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EN
This article is a personal story of unfulfilled cognitive relationship between the author, his young but ripening intellect, and a renowned Polish philosopher - Marek Siemek. Today, Siemek is seen as a visionary who expands frontiers of the thinkable. Siemek is portrayed as charismatic thinker who takes advantage of his influence on people in a virtuous attempt to establish dialogic relations between them. Such attitude is that of a storyteller - the author claims. The main challenge Siemek put before himself, was that of pointing out possibilities and underlying the potential of intersubjective model of socialization as well as the potential of cooperative social relations in a civil society (public reason). There are three incarnations of Siemek in the text: (1) Siemek as a philosopher struck by Marxism, (2) Siemek as a philosopher struck by Heglism, (3) and finally Siemek as a mature, independent and sovereign advocate of the idea of philosophy as a reasonable faith. Siemek's work however, is not a continuation of a rather theological issue - the one of conformity of faith and reason, but that of consistence and unity of both theoretical and practical reason; the reason being the highest instance of appeal, the one and only competent to decide on all matters related to its scope of power. It seems clear that Siemek follows the path once taken by Kant and Hegel; he finds the boundaries of reasoning to be also the boundaries of human freedom. Whatever we affirm with support of our free-thinking and unprejudiced judgement, we affirm freely; and as long as our behaviour is a reflection of this free affirmation, it is a manifestation of freedom. Hence, the apology of reasoning becomes an apology of freedom.
EN
Where should one seek the archaeological sources of the representation system? Are those skills embedded in our behavioral and even emotional functioning since in accordance with the suggestion formulated by Freud sources of human symbolism should be sought in defensive mechanisms which allow us to deal with the first painful wounds inflicted against our narcissism? In the beginning there was the sexual drive, and representation appears to be its mere perception; on the other hand, since in 'das Es' we encounter only representations of the drive and not the drive itself, then the life of representation seems to precede that of the forces of the drive. Or should we look for the origin of human symbolism in linguistic systems, i. e. in the ability to produce an endless sequence of sentences and to refer it to the world, as has been suggested by Chomsky? The basic purpose of this study is to attempt answering the above posed questions and, consequently, to confront the psychoanalytical and cognitivistic discourse. The author claims that the superiority of the former discourse consists predominantly in the fact that it tries to understand the root of representation 'avant la lettre', i. e. to comprehend the essence of representation before it started to fulfill orientation (representation) functions vis a vis the outer word. Moreover, the author maintains that the fundamental paradox of the human representation system consists in the fact that representation, whose initial yardstick is escape from the world of drives, is to become an appliance whose measure is adequacy. Representation, whose initial function was prolonging the existence of forces more powerful and primeval than itself (i. e. drives), is to become a depiction of something that is diametrically different from it and ontically totally alien, in other words, the outer world. Representation was the outer quality of the world of nature (the body) in the psychic apparatus; it is to become an inner simulation of the outer quality (nature) in the same apparatus. Hence the possibly hasty but indispensable conclusion that representation is a fold, a knot, a bow, a stratification, a crisis, and a meeting point of elements of the natural world, albeit experienced from two sides: the body and the world. That what we call an interior (representation) is only the outcome of a collision of two tectonic slabs in the world of nature: the physics of the outer world and the biology of the corporeal world. Only such a geographic location of representation in the world allows us to reconstruct the contents of this conception.
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