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EN
This essay pursues the onset of modern national identities of the Azerbaijanis and Armenians, which goes back to the last quarter of the 19th century; it was affected by the Azerbaijanian and Armenian elites' approach to their (historical) heritage of the Turkish, Persian and Russian empires and how they defined their attitudes towards them on the identity level. In a historical context that co-created the mentioned process, it analyses advancement of perceptions towards Russia and the Russians, Turkey and the Turks, Persia and the Persians in the milieu of the Azerbaijanis and Armenians, which subsequently affected formation of the modern nationalist perception of these two nations. The article thus concentrates on a period from the second half of the 19th century until 1920/1921, when a two-year long intermezzo of the Armenian and Azerbaijanian democracy ended and turned into a seventy-year long constituent of the Soviet Union.
EN
This article seeks to demonstrate that, with increasing US involvement in the affairs of the South Caucasus, relations between Russia and Georgia had permanently taken a turn for the worse as early as autumn 2001, when this process accelerated. In that sense, even the change in government in Georgia was not decisive, when, in late 2003, as a consequence of the Rose Revolution the moderate President Eduard Shevardnadze, a former Soviet foreign minister, was forced to resign and power was taken over by the pro-American politician Mikheil Saakashvili, who made Georgian membership in NATO and the EU an aim of his assertive foreign policy – in accord with the prevailing mood in Georgian society and his own overall orientation. The author focuses on how these deteriorating relations were reflected in disputes over the penetration of armed anti-Russian Islamist rebels into Georgian territory and their subsequent elimination, and in debates over the presence and removal of Russian military bases in Georgia, accompanied by massive American military assistance to the Georgian government. He also seeks to show that the short war between Moscow and Tbilisi in 2008 should be seen as the logical culmination of the long-lasting and escalating conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi, a conflict that was determined more by structural factors than personal ones and in which none of the sides showed a willingness to retreat from its position. In these circumstances it was just a matter of time before the ‘diplomatic war’ would lead to an armed confrontation.
EN
This article is an attempt to explore the roles played by three key regional powers in the Armenian-Azerbaijani war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region that was raging on in the period of 1992–1994. The article holds that it was the significance of Azerbaijan as a crucial producer of oil and natural gas from its deposits in the Caspian Sea, that along with the presence of a huge Azerbaijani minority in Iran's northwest shaped the policies of the regional powers toward the Karabakh conflict, and their stance to Yerevan and Baku that contributed to Azerbaijan's eventual defeat in the war.
EN
Notwithstanding lack of detailed and freely accessible data, this paper examines the heavily underresearched issue of ethno-nationalism and separatism amid Iran's largest ethnic minority, Azerbaijanis, in an attempt to identify whether they may pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic. Despite the fact that Azerbaijanis, a predominantly shiite community speaking a Turkic language, have historically been deeply integrated into Iranian society generating numerous élite members, recent decades have seen a gradual rise of nationalistic sentiments among them; sentiments that in some occassions have bordered on claims for secession. The authors claim that this process was instigated by a range of factors including the obtaining of independence by the post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, introduction of Turkish and Azeri satellite TV broadcast to Iran’s Azerbaijani provinces and increasing levels of economic migration from Iranian Azerbaijan to Turkey. The authors conclude by stating that as of yet, the community of Iranian Azerbaijanis is deepy divided between religiously-minded assimilationists advocating for the established status quo and ever radicalized ethno-nationalists whose aim is to at least achieve more ethno-cultural rights for themselves.
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EN
The aim of this article is to analyse the role of Russia in the transformation of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and analyse this important period in the history of the Caucasus, where Georgia and its secessionist region of South Ossetia have been trying to find a peaceful solution to their post-war situation. Major milestones of the official peace process are set in the context of Russian-Georgian relations. We then proceed to the analysis of the internal changes within the Russian Federation at the turn of the millennium and try to find a connection between this internal transformation of Russia and the transformation of the conflict in South Ossetia. The most important factors behind the more assertive approach by the Russian Federation towards Georgia in the last decade are considered: internal centralisation of power and economic growth of the Russian Federation, the reinforcement of the importance of the South Caucasus as part of the geopolitical discourse within the Russian Federation, the deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations, and the suppression of the fear of the spill-over effect since the end of Second Chechen War.
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