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## WILL ATLANTIC BRIDGE WITHSTAND SHOCKS?

We examine<sup>1</sup>changes in the Atlantic policy of the United States of President Donald Trump, including in particular changes in perception and narrative as well as relations with the institutions of the European pillar of the Atlantic bridge, namely the European Union and NATO. We take it for granted that both the bridge and the institutional links existing within its framework will survive the challenges of neo-isolationism and populism, as its foundation is the community and continuity of civilization and the real interests of allies who are strategic partners. We believe that relations between the US with the EU in the economy and in politics, in particular in the security and defense policy (in this area related to NATO) will continue regardless of turbulence in the institutionalization of economic cooperation resulting in the conclusion or failure of the agreement on the discriminatory liberalization of economic cooperation<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, we draw attention to the threats related to the implementation of the pessimistic

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<sup>2</sup> The institutional expression of the discriminatory liberalization of EU-US economic cooperation are agreements on trade preferences (RTA – regional trading agreement in accordance with the nomenclature of the WTO). Currently, RTAs usually include not only trade, but also other forms of economic cooperation – more on Czarny, 2013, Ch. 1. RTA opposes multilateral non-discriminatory liberalization of trade and other forms of cooperation under GATT/WTO.

scenario consisting in the breakup of the transatlantic community. Therefore, rejecting the axiom, we analyze the alternative variant.

We treat the current actions of the US administration as a temporary retreat from the post-war strategy and policy of the United States. Even if we consider these measures to be short-term, they will affect the long-term change in the parity of the potential of the transatlantic partners and their costs of cooperation.

At the same time, the characteristics and intensity of mutual EU-US relations have influenced and influence in a stabilizing way both the internal (socio-political and economic) order of both partners as well as the world order, which makes them unique on a global scale and particularly important both for the participants and for the third countries. In the face of these changes, the threats to deepen the destabilization of the world order are increasing.

This study has the following structure. In Part 1, we present the genesis of the current state of EU and US relations, deriving it from historical events. In Part 2, we write about the position of both partners in the world. Part 3 is devoted to the analysis of current relations between the transatlantic partners, that is the state during Trump's presidency, after the suspension, at the initiative of the US, of the TTIP negotiations (and the renegotiation of NAFTA and the withdrawal of the US from TPP). We finish the study with conclusions.

## THE EU AND THE US AS TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERS

Thirteen United States of America, declaring secession at the General Congress on 4 July 1776, pointed to the "laws of nature" as the basis of the right to (political) independence. At the same time, representatives of the United States of America "solemnly announced and declared"<sup>3</sup>, that the newly created state would respect international law.

In the Declaration of Independence, the foundations of the socio-political system of values not only of the metropolis, but also of Europe as a whole, that is the principle of "legitimacy of governments", were rejected. At the same time, the will to preserve civilizational relations with Europe and the community of identity were declared. The settlers becoming US citizens in fact descended from Europe. Thirteen States identified with the ideas and values of revolutionary France and the English Civil War, making them the foundation of their civil society and state institutions. At the same time, however, independence resulted from differences and deepened these differences. It was the independence of the United States, not the Atlantic, which was a natural barrier, that deepened divergence without disturbing the natural relations.

History confirms the existence of a transatlantic community based on common values both during and after World Wars, and especially after the Second World War, when the Americans contributed to the rebuilding and political reconstruction of Europe, supporting the cooperation of Western

<sup>3</sup> Quotations from the Declaration of Independence in the main text and footnote 4 as cited in: <http://www.kolousa.wssm.edu.pl/res/deklaracja.pdf>, [access on: 25/12/2015].

European states and its institutionalization<sup>4</sup>, including the creation of the concept of integrating and maintaining free, democratic Germany in free, democratic Europe. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the US supported systemic transformation in post-communist countries and their striving to participate in European and transatlantic institutions. They also supported the idea of the unification of Germany, the western part of which had long been an important part of the western hemisphere<sup>5</sup>. The symbol of the transatlantic community is the mirror reactions to the challenges of USSR and terrorists' aggression of President Kennedy against the Berlin Blockade („*Ich bin ein Berliner*”) and of European allies to the “attack IX / 11” („*We are all Americans! We are all New Yorkers*”)<sup>6</sup>.

