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EN
This paper analyses the nature of language and its role in realism-antirealism debate. The aim of the paper is (i) to present and defend the common-sense realism as a position, which enables us to offer a plausible explanation of the evolution of linguistic practice, and (ii) to present the realism-antirealism debate as a battle of an accent. The realists emphasize (a) the source of differentiation, while the antirealists accent the process of differentiation. Both of the aims are met via the conceptual analysis of the main realism-antirealism concepts such as language, differentiation, difference, reality, to constitute (construct) and by the assessment of the impact that the results of the abovementioned analysis would have on the position of common-sense realism.
EN
Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best theories/models recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This attitude has important metaphysical dimension. It is committed to the mind-independent existence of the world investigated by the sciences (Chakravartty 2013). In his papers Mathematics and Experience (2009) and Mathematics and Reality (2011) Ladislav Kvasz holds a position of instrumental realism. Kvasz claims that reality is instrumentally constituted and realism issue should be understood as a relation between two languages instead of world-language relation. Kvasz’s instrumental realism also suggests building up ontology of distinctions instead of ontology of fillings. The paper deals with Kvasz’s version of instrumental realism critically and it aims to show that Kvasz’s position is much closer to antirealism than to scientific realism because it does not meet the metaphysical dimension.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
|
vol. 66
|
issue 9
928 – 934
EN
The paper deals with free will as discussed in the recent book of Michael Frede A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. Besides a close view on the structure of Fredes’s main ideas and arguments, the paper aims to provide a critical discussion of Frede’s view of St. Augustine’s contribution to the development of the notion of free will. This would enable us to explore and re-think the historical and philosophical conditions of the rise of the notion of free will in ancient thought.
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