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## *Levels of modalization in existential and transcendental analysis: The matter of being-in-self*

**ABSTRACT:** This essay reflects on some applications of Eero Tarasti's existential semiotics to music analysis, starting from the asymmetry that marks the categories of "myself" and "itself". If it seems evident that we can know the musical being-in-itself, that is topics, norms, forms, and so on, we can wonder if and how we can know the being-in-myself, that is the pure kinetic energy before that it has taken any kind of forms. As it is for Schopenhauer's "Wille", that firstly becomes objective as Platonic ideas, and secondly as spatio-temporal-causal natural realm; musical energy or "being-in-myself" takes shape firstly as virtual deep-level-figures, and secondly as spatio-temporal-actorial situations, within which being-for-myself struggles with the being-for-itself. Modalities (will, must, can, know) operate in both these two levels of taking shape, but at the first level we have to look for a transcendental musical subject, not characterized by specific historical and cultural features. Then, I introduce the notion of homeostasis, that is the principle that "regulates the global process of breaking away from an original state of rest or balance, and of the subsequent restoration of that balance". Homeostasis allows us to analyze musical modalization at a deep level, where the transcendental subject takes the form of the being-in-itself. But the research of a transcendental subject is slightly different to that of the *Moi*, within which the being-in-myself is situated. To analyze the being-in-myself of an individual musical subject, we adopt a less universal homeostasis, that is a specific way to convey musical energy (melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, agogic, and so on) proper of Western music. So doing, I claim that one cannot recognize the first four measures of Beethoven's Piano Sonata op. 7 as "the moment of Being-in-myself in all of its immediacy" as Tarasti does. Being-in-myself has to be examined in a different light.

**KEYWORDS:** Homeostasis, existential semiotics, musical analysis, modalities, transcendental subject, kinetic energy

### Introduction

In his essay *Existential and Transcendental Analysis of Music*, Tarasti proposes two stimulating semiotic squares, within which he applies his reconsidered notions of "being" to music.<sup>1</sup> In order to have a synthetic view, I combine all Tarasti's notions and references to different semiotic perspectives just in one

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<sup>1</sup> Eero Tarasti, "Existential and Transcendental Analysis of Music" *Studi Musicali* XXXIV, 2 (2005), 223–66.

square (see Diagram 1). In my reconstruction, I clearly express Tarasti’s reformulation, according to which “the terms *an sich* [in oneself] and *für sich* [for oneself] start to means potential and actual”.<sup>2</sup>




Diagram 1. Tarasti’s notions and references to different semiotic perspectives

### Some reflections

1) As first, we can remark that in Tarasti’s thought the terms pertaining to the positive and the negative schemata (marked with) do not contract any relationships of contradiction. That is to say, “being-in-myself” and “being-in-itself” on one side, and “being-for-myself” and “being-for-itself” on the other one, are opposite and contradictory terms only in the abstract. In reality, every musical organism incorporates all of them, although in different proportions. Tarasti gives as examples the fugue — in which the *Soi* prevails —, and the Viennese-classical sonata form, the development of which “becomes the struggle place of *Moi*”.<sup>3</sup> As Tarasti writes, “the *Moi* of the composer is the pure source of ideas, but we can also say that the transcendence lives within a man. The *Moi* is surrounded by the sphere of the *Soi*, the part of the ego which is social, coded, community bound

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 232.  
<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 238–9.

and not existential; together they form the phenomenon called *the semiotic self*<sup>4</sup>, a concept determined by the physical and virtual body”.<sup>5</sup>

