The author argues that possible worlds semantics is counterintuitive and does not to achieve its goals. The definition of the meaning of a sentence as the set of all possible worlds in which the sentence is true is criticized as inadequate; the semantics of modal expressions is shown to be uninformative. Truth-conditions of counterfactuals on one hand, and definitions of law-like expressions (or statements expressing causal connection) on the other hand, are exposed as circular. A further development of indexical semantics - more fine-grained and involving interdisciplinary research into the relationships among the indices - is advocated as an alternative.
The author claims that it was Quine's criterion of ontological presuppositons rather than the criterion of ontological commitments commonly associated with his name that essentially shaped contemporary ontology and logic. Undoubtedly both criteria led to a better understanding of the connections between the content of a theory and its existential claims. It seems crucial, however, that Quine emphasized referential status of variables and the role of quantifiers. This aspect of his philosophy inspired interesting discussions and had a strong impct on contemporary logic.
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