is the process of acquiring the relevant knowledge, the notion of knowledge used here must be possible to naturalize. The reliabilist notion of knowledge aims to externalize the justification condition. The reliabilist way of naturalizing the justification condition does not have to be reductionist; for, instead of reducing the explicit justification, reliabilism requires that the belief-forming process is reliable and it plays a role as the implicit justification that can be made explicit by way of explicit justification. Of course, according to reliabilism, explicit justifications are not necessary for defining knowledge.<sup>26</sup> However, justifications play a different role in intersubjective discourse; namely, they make the implicit background beliefs (which are the constituents of the life-world) explicit.

I claim that the reliabilist theory of knowledge is consistent with the transcendental distinction between the rational realm of justifications (the life-world) and the causal realm of the objective world. Taking the example of perception, Goldman characterizes the formation of justified perceptual beliefs as follows: "(6a) If *S*'s belief in *p* at *t* results ("immediately") from a belief-independent process that is (unconditionally) reliable, then *S*'s belief in *p* at *t* is justified" (Goldman, 1979, p. 13; original numeration). Thus, Goldman states the connection between two sets of relationships: the causal and cognitive relationship between the objective world and the subject on the one hand, and the intersubjective justification relations in the life-world on the other.

My proposal that the pragmatist notion of truth is characterized in terms of the externalist notion of truth clearly respects these points.

#### 4.1.3. Anti-deflationism about truth.

So far, I have established two theses that are consistent with Habermas (1999, Chap. 5). First, the Kantian-pragmatic notion of truth should be characterized in terms of the externalist notion of knowledge, especially the reliabilist one (regardless of what Habermas's own position might be). Second, the notion of knowledge in question is weakly naturalistic (which is consistent with Habermas's text, especially in 1999). From these theses, I shall conclude that the consensus theory of truth is (1) pragmatist and (2) not deflationist.

(1) The consensus theory of truth follows the core principles of pragmatism and hence is a pragmatist notion of truth. First, the consensus theory of truth applies to the content of an utterance (or statement) and is defined in terms of discursive justification and the consensus reached through justification. That is, truth is dependent on the speaker's speech act. Second, according to the consen-

---

<sup>26</sup> Of course, justified true belief is not sufficient for the definition (Gettier, 1963).

sus theory of truth, consensus is reached only if explicit justifications for the validity claim in question are provided. From these two points, it follows that truth plays a pragmatic role in discourse.

(2) The weakly naturalistic nature of (Kantian) pragmatism is clearly inconsistent with the classical deflationist stance because deflationism is committed to anti-naturalism; as discussed in Section 3, deflationism claims that truth cannot be substituted with any empirical property or any class of such properties.

A more positive point can be made for the anti-deflationist stance. Deflationism asserts that a truth claim, such as “‘It snows in Tokyo’ is true,” does not claim anything more than “It snows in Tokyo”. However, I argued (with Habermas) in Section 3.3.2 that truth claims play a distinct role in discursive situations (without committing to the existence of the abstract property of truth) in two ways. First, truth claims make life-worldly beliefs explicit and illustrate a speaker’s readiness to justify the relevant validity claims. Second, the relevant justification is explicitly about truth rather than other sorts of validity claims.

#### **4.2. Habermasian in Spirit**

In Section 4.1, I advanced two theses: first, I argued that the consensus theory of truth relies on the externalist and reliabilist notion of knowledge. Second, I argued that the notion of truth is not deflationist because truth claims play a pragmatic role in discourse.

From these theses, it is almost straightforward to see that my provisional interpretation of the consensus theory of truth is consistent with Habermas’s text (1999). It is especially important that the consensus theory of truth depends on the reliabilist notion of knowledge. This dependence is necessary not only for the pragmatist and anti-deflationist notion of truth, but it is also consistent with the transcendental nature of such a notion.

Of course, the consistency between my theory and Habermas’s text does not necessarily mean that Habermas actually takes my theory as his own theory; therefore, I must say more. However, since I have already motivated the reliabilist theory of knowledge independently above, my theory must be seen as a plausible candidate for Kantian pragmatism.

### **5. Conclusion**

This paper has argued for three theses: first, the externalist notion of knowledge (rather than the internalist one) is necessary for the Habermasian notion of truth. Second, Kantian pragmatism is an anti-deflationist theory of truth. Finally, I defended my version of Kantian pragmatism and showed that it is consistent with Habermas’s weak naturalism. A full-fledged defense of Kantian pragmatism, of course, requires a more detailed examination of Habermas’s position, which remains to be conducted.

