Epistemic Role of the Logic of Falsehood

• Authors: Piotr Łukowski

Title variants

PL

Epistemiczna rola logiki fałszu

EN

Epistemic Role of the Logic of Falsehood

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

The idea of belief revision is strictly connected with the notion of contraction given by the set of postulates formulated by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson. In the present paper expansion and contraction are defined by Tarski's consequence relation and Tarski-like elimination relation. The logic of falsehood (i.e. a logic dual in Wójcicki's sense to the given logic of truth) plays a key role for defining the elimination relation. A decision of adding or refusing of some sentences is arbitrary and depends on our wish only. This decision cannot be logical and logic cannot justify it. In our approach logic is a tool for faultless and precise realization of extension or reducing of the set of our beliefs. Step forward extends the set of our beliefs and it is used when some new belief appears. Step backward reduces the set of our beliefs and it is used when we reject from some previously accepted belief. But why some "initial" sentences should be added or refused depends on extralogical reasons. The logic for the back-reasoning uses the class of models adequate for the logic extending the set of our beliefs. However, the class is used in a specific i.e. dual form. That is why the step forward (expansion) and the step backward (contraction) constitute the one whole. Procedure of contraction satisfies the well known AGM postulates. We limit our considerations to first six conditions for contraction. Satisfaction of almost every postulate is a good sign that our approach is reasonable. The only exception we make for the controversial fifth postulate.

• Publisher: University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
• Journal: Filozofia Nauki
• Year: 2006
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 57-77

Dates

published

2006-09-01

Contributors

author

Piotr Łukowski