PL EN


Journal
2006 | 14 | 3 | 49-56
Article title

Personal Identity through Time: Some Consequences of Essentialism

Content
Title variants
PL
Identyczność osobowa w czasie: konsekwencje esencjalizmu
EN
Personal Identity through Time: Some Consequences of Essentialism
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
PL
The paper is an attempt to formulate some consequences of the metaphysical doctrine of mereological essentialism (ME) and the assumption that persons persisting through time remain identical in the strict and philosophical sense (Chisholm, following Butler and Reid). Those consequences are substantiality, non-constitutivity, constantiality, anti-identism (non-bodility), and simplicity of persons. The author tries to show that although the above stance has a great theoretical appeal, it leads to the many further difficulties, which remain without reasonable answers.
Keywords
Journal
Year
Volume
14
Issue
3
Pages
49-56
Physical description
Dates
published
2006-09-01
Contributors
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.ojs-issn-2657-5868-year-2006-volume-14-issue-3-article-476
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