THE (UN)CONSCIOUSNESS OF ANIMALS AND THEIR MORAL STATUS. HOW CAN ONE RECONCILE ETHICS WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

• Authors: Kittel M.
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

Philosophers of mind are beginning to take an important part in the debate about the moral status of animals. However, some of the most promising contemporary theories of consciousness imply that animals cannot suffer like human beings. This claim is unacceptable for many scholars concerned about animal welfare. Moreover, it is equally troublesome for those ethicists who take the ability to suffer to be the basis requirement for granting a being moral standing, because their moral institutions seems to contradict the results of cognitive sciences. The author proposes to solve the problem by rejecting the idea of there being a necessary link between possessing moral status and the ability to suffer (understood in the standard way). Also, he presents a proposal for how at least some of the institutions based on empathy may be defended and become useful in the discussion about the moral status of animals.

Keywords

EN

COGNITIVE SCIENCES; MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS; PHILOSOPHY OF MIND; THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences and Warsaw University, Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology. Since 2007 - Warsaw University, Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology
• Journal: Etyka (Ethics)
• Year: 2006
• Issue: 39
• Pages: 99-114
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Kittel M.

• M. Kittel, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

08PLAAAA04428552