The similarity of European central banks in terms of transparency and effectiveness

• Authors: Mariusz Próchniak , Magdalena Szyszko

Abstracts

EN

Research background: The previous studies on monetary policy transparency suggest that the dependence between the degree of transparency and monetary policy effectiveness exists. In this examination, we tackle this issue for the most recent sample with the application of novel transparency measure, which is de-signed to cover forward-looking policy approach. Purpose of the article: We aim at evaluating forward-looking transparency of the European central banks and juxtapose it with their effectiveness in achieving monetary policy goals: price stability and output stabilization. The sample covers the central banks of the following countries: Sweden, the UK, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. We also search for the patters of similarity in our sample. Methods: We apply a novel, index-based transparency measure to assess central banks? transparency. We also estimate inflation gap and the output gap. The methods used are based on data and statistical analysis. The comparison of the behaviour of individual central banks is carried out for the variables measuring transparency and inflation and output gaps. The similarity of the performance of individual central banks is assessed with the use of measures of the distance between objects, including our own measure. Findings & Value added: Our results suggest the existence of different degrees of similarity in the sample, but some common tendencies can be found as well. For example, central banks with comparable transparency degree are found more similar. Novelty of the examination is related to our methodology: transparency and similarity measures applied and the most recent time span covered.

Keywords

EN

central bank transparency; forward-looking communication; coefficients of similarity

• Publisher: Instytut Badań Gospodarczych
• Journal: Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 385-404

Dates

published

2019

Contributors

author

Mariusz Próchniak

• SGH Warsaw School of Economics

• https://orcid.org/0000000326429510

author

Magdalena Szyszko

• WSB University in Poznan

• https://orcid.org/0000000253223334

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Identifiers

DOI

10.24136/eq.2019.018

Biblioteka Nauki

22446411