Aristotle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and What Does Not Exist

• Authors: Elsby Charlene
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

While nowhere does he use the term to refer to his own theory, Aristotle is often thought to exemplify an early correspondence theory of truth. In the paper, I examine the textual evidence used to support the idea that Aristotle holds a correspondence theory of truth, and to infer the nuances of this theory. I hold that Aristotle’s theory of truth can account for terms that signify non-existent things, i.e., that on Aristotle’s account, an assertion is not automatically false given its subject term’s “failure to refer”. Terms do not refer for Aristotle, they signify (and his use of the concept of signification extends far beyond linguistic reference).

Keywords

EN

Aristotle; correspondence; non-existence; reference; signification; isomorphism

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 25
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 57-72

Dates

online

2015-08-22

Contributors

author

Elsby Charlene

• Indiana University-Purdue University, Philosophy Department, Fort Wayne, IN, USA

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2015.016