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1

EXISTENCE, APPEARANCE, AND ACQUAINTANCE

100%
Riska A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2006
|
vol. 13
|
issue 1
5-15
EN
When A. J. Ayer commented on Russell's theory of acquaintance, he claimed that the person who is acquainted with an object knows that the object exists and also that the object in question has the properties which it appears to have. This essay employs Russell's theory of knowledge by acquaintance from the period between 1910 and 1918 and critically analyzes both the existential and the descriptive statements as they are related to the object of acquaintance. In particular, Ayer's views on the relationship between appearance and reality are treated as unacceptable from any sound epistemological point of view. I believe that the logical analysis of these epistemological problems reveals intricate issues involved in such discussions, which transcend their limited historical context.
2

A LOGICAL-PRAGMATIC THEORY OF OBJECTS

100%
Riska A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2006
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3
306-320
EN
There are two fundamental questions concerning the choice and presence of objects in various formal systems: (1) Where do these objects come from? (2) What do (can) we know about them? To answer these questions, the author introduces the notion of a protoontology as the pre-theoretic realm of (unspecified) entities from which the basic objects - individuals - of the formal system 'S' are postulated. The pragmatic aspects of such choices are investigated with regard to the first-order logic, both pure and applied. It is claimed that the postulated (chosen, constructed) objects enter the formal system 'S' with a package of the properties and relationships, the recognition of which depends on the interpretation and application of the available predicates of 'S'. If these properties and relationships are not made explicit, a possible clash may arise between them and the properties and relationships 'assigned' to the individuals of 'S' by the interpreted predicates of 'S'. As regards the relationship between logic and metaphysics, the author contends that logic can perhaps be viewed as the articulation of the fundamental features of the protoontological objects without which no discourse or theory would be possible. In this sense logic could also be viewed as a theory and method of the construction of a well-articulated metaphysical theory.
3

HUME'S DYNAMISM: THE PROBLEM OF POWER

100%
Riska A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2008
|
vol. 15
|
issue 1
20-28
EN
In this essay, the author investigates the dynamic foundations of Hume's philosophy which is so heavily dependent upon Newton's physics. Hume's ubiquitous phrase 'force and vivacity' is symptomatic of his dynamic, rather than voluntaristic, position that dominates his interpretation of the impressions, ideas, and causality in particular. After pointing out some inconsistencies of Hume's Newtonism, he concentrates on Hume's treatment of power. It is a well-known fact that Hume rejected the natural powers, in fear of their occult character, but accepted the human powers giving them an actual interpretation. The author suggests that there is a dispositional treatment hidden in Hume's statements which puts Hume in line with other philosophers of power.
4

ACQUAINTANCE AND NAMING: A RUSSELIAN THEME IN EPISTEMOLOGY

100%
Riska A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2005
|
vol. 12
|
issue 4
361-376
EN
Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description has been recently re-examined in frequently controversial epistemological contributions. The present essay reflects upon the pertinent papers by D. F. Pears, J. Hintikka, R. Chisholm, W. Sellars, A. J. Ayer, and others, but is primarily founded on Russell's significant formulations from his writings published between 1910 and 1918. By employing an auxiliary device of a late-Wittgensteinian language game, I explore at first the situation in which human subject is 'experiencing' and naming particular objects (Russell's sensedata and sensibilia) and later the subject's acquaintance with universals. The reconstruction of such situations shows that, contrary to Russell's assumptions, even the 'purest' acquaintance cannot function without knowledge by description, i.e. without stating propositions about the object of acquaintance (whatever its nature). Then the only 'descriptionless' alternative would be a kind of intuitive knowledge of such objects which is difficult to reconcile with the position held by Russell in the 1910s. Whatever the consequences, this topic retains its fundamental epistemological significance.
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