Also a close cooperation in the sphere of security and defense policy within NATO confirms the existence of the transatlantic community. This cooperation makes it particularly important to complement the institutionalized political-defense Atlantic bridge with an equivalent institutional component in the economic sphere.

The transatlantic continuity of civilization does not mean the identity of societies and the countries they create. Indeed, there are significant differences in the “cultures of capitalism”<sup>7</sup> on both sides of the Atlantic. It is about the socio-economic distance between citizens and their communities – civil societies on the two shores of the Ocean. This distance is particularly visible when we realize the existence of differences within Europe. So if you look for transatlantic closeness, there is more of it between the British and the Americans than between the Americans or the British and the Spaniards or the Portuguese.

The political paradigm formulated by Paine: „In America the law is king”<sup>8</sup> set the common foundation of the rule of law and liberal democracy, and its implementation led to the separation of Europe, with its authority having the title in legitimism, from the US as a state ruled by law. However, the experience of wars and totalitarian regimes led Europe to the adoption of the American system

<sup>4</sup> Churchill called for the creation of “the United States of Europe”, and the first European grouping of integration after World War II was BENELUX, which combined the closest allies of the USA (Belgium and the Netherlands).

<sup>5</sup> E. Czarny, J. Menkes, *Philosophy of development of the European Union*, in: European Union. Three Anniversaries. Polish Perspective, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2017, Ch. 1; these, *Transatlantic Trade And Investment Partnership (TTIP) And International Security System*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a M. 2017, Ch. 1.

<sup>6</sup> J.-M. Colombani J.-M., *We are All Americans*. Le Monde, 12 Sept., 2001.

<sup>7</sup> A. Trompenaars, *Siedem kultur kapitalizmu: USA, Japonia, Niemcy, Francja, Wielka Brytania, Szwecja, Holandia*. Oficyna Ekonomiczna. Kraków 2003.

<sup>8</sup> Th. Paine, *Common Sense, Jan, 1776*: „... But where says some is the King of America? I'll tell you Friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the Royal of Britain. Yet that we may not appear to be defective even in earthly honors, let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth placed on the divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other. But lest any ill use should afterwards arise, let the crown at the conclusion of the ceremony be demolished, and scattered among the people whose right it is.“

of values. The standards of the Washington Treaty<sup>9</sup>, the Treaty on European Union<sup>10</sup> and the constitutions of European countries<sup>11</sup> make civilizational and cultural convergence a fact. The division in Europe into the Left and the Right (regardless of what elements define these orientations) is the key to the perception of politics on the continent. The traditional European Left has been and is oriented to strengthening the state as a tool for the implementation of compensatory justice, and group rights are at the heart of its interest, which puts it in opposition to the Right oriented to the strong state defending the traditional social order and not involved in the economy<sup>12</sup>.

In the United States, as in England, such differences have never determined either discourse or reality. In the United States and the United Kingdom the following orientations can be distinguished: liberal, conservative and progressive. The diversity of political options both in the US and on the European continent is based on the attitude to the function of the state, methods of equaling social differences, basic rights and human freedom and group rights, but it creates separate social divisions as well as the political elites expressing them<sup>13</sup>.

The American and European tools for implementing the policy are also different. They result from cultural differences coupled with experience and possibilities. If contemporary (Western) Europe is the result of the defect of all in religious wars against all and the experience of inability to achieve victory, the US is in turn the work of people who – violently forced to give up religion (values) – remained steadfast and chose to found a new state on the land recognized by them as no man's land (of course, it was the land of “first inhabitants”)<sup>14</sup>. Europe was created on the foundation of the balance of power, and the US – on the belief that the winner takes it all. Contrary to the principles

<sup>9</sup> In the Preamble to the Washington Treaty, we read: „They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”

<sup>10</sup> In art. 2 „The Union is founded on the values of respect for the human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society based on pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men.”

<sup>11</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 art. 2 “The Republic of Poland is a democratic state of law that implements the principles of social justice.”

<http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19970780483>;

From the German Basic Law, Article 25, it follows that “The general principles of international law are part of federal law. They have priority over laws and create rights and obligations directly for residents of the territory of the Federation. Article 28. 1 (1) The constitutional order of federal states must correspond to the principles of a republican, democratic and social legal state within the meaning of this Basic Law.”<http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/konst/niemcy.html>; According to Article 1 of the Constitution of Sweden (Act of Forms of Government of February 28, 1974) “... Public authority is exercised within the framework of laws.”; [access everywhere: 25/12/2015].

