The aim of this paper is to consider a possibility of understanding assertability as a semantic concept. This leads to a nonstandard view of the relation and borderline between semantics and pragmatics. For the language of classical propositional logic entailment will be defined as a relation that preserves the assertability rather than truth and it will be shown that this enables us to model some linguistic phenomena in an adequate way.
The subject of this article is the traditional problem of free-will. In particular, I address the question of the compatibility of free-will and determinism. I formulate and defend a certain version of Compatibilism (the thesis that free-will is compatible with determinism), which is founded on Moore’s conditional analysis of the problem. I endeavour to elucidate this analysis by means of the modern logic of counter-factual sentences.
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