In this last section, I would like to provide some broader perspectives on pragmatism and its relationship to the notion of truth (Section 5.1) and briefly suggest some future lines of inquiry (Section 5.2).

### 5.1. The Role of Truth in Pragmatism

As mentioned above, there is a debate about whether the notion of truth plays any role in pragmatism at all (Misak, 2013; Okochi, 2017). However, the present paper clearly indicates that the notion of truth is not dispensable in pragmatism (regardless of whether it is Kantian or not). This is exactly the interpretation of Peirce that Misak (2007, Sec. 4) defends.<sup>27</sup> According to Misak, Peirce “was very explicitly not interested in a reductive analysis of truth. And he was not focused on the ideas of total evidence, epistemically ideal conditions, and the solving of all questions” (Misak, 2007, p. 82).

In an important respect, Misak’s interpretation of Peirce is consistent with my interpretation of Habermas (1999). According to her,

Peirce never went anywhere near trying to spell out what epistemically ideal conditions might be, and he never went anywhere near that idea that an inquirer would know that she was in epistemically ideal conditions. In fact, his fallibilism explicitly has it that a person could never know that inquiry had been pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. (Misak, 2007, p. 83)

As I have shown in this paper, this interpretation is perfectly consistent with (my interpretation of) Habermas (1999). He does not commit himself to the ideal discursive situation as a necessary condition for defining truth anymore. He is explicit about not spelling out “what epistemically ideal conditions might be”.

There are, of course, some inconsistencies between Habermas’s views and Peirce’s. For example, according to Misak (2007, p. 83), Peirce “thinks that truth is a property of beliefs” while Habermas thinks that truth is not a property of statements and the truth-predicate is applicable to statements rather than the semantic content of an utterance. Making the difference between them explicit requires another entire paper at least. Nonetheless, the interpretation advanced in this paper is consistent with Misak’s interpretation in the most important respects, and if Misak is successful in defending the indispensability of truth in pragmatism, I think Habermas’s Kantian pragmatism certainly counts as a pragmatist project.

### 5.2. Future Perspectives

I have proposed a provisional account of truth that is consistent with Kantian pragmatism, and I have also pointed out some theoretical claims to which Ha-

---

<sup>27</sup> The primary aim of this section is to examine Misak’s evaluation of Wright’s view (1992). However, I shall not get into the discussion laid out by Wright (1992).

bermas should be committed. However, so far, my reading is merely consistent with Habermas's views, and it remains to be shown whether Habermas is actually committed to the theoretical claims I have outlined. The latter task requires a far more detailed analysis of Habermas's works.

Another important issue that has remained undiscussed in this paper is the rightness (*Richtigkeit*) of normative statements, which Habermas must be able to analyze in a fully parallel way to truth.<sup>28</sup> Rightness constitutes the main domain of his social and moral theories and is the central notion at play in his discourse ethics (Habermas, 1991).

With regard to rightness, there is another important issue that has been left behind in this paper (and in my previous paper as well). This is the issue of the relationship between Habermas's current position (laid out in 1999) and Apel's position. They once worked together, and it is still common practice to treat both of them as defending the same consensus theory of truth. However, their positions cannot be seen as the same anymore (see, for example, Apel, 2011, Sec. 3, for Apel's criticism of Habermas's current theory of truth).<sup>29</sup> Explicitly differentiating their current theories would surely provide a better understanding of Habermas's Kantian pragmatism.

#### REFERENCES

- Apel, K.-O. (2011). Wahrheit als regulative Idee. In K.-O. Apel, *Paradigmen der Ersten Philosophie* (pp. 322–349). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Baynes, K. (2018). Postmetaphysical Thinking. In H. Brunkhorst, R. Kreide, C. Lafont (Eds.), *The Habermas Handbook* (pp. 71–74). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bernstein, R. J. (2018). Neopragmatism. In H. Brunkhorst, R. Kreide, C. Lafont (Eds.), *The Habermas Handbook* (pp. 188–195). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brandom, R. (1994). *Making It Explicit*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Brandom, R. (2000). Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts: A Reply to Habermas. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 8(3), 356–374.
- Brandom, R. (2009). Why Truth Is Not Important in Philosophy. In R. Brandom, *Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas* (pp. 156–176). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

---

<sup>28</sup> On the recent development of the relationship between truth and rightness, see Habermas 1999, ch. 6.