<sup>12</sup> These divisions, however, only fit into old Europe. However, they can not be applied to parties in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The Right in Poland (PiS – Law and Justice), in close cooperation with trade unions and the Church, wants the state's dominance in the economy and market restrictions. It defends labor unions at the same time guarding “traditional values”. The left, on the other hand, stands guard over the rights and freedoms of the individual opting for a market with a limited presence of the state.

<sup>13</sup> S.A. Lilie, W. S. Maddox, *An Alternative Analysis of Mass Belief Systems: Liberal, Conservative, Populist, and Libertarian*. Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 3. August 24, 1981.

<sup>14</sup> This is an experience not only of the first colonizers, but also the founders of Utah.

of the political system – common on both sides of the Atlantic – providing for the separation of religions and their institutions from the state, American politics and politicians are messianic and moralistic, such features being proper on the European continent only for populists and nationalists. Civil societies in Europe, despite the guise of elitism, are inclusive. American society, despite the layer of democracy, is exclusive. The experience of slavery to which all strata of American society were subjected<sup>15</sup>, despite the passage of time and activities in the socio-economic sphere constitutes an inconsistent society, constituting a social foundation of extremisms based on racial criterion<sup>16</sup>. Americans declare that they have dealt with the heritage and memory of slavery in their minds and hearts, but the reality denies this, pointing to the superficial nature of changes and the limited circle of people who have done it.

Europe has thought through the genesis of wars and is aware that each of them was the source of „unspeakable suffering” (preamble of the UN Charter)”. America believes in the cleansing effect of war. America wants a strong leadership, believing that it will “serve and protect” remaining at the same time resistant to dictatorial inclinations, thanks to - protecting the state and society – law and institutions, whereas Europe is afraid of strong leaders, because it has experienced them quite recently and could not build a sufficiently long-lasting and effective barrier against them in the form of law and institutions<sup>17</sup>. The US succumbs to the temptation of unilateralism knowing and believing that „Yes We Can”<sup>18</sup> and treating multilateral institutionalism as the second best choice. Europeans, in turn, consider cooperation as an exclusive choice, because all positive European experiences indicate it as the only way of action leading to lasting success.

In both international and internal policy (e.g. in the issue of relation to the death penalty or the right to abortion), the US is guided by values, at least in part, different from European ones. Transparency conduces to the demonstration of mutual claims<sup>19</sup>.

The transatlantic partners are also unable to avoid economic conflicts, sometimes transforming into conflicts of ideological nature. As it seems, for example the dispute over genetically modified food and feed (GMO, Genetically Modified Organisms) is moving in this direction.

During Obama’s presidency the distance between both partners was visible through the shift towards Asia (*pivot to Asia*) in American foreign policy. Its counterweight was Obama’s popularity in Europe. The paradox was the political

<sup>15</sup> Both slaves, their owners and supervisors as well as “white garbage” (poor people of the South) built a sense of value on contempt for others, a contempt based on differences in skin color. Currently, the members of the white supremacist movements are not recruited from the descendants of slave owners who are the material elite, but mostly from the descendants of the poor of the South who recognized race as the only basis for their sense of value; more broadly Flint, 2004.

<sup>16</sup> In Europe, a similar experience is relevant only to countries where serfdom was abolished late, i.e. Poland and Russia and the Ottoman Empire component.

<sup>17</sup> The most recent examples are provided by Hungary and Poland.

<sup>18</sup> Electoral slogan of Barack Obama from the 2008 campaign.

<sup>19</sup> The Western Europe’s response to the disclosure of American wiretaps was forced by citizens. However, it quickly turned out that mutual surveillance is also a norm in contacts between the allies.

and economic distancing of the partners from each other when their political culture was similar. The main reason for this was the fact that – according to the US – Europe was not a significant source of global instability and this state was considered unchangeable also in the near future.

In geopolitical terms, strengthening economic cooperation – for example in the form of RTA, which was to be the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), aimed at maintaining the dominant position of the EU and the US in the world economy and stabilizing the global economic system. The so far intense economic cooperation of the parties entitles to the conclusion that the economic interest inclines the partners to cooperate. The presence of Americans in Europe is needed to defend their economic interests, especially the interests of their transnational companies settled in EU countries.

