Self-Reference and Rejection

• Authors: Jan Woleński

Title variants

PL

Samozwrotność i odrzucanie

EN

Self-Reference and Rejection

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

The paper consists of two parts. The first contains the paradox of Truth-teller, i.e. a sentence which asserts own truth. The paradox appears when we apply logic of rejection to the Truth-teller sentence. The Truth-teller paradox is symmetric with respect to the Liar paradox. The second part considers a sentence which asserts own provability. This sentence is unprovable on the base of rejection logic. This leads to counterparts of the Gödel incompleteness theorems and other metamathematical results.

• Publisher: University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
• Journal: Filozofia Nauki
• Year: 1993
• Volume: 1
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 89-102

Dates

published

1993-03-01

Contributors

author

Jan Woleński