<sup>29</sup> Kettner (2018, p. 43) analyzes the distinction between Apel and Habermas in terms of their reliance on “two different strains of American pragmatism represented by Charles Sanders Peirce, on the one hand, and John Dewey, on the other”. These are certainly important theoretical points that need to be examined in detail.

- Capps, J. (2019). The Pragmatic Theory of Truth. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2019 Edition). Retrieved from: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/truth-pragmatic/>
- Frege, G. (1983). *Nachgelassene Schriften* (2nd ed.). Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- Gettier, E. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? *Analysis*, 23(6), 121–123.
- Goldman, A. (1979). What is Justified Belief? In G. S. Pappas (Ed.), *Justification and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy* (vol. 17, pp. 1–23). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Grover, D., Camp, J., Belnap, N. (1975). A Prosentential Theory of Truth. *Philosophical Studies*, 27(2), 73–125.
- Habermas, J. (1971). Der Universalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik. In J. Habermas, D. Heinrich, J. Taubes (Eds.), *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (pp. 120–159). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, J. (1981). *Theorie der kommunikativen Handelns, Band 1*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, J. (1988). *Nachmetaphysisches Denken: Philosophische Aufsätze*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, J. (1991). *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, J. (1992). *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (1996). Rorty's pragmatische Wende. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 44(5), 715–741.
- Habermas, J. (1999). *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, J. (2000). Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn. In R. Brandom (Ed.), *Rorty and His Critics* (pp. 31–55). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Habermas, J. (2003). *Truth and Justification*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (2005). *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, J. (2009a). Wahrheitstheorien. In J. Habermas, *Philosophische Texte* (2<sup>nd</sup> vol., pp. 208–269). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, J. (2009b). Rationalitäts- und Sprachtheorie. In J. Habermas, *Philosophische Texte* (2nd vol., pp. 105–145). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Horwich, P. (2010). *Truth-Meaning-Reality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kettner, M. (2018). Pragmatism and Ultimate Justification. In H. Brunkhorst, R. Kreide, C. Lafont (Eds.), *The Habermas Handbook* (pp. 43–48). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Misak, C. (2007). Pragmatism and Deflationism. In C. Misak (Ed.), *New Pragmatists* (pp. 69–90). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Habermas, J. (2013). Hundert Jahre Pragmatismus. In M. Hartmann, J. Liptow, M. Willaschek (Eds.), *Die Gegenwart des Pragmatismus* (pp. 62–80). Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Okochi, Y. (2015). Shinri to Kihan [Truth and Norm]. *Gendaishiso*, 43(11), 208–223.
- Rorty, R. (1994). Sind Aussage universelle Geltungsansprüche? *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 42(6), 975–988.

- Rorty, R. (2000a). Universality and Truth. In R. Brandom (Ed.), *Rorty and His Critics* (pp. 1–30). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Rorty, R. (2000b). Response to Jürgen Habermas. In R. Brandom (Ed.), *Rorty and His Critics* (pp. 56–64). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Schutz, A., Luckmann, T. (1973). *The Structure of the Life-World*. London: Heinemann.
- Ueda, T. (2019). Habermas-niokeru Shinri to Seitoka: Risokanashino Shinrino Goisetsu [Truth and Justification for Habermas: Consensus Theory of Truth without Idealization]. *Tokyo Ikashika Daigaku Kyoyobu Kenkyukiyo*, 49, 37–49.
- Wellmer, A. (1993). Wahrheit, Kontingenz, Moderne. In A. Wellmer, *Endspiele: Die unversöhnliche Moderne: Essays und Vorträge* (pp. 157–177). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- Wellmer, A. (2004). *Sprachphilosophie: Eine Vorlesung*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Wellmer, A. (2007a). Der Streit um die Wahrheit. Pragmatismus ohne regulative Ideen. In A. Wellmer, *Wie Worte Sinn machen* (pp. 180–207). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Wellmer, A. (2007b). Die Wahrheit über Wahrheit? Zu Jürgen Habermas, Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Philosophische Aufsätze. In A. Wellmer, *Wie Worte Sinn machen* (pp. 208–215). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1922). *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co.
- Wrenn, C. (2015). *Truth*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Wright, C. (1992). *Truth and Objectivity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.