Political interest may also encourage the US to maintain its alliance with the EU. The community of the value system makes Europe a natural partner of the United States to a greater extent than Asian countries, culturally, religiously and politically diverse, that are now becoming the main partner in their economic cooperation. At the same time the cooperation between the EU and the US in spreading the “common Western values” and standards may also be beneficial to third countries<sup>20</sup>.

The EU and the US are also natural allies in international organizations. No other partner, except for the EU, cooperates so loyally with the United States in combating international terrorism and economic crime (e.g. drug trafficking, illegal economic activity or corruption) and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the relative stability and predictability of Western Europe makes it a desirable partner and ally.

## THE POSITION OF THE US AND THE EU IN THE WORLD

The importance of a potential EU-US RTA is derived from the global importance of the parties to the agreement. The role and status of the United States as the only world hyperpower<sup>21</sup> (a necessary power) nobody, except the United States itself, does not undermine. Moreover, it is believed that this is the only entity that is capable of (politically and militarily) overcoming international conflicts anywhere in the world<sup>22</sup>.

At the same time, there are visible attempts made to undermine the dominant position of the United States in order to replace the unipolar world with the multipolar one. China's economic growth, which is the main creditor of the

<sup>20</sup> F. Merz, *Mehr als eine Vernunftsehe: Perspektiven Und Konfliktfelder für eine vertiefte Transatlantische Partnerschaft, Kleine Reihe*, Heft 82, Walter-Raymond-Stiftung der BDA, Berlin 2015, pp. 7-8.

<sup>21</sup> A hyperpower is „a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories ...this domination of attitudes, concepts, language and modes of life”. Such pioneering definition was used by Minister of Foreign Affairs of France Hubert Vedrine in a speech at the forum *Association France-Amériques* in February 1999. The essence of the status of a hyperpower is the full range of domination, which distinguishes it from the superpower of the USSR and the US, which during the Cold War was described only by their military potential.

<sup>22</sup> F. Merz, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

United States, means seeing it as a significant economic power. It is similar with India which is dynamically growing and presenting its political independence. It is also hard to disregard Russia's aspirations with its great territory and resource wealth, which at the same time conducts a deliberately unpredictable yet rational policy.

The United States itself – despite protests reviving during the participation of Americans in practically every armed conflict in the territory outside the US – has assumed so far the role of a hyper – and previously superpower. Currently – as the result of the presidential election and the statements of President Trump – it declares its will to limit the external political and military activity. They expect NATO members to fulfill their obligations and raise defense spending by 2024<sup>23</sup>. Holding the US responsible for providing security in the world made Trump respond that by helping the armies of other states, the United States destroyed its own army<sup>24</sup>. The paradox is that the president posed on macho and appealing to voters representing the culture of vulgar patriarchy wants to put into practice the postulates of American pacifists.

At the same time, Trump's claims for the greater participation of NATO allies in defense spending can be accepted. While there is an understanding on both sides of the Atlantic, why American soldiers are supposed to fight (and die) in defense of Estonia and Latvia, it is difficult to understand why the American taxpayer should cover the cost of Estonian or Latvian contribution to the defense budget. Emphasizing the fact by successive, from the 1990s, American administrations that Europeans take raisins out of dough, drawing benefits from cooperation without sharing the costs and want security of a higher standard than paid by them, is an unpleasant truth for Europeans.

Integrating Europe was not unquestionably regarded as a global or even a regional European power<sup>25</sup>. Today, the European ability to create and implement foreign and security policy is seldom undermined<sup>26</sup>, although the EU's use of US military capabilities in political and military operations may turn out to be dangerous and it is slowly becoming impossible.

Europe has also proved its ability to function effectively in the sphere of global international relations. An example is the overcoming of the immigration crisis of autumn 2015. The European-American coalition made it possible to overthrow dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Iraq, but it is difficult to treat it as a success. In Egypt, there was a quick reconstruction of the regime, while in other countries the level of respect for human rights and freedoms has

<sup>23</sup> In 2016, the US spent 3.61% of GDP on defense purposes, or USD 664.1 billion. For comparison, Germany's expenses amounted to 1.19% of GDP (USD 40.7 billion) - more broadly Willershausen (2017) quoting NATO sources.

