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Recenzja Łukasz Machaj, Wypowiedzi symboliczne w orzecznictwie Sądu Najwyższego USA, Wrocław 2011, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego (Prawnicza i Ekonomiczna Biblioteka Cyfrowa), ss. 492

100%
Małajny R. M.
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego
|
2013
|
issue 4 (16)
245-250
2
Content available remote

Rząd i sprawy zagraniczne w konstytucjonalizmie niemieckim

100%
Małajny R. M.
Przegląd Sejmowy
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2016
|
issue 1(132)
65-83
EN
The article starts with the overview of the evolution of the concept of Regierung which exists in German literature from the fi fteenth century. The author, fi rst of all, deals with historical concepts and, then, with contemporary issues. In the period of constitutional monarchy, the German scientists used the term “government” to mean the entire activity of the state. However, some authors have conceived it more narrowly, as the entire state power, but with the exception of the legislative and judicial branches. In contrast, from contemporary perspective, the government is considered as that part of the executive which makes creative decisions, applies political initiative, conducts oversight over the activities of the executive and exercises general management of the state. Subsequently, the author discusses the functions of government, the term “organizational power”, the interpretation of the term Auswärtige Gewalt and the procedure for concluding international agreements by the Federal Republic of Germany. The fi nal part of the article provides conclusions.
3
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Rozwiązanie legislatywy w systemie parlamentarnym

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Małajny R. M.
Przegląd Sejmowy
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2017
|
issue 2(139)
27–50
EN
It is noticeable that, while the parliament has a lot of constitutional checks against the government, the latter does not, at least directly, have such a weapon. It must avail itself of good will of the head of state and his willingness to cooperate. Two constitutional checks are in play: the dissolution of the legislature and the vetoing of the statute passed by it. The fi rst is considered a counterbalance to the procedure for exercising parliamentary responsibility by way of a motion of no confi dence. It has inhibiting effect on the legislature reducing their desire to apply this measure. Obviously, as a rule, its application leads to the immediate termination of the legislature’s mandate and necessitates the holding of a new election. It is, therefore, a measure to exert pressure on the parliament, used as a form of psychological blackmail. No MP will willingly resign from seat, especially in the face of an expensive, costly and cumbersome election campaign whose outcome is uncertain. In theory, the threat of dissolution of the legislature alone had to ensure a balance between it and the executive branch. Normally, use of this threat is enough to prevent the government from falling, because its parliamentary faction then closes ranks and ceases a revolt against its leadership. And when the threat does not work, it usually is put into effect. This measure is intended to be used as a means of resolving a fundamental confl ict between the supreme state authorities, the confl ict which has damaged their ability to cooperate. The examined instrument is sui generis a counterpoint to the vote of no confi dence, or a “deterrence.” Thus, it signifi cantly affects the functioning of the entire state system.
4
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Podział władzy w Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku. Analiza formalna

100%
Małajny R. M.
Przegląd Sejmowy
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2017
|
issue 6(143)
97–123
EN
The author fi rst builds the theoretical framework of the principle of division of powers, which consists of the following standards: A. Division between the legal spheres of state activity. B. Separation of the state apparatus into the corresponding organ groups (minimum two) according to the division of spheres, C. Relations between these organs are based on the principle of independence and equality. D. Individual groups of organs mutually check each other, and the use of these checks will result in both a relative balance and cooperation between them. E. Each group of organs is mostly engaged in its own legal sphere of activity and has a relatively limited ability to intervene in the activities of other groups. Then, the author compares these canons to the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997. As a result, he concludes that it is not possible to strictly separate the legislative and executive sphere of activity of the state and the complete exclusiveness of operation of an organ in its sphere. Moreover, it is not possible to perfectly balance the mutual infl uence of individual organs. The above listed canons of the division of powers thus function in the parliamentary system mainly as an ideal theoretical construction. Nevertheless, at least the essential part of them is provided.
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