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1

Critical Remarks about Modal Realism of David Lewis

100%
Filipczyk H.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2(66)
193-210
EN
David Lewis believes that possible worlds are spatiotemporal entities, maximal and causally isolated. They exist in the very same sense as 'our' world does. The article critically discusses his 'extreme modal realism', propounded mainly in his book 'On the Plurality of Worlds'. Having outlined the main features of this doctrine, the authoress raises several objections to it. 'Modal realism' is neither modal nor realistic. First, contrary to what Lewis declares, his theory does not analyze modality in terms of more basis entities in a theoretically defensible way. Secondly, it contains incredible existential claims whose ludicrousness is not justified by the presumed theoretical benefits it offers (in particular, by its 'economy'). Finally, it assumes that 'anything can co-exist with anything else'. This postulation, however, is controversial: it is implausible and it deprives the theory of possible worlds of its foremost motivation. Moreover it is at variance with ontological rationality. In sum, the doctrine in question, though designed with care and courage, sounds unconvincing.
2

MIND AND ONTOLOGICAL SPACE. A CRITICAL OUTLINE IN MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY

100%
Filipczyk H.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2008
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vol. 36
|
issue 1
69-85
EN
The paper focuses on one of the problems haunting contemporary thought about possible worlds - namely, that of the relation between conceivability and possibility. 'Conceivability arguments' (based on the premise that the conceivability of a given situation implies its possibility) are often used carelessly, not being properly rooted in any explicit and full-fledged ontology. In the paper the reasons that are commonly proposed for the 'liberal' use of 'conceivability arguments' are critically discussed and certain suggestions as to the proper application of such arguments are presented. It is then pointed out that the issue discussed in fact refers to a deeper problem, that of the opposition between combinatorial and combination ontology. The above is also shown to be a modern version of the classical dispute between Descartes and Leibniz. Finally, the authoress presents some general comments on 'modal epistemology'.
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