2) By means of social-historical knowledges and some inferences, we can know the musical “being-in-itself”, that is topics, norms, forms, and so on. But how to know the “being-in-myself”? That is the pure kinetic energy (“khora”, i.e. the archaic level of consciousness; or Kurth’s energetic-kinetic impulses of music<sup>6</sup>) before that it has taken any kind of forms. My question is if the potential primary kinetic musical energy is knowable before it becomes actual in a certain form. If we follow Plato’s idea of Chora, the answer is negative, because he thinks that before the action of Demiurge the universe was just a formless chaos, or a lifeless spatial matter. If we go to Aristotle’s thought, the notion of the primal matter is only an unknowable limit concept, because in our world we can meet only already formed matter. In this perspective, Kristeva’s concept of “khora”, appears to us always as a certain level of consciousness, although archaic, and never as the pure unconscious. In Freudian terms, all primary processes are knowable only through the secondary ones. Also neonatal gestuality — although opened to take on a lot of different forms, depending on coming experiences — takes shape according to some familiar characteristics transmitted by means of DNA.

## Tarasti’s analysis of Beethoven’s op. 7 and the matter of the “khora” or “being-in-myself”

Tarasti seems to suggest that it is possible to identify the “chora” with a certain “moment” — specified in musical time and space (*principium individuationis*) — of a piece. About Beethoven’s sonata op. 7, he says that “at the beginning of the first movement we hear only the pulsating triple rhythm and short motifs, which can be understood as a phase of “want-to-do” — kinetic energy as such without stability. That is the moment of being-in-myself in all of its immediacy”.<sup>7</sup> He refers here to the first four measures of the exposition. Then [bb. 5–15] “enters a melodic element in the upper part: the triplet pulsation continues but it is provided with form by this motivic idea, at which point we reach the moment of Being-for-myself”.<sup>8</sup> According to this interpretation, we can notice that, from measures 1 to 15, the piece juxtaposes two different situations internal to the *Moi*, or myself. Next appearances of two topics, those of “galloping horses” (first occurrence at bars 25–32) and of “chorale” (bars 59–81), represent in Tarasti’s interpretation the

<sup>4</sup> See Thomas A. Sebeok 1979.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 240.

<sup>6</sup> Eero Tarasti, *Signs of Music. A Guide to Musical Semiotics* (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2002): 135.

<sup>7</sup> Tarasti, “Existential”, 246.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

entrance of the patriarchal order and that of the logos "with all its authority".<sup>9</sup> As he says "these topics allude to Being-for-itself. The ideal types of "galloping horse" rhythm or Lutheran chorale can be inferred from the texture as its Being-in-itself".<sup>10</sup>

A circle is closed. We can notice that the order of the operations, as described by Tarasti, goes always from left to right within the square, first on the axis of the contraries, and then on the axis of the sub-contraries (both marked with). But, in the first case we have a passage from potential to actual states, in the second from actual to potential ones. Maybe, it would be better to describe these processes across the square by turning clockwise. This way, it would result a symmetric passage from potential to actual states, first within the *Moi*, and then within the *Soi*.

But an asymmetrical relationship, however, emerges in Tarasti's analysis. In fact, while on the axis of the sub-contraries, that is the axis of the *Soi*, the potential state is represented by virtual signs (abstract topics), on the axis of the *Moi*, both potential and actual states are represented by act-signs.

It is true that Tarasti does not overgeneralize. When he says that "in this sonata the "Being-in-myself" might be represented by the themes in their first occurrences",<sup>11</sup> he certainly means that each piece of art music has an owner, specific, individual organization. But, wherever the *Moi* does appear, the main problem remains if it can really appear in a certain form, that is to say in a form of the surface level.

## A Schopenhauerian perspective

In elaborating his musical concept of "being-in-myself", Tarasti refers to Kristeva's "khora" and Fontanille's *Figures du corps*. The latter distinguishes two kinds of body that resemble the two way by which the body is given to the knowing subject in Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. On one side, the "body as such or flesh (chair), which is the center of all, the material resistance or impulse to semiotic processes",<sup>12</sup> that corresponds to Schopenhauer's direct inner experience of will. On the other side, "there is a body in the proper sense which constitutes the identity and directional principle of the body",<sup>13</sup> which corresponds to Schopenhauer's intuitive representation of the intellect, by which the body is experienced as an object among the other.

