Proč jsou elementární věty a stavy věcí v Traktátu vzájemně nezávislé?

• Authors: Daňková, Zuzana

Title variants

EN

Why are atomic propositions and states of affairs mutually independent in the "Tractatus"?

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

In this article I attempt to reply to the question of whether, in the framework of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, reasons and arguments are given which might plausibly motivate the claim - made by Wittgenstein himself - that atomic propositions and their correlates (states of affairs) are mutually independent. My first step is to make clear that an answer to this question demands a detailed interpretation of Tractarian objects and, specifically, whether they are only particulars, or properties and relations too. After sketching the evidential support for both interpretations, I incline to a reading that takes properties and relations to be objects. In the context of the narrower and broader conceptions of objects, I then give a detailed analysis of the metaphor “the space of states of affairs” and “logical space”, which I consider to be the principal guide in our understanding the reasons for the independence of states of affairs and thus, more generally, of atomic propositions too.

Keywords

EN

Wittgenstein; the mutual independence of atomic facts; states of affairs; Tractarian objects; logical space

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 62
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 61-76
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Daňková, Zuzana

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic