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PL
Celem rozważań jest prezentacja i analiza aktywności dyplomatycznej USA wobec problemu zwołania II Konferencji Pokojowej w Hadze i przygotowania doń delegacji amerykańskiej. Pozwala to określić stosunek USA do szukającej wówczas swego miejsca w stosunkach międzynarodowych idei rozbrojenia i wyznaczyć cele dyplomacji amerykańskiej w okresie przed I wojną światową. Artykuł wypełnia lukę w dotychczasowych badaniach nad polityką zagraniczną USA w XX wieku oraz ich stosunkiem do rozbrojenia. Artykuł ma charakter badawczy. Posłużono się w nim indukcyjną analizą materiałów archiwalnych, publikowanej korespondencji prywatnej i dyplomatycznej oraz literatury przedmiotu. Uwzględniono też specyfikę amerykańskiego procesu decyzyjnego (prezydent-sekretarz stanu) korzystając z metody systemowej. Wyniki badań dowodzą, że w początku XX w. USA zachowywały daleko posunięty sceptycyzm wobec kwestii rozbrojenia. Wolały skupić się na osiągnięciu istotnych dla ich polityki zagranicznej celów oraz usprawniać narzędzia już w pewnym stopniu sprawdzone (arbitraż). Zdecydowanie bardziej jednak otwarty był tu sekretarz Root niż prezydent Roosevelt.
EN
An aim of considerations is to present and analyse the US activity towards the issue of convention of the Second Hague Peace Conference and preparedness to it of the American delegation. This allows determining of the USA’s attitude towards the looking then for its place in international relations idea of disarmament and setting forth the objectives of the American diplomacy in the period before the First World War. The article fill the gap in the hitherto studies on the US foreign policy in the 20th century and its attitudes towards disarmament. The article is of the research nature. The author used in it the inferential analysis of archive materials, published private and diplomatic correspondence as well as the subject literature. He also took into account the specifics of the American decision-making process (President-Secretary of State) making use of the systems method. The study findings prove that at the beginning of the 20th century the USA kept far-reaching scepticism towards the disarmament issue. It preferred to focus on the achievement of important for its foreign policy objectives and to improve the tools already tested to some extent (arbitrage). However, definitely more open-minded was here Secretary of State Root than President Roosevelt.
EN
This article examines the rise of Russian public claim to Alaska in the US, challenging Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. Both cases are analyzed in light of the theoretical framework of the English school of international relations, which presupposes that the international community is governed by treaty provisions and norms of conduct, as well as principles and values shared by its members. For this reason, the main part of the article focuses on the analysis of the treaty provisions and their implementation. Based on this, it was concluded that the rhetoric towards Alaska and Svalbard adopted by the Russian government represents Russia’s departure from the norms and principles constituting the Arctic regime (the so-called exceptionalism) and the implementation in the High North of foreign policy tools which, although typical for the Kremlin in other parts of the world, have not yet been applied in the Arctic. Then, in accordance with the theoretical presumptions of the English school of international relations, it was verified whether the Russian policy in the Arctic in these cases violated the principles underlying the particularity of the region established within the framework of the Arctic international society.
