Niniejszy artykuł prezentuje wynik badania, którego głównym celem była odpowiedź na pytanie: czy zjawisko judycyzacji polityki występujące w ramach UE może być wykorzystywane także i na płaszczyźnie rodzimego systemu kreowania polityk publicznych przez podmioty niepubliczne? Przeprowadzona analiza pozwala zauważyć, iż polskie podmioty wykazują chęć do posługiwania się tym właśnie narzędziem. Nie są jednak w pełni przygotowane merytorycznie do czerpania z tego rodzaju posiadanych uprawnień. W polskich warunkach zastosowanie judycyzacji jest o tyle trudne albowiem nie ma tu, jak chociażby w krajach common law, utrwalonej praktyki sądowego kreowania prawa, ale też i – w dalszej kolejności – wykorzystywania rozstrzygnięć sądowych do wpływania na kreowanie decyzji publicznych. Nakłada się to również na wciąż niewielką wiedzę polskich podmiotów o UE i zasadach jej działania. Wyciągane i prezentowane w artykule wnioski oparte są m.in. na jakościowej ocenie wszystkich skarg składanych bezpośrednio przez polskie podmioty niepubliczne do pionu sądowego UE w latach 2004–13, a także ocenie liczby pytań prejudycjalnych kierowanych z Polski przypisanych do poszczególnych kategorii spraw.
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This article is the result of a study concerned with the question of whether the “politics judicialisation phenomenon”, present within the EU, can also be found in the Polish system of creating public policies by non-state actors. The analysis conducted allows to observe that Polish entities show interest in using this tool. However, they have insufficient substantive preparation to make full use of this kind of rights. In the Polish conditions it is difficult to put it in practice because, unlike in common law countries, Poland has no established practice of judicial law-making and, further, using court adjudications to influence public decision-making. It is also connected with the still limited knowledge of Polish entities about the EU and its procedures. The conclusions are made on the basis of, among others, a qualitative analysis of all plaints filed directly by Polish non-state actors to the EU judiciary in the years 2004-2013 and a quantitative analysis of prejudicial questions originating in Poland.
European Union is a specific political system of intergovernmental cooperation with multi level governance and complicated decision making procedures. One of the consequences of this is that the role of citizens during the policy making process is not as strong as it is in national systems. It is called ‘democratic deficit’. Treaty of Lisbon delivers some changes on that field. It creates for example citizens’ law initiative and delivers more competences to the European Parliament (via widening the co-decision procedure). However, despite that it appears that the most important factor of strengthening the social influence on the policy making process in the EU is the civil activeness and ability to self organize.
Civil society is characterized by activeness and ability to self organize. It is also capable of setting and reaching designated issues without impulses from the state authority. System of receiving of the money from structural funds, on the different levels, creates frameworks to put such attitudes to use. The key concepts here are the planning stage of sharing of the amount granted from the union budget, all taking place within social consultation [partnership rule], and the process of utilising of funds itself. It is not uncommon that projects are carried out by different kinds of foundations or social groups which are set up as a result of the rank-and-file initiative relevant for the very purpose. Analysis on the basis of experiences from the kujawsko-pomorski region confirms that conclusions.
The dispute over the division of powers and the burden of competence presumption between the European Union and its Member States has been going on practically from the very beginning of the integration process and has become an immanent part of the political system of the EU and of the decision-making process functioning within its framework. One of the most important steps to clarify this issue was the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity, which clearly indicated the mode in which institutions of the EU could exercise specific powers when shaping public policies. Another step was the inclusion of national parliaments in the process of safeguarding compliance with this principle, which was related to the ongoing debate on the reduction of the so-called “democratic deficit”, that occurs during public policy-making processes in the EU. From a purely theoretical point of view, one could conclude that the inclusion of national parliaments in the creation of public policies at such an important stage should be equivalent to offering them vast opportunities to influence the decision-making process within the framework of the political system in the EU. Moreover, after Poland’s accession to the EU, our national parliament has become a legitimate user and beneficiary of these regulations. It is thus fully justified to ask the question about the actual efficacy of the existing solutions and the possible direction in which national parliaments will evolve in the process of integration. Having this in mind, the authors of the study set themselves several fundamental research objectives. The first is to assess the extent to which the Parliament of the Republic of Poland is prepared and able to use the procedure for monitoring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The second, and equally important, research goal concerns the identification of the actual influence of national parliaments on public policy-making processes within the EU political system through the procedure for safeguarding compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. It is also the intention of the authors to identify the possible direction in which the position of national parliaments will evolve in the EU decision-making processes.
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