'Body is the carrier of the "me", *Moi*, whereas the proper body supports the "self" or *Soi*".<sup>14</sup> This distinction resembles also Freud's distinction between primary

<sup>9</sup> Tarasti, forthcoming, 91.

<sup>10</sup> Tarasti, "Existential", 246.

<sup>11</sup> Tarasti, forthcoming, 93.

<sup>12</sup> Tarasti, "Existential", 233.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

and secondary languages, the former concerning the unconscious, the latter the consciousness; we can approach the primary language and its “logic” only by means of the secondary language. In fact, as Tarasti says, “the *Soi* or self builds itself in the discursive activity. The *Soi* is that part of ourselves, which me, *Moi*, projects out of itself in order to create itself in its activity”,<sup>15</sup> and so on.

But as we know, in his existential and transcendental analysis of music, Tarasti puts into a new form all these concepts, and we have to remark that Schopenhauer’s distinction between two experiences of the body corresponds to Tarasti’s distinction — both within the sphere of the *Moi* — between “being-in-myself”, potentiality without any form, and “being-for-myself”, actuality with a proper form.

Now we wonder how the “being-in-myself” can be recognized out of the “being-for-myself”. Or better, if the “being-in-myself” really stays on the same level of the “being-for-myself”. That means, in musical terms: it is possible to identify the “being-in-myself” as a musical unit belonging to the same surface level within which we find the musical units recognized as “being-for-myself?” Although Tarasti’s analysis of Beethoven’s op. 7 was very fascinating, and the most of its results are analytically pertinent and significant, I think that it is not possible to identify the “being-in-myself” with a certain musical unit, as Tarasti does by individuating the “being-in-myself” as the first two motifs (“a”) occurring at measures 1–4. Before to debate this question in technical musical terms, I want to close my comparison between Tarasti’s and Schopenhauer’s models. See the diagram 2.

		Firstly	Secondly
<b>Tarasti</b> (2005: 236)			
energetic field	takes shape as	deep-level-figures	spatio-temporal-actorial situations
being-in-myself		being-in-itself	being-for-myself VS being-for-itself
level 0 virtual		level 1 virtual	level 2 actual
			My body VS Other bodies
‘Wille’	becomes objective as	Platonic Ideas	spatio-temporal-causal natural realm
<b>Schopenhauer</b>			

Diagram 2. Comparison between Tarasti’s and Schopenhauer’s models

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 233–4.

Close relationships come out from the scheme, which corroborate my idea that “being-in-myself” can not be described in terms of space, time and causality, as for the Schopenhauer’s “Wille”. “Being-in-myself” stays on a different, deeper level; we can only hypothesize its features, by means of hypothetical processes. Otherwise, by means of different kinds of inference, we can describe musical topics, norms, forms as well as we do for the Ideas of all the things in the world, and although Ideas of the things and musical norms and forms have got only a virtual existence, they can operate in a normative way.

### How can we approach the “being-in-myself” in music?

By following Tarasti’s perspective, I’m searching for modalities and/or metamodalities on different levels of musical events, but without blending these levels. As Tarasti himself admits, one’s *Moi* can not directly communicate with other’s *Moi*. “*Moi* must first transform into *Soi* within one’s organism, I must become Me”.<sup>16</sup> In other words, that means that we have to search for the “being-in-myself” starting from the “being-in-itself”.

By the way, Schopenhauer debates the same matter when he discovers that we know the Will just starting from our individual will, from our body. Our will (Fontanille’s body, or Kristeva’s “khora”) is not the pure Will, it is always the result of a mediation with our objectified body (Fontanille’s proper body) by means of *principium individuationis*.

Let us start by investigating the “being-in-itself”. In this research I have to restrict the field, and take into account just of the Western musical tradition, because of my specific competences. But then it will be possible to extend all results to the music of different cultures in space and time.