<sup>24</sup> F. Willershausen, *Mehr wollen müssen*, Wirtschaftswoche, No 5, 27.01.2017, pp. 29-30.

<sup>25</sup> The facts decided once about Kissinger's critical statement towards Europe, who in response to the accusation that the US does not agree on a global policy with Europe, replied that there is no contact with "Europe" („'Europe?' Give me a name and a phone number!"), see [http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Talk:Henry\\_Kissinger](http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Talk:Henry_Kissinger) [access: 15.03.2014].

<sup>26</sup> See e.g. M. Sobczyk, *Europe Still Seeks Voice, Kissinger Says*, The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2012.

significantly decreased, whereas threats to regional and international security have increased.

At the same time, the EU is systematically confronted with the challenges, the fulfillment of which seems to require deepening integration. They were and are, among others the Greek crisis, Brexit as well as populism and nationalism reviving in many Member States<sup>27</sup>. The international position of the European Union is also weakened by its relatively poor economic situation. After the global crisis started in 2008, the EU not only did not return to the path of development but has immersed itself in a social, economic and political crisis. Its ingredients contain among others contesting common European values, combined with the revival of nationalisms revealed in connection with economic problems, including migration, as well as the admission of countries not ready to participate in the integration. The internal weakness of the EU is deepened by the weakness of Member States towards important external partners, manifested in particular by the dependence on Russian energy resources and the military potential of the USA. It is also difficult to ignore in this context a closer, than it results from the value-based evaluation of internal situation, cooperation with Turkey. It is mainly caused by the temporary benefits of restraining the flow of refugees into Europe by Turkey.

The EU is also not strengthened by the differences in views of its Member States demonstrated in international fora, e.g. in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations, or the G20 – more broadly Gamble<sup>28</sup>. Also, the disintegration of the EU into a „two-speed Union” and the actual focus of its authorities and leading Member States on the problems of the European Monetary Union (EMU), while at the same time neglecting the interests of non-EMU Member States is a sign of a regression of the European integration process.

However, only some perceive the unification of Europe as a remedy, while others postulate a departure from integration and a return to its exclusively economic dimension, with a concurrent releasing the Member States of restrictions on the implementation of their national interest (*raison d'État*). It seems, however, that – among others as a result of the awareness of growing external threats – the last option loses significance due to the growing fear of a situation in which each EU Member State would face threats and bear the costs of their elimination on its own.

Even taking into account the weakening economic position of the EU and the US in the global economy (for instance their declining shares e.g. in the global GDP, trade and FDI flow<sup>29</sup>), their political position remains dominant. Economic

<sup>27</sup> The proof can be the relatively high ratings of politicians and parties representing populist and nationalist views, among others in France and Austria, and now also in Germany. It is optimistic that in France and Austria the representatives of these political options lost the presidential election, while in Germany - although they have become an alarmingly important force - they have no chance of taking power.

<sup>28</sup> Gamble (2015, p. 15) stated: "Unable among themselves to agree a common position on many issues the Europeans look to the United States to provide leadership for the Western interest."

<sup>29</sup> Seemore E. Czarny, P. Folfas, , *Unia Europejska i USA w globalnej produkcji i międzynarodowej współpracy gospodarczej a Transatlantyczne Partnerstwo w dziedzinie Handlu i Inwestycji*, (in:) *Partnerstwo Transatlantyczne – Wnioski dla Polski*, PWE, Warszawa 2016, Ch. 2.



cooperation can strengthen these relationships. Intensification of economic cooperation is also an important element of the system of widely understood international security, seen mainly in political, military, economic and energy contexts, as well as ecological or cultural.

## THE TRANSATLANTIC REGION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESIDENCY OF DONALD TRUMP

Prior to TTIP negotiations in 2013, US-EU economic cooperation was well developed, mutually beneficial and nothing forced the parties to change it profoundly. It was not shaken up either by the creation of a single EU market or the founding of NAFTA. However, due to the weakening of the global position of the USA and the EU and the challenges from a direction of less developed countries, especially China and India, deepening cooperation through discriminatory liberalization of cooperation was considered a desirable tool to maintain the place in the world<sup>30</sup>. Additional reasons for starting TTIP negotiations were, among others: the conviction that the transatlantic economic cooperation does not grow up with its intensity to the level of political and social cooperation, and the disappointment with the stagnation of negotiations of non-discriminatory liberalization within the WTO. From the point of view of the EU, an important motive was also the desire to maintain the US presence in Europe in the face of an increasingly visible turn of American policy towards Asia and the growing threats on the European continent (more on the reasons for starting the TTIP negotiations<sup>31</sup>).

