Silne i bezpieczne równowagi Nasha w pewnych grach powtarzanych 3 graczy

• Authors: Kufel Tadeusz , Plaskacz Sławomir , Zwierzchowska Joanna

Title variants

Strong and Safe Nash Equilibrium in Some Repeated 3-Player Games

• Languages of publication: PL

Keywords

gra powtarzana; silna równowaga Nasha; metoda Blackwell'a w problemie zbliżania; metoda funkcji Lapunowa

• Publisher: Główny Urząd Statystyczny
• Journal: Przegląd Statystyczny
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 65
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 271-295

Contributors

author

Kufel Tadeusz

• Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management, Department of Econometrics and Statistics

author

Plaskacz Sławomir

• Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Nonlinear Mathematical Analysis and Topology

author

Zwierzchowska Joanna

• Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science

References

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• Aumann R. J., (1961), The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 98, 539–552.
• Aumann R. J., (1967), A Survey of Cooperative Games Without Side Payments, in: Shubik M., (ed.), Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honour of Oscar Morgenstern, 3–27.
• Axelrod R., (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York. Behrstock K., Benaim M., Hirsch M. W., (2015), Smale Strategies for Network Prisoner’s Dilemma Games, Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2, 141–155.
• Blackwell D., (1956), An Analog of The Minimax Theorem for Vector Payoffs, Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 6, 1–8.
• Conway J. B., (1985), A Course in Functional Analysis, Springer Verlag, New York.
• Dawes R. M., (1980), Social Dilemmas, Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193.
• Konishi H., Le Breton M., Weber S., (1997), Equivalence of Strong And Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Games Without Spillovers, Economic Theory, 9, 97–113.
• Nessah R., Tian G., (2014), On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibrium, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 414, 871–885.
• Plaskacz S., Zwierzchowska J., (2018), Dynamical Systems Associated to the β-core in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Dynamic Games and Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235– –018-0262-x.
• Shani B., Solan E., (2014), Strong Approachability, Journal of Dynamics and Games, 1, 507–535.
• Smale S., (1980), The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games, Econometrica, 48, 1617–1634.
• Sorin S., (1992), Repeated Games with Complete Information, in: Aumann R. J., Hart S., (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory, 72–107.

Identifiers

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0014.0540