Would it be possible to find any transcendental (in the Kantian sense) conditions of western musical object? That is to say, a condition which — although limited in the space and the time of the western culture — was not depending from specific determinations as is the case of topics, forms, stylistic elements, modal/tonal/not-tonal norms, and so on? In previous works of mine and other colleagues, i.e. Fulvio Delli Pizzi and Michele Ignelzi, we proposed the homeostasis as such a principle. According to its most general definition, homeostasis “regulates the global process of breaking away from an original state of rest or balance, and of the subsequent restoration of that balance”.<sup>17</sup> It seems to be evident that such a principle is more general than Leonard B. Meyer’s “implication structure”, as well as than Schenker’s “Ursatz”, because both these are tonally and stylistically

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 240.

<sup>17</sup> Fulvio Delli Pizzi, Michele Ignelzi, Paolo Rosato, *Systems of Musical Sense. Essays on the Analysis, Semiotics, and Hermeneutics of Music* (Helsinki: ISI. 2004), 19.

determined. On the contrary, Kurth's energetic conception of music is very close to our perspective, but I cannot debate here this matter.

## Transcendental subject and modalization at a deep level (being-in-itself)

In physical terms, "energy" is the result of a "work", and this latter of a "force". At last, a subject is needed as a bringer of this force. Let us delay the question about the substantiality of this subject in the musical field, and let try to describe it in terms of modalities.

This musical subject "**will**" both "be" and "do". I agree with Tarasti's distinction between "to be" and "spaciality" on one side, and "to do" and "temporality" on the other, but just for the levels of surface. If we examine a theme in a sonata form, we can well identify it with the static moment of "to be", in opposition to the transition and the development which will appear as the dynamical moment of "to do". But in a proper sense, no musical theme can be really static, because music is always a form of movement. So, in a deep sense, if a musical subject want "to be", it has necessarily "to do". In an Heideggerian perspective, we could say that musical being is time: in music — almost at this level of analysis — to be is the same that to do. We can also refer to Fichte's principle that *esse sequitur operari*.

Homeostasis well clarifies the sense of the all aforementioned propositions. Musical subject bursts out of the silence, if he want "to be". But homeostasis says also that this musical subject "**must**" to limitate his own "to do", if he want to be recognizable as such (modality of "**know**").

But what does mean that this musical subject "**can**"? We are here studying some processes internal to the musical text (utterance, enunciation), but it is not easy to separate these processes from those, external to the text, which depend on the subjects of the act of enunciation. The composer and the performer "can" do that the music sounds. The listener, or the receiver of the enunciatarion, needs to "know" something, if he wants to activate musical potentiality: in fact, an unqualified listener could not recognize a given set of frequencies as sounds or music (see John Blacking's *humanly organized sound*, 1974).<sup>18</sup> However, if we refer to an implied composer, in the sense of Umberto Eco and Eero Tarasti,<sup>19</sup> we can say that his action objectivated itself within the musical signs of a score — in Tarasti term's they have already become act-signs in the score —, and that these potential-signs can be activated (and they can become also act-signs of the performance) whenever somebody wants, and/or can, and/or knows, and/or must.

<sup>18</sup> John Blacking, *How Musical is Man?* (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1974).

<sup>19</sup> Tarasti, *Signs*, 73–4.

The subject we are searching for at this deep level comes before any other kind of musical subject within the text: so, he cannot be identified with any certain utterances, and it has not got any modal and/or tonal determinations. Therefore, I'm not agree with Tarasti when he says that modalities, as deep-level figures, "can be portrayed just like Schenker did with his typical forms of *Urlinie* and *Bass Brechung*".<sup>20</sup> *Urlinie* and *Bass Brechung* are not primary events, but they are phenomenical ones, although they pertain to a not superficial level.

We are searching for a transcendental subject who was able to fix the conditions of the existence of each individual musical subject within any texts (or musical objects) of the western culture.

