Intensionalism and foundationalism in epistemology

• Authors: Renata Ziemińska

Title variants

PL

Internalizm i fundamentalizm w epistemologii

EN

Intensionalism and foundationalism in epistemology

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Contemporary philosophy (at least in English-speaking world) is dominated by discussions between foundationalism and externalism on the other hand. R. Chisholm defends foundationalistic and internalistic position. Epistemological foundationalism is the thesis that there are basic beliefs which are the foundation for the justificaction of others. According to Chisholm such basic beliefs are some simple truths of reason and some beliefs about the self-presenting states like thinking, seeming or sensing. There are some problems with such basic beliefs, but Chisholm's main important argument is that here is no alternative to foundationalism in epistemology, because its opponent, the coherence theory, presupposes some form of foundationalism. The discussion between internalism and externalism is more recent. Externalism claims that what makes our beliefs justified is something external to subject, It may be truth, causal relations or counterfactual relations. According to Chisholm all externalistic theories are either empty (they reduce justification to truth) or they use some internalistic concepts. He gives some counterexamples to the theory by A. Goldman (one of the most important proponents of externalism). Internalists claim that what can make our beliefs justified must be something internal, accessible to subject.

• Publisher: University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
• Journal: Filozofia Nauki
• Year: 1997
• Volume: 5
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 45-53

Dates

published

1997-09-01

Contributors

author

Renata Ziemińska