FENOMÉN MEZI INTENCIONALITOU A POČITKEM. LEVINAS A HUSSERL

• Authors: Novotný Karel

Title variants

EN

Phenomenon between intentionality and sensation. Levinas and Husserl

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The paper remembers some features of the Husserlian conception of the phenomenon in order to show the ways of the inversion imposed to it by Levinas, namely in his book 'Totalité et infini' and in his article 'Intentionnalité et sensation'. In these texts it is still possible to maintain a fundamental description of the phenomenon as 'experience/vécu/Erlebnis' even with 'intentionality' and 'sensation' as its components. The rejection of the concept of 'representation' as the very fundament of appearance by Levinas does not make obsolete any use of those concepts which locate an important dimension of the phenomenality to the interiority of the experience, in the subjectivity. Even if the subjectivity in Levinas seems to admit no homogeneous unity and seems to be constituted by the different kinds of the relations to an exteriority the phenomena implicated in these relations remain inner sensual experiences.

Keywords

EN

HUSSERLIAN CONCEPTION; INTENTIONALITY; LEVINAS; PHENOMENON; SENSATION

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filozofia (Philosophy)
• Year: 2006
• Volume: 61
• Issue: 8
• Pages: 221-231
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Novotný Karel

• Filozofický ústav AV ČR, Praha, Czech Republic

• K. Novotny, Filozoficky ustav Akademie ved Ceske republiky, Praha, Czech Republic

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

07SKAAAA01924113