## Homeostasis and metamodalities: a Fichtian perspective (being-in-myself)

I have already resorted to the notion of homeostasis in order to explain the presence of modalities at the deepest level of music, in particular when I spoke of "must" and "know". I want also to remark that the research of a transcendental subject is a bit different from that of the *Moi*. And then, when Tarasti says that "even the *Moi* possesses its own inner obligation, its "must" — one cannot break against the laws of *Moi*",<sup>21</sup> he is referring to another question, on another level of study, that is the research of an individual and real, actual subject. It is not a case that Tarasti concludes his previous reasoning by affirming that if somebody breaks against the laws of *Moi*, he "subdues his expression".<sup>22</sup> A transcendental subject does not aim to any forms of expression in the meaning of individual and artistic expressivity.

Let us examine in a detailed manner the relationships between homeostasis and metamodalities. To do this, Fichte offers us very useful tools.

1. Transcendental musical subject posits itself. The Fichtian "Ego posits itself", or "the Ego posits originally its own Being".<sup>23</sup> This is the affirmative moment of will and can "to be and to do". As already said, to be is a consequent of to do (*esse sequitur operari*). Here, the willing subject expresses itself as force, work and energy. Sounds are freely generated in not-defined time and space.

2. Transcendental musical subject negates itself by means of a resistance. The Fichtian "Ego posits non-Ego" or "a non-Ego is absolutely opposed to the Ego".<sup>24</sup> This is the moment of negation (or absolute limitation) through which the subject

<sup>20</sup> Tarasti, "Existential", 236.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 242.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge*, trans. Adolph Ernst Kroeger. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1868), 72.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.



recognizes itself thanks to the opposition to the alterity. This latter is not at all another subject, or an opposing object, but rather a kind of resistance that the subject finds in itself. Although this is a first emergency of an inner obligation, the prevalent modality is that of “know”: the subject is in front of its identity. Here, the homeostasis — as a concluded process of destroying/restoring equilibrium — does clearly appear. Sounds have got a determination in time.

3. “The Ego opposites in the Ego a divisible Non-Ego to a divisible Ego”.<sup>25</sup> This is the moment of “must”, when the subject is internally de-limited. Sounds have got a limitation and also a placement in space. Reciprocal action within the sounds of subject articulate the space as an oriented field. See diagram 3, where I introduce also some Kantian concepts.

FICHTE	KANT		TARASTI	ANALYSIS of musical being-in-itself	
				musical phe- nomena	involved concepts
	categories of quality	categories of relation			
Ego posits itself	affirmation reality	substance	WILL CAN	production of sounds	force work energy
Ego posits non-Ego	negation	cause/effect	KNOW	temporal de- termination of sounds	homeostasis 0
opposition of divisible Ego and non-Ego	limitation	reciprocal ac- tion	MUST	spatial placement of sounds	oriented field

Diagram 3. Analysis of musical being-in-itself in Fichte’s, Kant’s and Tarasti’s concepts

## Some subsidiary reflections

We know that Fichte gives to his three principles a logical order, but not a chronological one, because the Ego, which is not a mere “to be”, is itself only by means of its activity (“to do”). Is it the same in music? The answer is absolutely yes. In fact, only in principle we can think to some pure sounds, without any relationships with time and space. Practically, if I produce just a single note with my voice, I feel at the same time with and within my body: 1) an effort; 2) a rupture of

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 84.

equilibrium — followed by a restoration when the sound ends; 3) a spatial placement (head, throat, chest). There is not great differences if I play an instrument and the sound come in my body from outside, or if I just listen to a sound produced by another one.

Note that in my scheme I compare Kant's categories of relation with all the three principles, differently from Fichte (who infers these categories just from the third principle).

What I here call homeostasis is a universal, transcendental concept, consequent to the human substance (in the Kantian terms). In a different way, when I speak of homeostasis in analyzing western music, I think to a specific, certain way to convey musical energy (melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, agogic, and so on), that is the result of historical and social processes. In this sense, I assume that there is also a kind of less universal homeostasis, at the same time transcendental (as an *a-priori* condition of listening to) and historical (a condition limited in space and time). We can call the latter H(omeostasis)1, and the former H(omeostasis)0.

