A Modern Version of Relativism about Truth

• Authors: Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska

Title variants

PL

A Modern Version of Relativism about Truth

EN

A Modern Version of Relativism about Truth

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

In the paper I describe John MacFarlane’s version of relativism about truth. I begin by discussing Twardowski’s (1900) and Kokoszynska’s (1948; 1951) arguments against relativism. They think - just as Haack does (see 2011) - that sentences may be relatively true, if they are incomplete, but once they are completed they become true (or false) absolutely. MacFarlane distinguishes between nonindexical contextualism (which was anticipated by Kokoszynska (sic!)) and relativism which requires the introduction of the context of assessment. According to him only the view which postulates double-indexed (to contexts of utterance and to contexts of assessments) truth is able to explain disagreement in subjective domains and contradicting intuitions about the truth-value of future-contingents.

• Publisher: University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
• Journal: Filozofia Nauki
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 43-53

Dates

published

2011-12-01

Contributors

author

Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska