Old Times' Sake as a Moral Category

• Authors: Benziman Yotam
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper I discuss the notion of old times’ sake, one which is hardly discussed by moral philosophers, and claim that it serves as a moral reason for us to act on behalf of the people we used to cherish: former friends, colleagues, neighbors, or spouses. While our relationship with them has ended, the building-blocks of our identity will continue to bear their fingerprints, and they will ever be an important part of our biography. Acting for old times’ sake reflects both our caring about them, and our caring about our own past, biography, and accumulated identity. Why the relationship has ceased will of course affect our attitude towards them. Although old times’ sake might not always be a decisive factor, it still serves as a moral reason for action.

Keywords

EN

ethics; old times' sake; personal relation; friendship; identity; memory

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 17
• Issue: 66

Dates

published

2020-12

Contributors

author

Benziman Yotam

• Sapir Academic College

References

• Aristotle (1906), The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. F.H. Peters, Kegan Paul, London.
• Blustein J. (2008), The Moral Demands of Memory, Cambridge University Press, New York.
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• Crépel A.-L. (2014), “Friendship: Shaping Ourselves,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2): 184–198.
• Kant I. (1964), The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. M.J. Gregor, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
• Margalit A. (2002), The Ethics of Memory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London.
• Murphy J. (1982), “Forgiveness and Resentment,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1): 503–516.
• Richards N. (1988), “Forgiveness,” Ethics 99 (1): 77–97.
• Stroud S. (2016), “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,” Ethics 116 (3): 498–524.

Identifiers

ISSN

1733-5566

DOI

10.33392/diam.1462