An interesting question is if in some practical and cultural conditions, a distinction between homeostasis and oriented field was never possible. For example, a descending melody of random sounds which cannot evoke any oriented fields (modal, tonal, serial, dodecaphonic, and so on), at least in their first occurrence.<sup>26</sup>

However, the fact that homeostasis and oriented field are strictly related, does not mean that we cannot distinguish them in our analytical phases. By changing some features pertaining to homeostasis and/or to the oriented field, music can change its meanings.

At last, we have to remember that here we are studying the metamodalities in their most abstract aspects. When analyzing a musical text, we have to consider modalities and musical features at very different levels, and we have to take into account of their manifold relationships.

## From a transcendental to an individual subject

What we have studied until now, pertains to the musical being-in-itself in its deepest level. But we can taste immediately some consequents in practical analysis.

Let us return to Tarasti's analysis of Beethoven. As seen above, he says that "in bars 1–4 we hear only the pulsating triple rhythm and short motifs ('a'), discussed [...] in terms of the "want-to-do" of kinetic energy without stability".<sup>27</sup> Tarasti recognizes here "the moment of Being-in-myself in all of its immediacy".<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> See Firstness in Peircian sense, in Tarasti, *Signs*, in particular 10 and 85.

<sup>27</sup> Tarasti, "Existential", 257.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 246.

Let us see now at the first four bars in our homeostatical perspective. I mean here a homeostasis which has been culturally determined, that is H1. Inner and external spaces are both stationary on the tonic: we hear only sounds from the E flat triad in a fixed register. On the contrary, rhythm and melody are in movement, as also Tarasti points out. But pulsating triple rhythm is not yet vectorialized: it is tensive just because of the context, that is the beginning of something to be discovered. It is not a case that we find a similar situation at the end of this piece (from bar 351), this time with a closing function.

Melody shows two contrasting directions in its moving: a descent (a third) in the distinctive units (Tarasti's motifs "a" and "a<sup>l</sup>"), and an ascent (again a third) in the conjunction of these two melodic units. See example 1.

Allegro molto e con brio  
**du1** **du2 (a third above)**

*p* 3rd *f* 3rd

Example 1

By applying Tarasti's paradigms of memory and waiting,<sup>29</sup> we can ask in which way these four bars have to be continued in order to create a homeostatical unit as short as possible. Firstly, let us consider the pure melody. We know that a significative melodic unit needs at least of an opening, a tension, a relaxation, and a closing. In our four bars we can find the opening, the tension, and just the beginning of the relaxation. See example 2. In fact, the point of rest of our curve is E flat<sup>3</sup>, and it has to be reached yet. So, if we are looking for a melodic stability, we have to add a movement towards that note and a closing too.

opening tension apex beginning of relaxation

**du1** **du2**

*p* *p* *f* *p*

Example 2

<sup>29</sup> Tarasti, *A Theory of Musical Semiotics*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 63–6.

In example 3 I show a first possibility. Here, I add two distinctive units which reproduce the model of ud1, and complete the descent from B flat to E flat. I call them V-ud, where “V” means “virtual”, as they do not appear in the real text. In this case, V-ud4 is identical to ud1, but with an opposite function within the curve. Moreover, A flat and F (in V-ud3) need a dominant chord. This way, a tension appears also in the harmonic level, which occurs in a different moment with respect to the melodic one. However, both harmonic and melodic tensions find their discharge at the end on the tonic, and what results is an absolutely homeostatical organism.

melodic tension

opening	apex	relaxation	closing
du1	du2	V-du3	V-du4 (=du1)

harmonic tension

Detailed description: This musical score is written for piano in a 6/8 time signature. The melody is on the upper staff, and the accompaniment is on the lower staff. The melody starts with a piano (*p*) dynamic and a half note chord, then rises to a fortissimo (*sf*) dynamic at the apex. It then descends through a relaxation phase, marked by a vertical dashed line, and ends with a closing phase. The accompaniment consists of rhythmic patterns in the left hand and chords in the right hand. Labels above the staff indicate 'melodic tension' and 'harmonic tension' with brackets. The melodic tension curve is labeled with 'opening', 'apex', 'relaxation', and 'closing' phases, and specific units 'du1', 'du2', 'V-du3', and 'V-du4 (=du1)'. The harmonic tension curve is labeled 'harmonic tension'.

