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PL EN


Journal

2013 | 21 | 1 | 37-60

Article title

The Concept of Object in Theories of Visual Binding

Content

Title variants

PL
Pojęcie przedmiotu w koncepcjach scalania wzrokowego
EN
The Concept of Object in Theories of Visual Binding

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

PL
The article investigates the concept of object used in the theories of visual binding. Two different theories of visual binding are considered: (1) the classical, psychological Feature Integration Theory (FIT) and (2) the model of neural synchronization formulated by Schillen and König. The description of the conceptual structure of those theories is first presented and then followed with a list of postulates which have to be satisfied by a concept of object coherent with the considered theories. Subsequently, the characteristics of the notions of object which satisfy the postulates formulated for each theory are proposed by using notions developed in the field of analytic metaphysics. In conclusion, it is stated that theoretical differences between psychological FIT and the neural model lead to significant differences in the used notion of object. However, the extent of that difference depends on the interpretation of the concept of representation which is ambiguous within the framework of the considered neural model. Despite the differences, it appears that the concepts coherent with the abovementioned postulates bear some resemblance to the notion of object proposed by the metaphysical substratum theories.

Keywords

Journal

Year

Volume

21

Issue

1

Pages

37-60

Physical description

Dates

published
2013-03-01

Contributors

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-issn-2657-5868-year-2013-volume-21-issue-1-article-704
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