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Journal

2013 | 21 | 1 | 61-80

Article title

Rationalist Pragmatism and the Critique of Empiricism in the Philosophy of Robert B. Brandom

Content

Title variants

PL
Racjonalistyczny pragmatyzm i krytyka empiryzmu w filozofii Roberta B. Brandoma
EN
Rationalist Pragmatism and the Critique of Empiricism in the Philosophy of Robert B. Brandom

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

PL
At the outset of the article I set forth a general characterization of Robert B. Brandom’s philosophy, as belonging to the post-empiricist tradition with inferential-ism as its main idea. In section 2 I discuss four dichotomies important to the method-ology which allows Brandom to construct his philosophical system. My point is to indicate the arbitrariness of the absolutist account of these dichotomies, which gives rise to misuse of relative categories. In effect, Brandom’s dichotomic way of theo-retical exposition does not respect Davidson’s principle of relationism, which Bran-dom himself declares to accept. In the next section, I go on to consider two basic mo-tives for the resolute Brandomian attack on empiricism: strong inferentialist and an-tirepresentationalist theses. Pertaining to this view is also the claim of irreducible linguistic normativity. In section 4, these questions are treated in the context of the ap-parently novel theory of semantic pragmatism. Section 5 is crucial to my purposes. There I criticize the excessively narrow Brandomian conception of empiricism in the theory of meaning. I argue that Brandom’s attack on empiricism depends on a false analysis of the distinction between circumstances and consequences of application holding for sentences. In addition, the problem of conceptual content’s fine grainess is treated, as well as the Kantian dichotomy of reasons versus causes, interpreted by Brandom in terms of the social/natural distinction. Finally, section 6 deals with the relation holding between the concept of reason on the one hand, and the objectivism and representationalism theses, on the other. Despite appearances, in Brandom’s philosophical system there is no place for objective standards of procedural reason.

Keywords

Journal

Year

Volume

21

Issue

1

Pages

61-80

Physical description

Dates

published
2013-03-01

Contributors

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-issn-2657-5868-year-2013-volume-21-issue-1-article-705
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