However, in the course of TTIP negotiations, political relations between the partners deteriorated. Protests against ACTA, eavesdropping scandal and sensations announced by Wikileaks once again in the post-war history have affected the economic relations. Differences in European and American approaches, e.g. to regulations, have tightened objections<sup>32</sup>. As a result, EU and US societies questioned not only the mutual political and economic relationships, but also the entire current world order and the model of cooperation based on the removal of economic, social, political and cultural barriers. Xenophobic, nationalistic or even racist attitudes revived.

During the TTIP negotiations in the societies of the participating countries, a social movement was created against the discriminatory liberalization of transatlantic cooperation<sup>33</sup> and contesting the philosophy on which negotiations

<sup>30</sup> Opinion-forming circles in the EU and the US recognized the paradigm of being caught up by BRICS countries. They rejected the thesis that these countries “will stumble over their own legs” in development.

<sup>31</sup> See E. Czarny, J. Menkes, *Globalne znaczenie Transatlantyckiego Partnerstwa w dziedzinie Handlu i Inwestycji (TTIP)*, in: *Partnerstwo Transatlantyckie – Wnioski dla Polski*, PWE, Warszawa 2016, Ch.1 and E. Czarny, P. Folfas, *op. cit.*

<sup>32</sup> E. Czarny, J. Menkes, *Transatlantic Trade And Investment Partnership (TTIP) And International Security System*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a M. 2017, Ch. 1 & A. Kuźnar, *European Union as the creator of international standards of protection of intellectual property rights – the case of geographical indications*, (in:) *European Union. Three Anniversaries. Polish Perspective*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2017, Ch. 3.

<sup>33</sup> It is about protests not only against TTIP, but also against CETA (*Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreee-*

are based, and more broadly the cooperation. The movement aimed at rejecting organizational idealism, freedom of trade and removing barriers in international relations is fueled by social dissatisfaction resulting from the deterioration of the living situation of numerous social groups, as a result of, inter alia, job losses. They blame globalization and co-existing with it integration, among others economic. Victims of changes in the world believe that it is possible to return to the „good old days”, in which – together with the return of economic and political borders – workplaces will return and at the same time armed conflicts will not return. Users of new technologies do not want to accept the consequences of their existence<sup>34</sup>. As a consequence, TTIP negotiations have been suspended and the victims of their failure will be its culprits. However, they will remain unpunished because they are so permanently hurt that they are unable to bear the costs of the damage they caused.

The culmination of contesting not only TTIP and – more broadly – authorities in the US were social processes leading to the election of Donald Trump in the autumn of 2016 for the President of the United States. Trump won the election using the program „America first” rejecting the principles of the existing order which amounted the United States to the rank of the world’s hyperpower. Within the implementation of the program, he undermined not only economic but also political alliances. The rejection of the transpacific agreement<sup>35</sup>, the freezing of TTIP negotiations and the announcement of renegotiation of NAFTA indicate the direction of changes in US economic relations with the outside world. President Trump’s proposals make US trade policy incompatible with WTO rules. Thus, the announcement of subsidizing American exports and taxing imports depending on the country of origin violates the principles of free trade according to the WTO and is a violation of the principle of equal treatment of trade partners (rooted in the rule of the greatest preference – more on the world trade order according to the GATT/WTO rules<sup>36</sup>). These changes in rules may even lead to the liquidation of the existing rules of world trade and related forms of economic cooperation, if the US implements the threat of withdrawal from the WTO in the event of protests of the Organization against its policy of protectionism<sup>37</sup>. The suspension of multilateral negotiations and their replacement with RTA agreements may become real. It would be unfavorable for the world economy. Not only would the process of creating a global system of economic cooperation based on the *ment*), that is the agreement on the discriminatory liberalization of cooperation between the EU and Canada (currently undergoing the ratification process). In essence, this is a protest against the liberalization of trade.

