PL EN


Journal
2010 | 18 | 1 | 53-66
Article title

The Problem of the Directness of the Cognitive Access to One's Own Mental States

Content
Title variants
PL
Zagadnienie bezpośredniości dostępu poznawczego do własnych stanów mentalnych
EN
The Problem of the Directness of the Cognitive Access to One's Own Mental States
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
PL
The question of subject's cognitive access to his own mental states contains an assumption, that this cognition is direct and authoritative, what is also a condition of subject's self-knowledge. The directness means, that this kind of cognition is not burdened by the intermediaries as Fregean senses or representations. Now arises the problem, how the self-knowledge, which has a propositional character can be direct, hence nonrepresentational. In this paper I considered the three kinds of representations, which are present in self-knowledge and I have tried to answer the question, whether it is possible to preserve the directness of self-knowledge, despite of its representational constituents. First I have asked about the representation of self, then I assumed that to have self-knowledge a subject has to conceptualise his state as a belief or other experience of a certain kind and he has to think about himself as a subject of this state. Then I considered the representation of the modality of the state. Finally I analysed the representational character of the content of mental states. The conclusion of these investigations was that even if the self-knowledge in its epistemological aspect is representational (for example because of its propositional structure) it preserves its directness in its essential form, i.e. psychological aspect.
Keywords
Journal
Year
Volume
18
Issue
1
Pages
53-66
Physical description
Dates
published
2010-03-01
Contributors
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.ojs-issn-2657-5868-year-2010-volume-18-issue-1-article-594
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