The Relation of Instantiation

• Authors: José Tomás Alvarado Marambio

Title variants

PL

The Relation of Instantiation

EN

The Relation of Instantiation

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

It is argued that instantiation, i.e. the relation between particular objects and properties (conceived as universals or tropes) is indeed an ontologically robust relation. The relation of instantiation is required to explain the difference between a state of affairs of, for example, a being F, and the mereological fusion [a + F]. If instantiation is a true relation, then Bradley’s Regress ensues. It is argued, nevertheless, that the regress cannot be taken as a reason to reject the existence of instantiation or to reject the existence of properties as entities numerically different from particular objects to which the properties should be related. All the nominalist alternatives suffer from similar regresses. Bradley’s Regress should, therefore, be addressed head-on. After dismissing all the applicable ways in which an infinite regress may be deemed vicious, it is argued that Bradley’s Regress is - in a sense - harmless.

• Publisher: University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
• Journal: Filozofia Nauki
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 21
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 31-49

Dates

published

2013-06-01

Contributors

author

José Tomás Alvarado Marambio