<sup>34</sup> It was similar in the case of, for example, British workers from the nineteenth century who, destroying steam engines, believed that they would stop progress.

<sup>35</sup> Trans-Pacific Partnership, (TPP) was to be an RTA agreement, under which it was expected to lower tariffs and other trade barriers, introduce regulations on the protection of intellectual property and rules for settling disputes between the state and the private investor (ISDS). It was also intended to ensure higher standards of protection of employees and the environment. President Trump rejected the possibility of adopting the TPP by the United States, which was to be one of its signatories.

<sup>36</sup> See E. Czarny, J. Menkes, K. Śledziewska [2010], *Umowy o preferencjach handlowych - bariera czy uzupełnienie globalnej liberalizacji handlu międzynarodowego*, Zeszyty Naukowe KGŚ SGH (International Journal of Management and Economics), No. 28, pp.28-51

<sup>37</sup> More on M. Meckel et. all, *Der Preis des Protektionismus*, Wirtschaftswoche, No 4, 20.01.2017, pp. 17-23.

principle of non-discrimination be inhibited, but it could be replaced by a set of unclear bilateral and multilateral RTAs. The last scenario is confirmed by Trump's announcement to abandon multilateral agreements for bilateral ones (tit for tat). This could initiate the process of creating closed, protectionist groups following the „beggar-thy-neighbor” principle, known from the interwar period<sup>38</sup>.

Trump's presidency which started in the period of instability and the increase of security threats in the world, because of the President's program and personality, brought forward the announcement of changes that – at least in the short term – threatened with another increase in instability. President Trump announced cooperation with Russia and questioned the value of NATO and American obligations within its framework. He positively perceived Brexit and announced an economic and political confrontation with China.

It was difficult, however, to suppose that during the first 100 days the plans would be so brutally confronted with reality. The initial announcements of the US cooperation with Russia quickly turned into mutual distrust. US-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War were not as bad as they are today. The dismissals in the US administration and the proceedings involving contacts between the new administration and Russia foreshadow difficulties in informal relations and limiting communication channels. These changes are accompanied by distrust and overtly confrontational objectives, which hinders cooperation between the US and Russia. The dilemmas are illustrated here by the case of Syria. Having experienced a vacuum of power after the fall of bloody dictatorships in the Arab states, the US restrainedly treated the actions leading to the overthrow of President Assad, realizing that there is no chance of establishing the rule of law and democracy after his overthrowing. At the same time, there was a „red line” in the form of a ban on war crimes (using prohibited means of armed struggle) in an internal conflict. Assad crossed this line by using chemical weapons against the civilian population. The immediate reaction of the US in the form of a rocket attack caused a conflict with Russia threatening military confrontation.

In July 2017, Congress passed further sanctions against Russia, at the same time punishing the US partners cooperating with it in the field of energy. The sanctions affected, among others, German companies involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Thus, the positions of the American administration on energy issues are in opposition to the interests of the partners of the Fifteen. In this case, it is not only about politics and the value system. The EU sees in this move the US fight to improve its own position on the gas market at the expense of supplies from Russia. The change in US energy policy is therefore not only political, but reflects also the economic interest of the United States. The weakening of the Russian and strengthening of the American energy sector is supported by the program „America first” focused mainly on the creation of new workplaces in the US, which means that sanctions are abused to realize the national economic goals of the US.

<sup>38</sup> More on E. Czarny, *Regionalne grupowania integracyjne w gospodarce światowej*, Warszawa 2013, Ch. 1.

At the same time, the US strongly criticized the attack of the Hungarian authorities on the independent university and the Soros foundation, which means a return to the policy of the previous administration – spreading the umbrella over the rule of law, democracy and human rights. The attitude to „non-liberal democracy” in Hungary is a litmus test of the state of relations with Russia, supporting the Orban government, and Germany being a patron of common European values in Central and Eastern Europe.

In view of North Korea’s expansion of the unconventional weapons and means of their delivery, the US has recognized itself forced to confirm the security guarantees for Asian allies and to cooperate with China to stop the Korean military activity.

