HIGH STANDARD EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE APPEAL TO INTUITION

• Authors: Gasparatou Renia
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In the analytic tradition, the appeal to intuition has been a common philosophical practice that supposedly provides us with epistemic standards. The authoress argues that the high epistemological standards of traditional analytic philosophy cannot be pursued by this method. Perhaps within a naturalistic, reliable frame intuitions can be evoked more coherently. Philosophers can use intuition as scientists do, in hypothesis- construction or data- collection. This is an ironic conclusion: Traditional analytic epistemologists rely on the appeal to intuition, but cannot justify it. Naturalists, on the other hand, are not those who need such a method; yet they can better accommodate it within their view.

Keywords

EN

EPISTEMOLOGY; EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY; INTUITION; NATURALISM

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filozofia (Philosophy)
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 64
• Issue: 7
• Pages: 680-692
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Gasparatou Renia

• Renia Gasparatou, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Patras, Rion 26500, Greece; www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/filozofia

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

09SKAAAA068112