PL EN


Journal
2005 | 13 | 3 | 57-69
Article title

In Defence of Mereological Essentialism

Content
Title variants
PL
W obronie mereologicznego esencjalizmu
EN
In Defence of Mereological Essentialism
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
PL
The paper is an attempt to defend the Chisholm's metaphysical doctrine called mereological essentialism. The main thesis of mereological essentialism states that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). This radical theory gives a categorisation of all objects via entia per se and entia successiva. The paper contains a critical survey of the theory of mereological essentialism: it deals with some important arguments against it and answers as well. The author tries to show that in defence of the theory and the categorisation in question the applicability of the doctrine of mereological essentialism must be somehow limited. He suggests that the best way in doing so is to restrict theses of mereological essentialism either only to objects qua occurrents or only to objects qua continuants or only to persons.
Keywords
Journal
Year
Volume
13
Issue
3
Pages
57-69
Physical description
Dates
published
2005-09-01
Contributors
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.ojs-issn-2657-5868-year-2005-volume-13-issue-3-article-434
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