The US president confronted with the real world may be forced to return to cooperation with the old allies (EU, Japan, South Korea) and predictable partners (China), which reduces his ability to reorient politics. At the same time, the old policy will be more costly to implement, as the announcements of changes have reduced the confidence of the partners. The fall in confidence in the US and its president increases the potential of Europe as a reliable partner in global and regional relations. The US, after the explicit rejection of the values as a signpost in politics, will not be able to demand from the partners co-financing a policy aimed at its own interest (combating drugs, non-proliferation, etc.). The deterioration of the international position of the US can also accelerate changes targeting to become independent from it. At the same time, Europe’s potential is also weakening. Its testimony is, among others Brexit and centrifugal tendencies demonstrated regionally (Catalonia) and nationally (Hungary). In this situation, questions about the stability of the global order and international leadership are formulated.

TTIP contestation, the demand for transparency of negotiations harms the process of institutionalization of EU-US economic cooperation, but it does not harm this cooperation, because it is supported by the interests and benefits of the parties, not emotions. Both Europe (EU) and America (USA, Canada) need transatlantic ties, and the consequences of their weakening are unacceptable to the parties neither in the short nor medium-term perspective.

## SUMMARY

Transatlantic economic cooperation is crucial for ensuring long-term stabilization of the world economy, maintaining peace and establishing/maintaining democracy in many countries. Although the US administration today rejects the basis of the so far conducted policy, it seems that it can just as quickly return to the old policy as loudly it announced its abandoning. The declarations of politicians belonging to the current US administration show that the return to the RTA negotiations with the EU is being considered. However, the EU is also changing. Brexit means weakening pro-American forces in Europe and an increase in the relative importance of protectionistly oriented France.

At the same time, Trump's statements, pronounced from the position of power, may – after the change of the ruling coalition in Germany - harden the position of the EU economic tycoon.

It may therefore turn out that it is not enough to change the signboard and replace TTIP with another agreement of a similar nature, even if such an agreement would give the signatories economic benefits related to the liberalization of mutual cooperation and political ones resulting from the tightening of mutual relationships.

The road to an agreement leads through negotiations, not through a split. Meanwhile, instead of convergence, we have divergence in transatlantic relations. It is difficult to resist the impression that for the first time since long, fears have become justified that there will be neither interlocutors nor matters connecting them.

At the same time, Russia's expansionism, adventurism of North Korea (the nuclear program, work on the means of transferring weapons of mass destruction, political murders abroad) and persistent instability in the Middle East also leave no room for seeking the possibility of changes in alliances that have undergone positive verification during the Cold War.

Peace, cooperation and democracy are fragile and can easily be replaced by conflicts, rivalry and authoritarian systems. This strengthens our conviction that it is worth taking care of transatlantic relations in the name of common values and goals.

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**Summary:** The authors analyzed changes in the Atlantic policy of the United States as part of the political strategy of President Donald Trump. They acknowledged that they were of temporary nature though definitely harmful from the point of view of the interests of the parties, The changes deny the entire post-war US political strategy towards the transatlantic space and the world. At the bottom of recognizing this change as temporary turbulence was the assessment of the significance of the sources of the transatlantic “community of values”. The conclusions have been formulated on the basis of factors that, on the one hand, mark the EU’s convergence with the US and Canada and on the other, the divergence between EU-US-Canada and countries outside the Western Hemisphere.

**Keywords:** Atlantic alliance, Trump, TTIP, EU, NAFTA, Brexit, pivot to Asia

## CZY MOST ATLANTYCKI WYTRZYMA WSTRZĄSY?

**Streszczenie:** Autorzy przeanalizowali zmiany polityki atlantyckiej Stanów Zjednoczonych w ramach strategii politycznej prezydenta Donalda Trumpa. Uznali, że mają one charakter doraźny acz zdecydowanie szkodliwy z punktu widzenia interesu stron. Zmiany zaprzeczają całą powojenną strategię polityczną USA wobec przestrzeni transatlantyckiej i świata. U podstaw uznania tej zmiany za przejściowe turbulencje leżała ocena wagi źródeł transatlantyckiej „wspólnoty wartości”. Wnioski sformułowano na podstawie czynników wyznaczających z jednej strony konwergencję UE z USA i Kanadą z drugiej dywergencję pomiędzy UE-USA-Kanadą a państwami nie należącymi do zachodniej hemisfery.

**Słowa kluczowe:** sojusz atlantycki, Trump, TTIP, UE, NAFTA, Brexit, pivot to Asia