EN
After the collapse of the ‘Boxer Rebellion’, Russia wanted to take an advantage of the fact that hers troops occupied Manchuria and to obtain the exclusive influence in this country. This was contrary to the Open Door policy which had been declared by the United States, Japan, Great Britain and other European Powers, including the Russian Empire, since 1899. These had made London to rethink his own policy in the Far East. British hadn’t much interests in Manchuria. However, in their point of view rise of Russian power in China would destabilize situ¬ation in the Celestial Empire and encourage other Powers to ‘curving a Chinese pie’. It would affect British interests in Qing’s State which were larger than any other Power. Russian railway businesses and her ambition in North-East China were also a danger to similar British investments. This was one of the reasons to abandon a policy of so called ‘splendid isolation’. First visible effect of this decision was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 30th, 1902. The treaty was a defensive one but clearly anti-Russian. Simultaneously Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquess of Lansdowne, raised that Russian policy was contrary to the Open Door policy. In fact Britain was concerned on defending her own interests instead of Open Door which was only a slogan for her. During February and March of 1902 London wasn’t able to develop a common policy with his ally – Japan, and also with the United States which appeal for the ‘open door’ once again (February 1st, 1902). St Petersburg took the opportunity and published with Paris the Franco-Russian Declaration of March 16th, 1902. Foreign Office was ready to deal with Russian Government, but the tenacity of the latter convinced Whitehall that Britain should act in accord with Tokyo and Washington. This made Russia to sign an agreement with China on April 8th, 1902. Between April 8th, 1902 and April 8th, 1903 British were waiting and observing the results of Russian evacuation from Manchuria. At this time they weren’t especially concerned about the situation in North-East China as far as Russians were accomplishing the terms of the agreement. They only singed a commercial treaty with the Celestial Empire of September 5th, 1902. This was changed by St Petersburg announcement about new terms of evacuation of Russian soldiers (April 8th, 1903). This time London, as well as Washington, didn’t force Russia to fulfil her treaty obligations. Only Tokyo whose interests were most endangered strongly opposed Russia’s plans. Lansdowne who was planning an agreement with France was also thinking about rapprochement with Russia. Lack of strong reaction from Washington on St Petersburg’s demands convinced Whitehall of rightness of his own policy. British abandoned the phrase of Open Door and de facto recognized Russian influences in Manchuria in the Lansdowne’s proposition of July 29th, of 1903. Russia answered with formation of the Far Eastern Viceroyalty. This had ended the first attempt of British-Russian rapprochement but didn’t stop Franco-British talks which leaded to so called Entente Cordiale of April 8th, 1904. It proves that Britain hadn’t been committed to the Open Door policy which was only an in¬strument securing her interests in Qing’s Empire. The alliance with Japan had the same task. When British politicians had realized that both instruments hadn’t brought expected results they started to search a better way to secure British interests. The only reasonable step for Whitehall, who wanted to avoid a war, was an agreement with Russia.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza relacji brytyjsKO-burskich po „rajdzie Jamesona” - od stycznia do kwietnia 1896 r. - krótkim, ale istotnym okresie działań politycznych rządu JKM i prezydenta Transwalu Paulusa Krügera. Podjęta wtedy przez każdą ze stron próba zmiany statusu stosunków wzajemnych ujawniła pogłębiającą się sprzeczność interesów.
EN
Period between January and April 1896 in Boer-British relations was more specific than other ones. Great Britain stood in face of difficult situation because of “Jameson raid". British South African Company troops had invaded formally friendly state, which had serious economic bonds with German Empire and even developed friendly relations with it. In such case Britain’s most significant issue was to calm down the situation and to stress that South Africa was still area British of influence. That’s why secretary of state for the colonies - Joseph Chamberlain, was very careful relating to Transvaal and stressed that British Empire dissociated itself from the action of BSAC, and it would help in any way. On the other hand he aggressively react on Kruger Telegram. In 17th January 1896, some of British subjects inhabitants of Witwatersrand came up an idea in which president should visit to London to explain all misunderstandings, that had gathered long before the raid. Both sides were positive to this idea, but Chamberlain wanted only to explain all difficulties between Empire and its protectorate. Kruger had other vision. He demanded an invitation and promise that Article IV of London Convention 1884 would be changed. Secretary Chamberlain sent the invitation but he could not agree at president’s conditions as far as Convention was concerned. Finally at 27th April Kruger refused visit to London and Cabinet withdrew the invitation. The discussion over Article IV did not finish after Kruger’s withdrawal from the idea of presidential visit. Transvaal came out with its new interpretation. British rightly saw, that it might threat their interests, and they even might lose their suzerainty over South African Republic. Because of that they opposed the idea. Dispute was partly solved in 1898 by settlement which gave Transvaal more freedom in its international politics. The attitude of both sides was more and more uncompromising, and the zenith of it took place at Bloemfontein Conference at 1899.
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