Example 3

By applying the gap-fill melody logic, we can observe that the melodic G in V-ud4 is superfluous. We can eliminate it and go directly to E flat. This way we can obtain also a more metrically standard conclusion, with a long tonic, according with a cultural paradigm of memory and waiting. See example 4.

melodic tension

opening	apex	relaxation	closing
du1	du2	V-du3	V-du4'

harmonic tension

Detailed description: This musical score is similar to Example 3, but with a different melodic structure. The melody starts with a piano (*p*) dynamic and a half note chord, then rises to a fortissimo (*sf*) dynamic at the apex. It then descends through a relaxation phase, marked by a vertical dashed line, and ends with a closing phase. The accompaniment consists of rhythmic patterns in the left hand and chords in the right hand. Labels above the staff indicate 'melodic tension' and 'harmonic tension' with brackets. The melodic tension curve is labeled with 'opening', 'apex', 'relaxation', and 'closing' phases, and specific units 'du1', 'du2', 'V-du3', and 'V-du4''. The harmonic tension curve is labeled 'harmonic tension'.

Example 4

Now, we wonder if we can build such a homeostatical organism without any references to the dominant chord. To do this, we have simply to erase V-ud3 from

the melodic organism of example 3 (see example 5, line 1), and then to change its conclusion like we did in example 4 (see example 5, line 2). The last melodic organism we have just found seems to satisfy what needed from homeostasis, although it was only six bars long.

The image shows two staves of musical notation, labeled 1 and 2. Above the staves are five columns of text: 'opening', 'tension', 'apex', 'relaxation', and 'closing'. Below staff 1 are three labels: 'du1', 'du2', and 'V-du4 (=du1)'. Below staff 2 are three labels: 'du1', 'du2', and 'V-du4''. The music consists of two staves, each with a treble and bass clef. Staff 1 has dynamics 'p' and 'sf'. Staff 2 has dynamic 'p'. There are various musical notations including slurs, ties, and a dashed line connecting a note in staff 1 to a note in staff 2.

Example 5

Let us compare this six bars with the beginning of the piece. See example 6. Beethoven's real text shows an overlapped new melodic unit at the right hand, while the conclusion of the first melodic significant unit occurs at the left hand. Moreover, at this hand, disappears the pulsating rhythm, which is continued at the right hand.

All this means, in my opinion, that the first occurrence in the piece is a melodic-harmonic unit of six bars. This unit — although not perfectly homeostatic because of the lack of the tonic in the lower voice at bar 6 — seems to possess a great degree of stability. Rupture of stability depends on the overlapping of a new voice, in an upper register (a break in the external space).

Tarasti notices that *ud1* (motif "a" in his terms) "returns in a way in the discant register as the inversion of the melodic-triadic motif of the opening".<sup>30</sup> If we change something in example 5, like we do in example 7, we can better understand this phenomenon. In fact, the bass line from E flat to G, in bars 5–6 (see example 7, line 2), is the inversion of *V-ud4* (G-E flat), before it was transformed in *V-ud4'*. That means that some virtual features of the first occurrence of the piece have been conserved although partially hidden. Moreover (see line 2 again) I reduced the new melodic unit (motif "b" in Tarasti's terms) to the basic pulsating triple

<sup>30</sup> Tarasti, "Existential", 258.



It seems to be clear that, although in an essential manner, the beginning of this piece has got a certain kinetic form, which satisfies the homeostatical principle. If we can speak of instability it is because of other elements, like the overlapping of the second melodic unit, or the rhythmical transformation of the conclusion of the first unit, or the lack of the tonic in the lower voice. That means that the beginning of this piece puts us in front of the being-for-myself, not the being-in-myself. If we want to investigate on the being-in-myself we have to search in a different way.

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